Anthony Larkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 26 2019, 9:06 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frederick Vaiana F. Aaron Negangard
Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin Chief Deputy Attorney General
& Webb
Indianapolis, Indiana Lauren A. Jacobsen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Anthony Larkins, June 26, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2820
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marc T.
Appellee-Plaintiff Rothenberg, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G02-1708-F1-30662
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Anthony Larkins appeals his thirty-one-year aggregate sentence for level 1
felony attempted murder and class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without
being licensed. Larkins asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing
to find his mental illness as a significant mitigating circumstance. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 7, 2017, Andrew Black hosted a barbecue at his Indianapolis
apartment and invited his recent acquaintance, Teddy Dunbar, Jr., to attend.
Shortly thereafter, MacReynolds, Javon Lewis, and Larkins arrived at Black’s
apartment. Dunbar had known MacReynolds and Larkins for years. While at
the barbecue, a group including Larkins, Dunbar, MacReynolds, and Lewis
“[j]ust hung out. Just talked.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 36. MacReynolds, Lewis, and
Larkins all carried semiautomatic pistols, but no one at the barbecue could
recall any issues between any of the men. There were no arguments or physical
altercations. After about an hour, the trio left the barbecue.
[3] Larkins called Dunbar about fifteen minutes after departing the barbecue,
wanting to know where Dunbar was and if he could buy marijuana from him.
Dunbar told him that he was sitting in his truck outside Black’s apartment.
Larkins returned alone and parked his vehicle next to Dunbar’s truck, now
occupied by Dunbar and Black. He walked around the back of Dunbar’s truck
to the open driver’s side window. Larkins began to say, “[H]ey man[,]” when
he abruptly fired multiple shots into Dunbar at point-blank range. Id. at 64.
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Dunbar suffered nine gunshot wounds from five shots to his neck, chest, and
abdomen. Black was startled by the gunshots and took off running. Larkins ran
back to his car and drove away. Dunbar survived the attack. Police arrived at
Black’s apartment along with medics, who took Dunbar to the hospital.
[4] The State charged Larkins with level 1 felony attempted murder, level 5 felony
battery with a deadly weapon, and class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun
without being licensed. The trial court granted Larkins’s request to appoint two
medical professionals to evaluate him for competency to stand trial and for a
potential insanity defense. Drs. Don Olive and George Parker evaluated
Larkins; both found that while he did have certain mental health issues, he was
competent to stand trial and was not affected by any mental illness during the
commission of the crimes.1 A jury convicted Larkins as charged, and the trial
court vacated the level 5 felony conviction.
[5] At sentencing, Larkins argued that his mental illness should be a mitigating
factor. The trial court found Larkins’s criminal history and the nature and
circumstance of the crimes as aggravators. The trial court stated that the
aggravators “slightly outweigh[ed]” the lone mitigator—hardship on Larkins’s
1
Dr. Olive reported diagnostic impressions of unspecified schizophrenia and other psychotic disorder,
cannabis use disorder, and features of antisocial personality disorder, while Dr. Parker reported that Larkins
meets the criteria for diagnoses of borderline intellectual functioning and unspecified psychosis. Ultimately,
Dr. Olive concluded that Larkins understood what he was doing and was in control of his actions at the time
of the offense. Dr. Parker opined that Larkins did not suffer from a mental disease during the commission of
the crime.
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dependents. Tr. Vol. 3 at 82. A level 1 felony carries a sentence of
imprisonment for a term between twenty and forty years, with the advisory
sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b). A class A misdemeanor
carries a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Ind.
Code § 35-50-3-2. The trial court sentenced Larkins to thirty years on the level 1
felony and one year on the class A misdemeanor, to be served consecutively, all
executed. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Larkins contends that the trial court erred by not considering his mental illness
as a mitigating factor. “Generally speaking, sentencing decisions are left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court’s decision only
for an abuse of this discretion.” Singh v. State, 40 N.E.3d 981, 987 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015), trans. denied (2016).2 An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom. Anglemeyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g,
875 N.E.2d 218.
2
Citing Cox v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), Larkins asserts that failure to give “[d]ocumented
mental illness” mitigating weight is prima facie error. Appellant’s Br. at 9. We disagree. The court in Cox
employed the prima facie error standard because the State had failed to respond to the defendant’s argument
regarding his mental illness; which is akin to failing to file a brief. Here, the State has responded to Larkins’s
argument regarding his mental illness. As such, we apply the abuse of discretion standard of review.
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[7] “[W]hile a sentencing court must consider all evidence of mitigating
circumstances presented by a defendant, the finding of mitigating circumstances
rests within the sound discretion of the court.” Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d
293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied (2004). One way a trial court may
abuse its discretion is by failing to consider or identify mitigating factors that are
significant and clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration
during sentencing. Anglemeyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91, 493. A trial court is not
obligated to find a circumstance as mitigating simply because it has been
advanced by the defendant. Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000).
Furthermore, a trial court is not required to consider alleged mitigating
circumstances that are highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance.
Newsome, 797 N.E.2d at 301. A trial court does not have to explain why it has
found a factor does not exist. Anglemeyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.
[8] Our supreme court has outlined factors to consider when assessing the effect of
a defendant’s mental illness on sentencing: (1) the extent of the defendant’s
inability to control his behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall
limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the
extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of
the crime. Weeks v. State, 697 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998). We cannot say that
Larkins has established that his mental illnesses—as described above—were
longstanding, or that they affected his abilities to function and to control his
behavior. Likewise, Larkins has failed to establish a nexus between the
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commission of his crimes and his impairments. We conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its sentencing discretion.
[9] Even if the trial court had abused its discretion by omitting mental illness as a
mitigating factor, there would be no need to remand for resentencing. The trial
court gave Larkins the advisory sentence of thirty years despite finding that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigator. Put differently, the trial
court gave Larkins a sentence that does not reflect the aggravated nature of his
offenses. Therefore, we affirm.
[10] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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