Clyde D. Lewis, III v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMO RANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Mar 30 2017, 6:03 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew J. McGovern Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Clyde D. Lewis, III, March 30, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
31A04-1605-CR-1006
v. Appeal from the Harrison Superior
Court.
The Honorable Joseph J. Claypool,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable H.L. Whitis, Senior
Judge.
Trial Court Cause No. 31D01-1512-
F5-795
Friedlander, Senior Judge
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1
[1] Clyde D. Lewis, III, appeals his conviction of battery, a Level 5 felony. We
reverse and remand for a new trial.
[2] The State alleged that Lewis battered his five-year-old stepson X.R. by striking
him repeatedly with a belt, leaving marks on his back and thighs. At the initial
hearing, Lewis stated he wanted to represent himself and signed a form waiving
his right to counsel. The trial court did not discuss the form with him. Lewis
subsequently represented himself at several pretrial hearings. At the final
pretrial hearing, the trial court on its own motion appointed counsel to advise
him, stating that counsel could answer Lewis’s questions but Lewis would
otherwise represent himself. The court described counsel’s role as “stand-by
counsel.” Tr. Vol. V., p. 4.
[3] On the day of trial, Lewis asked to be represented by counsel, telling the court,
“I’m in over my head.” Tr. Vol. VI, p. 6. The State objected to Lewis’s
request. The trial court denied Lewis’s request and directed him to proceed pro
se, with counsel available to provide advice. A jury determined Lewis was
guilty as charged, and the court imposed a sentence. At sentencing, Lewis
requested an attorney for an appeal. The court granted his request and this
appeal followed.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2014).
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[4] Lewis raises three issues, which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court erred
in determining Lewis validly waived his right to counsel; (2) whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying Lewis’s request for counsel on the day of
trial; and (3) whether the prosecutor engaged in fundamentally erroneous
misconduct during trial. We need not address Lewis’s third claim because his
first and second claims are dispositive.
[5] We start with the waiver of counsel. Lewis argues his waiver of his right to
counsel was invalid and his conviction must be reversed. The State responds
that the record establishes the trial court properly allowed Lewis to represent
himself. We agree with Lewis.
[6] The Sixth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel before he or
she may be tried, convicted and punished. Parish v. State, 989 N.E.2d 831 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013). This protection also encompasses an affirmative right for a
defendant to represent himself or herself in a criminal case. Id.
[7] When a defendant asserts the right to self-representation, the court should tell
the defendant of the “‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’”
Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)). There is no
set formula or script the court must follow in advising the defendant, but the
court must come to a “considered determination” that the defendant is making
a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Id. Specifically, the court must
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determine the defendant’s competency to represent himself or herself and
establish a record of the waiver. Bumbalough v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007). Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver
of the right to counsel. Hawkins v. State, 982 N.E.2d 997 (Ind. 2013).
[8] We review de novo a trial court’s determination that the defendant validly
waived the right to counsel. Silvers v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). An appellate court reviewing the adequacy of a waiver must consider:
(1) the extent of the trial court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision, (2) other
evidence in the record establishing whether the defendant understood the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (3) the background and
experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the decision to proceed pro
se. Parish, 989 N.E.2d 831.
[9] In this case, Lewis appeared at an initial hearing on December 23, 2015. Senior
Judge H.L. Whitis presided. The judge informed Lewis he had a right to an
attorney at no expense if he could not afford one, read the criminal charge to
Lewis, and informed Lewis of the possible penalties he was facing. Lewis told
the court he intended to represent himself, and the court responded, “You are?
Which is normally not a good idea unless you’ve got a law degree or been a
paralegal or something.” Tr. Vol. II., p. 7.
[10] Next, the court presented Lewis with a waiver of attorney form and paused the
proceedings to allow Lewis to review it. When the proceedings resumed, Lewis
told the court he had read, understood, and signed the form. Lewis noted on
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the form that he had completed school through the twelfth grade plus two years
of college. He also indicated he had no prior criminal prosecutions. The form
included the following advisements:
6. I understand that I have a right to be defended in this case by
an attorney. I have the right to employ an attorney of my own
choice to defend me. I know the judge would give me a
continuance to save my money and hire an attorney. I also
understand that if I cannot afford to hire an attorney, the Court
will provide an attorney for me in this case at no expense to me.
