Devin M. Reith v. State of Indiana (mem.dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                           FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                     Mar 11 2019, 8:47 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                     CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                         and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    John M. Haecker                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Auburn, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Ian McLean
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Devin M. Reith,                                          March 11, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-2440
    v.                                               Appeal from the DeKalb Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Monte L. Brown,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    17D02-1702-F5-14
    Tavitas, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019                     Page 1 of 13
    Case Summary
    [1]   Devin M. Reith appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and the
    imposition of his previously-suspended sentence. We affirm.
    Issues
    [2]   Reith raises a single issue on appeal, which we restate as follows:
    I.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
    revoked Reith’s probation.
    II.      Whether the trial court erred when it imposed Reith’s
    previously-suspended sentence.
    Facts
    [3]   On February 22, 2017, Reith struck Evan Rehl in the head with a shovel and
    caused Rehl to suffer a deep laceration on the left side of his head. The incident
    occurred in DeKalb County. On February 22, 2017, the State charged Reith
    with battery, a Level 5 felony. On July 31, 2017, Reith pleaded guilty to one
    count of battery, a Level 5 felony. The plea agreement provided the following
    “additional, specific” terms: “As a term of probation, [Reith] must get
    counseling and apply for Recovery Works.” 1 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 31.
    1
    According to the Family and Social Services Administration’s website:
    Recovery Works focuses on pre-incarceration diversion services and post-incarceration
    re-entry services, which not only hopes to divert low-level offenders from incarceration to
    community services, but to reduce recidivism by 20%, as well. Promoting recovery
    through community support and treatment/intervention is critical in reducing the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019                       Page 2 of 13
    [4]   At Reith’s guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked defense counsel, “[J]ust so
    I’m clear, what counseling is contemplated as a possibility?” Defense counsel
    responded, “[P]robation will probably look into that Judge, but, they, they may
    contemplate, um, an anger management class and/or, um, some substance
    abuse stuff. You know, that’s, that’s how we always end up in these sort of
    situations.” Tr. Vol. II p. 12. The trial court then asked Reith, “[Do] you
    understand that [ ]?” Id. Reith responded, “Yes.” Id. The trial court accepted
    the plea agreement.
    [5]   At Reith’s sentencing hearing on August 28, 2017, counsel for the State argued
    that the attack on Rehl was “somewhat fueled if not largely fueled by a
    substance abuse issue[.]” Id. at 20. Defense counsel stated,
    . . . [Reith]’s had some subst-some substance abuse, uh, issues.
    Um, and substance abuse played a big part in what was going on
    this evening . . . . I think . . . the State may have hit the nail right
    on the head in that, uh, . . . it’s time to get a handle of things, it’s
    time to deal with the substance abuse, and [Reith] has his first
    child, uh, coming due in November and, uh, maybe that will also
    be, uh, a motivation for some maturity, um, into take, uh, this
    substance abuse, uh, counseling, maybe some, some of the other
    counseling as recommended seriously.
    number of persons with mental health and addiction disorders that are entering our
    criminal justice system.
    https://www.in.gov/fssa/dmha/2940.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019               Page 3 of 13
    Id. at 21. The trial court sentenced Reith to five years in the Department of
    Correction, ordered 248 days to be executed in the Department of Correction,
    and suspended four years and 117 days to probation. The court gave Reith 186
    actual days of accrued credit time and deemed the executed portion of Reith’s
    sentence already served at sentencing. In releasing Reith to probation, the trial
    court stated: “. . .[T]here are formal rules of probation, it will include Recovery
    Works, that sort of thing. Um, Devin, again, I, I just can’t stress enough the
    importance of towing [sic] the line. You’re at the end of the line. Okay?” Id. at
    25.
