Stephanie Harris v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Apr 26 2017, 5:44 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Susan D. Rayl Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Smith Rayl Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Stephanie Harris, April 26, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1608-CR-1797
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable Marc T. Rothenberg,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable Amy J. Barbar,
Magistrate.
Cause No. 49G02-1507-F5-25547
Friedlander, Senior Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 1 of 19
1
[1] Stephanie Harris appeals her conviction of burglary as a Level 5 felony. We
affirm.
[2] Harris presents three issues for our review, which we restate as two:
1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony at
trial.
2. Whether the State erred by filing criminal charges in this
action.
[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment follow. On May 28, 2015, Officer
Williams-Ervin was dispatched to a residence. When he arrived, he
encountered Jeannette Shaw and a mortgage inspector. Shaw explained to the
officer that her mother, Floreatha McKoy, owned the house and that McKoy
had given Shaw power of attorney. Shaw was attempting to gain entry to the
house so the inspector could prepare his report, but she believed someone was
inside the residence.
[4] She and Officer Williams-Ervin knocked on the door of the residence, and a
young man answered and stated the house belonged to his mother, Harris.
Officer Williams-Ervin and Shaw then talked to Harris and explained that
Shaw’s mother owned the house. Harris, in turn, told them that she had leased
the house from Floreatha McKoy. Shaw stated that neither she nor her mother
had leased the house to anyone, and Officer Williams-Ervin suggested to Harris
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 2 of 19
that she might have been a victim of fraud. Harris became angry and accused
Shaw of being the person who leased the residence to her, although moments
earlier she had inquired as to Shaw’s identity.
[5] Although Harris eventually produced a lease and a receipt for payment of
$5,000, she was unable to provide contact information for the person from
whom she leased the house. After an investigation, officers informed a
belligerent Harris on June 12, 2015 that she had to move out of the house. On
July 8, officers informed Harris once again that she had to move. Harris
became very angry and indicated that she was not leaving. Officers returned
the next day, and Harris stated they were harassing her and could not make her
leave. Finally, on July 20, 2015, when Harris had still not vacated the house,
the police turned the case over to the prosecutor’s office.
2
[6] Harris was charged with burglary, a Level 5 felony; theft, a Level 6 felony; and
3
forgery, a Level 6 felony. At trial, the State proceeded on the theory that
Harris had engaged in a home takeover scheme in order to inhabit the house. A
jury found her guilty of burglary and theft. The trial court merged the theft
conviction into the burglary conviction and sentenced Harris to five years,
consisting of two years executed followed by one year of home detention and
2
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (2014).
3
Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2 (2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 3 of 19
two years suspended to probation. It is from this conviction that she now
appeals.
[7] Harris first contends that the trial court erred in its admission of certain
testimony at trial. Particularly, she argues that the trial court admitted
irrelevant and prejudicial testimony and that the court improperly admitted
opinion testimony concerning guilt or innocence and legal conclusions.
[8] The trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Cherry v. State, 57 N.E.3d 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016),
trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Paul v. State,
971 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[9] We first address Harris’ challenge to the testimony of Sergeant Walters
regarding the two types of home takeover schemes and the investigation
procedure for these types of cases. Harris claims that Sergeant Walters’
testimony is irrelevant and highly prejudicial and, therefore, should not have
been admitted.
[10] At trial, Sergeant Walters testified:
A home takeover because in Marion County in the last two and a
half years, we have experienced a – an epidemic of basic
individuals that have properties either for sale or, uh, that they’re
vacant, going through foreclosure, uh, or just basically an
abandoned house. We have individuals that are taking those
houses – who have taken possession of those properties, and they
basically just assume the property without going through any
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 4 of 19
kind of legal documents, any kind of contractual interests or
anything like that. So, we have labeled those because there’s
such an epidemic of it, we’ve labeled them home takeovers, and
because we have so many of them, our unit has been assigned
specifically to deal with that because they usually deal with
fraudulent documents, forgery, thefts, so on and so forth. So our
unit is specifically in charge of dealing with all of the home
takeovers.
Tr. pp. 55-56.