I further understand that I have a right to have an attorney
provided by the Court even if I am found guilty of the offense
charged.
7. I declare that no person has made any promise or suggestion
of any kind to me or to anyone else that I would receive any
favors, special treatment or any other form of leniency if I would
decide not to have an attorney defend me in this case. I declare
that this Waiver is made and signed by me freely and voluntarily.
8. I am aware of the following pitfalls, dangers, and
disadvantages of representing myself:
(a) A person untrained and uneducated and without any skill or
experience in constitutional and criminal law and the procedural
and evidentiary rules may not be able to adequately represent
himself or herself;
(b) A person untrained in and unfamiliar with the art of
persuasion, negotiation, and the plea bargaining process in
criminal cases may not be able to adequately represent himself or
herself;
(c) A person not possessing the skills of a lawyer may not be able
to accurately assess the strengths and weaknesses of the case, the
likelihood of the State succeeding at trial, or the legal validity of
the charges against them;
(d) An untrained person may lack the skill to adequately prepare
a defense;
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(e) An untrained person may lack the skill to accurately assess
actual guilt of charges filed; and
(f) A person representing himself or herself will be held to the
same standard as an attorney and will be responsible for making
objections and arguments, following procedural and evidentiary
rules, preparing his or her defense, and representing themselves
at every step in the proceedings without any assistance.
Appellant’s App. p. 13.
[11] The form provided space for Lewis to explain his reasons for representing
himself:
9. I am aware of the pitfalls, dangers, and disadvantages of
representing myself and I want to represent myself for some of
the following reasons (initial or check all that apply):
****
__√__ (c) I want to get my case over with sooner to have the
case finalized and eliminate the uncertainty and anxiety of a
pending case.
****
__√__ (f) I do not want to come back to court because I will
have to miss work.
I believe and feel that I fully understand the proceedings in this
case against me and I understand my right to be represented by
an attorney.
I DECLARE THAT I DO NOT WANT TO BE DEFENDED
BY AN ATTORNEY IN THIS CASE.
Id. at 14.
[12] The court did not discuss the form with Lewis or any other issues related to
waiver of the right to counsel. Instead, the parties and the court moved on to
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other preliminary matters. Lewis declined to post bond, asserting he would
remain in jail pending trial, contradicting his indication on the waiver form that
he did not want to miss work.
[13] Next, Judge Joseph L. Claypool presided at a pretrial hearing on February 12,
2016. Judge Claypool presided over all subsequent pretrial hearings and the
trial. At the February 12 hearing, Lewis stated he wanted to subpoena X.R. to
testify at trial. The following exchange occurred during this discussion:
THE COURT: And you’re representing yourself as counsel so
therefore, you’re required to – to – Here’s what – Here’s what
you’re required. This is what is usually read to you when you go
through these things. And Judge – Judge Whitis intimated these
things to you when we went through. Okay? That you have to
follow the rules of evidence and trial procedure. Okay. Do you
understand that?
MR. LEWIS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you know what the rules of trial
procedure are?
MR. LEWIS: Vaguely.
THE COURT: Vaguely. Okay. Well, the next thing is that you
can’t later claim that you had inadequate representation.
MR. LEWIS: I’m not.
THE COURT: Okay. And that – do you understand that the
questions might open up any sorts of things otherwise that
wouldn’t come into the trial? And you understand that attorneys
have certain skills that you don’t have?
MR. LEWIS: Yes, sir.
Tr. Vol. III, pp. 23-24.
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[14] At a February 22, 2016, pretrial conference, Lewis told Judge Claypool he was
prepared for trial and still wanted to represent himself. The court and the
parties discussed discovery issues. During the discussion, the court stated:
Sir, sir, the Court is trying to give you as much leeway as possible
since you’re representing yourself, okay. Now we went through
this several times about you’re under the same obligations as an
attorney would be if you’re asking for document [sic] and so
forth, and subpoenas or to get witnesses to come here and
everything else.
Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 9-10.
[15] Later in the hearing, the trial court again asked Lewis if he wanted to represent
himself. Lewis responded “I have no choice. I have no choice in the matter.”
