Rebecca A. Camplin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 07 2018, 10:05 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Benjamin Loheide Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Law Office of Benjamin Loheide Attorney General of Indiana
Columbus, Indiana
Evan M. Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Rebecca A. Camplin, December 7, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1260
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable James D. Worton,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
03D01-1703-F6-1553
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 1 of 5
[1] Rebecca A. Camplin appeals the trial court’s order that revoked her probation
and ordered her to serve all of her suspended sentence. Finding no abuse of
discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 23, 2017, Camplin pled guilty to Level 6 felony possession of a
narcotic. 1 Pursuant to her plea agreement, the court imposed a two-year
sentence and placed Camplin on probation for two years. As conditions of
probation, the court ordered Camplin to, among other things, undergo a
substance abuse evaluation and follow any treatment recommendations. After
the sentencing hearing, the court released Camplin and she went to the
probation office, where she scheduled an orientation appointment for
November 30, 2017.
[3] Camplin did not appear for her scheduled appointment. Probation officer
Shalah Noblitt attempted to reschedule Camplin’s orientation appointment for
December and January by sending letters to the address that Camplin had
provided to the probation office. Camplin did not respond to either of those
letters, and she did not contact the probation office to reschedule. Because she
had not been to her orientation, her substance abuse evaluation was not
scheduled.
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 2 of 5
[4] On January 9, 2018, the State filed a petition to revoke Camplin’s probation
because she had failed to report to orientation on November 30, 2017, on
December 14, 2017, and on January 4, 2018. The court set the petition for a
hearing on February 16, 2018. Camplin failed to appear for that hearing, so the
court issued a warrant for her arrest. Police arrested Camplin on March 8,
2018. On April 9, 2018, the State filed an amended petition to revoke probation
that alleged Camplin had failed to appear, had failed to obtain the substance
abuse evaluation, had failed to pay court costs and probation fees within 180
days as ordered, and had committed a new criminal offense in Jennings
County.
[5] The court held a hearing on the amended petition on May 10, 2018. Camplin
admitted all the violations except the commission of the new criminal offense.
The probation office recommended the court order Camplin to serve the
remainder of her sentence incarcerated. The court revoked all of Camplin’s
suspended time and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentence in jail.
Discussion and Decision
[6] “Probation is a favor granted by the State, not a right to which a criminal
defendant is entitled.” Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied. Revocation of that favor is a two-step process: first, the
court must determine whether a probationer violated a condition of probation;
second, the court must decide whether that violation justifies revocation of
probation. Id. If a probationer admits violating probation, “the court can
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 3 of 5
proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation
warrants revocation.” Id.[7] When we review the revocation of probation, we look only at the evidence
favorable to the trial court’s judgment, and we may not reweigh the evidence or
assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 954-55. We may reverse the trial
court’s determination only if the probationer demonstrates the court abused its
discretion. Id. at 956. An abuse of discretion occurred if the trial court’s
decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances that
were before the court.
[8] Here, Camplin admitted three violations of probation: failure to appear for her
probation orientation, failure to undergo the substance abuse evaluation, and
failure to pay costs and fees. Thus, we turn to whether the violations justified
revocation of her probation. See id. at 955 (court found violation based on
admissions and parties presented evidence as to proper sanction).
[9] Camplin testified that when she was released following her sentence, she found
out that she was homeless and had no car or phone. She claimed she had no
way to get to the probation orientation because she had no car and no friends to
drive her there. She also testified that the monthly disability check she receives
is not enough money for her to rent a place to live. Although Camplin claimed
she tried to contact the probation department after she missed her November
appointment, the probation department has no record that she called to
reschedule her orientation or to report her location or status. As Camplin
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 4 of 5
provided no testimony to suggest the situation would be any different if the
court kept her on probation, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s decision to revoke Camplin’s probation and order her to serve the
remainder of her sentence incarcerated. 2 See id. at 957 (affirming revocation of
remainder of suspended sentence).
Conclusion
[10] Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked the
remainder of Camplin’s two-year suspended sentence, we affirm.
[11] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.
2
Camplin argues “the court skipped straight to the most severe sanction, when any number of intermediate
sanctions would have been far more reasonable.” (Br. of Appellant at 9.) However, while the statute
controlling dispositions of juvenile delinquents requires the court to place an offender in “the least restrictive
(most family like) and most appropriate setting available,” Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6, the statute controlling
probation revocations includes no such restriction. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (containing no restriction on
the court’s authority if probationer violates condition of probation prior to termination of probation).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 5 of 5