[11] The prosecuting attorney then asked Sergeant Walters to explain “the typical
investigation into one of the home takeover cases.” Id. at 56. Defense counsel
objected on the basis that the information was speculative, irrelevant, and
prejudicial. The State responded that the information was relevant because the
allegations in the case involve a home takeover investigation, and Sergeant
Walters would testify to how that type of investigation is handled. The
objection was overruled, and Sergeant Walters continued, stating that there are
two types of home takeover schemes.
[12] Defense counsel again objected:
Defense: Judge, he’s not testifying to how he investigates.
He’s testifying about the schemes. This is totally meant to be
prejudicial. If he wants to talk about what he did in this
particular case, that’s relevant. Other cases are not relevant to
this case.
Court: State?
State: Judge, the detective is going to testify to how he
typically handles the investigations. This case originally fell
under two different types of investigations. He needs to explain
what he normally does. That is incredibly relevant to the case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 5 of 19
Defense: That’s not what he was getting ready to testify to.
Court: Well, I can’t say exactly what he was getting ready
to testify to, but it sounds like he’s talking about different types of
ways this can occur, and what his investigation would consist of.
Is that . . .
State: Yes.
Court: That’s what it sounds like to me. So I’m gonna
overrule the objection.
Id. at 57-58.
[13] Sergeant Walters then proceeded with his explanation of the ways home
takeovers occur and the process of the investigation into these types of cases:
Walters: Okay. Just to help the defense attorney, a
procedural notice was established by our unit, which was –
because we assign all these cases. We work all these cases. So a
procedural notice for the uniform officers who respond to the
home takeovers, we establish that actual criteria, and within that
procedural notice is how an investigation is supposed to occur
from the responding officers to the detectives when they arrive on
the scene the day after to complete the investigation. So what we
have – in this situation we have two different scenarios. We have
scenario one, where we have a victim that is either – finds
somebody on Craigslist, eBay, phone, ad; whatever it may be.
They portray them self [sic] to be a leasor [sic] or an agent of that
actual real estate. They set up an arrangement to meet with the
soon to be victim. They get the keys to them. They show them
the house. They take the deposit and off they go, and they’re
never heard of again. A management group or a person, the
realtor, the homeowner, somebody shows up at the house. At
that point, he goes hey, somebody’s in my house and they
shouldn’t be here. They call the police. At that point, the
procedural notice is for the responding officers to talk to the
individual who actually calls the police, which is you the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 6 of 19
homeowner, or property management person. Get the facts from
them. At that point, they go talk to the individual inside the
residence. They establish from them a, do you have any
paperwork, documentation, contact information; so on and so
forth. They collect that information. They contact a detective.
A detective will either respond to the scene and complete the
investigation from there, or we will get the paperwork the next
day and go out and investigate that. That’s one type of
procedural notice that we follow with a house where you have a
victim that was getting a property based on Craigslist or so on
and so forth.
State: So in that particular case, there’s two victims then?
We have –
Walters: Exactly.
State: – we have the primary victim who is the
homeowner?
Walters: Who’s the homeowner, and the secondary victim
who has been at that point given money out for a property that
they had no contractual interest in.
State: Okay. And then what is the other type of scheme
that you see?
Walters: The other scam that we have at this point within
Marion County is basically it’s a house going through
foreclosure. It is a vacant house. It is a house for sale where
people basically just come over and they assume the property,
basically.
[Preliminary Questions by Defense Counsel]
Walters: Okay, so the second one basically, individuals – big
houses abandoned so on and so forth. Uh, there are several ways
to look at a house to see if it’s going through foreclosure; a bank,
Fizbo [sic], real estate, Assessor’s Office. You can see the
different properties that are listed in Marion County that are
going through foreclosure. Individuals basically come in, they
pop a lock or somehow they get inside the residence. They
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 7 of 19
change the locks to the door. At that point, they basically
assume the property and they move in with all their stuff, and
they take possession of the house. That is fine until a property
management group or a homeowner comes by and says hey,
who’s is my house? At that point there’s where we have to
explain, okay, what has happened here? Who owns the house?
And then we have to go through an investigation as to true
ownership of the house, and then find out if they have any
documentation. So we have to verify, validate all the
documentation they provide to us, and then we basically
complete our investigation working with initially as two victims
because we were gonna give the benefit of the doubt to the first –
the person in the house until we disprove whether or not they
had a legal right to go through there or if their story is not
legitimate, and also we always work for the primary victim which
is the homeowner. So that’s kind of how we go with the two.
