Elgin Andrew Fidell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), May 03 2017, 9:19 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Megan Shipley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Elgin Fidell, May 3, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1606-CR-1389
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stanley Kroh,
Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G03-1602-CM-6494
May, Judge.
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[1] A jury found Elgin Fidell guilty of Level 5 felony battery 1 and Level 6 felony
invasion of privacy. 2 Fidell appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction of Level 5 felony battery and his sentence is
inappropriate. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Fidell and S.T. began dating in February 2015 and continued to date “on and
off for about a year.” (Tr. at 5.) Their relationship was tumultuous and Fidell
was physically violent toward S.T. On April 21, 2015, S.T. obtained a
protective order from the court under Cause Number 32D01-1504-CM-509
(“Cause 509”) that required Fidell have no contact with S.T.
[3] On August 11, 2015, under Cause Number 49G16-1508-CM-028361 (“Cause
28361”), for acts committed against S.T., the State charged Fidell with Class A
misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury 3 and Class A misdemeanor
invasion of privacy. 4 On October 27, 2015, the trial court convicted Fidell of
both crimes in Cause 28361.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(f)(4) (2014).
2
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2014).
3
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c) (2014).
4
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2014).
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[4] Fidell and S.T. broke up in February 2016. On February 15, 2016, S.T. was at
Circle Center Mall in Indianapolis with her friend Nick. While S.T. and Nick
were walking around the mall, S.T. saw Fidell. Fidell called S.T. profane
names, but S.T. ignored Fidell and walked away with Nick. S.T. and Nick then
split up and agreed to meet later at the food court. When S.T. returned to the
food court to meet Nick, she saw Fidell sitting with Nick. S.T. was “frustrated”
and began yelling at Fidell because she knew Fidell and Nick were not friends.
(Id. at 12.) Nick got up, and he and S.T. began to walk away. Fidell then
“rushed” toward S.T. (Id.) S.T. pushed Fidell away and ran away from Fidell
toward the escalators. Fidell chased after her. S.T. made it down the escalator
from the third floor to the second floor before Fidell caught up with her. Fidell
then threw S.T. onto the floor and began hitting and kicking her. Nick pulled
Fidell off S.T., and a mall security guard, Ashley Patton, who had seen these
events, approached. By the time Patton arrived, Fidell and S.T. were separated.
Patton notified the mall security office of the situation, and the security office
called the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”).
[5] Two other security officers arrived to assist Patton in escorting Fidell and S.T.
to the security office. As the group was walking to the security office, Fidell
began yelling and tried to hit S.T. in the head. The security officers and
bystanders took Fidell to the ground. This second attack occurred outside of
Victoria’s Secret, near the mall’s security office. Around this same time, IMPD
Officer Gregory Weber arrived and observed Fidell yelling as he was being
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restrained on the floor. As a result of Fidell’s attacks, S.T. sustained contusions
on her chest and forehead.
[6] On March 1, 2016, the State charged Fidell with Class B misdemeanor battery 5
and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy for Fidell’s violation of the no
contact order in Cause 509. In its charging information, the State alleged
Fidell’s prior convictions of battery and invasion of privacy in Cause 28361
could be used to elevate Fidell’s present crimes. Thus, the State also charged
Fidell with battery as a Level 5 felony and Level 6 felony invasion of privacy.
[7] The court held a bifurcated jury trial 6 on April 21, 2016. During the first part of
the trial, the jury heard testimony from S.T., Patton, and Officer Weber
regarding the incidents on February 15, 2016, at Circle Center Mall. The jury
found Fidell guilty of battery as a Class B misdemeanor and invasion of privacy
as a Class A misdemeanor. During the second part of the trial, the judge
instructed the jury on the elevated counts of Level 5 felony battery and Level 6
felony invasion of privacy. The jury heard expert testimony from Jason
Sumner, a fingerprint analysist for the IMPD. Sumner testified he administered
a fingerprint test on Fidell earlier that afternoon (“trial fingerprint”) and Fidell’s
trial fingerprint print matched Fidell’s fingerprint from the day he was arrested
5
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2014).
6
The court held a bifurcated trial so that the jury would not be told of Fidell’s prior convictions of battery and
invasion of privacy in Cause 28361 before it determined whether he committed battery and invasion of
privacy at Circle Center Mall on February 15, 2016.
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on August 11, 2015 in Cause 28361 (“Cause 28361 fingerprint”). Fidell’s Cause
28361 fingerprint and trial fingerprint were submitted into evidence as Exhibits
7 and 8, respectively. After hearing this evidence, the jury further found Fidell
guilty of Level 5 felony battery and Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. The
court accepted the jury’s verdicts and convicted Fidell of Level 5 felony battery
and Level 6 felony invasion of privacy.