Id. at 11. He also said, “I’m already this far into it. I mean, what’s the worst
that could happen?” Id. The following discussion occurred:
THE COURT: The worst that can happen to you – I’m gonna
read this to you again. A Level 5 Felony, the penalty is 1 to 6
years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine. That’s what can happen
to you. Okay? That’s a pretty stiff penalty. It’s a non – You
know, this isn’t a – this isn’t a Correct Misdemeanor where
you’re gonna spend 30 days in the Harrison County Jail. So, you
know, the deal is is [sic] that, again, the Prosecutor and the Court
here has been trying to do as much as we possibly can to make
sure that you get – You know, that you understand what
representing yourself means. Okay? That you want to represent
yourself. You have an absolute constitutional right to do so.
You know, your – your mental competency is something that
was coming up to me. I mean, do you feel like you can
understand what’s going on here?
[LEWIS]: Yes, sir.
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Id. at 12-13. The court asked Lewis if he had ever been confined to a mental
hospital or been diagnosed with a mental illness or emotional disability, and
Lewis responded in the negative. The court further asked Lewis if he wanted
the court to schedule a competency hearing, and Lewis said no.
[16] Next, during the final pretrial conference, which was held on February 24,
2016, the court stated it had contacted an attorney to serve as “stand-by
counsel” if Lewis was agreeable. Tr. Vol. V, p. 4. The court asked Mr. Lewis,
“You’re still representing yourself; do you understand that?” Id. at 5. Lewis
indicated that he understood.
[17] We must now consider the factors set forth in Parish v. State in the context of
this record. First, as to the extent of the trial court’s inquiry into the
defendant’s decision, neither of the judges talked with Lewis about his request
to waive representation by counsel. At the preliminary hearing, Lewis merely
signed a form, with no further discussion. At the next hearing, Judge Claypool
indicated that certain advisements should have been read to Lewis, but no such
reading occurred. Although a waiver form may eliminate the need for the trial
court to question the defendant at length, caselaw requires some investigation
into a defendant’s motivation for waiving counsel. See Castel v. State, 876
N.E.2d 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing conviction of defendant who
represented herself at trial where the trial court made no inquiries into
defendant’s decision to proceed pro se). At subsequent pretrial hearings, the
court indicated it would allow Lewis to proceed pro se but did not inquire into
the circumstances of his decision, other than questioning him about his mental
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state. Most troublingly, neither of the judges explicitly determined that Lewis
had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
[18] Second, we consider whether there was other evidence in the record
establishing whether Lewis understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. At the initial hearing, Lewis signed a form that contained
several detailed advisements about proceeding pro se. The form also indicated
Lewis was aware of the dangers of self-representation and understood the
proceedings, but no attempt was made to follow up on those general
statements. Lewis was told at several pretrial hearings that he would be held to
the same standard as an attorney, who may have skills that he did not possess.
[19] The third factor is the background and experience of the defendant. During the
initial hearing, Lewis wrote on the form that he was a high school graduate
who took some college classes, but he had no prior encounters with the justice
system. At a later pretrial hearing, Lewis conceded he was only “vaguely”
familiar with the rules of procedure. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 23-24. Further, during the
February 22, 2016 pretrial conference, the trial court on its own initiative asked
Lewis about his mental health in detail, asking several times whether he had
ever been confined because he was a danger to himself or others.
[20] Finally, we look at the context of the decision to proceed pro se. If a
defendant’s decision to proceed without counsel appears tactical, then this
factor weighs in favor of finding a knowing and intelligent waiver. Drake v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). At the initial hearing, Lewis
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indicated on the form that he wanted to represent himself because he wanted to
get the case “over with” and did not want to miss work. Appellant’s App. p.
14. Intending to resolve the case as quickly as possible and return to normal life
could be viewed as a logical consideration, but during the same hearing, Lewis
undercut his own reasoning by refusing to pay a bond and choosing to remain
incarcerated for the duration of the case. In addition, during the February 26,
2016 hearing, when asked if he wanted to continue to represent himself, Lewis
said, “I have no choice. I have no choice in the matter.” Tr. Vol. IV, p. 11.
The trial court questioned Lewis about his mental state and mental health
history shortly after that statement. These facts indicate that Lewis’s decision
to proceed pro se may not have been tactical.