One, is the secondary victim where they get something off
Craigslist. The second one is they just basically take over the
house, which is the tame [sic] – the term home takeover.
State: And so you essentially start with assuming everyone
is a victim –
Walters: Correct.
State: – who’s involved?
Walters: Correct.
State: Whether it be the person in the home or the
homeowner?
Walters: Yes.
State: And then you work backwards until you . . .
Defense: Objection, Judge. Leading.
State: It’s a . . .
Court: Overruled.
State: And you essentially work backwards until you can
determine exactly what happened?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 8 of 19
Walters: That’s correct.
State: And is that why you have a procedure in place that
directs district officers and those who respond to the scene?
Walters: Yes, because we have so many of these we had to be
like – we – our unit, we only have twelve or thirteen people. We
couldn’t respond to all the amount of runs that we’re getting so
we created a procedural notice for that purpose for the
responding officers to be able to collect that data for us, get the
information, then we come back and verify it through the
Assessor’s Office; find out if the actual land – or the homeowner
is the true homeowner by the documents in the Assessor’s Office
so on so forth. So that’s how we begin our investigation.
State: Okay. Now with regards to, um, these home
takeovers, is it – is it typical to see that a home could be fully
decorated?
Walters: Absolutely.
State: Okay. And why is that?
Walters: Basically when you take over a home, if it has been
vacant for a while or there’s nobody – most property
management groups are supposed to check a house weekly.
They don’t do that. So a lot of a [sic] neighborhoods have houses
that are vacant that you basically, if you assume a house whether
it be you’re being scammed out or you take the house over
yourself, you’re going to keep the upkeep of it to bring no
attention to you because you’re now just a homeowner or a
renter or leaser [sic] or so on and so forth. So you’re not trying to
bring any kind of negative attention your way. You keep the
house and the upkeep just like you normally would if you’re a
legal homeowner.
Id. at 58-63.
[14] In challenging this testimony on appeal, Harris asserts that it is course-of-
investigation evidence that should not have been admitted. Course-of-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 9 of 19
investigation evidence is introduced to explain why police officers or
investigators proceeded in a particular manner. Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d
1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Sampson v. State, 38
N.E.3d 985 (Ind. 2015). This type of evidence may be irrelevant and generally
consists of hearsay statements in the form of complaints and reports made to
the police, upon which officers then take steps to investigate. Id.[15] We first note that Harris did not object to Sergeant Walters’ testimony at trial
on the basis that it is improper course-of-investigation testimony. Any grounds
for objections not raised at trial are not available on appeal, and a party may
not add to or change her grounds in the reviewing court. Treadway v. State, 924
N.E.2d 621 (Ind. 2010). Further, unlike course-of-investigation testimony,
Sergeant Walters’ testimony did not consist of hearsay statements. Rather,
Sergeant Walters was present in court and testified regarding his knowledge
about the criminal activity police have labeled “home takeover” and discussed
the special procedures that were developed to handle these types of cases.
Therefore, we address Harris’ trial objection of relevancy and prejudice as to
this evidence.
[16] Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make a fact, that is of
consequence in determining the action, more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Additionally, although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Evid. R. 403. The standard
set forth in Rule 401 is a liberal one, and the trial court’s ruling on relevance is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 10 of 19
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Patton v. State, 725 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000). Further, trial courts are given wide latitude in weighing probative
value against prejudicial effect, and that decision is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion as well. Id.[17] Sergeant Walters’ testimony was relevant to explain the complex criminal
scheme involved in this case. He explained the nature of the scheme, the ways
in which takeovers occur, and the different parties that can be involved. He
also described the procedures that his department has developed because it is so
prevalent and police resources are limited. All of this information aided the
jury in understanding what was most likely an unfamiliar topic and was helpful
as the jury sorted through the facts of this case. This is especially true given that
both types of home takeovers are addressed in this case. The State proceeded
with its case on the theory that Harris was providing fraudulent rental
documents in order to take over the home, as Walters described in the second
type of takeover. On the other hand, Harris claimed that she was a victim also,
as Walters described in the first type of takeover.