[8] The court held a sentencing hearing on May 31, 2016. The court found Fidell’s
“young” age of twenty-seven years to be a mitigating factor. (Id. at 120.) The
court also found as a mitigating factor Fidell’s “early childhood and
upbringing” involving foster care, frequent moves and a father who was in
prison since Fidell was very young. (Id.) The court found as an aggravating
circumstance Fidell’s lengthy criminal history including seventeen arrests, ten
misdemeanor convictions, and two felony convictions. Additionally, the court
noted the “violent” nature of the battery as an aggravator. (Id.) For the Level 5
felony battery conviction, the court sentenced Fidell to six years, with one year
suspended to probation. The court also ordered Fidell, during probation, to
complete a mental health evaluation and domestic violence counseling. For the
Level 6 felony invasion of privacy conviction, the court sentenced Fidell to two
years and ordered the sentence be served concurrent with the six-year sentence
for battery. The court granted Fidell credit for 141 days served.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of Evidence
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[9] When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will
consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. The
decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the
credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Reversal
is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not
required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient
if an inference reasonably may be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at
147.
[10] To prove Fidell committed Level 5 felony battery, the State had to show: (1)
Fidell knowingly or intentionally touched S.T. in a rude, insolent, or angry
manner, and (2) Fidell was previously convicted of battery against S.T. See Ind.
Code § 35-42-2-1(f)(4) (2014). Fidell argues the State failed to present sufficient
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that S.T. was the victim in Fidell’s battery
conviction 7 in Case 28361. We disagree.
7
Fidell challenges only the “same victim” element required to be convicted of Level 5 felony battery under
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(f)(4) (2014). Because the “same victim” element is not present in Ind. Code § 35-46-1-
15.1 (2014), Fidell does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence pertaining to his conviction of Level 6
invasion of privacy.
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[11] The jury heard testimony from Sumner, who testified the fingerprint of the
person convicted in Cause 28361 was the same as Fidell’s trial fingerprint. The
jury also heard S.T.’s testimony that she and Fidell had been dating since
February 2015 and that she had obtained a protective order from the court
against Fidell in April 2015. The State presented the jury with the charging
information, judgment of conviction, and sentencing order in Cause 28361.
The charging information in Cause 28361 alleged Fidell “knowingly touch[ed]
[S.T.]” in a rude, insolent, or angry manner and knowingly violated the
protective order issued in Cause 509. (Ex. 6.) The jury had the opportunity to
assess the testimony and evidence before it, and the jury found the State proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Fidell committed the battery against S.T. in
Cause 28361. Fidell’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence
and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See Drane, 867
N.E.2d at 146 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility
of witnesses). Based on the record before us, we cannot say the evidence was
insufficient for the jury to find Fidell had been convicted of battery against S.T.
in Cause 28361, which supports the enhancement of his crime herein.
Inappropriate Sentence
[12] Fidell also argues his aggregate six-year sentence is inappropriate. Under
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find the sentence is inappropriate
in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Williams v.
State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Our review is deferential to
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the trial court’s decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant’s
sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more
appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied. The
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate.
Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
[13] When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting
point for determining the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 878 N.E.2d 218 (2007). The
statutory range for a Level 5 felony sentence is one to six years, with the
advisory sentence being three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2014). The
statutory range for a Level 6 felony sentence is six months to two-and-a-half
years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (2014).
One factor we consider when determining the appropriateness of a deviation
from the advisory sentence is whether there is anything more or less egregious
about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the
“typical” offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory
sentence. Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
[14] We agree with the State that the nature of the offense here was more egregious
than a typical battery. Fidell violated the protective order more than once and
physically assaulted S.T. more than once at Circle Center Mall on February 15,
2016. When Fidell saw S.T. at the mall and called her names, he did not stay
away from her as required by the no contact order. Instead, Fidell waited for
S.T. in the food court. The confrontation in the food court led to Fidell chasing
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S.T. through the mall and physically attacking her not once, but twice: first by
the escalators, and then near Victoria’s Secret. Fidell’s acts were not the
product of a momentary lapse of judgment. Rather, his acts were persistent,
cruel, and violent. Based on the violent and relentless nature of Fidell’s actions,
the trial court was warranted in sentencing Fidell to more than the advisory
three years.
[15] Regarding Fidell’s character, the trial court acknowledged Fidell’s young age
and troubled childhood as mitigating circumstances. However, the trial court
also noted Fidell’s lengthy juvenile and adult criminal history, and Fidell’s
crimes against S.T. at the mall following a long series of other violent crimes
Fidell committed against S.T. Indeed, Fidell’s inability to leave S.T. alone,
even in the presence of protective orders, reflects poorly on his character. Fidell
has failed to show that the nature of the offense and his character render his six-
year aggregate sentence inappropriate. See Stephenson v. State, 53 N.E.3d 557,
562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding enhanced sentence not inappropriate where
appellant had criminal history reflecting poorly on his character).
Conclusion
[16] The State presented sufficient evidence Fidell committed Level 5 felony battery,
and his sentence is not inappropriate based on his character or the nature of the
crime. Accordingly, we affirm.
[17] Affirmed.
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Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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