[21] Weighing these factors as applied to the facts, we conclude Lewis’s waiver of
counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The written advisements
of the dangers of proceeding pro se and the trial court’s reminders that Lewis
would be held to the same standard as an attorney are outweighed by the
court’s lack of an inquiry into Lewis’s decision, Lewis’s utter lack of experience
in trial matters, and the context of his decision to proceed pro se. See Parish,
989 N.E.2d 831 (waiver of right to counsel was invalid considering the facts and
circumstances, including a failure by the court to inquire into defendant’s
decision to proceed pro se).
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[22] In the alternative, we also conclude the trial court erred in denying Lewis’s
2
request for counsel on the day of trial. The decision of whether to allow a
defendant to reassert a right of counsel during trial is left to the discretion of the
trial court, and we reverse only for abuse of discretion. Koehler v. State, 499
N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 1986). Relevant factors to consider include:
(1) defendant’s prior history in the substitution of counsel and in
the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-
representation; (2) the reasons set forth for the request; (3) the
length and stage of the trial proceedings; (4) disruption or delay
which reasonably might be expected to ensue from the granting
of such motion; and (5) the likelihood of defendant’s
effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to
continue to act as his own attorney.
Id. at 199 (quoting People v. Elliott, 70 Cal. App. 3d 984, 993-94, 139 Cal. Rptr.
205, 211 (1977)).
[23] In this case, on the day of trial Lewis asked to be represented by counsel. The
court denied Lewis’s request for counsel, noting the jury pool had been
assembled, X.R.’s mother indicated she may be moving out of the county and
“may not be able to appear at a later date,” and Lewis had been given prior
opportunities to request representation by counsel. Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 16-17.
[24] Turning to the factors noted in Kohler, Lewis did not have a history of
substituting counsel or vacillating between representing himself or being
2
The State claims Lewis’s request for counsel was ambiguous or was, in substance, a request for
inappropriate hybrid representation. Based on our review of the record, we conclude Lewis unambiguously
asked to be represented by counsel on the day of trial.
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represented by counsel. He instead represented himself from the initial hearing
until the day of trial, at which point, upon being finally confronted with the
difficulties he faced, he requested counsel.
[25] Lewis’s reason for requesting counsel - that he was not capable of adequately
defending himself because he did not understand court procedures - appears to
be legitimate. See Kohler, 499 N.E.2d 196 (inability to understand habitual
offender proceedings was legitimate reason for requesting counsel during trial).
Lewis told the court, “I’m in over my head” and “It’s not a good idea for me [to
represent myself.]” Tr. Vol. VI, p. 6. The trial had not yet begun, although the
jury pool had been assembled.
[26] As for disruption and delay, the prosecutor and the trial court told Lewis that
the attorney that the court had arranged to advise Lewis could not represent
him at trial that day because she was not one of the county’s public defenders.
Instead, a different attorney would have to be appointed to represent him.
Thus, granting Lewis’s request for counsel would have resulted in delay, but
two counterpoints are clear from the record. First, it appears the trial court did
not tell Lewis until the day of trial that his attorney was not a true standby
counsel; that is, she would not be able to represent him at trial if needed. It is
unclear why the trial court did not ask one of the public defenders to serve as
standby counsel, who could, in theory, have proceeded on the day of trial.
Second, Lewis informed the court that if it was necessary to appoint a different
attorney, he would waive his right to a speedy trial and agree to delay the trial.
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[27] The final factor discussed in Kohler is the likelihood of the defendant’s
effectiveness at trial if required to continue to represent himself. The record
reflects that when Lewis made his request for counsel, he demonstrated an utter
lack of knowledge of procedural rules. Although he had previously asked for
information on subpoenaing witnesses, he did not understand that he would
have to seek evidence from third parties such as the Department of Child
Services and X.R.’s doctors on his own. Further, when the trial court moved
up the trial date to preserve Lewis’s right to a speedy trial, Lewis appeared not
to understand that the trial would be held within the speedy trial period and
indicated he might file a motion to dismiss. He conceded he was “vaguely”
familiar with the rules of trial procedure. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 23-24. It was clear
that he would have had difficulty presenting an effective defense at trial.
[28] Based on these factors, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Lewis’s
request for counsel on the day of trial. See Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063,
1067-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (trial court abused discretion in summarily
denying defendant’s request for standby counsel to take over during trial;
defendant had done a poor job representing himself and standby counsel “may”
have been ready to step in), trans. denied.
[29] For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand for a new trial.
[30] Judgment reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., concurs in result without opinion.
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Kirsch, J., concurs.
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