[18] In addition, the probative value of Sergeant Walters’ challenged testimony was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. It provided
background information of the general nature of the offense and the procedures
for any ensuing investigation without relating the information to Harris or this
specific case. Moreover, his testimony set up the framework for Harris to claim
that she was a victim to a scammer who posted the listing on Craigslist and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 11 of 19
posed as McKoy to rent her the house. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting this testimony.
[19] Harris also alleges error with the trial court’s admission of the testimony of
Officer Williams-Ervin and additional testimony of Sergeant Walters.
Although Harris filed, and the trial court granted, a pretrial motion in limine
regarding testimony of opinions of guilt or innocence or legal conclusions,
Harris failed to lodge any objections when this testimony was presented at trial.
Thus, Harris’ claim of error is waived. See Peaver v. State, 937 N.E.2d 896 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010) (failure to object at trial to admission of evidence results in
waiver of error, notwithstanding prior motion in limine), trans. denied.
[20] To avoid waiver, Harris claims that admission of the testimony constitutes
fundamental error. The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and
applies only when the error amounts to a blatant violation of basic principles,
the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the
defendant fundamental due process. Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010), trans. denied. This doctrine is available only in egregious
circumstances. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 2010).
[21] Harris argues that the testimony amounts to evidence of legal conclusions and
opinions on her guilt or innocence prohibited by Evidence Rule 704(b). The
Rule provides:
Witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or
innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations;
whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 12 of 19
Evid. R. 704(b).
[22] First, Harris claims that Officer Williams-Ervin’s testimony was a prohibited
opinion of her guilt. On redirect examination, Officer Williams-Ervin was
asked his assessment of the case given that the non-homeowners in these types
of cases can either be victims of fraud or squatters. He responded, “Um, after –
based on my, my experience with the two, um, that this person was squatting in
the residence based on their behavior given, given the fact that we tried to
explain what, what – they were possibly a victim here, and that she didn’t – she
didn’t act, um, in the way that I have seen victims act. She was more angry
than remorseful or sad, and that she had been the victim.” Tr. pp. 26-27.
[23] In making this argument, Harris overlooks the fact that defense counsel
addressed the topic of Harris as a victim of fraud during cross-examination of
Officer Williams-Ervin. Defense counsel questioned the officer as follows:
Defense: Right? Um, she produced a lease?
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: You have no knowledge of who prepared that
lease?
Williams-Ervin: No.
Defense: You, you can’t say that Ms. Harris prepared
that lease?
Williams-Ervin: I cannot.
Defense: All you know is that Ms. Harris produced the
lease?
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: On the day that you came there requesting it?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 13 of 19
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: And she produced a receipt?
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: And she became upset when she – when she
advised that she had paid a large sum of
money to stay at that residence?
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
******
Defense: You testified earlier that this type of situation
happens often, or you’ve encountered it
often?
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: Where individuals are rented properties only
later to be found out that the transaction was
fraudulent?
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: So this is not uncommon?
Williams-Ervin: No.
Defense: And the person who actually rents the
property, are they victims of the crime
themselves?
Williams-Ervin: The person that pays the money?
Defense: Yes, sir.
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: So they’re a victim?
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: Not a criminal?
Williams-Ervin: Absolutely.
Defense: They, they – would you say that they were
taken advantage of?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 14 of 19
Williams-Ervin: Yes.
Defense: Would you say that they were naïve?
Williams-Ervin: I – yes.
Defense: They’re not normally prosecuted?
Williams-Ervin: No.
Id. at 22-23. The State then elicited the challenged testimony on redirect
examination in response to defense counsel’s line of questioning concerning
Harris’ status as a victim.
[24] Even if the testimony in question was an impermissible opinion of Harris’ guilt,
the State was merely rebutting the defense’s suggestion that Harris was also a
victim in this case who should not have been charged criminally. See Robey v.
State, 7 N.E.3d 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (State is entitled to respond to
allegations and inferences raised by defense even if response would be
otherwise objectionable), trans. denied. Moreover, the jury found Harris not
guilty of forgery, thus suggesting its belief that Harris was a victim of a
fraudulent lease. Accordingly, we conclude these circumstances do not
establish fundamental error.
