James Woodrow Morrison v. State of Indiana , 118 N.E.3d 61 ( 2019 )

FILED
Jan 24 2019, 8:48 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Troy D. Warner Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James Woodrow Morrison, January 24, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1073
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Elizabeth C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Hurley, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D08-1702-F3-11
Shepard, Senior Judge.
[1] James Morrison claims his convictions of both resisting law enforcement while
operating a vehicle in a manner that causes death and operating a vehicle with a
controlled substance in the body causing serious bodily injury violate his right
against double jeopardy. Concluding that his rights were not violated, we
affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1073 | January 24, 2019 Page 1 of 5
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In February 2017, a police officer observed a vehicle he believed was recently
stolen. After using the plate number to confirm this belief, the officer attempted
to stop the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle, who was later identified as
Morrison, accelerated and refused to stop for the officer. Morrison disregarded
a red traffic light and collided with a pick-up truck, killing its driver. Morrison’s
three passengers were also severely injured. The collision involved four other
vehicles that were struck by either the stolen vehicle, the pick-up truck, or
debris. Morrison admitted to medical personnel that he had used heroin earlier
in the day, which was later confirmed by a blood test.
[3] Morrison was charged with Count I resisting law enforcement while operating a
1
vehicle in a manner that causes death, a Level 3 felony; Count II operating a
vehicle with a controlled substance in the blood causing death, a Level 4
2
felony; and Counts III-V operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the
3
body causing serious bodily injury, all as Level 6 felonies. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, he pleaded guilty to all the charges. The plea agreement also
reserved Morrison’s “right to appeal his sentence regarding double jeopardy
issues that may be directly related to issues raised by” this Court’s decision in
1
Ind. Code §§ 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), (b)(3) (2016).
2
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(b)(2) (2016).
3
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4(a)(2) (2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1073 | January 24, 2019 Page 2 of 5
Edmonds v. State, 86 N.E.3d 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. granted. Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2, p. 37.
[4] Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, sentencing was left to the court’s discretion.
The court entered judgment on all counts but did so on the lesser-included
offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor for
Count II. The court sentenced Morrison to sixteen years on Count I and twelve
months on Count II, to be served concurrently, and to thirty months each on
Counts III-V, to be served consecutively to each other as well as consecutively
to Counts I and II. The total is thus twenty-three and one-half years.
Issue
[5] Morrison presents one issue: whether his convictions violate double jeopardy.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Morrison contends that, in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Edmonds v.
State, 100 N.E.3d 258 (Ind. 2018), his convictions of (1) resisting law
enforcement while operating a vehicle in a manner that causes death, and (2)
operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the body causing serious
4
bodily injury constitute a statutory double jeopardy violation.
4
Morrison’s plea agreement reserved his right to appeal his sentence based upon this Court’s decision in
Edmonds, 86 N.E.3d 414. However, following Morrison’s plea but prior to the filing of his appellate brief, our
Supreme Court granted transfer in Edmonds and issued a decision in June 2018. Accordingly, on appeal
Morrison bases his argument on the decision of our Supreme Court.
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[7] In Edmonds, the defendant’s convictions included one count of felony resisting
law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing death and two counts of felony
resisting law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing serious bodily injury.
The Supreme Court held that Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1, which makes
resisting law enforcement unlawful, authorizes only one felony conviction
where a single act of resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle causes
both death and serious bodily injury, regardless of how many people are
harmed. Id. at 262-63.
[8] Here, Morrison was convicted of only one offense under the resisting statute—
resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle in a manner that causes
death. His convictions for causing serious bodily injury while operating a
vehicle arise from the operating while intoxicated statute. See Appellant’s App.
Vol. 2, pp. 146-47; see also Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4(a)(2). In Edmonds, the Supreme
Court plainly stated that its decision was specific to and rested only on the
statutory grounds of the resisting statute. While a perpetrator who races away
from police after a multiple victim collision commits only one “resisting,” a
perpetrator whose driving injures multiple victims commits multiple offenses
under the operating statutes.
[9] Morrison’s convictions do not create a statutory double jeopardy violation.
[10] In his brief to this Court, Morrison also includes a constitutional double jeopardy
analysis. Assuming, arguendo, that his plea agreement permits a constitutional
double jeopardy challenge, we conclude there is none. Morrison’s convictions
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1073 | January 24, 2019 Page 4 of 5
for resisting law enforcement and operating a vehicle causing serious bodily
injury involve separate victims. The driver of the pick-up truck is the victim of
Morrison’s resisting conviction, and Morrison’s three passengers are the
victims, individually, of his three convictions of operating a vehicle causing
serious bodily injury. See Rawson v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(stating that our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where convictions
arise from situation where separate victims are involved, no double jeopardy
violation exists), trans. denied.
Conclusion
[11] We conclude Morrison’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy.
[12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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