[25] Harris further contends that the testimony of both Officer Williams-Ervin and
Sergeant Walters amounted to prohibited legal conclusions that she did not
have a contractual interest in the property and that she had exercised
unauthorized control over the property. In support of her argument, she cites
Officer Williams-Ervin’s testimony that “the defense wasn’t able to demonstrate
to us that [Harris] had contractual interest in the property.” Tr. p. 16. Officer
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 15 of 19
Williams-Ervin made this statement on direct examination in response to the
question, “After you called the detectives, what did you do next?” Id. The
officer then responded: “After I called the detectives, I explained to them that I
believed that I had probable cause to make an arrest at this residence for
trespassing, um, given the fact that the defense wasn’t able to demonstrate to us
that she had contractual interest in the property.” Id. Taken in context, it is
evident that this statement was an explanation of the officer’s actions at that
point in the investigation rather than an impermissible legal conclusion. We
find no error.
[26] Harris also cites numerous sections of Sergeant Walters’ testimony; however,
much of this testimony was elicited by Harris, thereby constituting invited error.
The invited error doctrine forbids a party to take advantage of an error that she
commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or
misconduct. Nichols v. State, 55 N.E.3d 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
Further, invited error is not fundamental error. Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126(Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[27] First, Harris alleges that Sergeant Walters’ reference to the lease as a
“fraudulent document” was improper. Tr. p. 87. There, Walters was being
cross-examined, and it was defense counsel, not Walters, who used the term
“fraudulent document” in his question to Walters. As such, this statement can
only constitute invited error.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 16 of 19
[28] Later during cross-examination, Sergeant Walters was asked how these cases
proceed and if this was a typical case. In responding, he stated, “we explained
to Ms. Harris because this document is a fraudulent document, she’s not
afforded the same civil liberties to go to small claims court because it’s – she’s
there illegally.” Id. at 94. Walters also testified that he told Harris she did not
“have any legal remedy to be in here; [she didn’t] have civil remedies afforded
to [her] that everybody else who enters into a legal document.” Id. at 99. In
these instances, Sergeant Walters was not testifying to a legal conclusion;
rather, he was simply stating what he had said to Harris during the investigation
of this case. Regardless, this testimony represents invited error because it was
elicited by Harris’ counsel on cross-examination.
[29] In addition, Walters testified that Harris was “entering without authorization.”
Id. at 90. This statement, too, was obtained by defense counsel on cross-
examination, as were Sergeant Walters’ statements that the police had
“disproved the lease factor” and that he “instructed the Judge [of small claims
court] on behalf of the City and on behalf of Jeannette Shaw to explain to Ms.
Harris she has no civil remedies or legal binding contractual interest to be in
that property, and she needs to vacate.” Id. at 96, 95. Sergeant Walters also
responded to a question on cross-examination that Harris’ lawsuits “keep
getting dismissed because she’s not afforded the civil remedies that he and I are
if we enter into a legal binding contract.” Id. at 100. All of this testimony
constitutes invited error and thus does not establish fundamental error. See Cole,
28 N.E.3d 1126.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 17 of 19
[30] In yet another instance, Harris contends that Sergeant Walters testified, in
violation of Rule 704(b), that she had “no legal right to that residence.” Tr. p.
80. These words, however, were not Sergeant Walters’ words. Instead, they
were the words of the prosecuting attorney in posing a question to Walters.
Thus, we find no error.
[31] Finally, Walters testified that Harris had “no legal binding interest in the
property” and “no legal interest in this house.” Id. at 81, 82. In both of these
instances, Sergeant Walters was not testifying to a legal conclusion; rather, he
was telling the jury what he had said to Harris during the investigation of this
case. We find no error. Moreover, Harris has failed to establish fundamental
error caused by the admission of any of this testimony.
[32] We turn now to Harris’ second issue. She asserts that the preferred remedy in
this case is a civil eviction action rather than criminal charges.
[33] Whether to prosecute and what charges to bring are decisions that generally rest
in the discretion of the prosecutor. Grott v. State, 30 N.E.3d 777 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015). Thus, whether a burglary prosecution is the wrong tool for the job in
this case is not our decision to make. Rather, our job is to apply the Indiana
criminal statutes as drafted by our Legislature. See An-Hung Yao v. State, 975
N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. 2012) (discussing defendants’ argument that case should be
resolved under civil trademark infringement law instead of criminal law). As
we have done that which we are bound to do, there is no question for us to
address on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 18 of 19
[34] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[35] Judgment affirmed.
Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1797 | April 26, 2017 Page 19 of 19