    [6]   The Rules of Probation entered as to Reith included the following: “You shall
    not possess, use, sell, distribute, or have in your control any controlled
    substances or synthetic drugs without a prescription”; and “[y]ou shall undergo
    an assessment for possible program placement, if assessment is deemed
    necessary by the staff with the DeKalb County Courts. You shall satisfactorily
    complete any program indicated by [the] assessment.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II
    pp. 95-96. Reith signed the written rules of probation that outlined the
    conditions of his probation on August 28, 2017. The rules of probation stated,
    in part: “You shall undergo assessment for possible program placement, if
    assessment is deemed necessary . . . .[y]ou shall satisfactorily complete any
    program indicated by assessment.” Id. at 96.
    [7]   On September 5, 2017, the trial court entered its order and judgment for felony
    sentencing, which included the following provisions:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 4 of 13
    *****
    8. For the conviction of the criminal offense of Battery, a Level 5
    Felony, the Court sentences [Reith] to 5 years of incarceration at
    the Indiana Department of Correction[ ] or the DeKalb County
    Jail 248 days to be served as an executed sentence followed by 4
    years and 117 days of suspended sentence upon his compliance
    with the Rules, Terms and Conditions of Probation, to be
    supervised by the DeKalb County Probation Department.
    *****
    11. Written Rules of Probation have been reviewed with [Reith]
    in open Court, he has signed them promising that he will obey
    them, he has been given a copy of' them, and he is Ordered to
    comply with them. Said Rules are incorporated herein and made
    a part of this Order by reference thereto. Said Rules, which
    include a requirement that [Reith] successfully complete the
    Recovery Works Program, are incorporated herein and made a
    part of this Order by reference thereto.
    Id. at 100-01. Reith subsequently underwent an assessment, which yielded
    recommendations that Reith should complete anger management classes and a
    substance abuse program administered by the Northeastern Center.
    [8]   On April 25, 2018, Reith tested positive for amphetamine and
    methamphetamine. On May 24, 2018, the State filed a petition to revoke
    Reith’s probation due to the failed drug tests and his failure to participate in the
    Northeastern Center’s substance abuse program.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 5 of 13
    [9]   The trial court conducted a hearing on the petition to revoke Reith’s probation
    on September 10, 2018. Johanna Scott of the DeKalb Probation Department
    testified that, as part of his probation, Reith “was ordered to complete an Anger
    Management Program and then follow through with Northeastern Center”; and
    that, although Reith completed the anger management program, he failed to
    complete substance abuse counseling with the Northeastern Center. Tr. Vol. II
    p. 40. Under direct examination of probation officer Scott, the following
    exchange occurred:
    Q. Uh, Ms. Scott, as part of his probation, was [Reith] ordered to
    complete the program at the Northeastern Center?
    A. Yes, he was ordered to complete an Anger Management
    Program and then follow through with Northeastern Center.
    Q. All right. Did he complete the rest of program [sic] that you
    required?
    A. No sir.
    Q. All right. And did he go to some of those classes?
    A. Yeah, actually he, so according to the reports from
    Northeastern Center, he completed, he was scheduled to
    complete four (4) anger management groups and then he
    attended all four (4) of those. He was also scheduled to complete
    twenty five (25) substance abuse groups in which he attended
    eleven (11), no-showed on eight (8), and cancelled six (6).
    Q. All right. And-
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 6 of 13
    THE COURT: Which program was that?
    THE WITNESS: That’s for the substance abuse group, through
    the Northeastern Center.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    Q. And um, what is, what is, when was the last time he was
    actually participating in that program? Can you tell from the
    report?
    A. The, as far as I can see, the reports state that he has not
    returned to services since his last group on January 3rd, 2018.
    He did contact his counselor on April 25th and discussed that he
    would return to group on May 2nd and he has not done that.
    Q. All right. Um, so as far as you can tell, the last contact, actual
    appointment he went to, the group that he was supposed to was
    January?
    A. That’s correct.
    Q. Okay. And he said he was gonna (sic) restart in May and he
    just didn’t do it?
    A. That’s correct.
    Q. Since then, do you know if he’s had any contact with
    Northeastern Center?
    A. Um, according to these reports, no.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 7 of 13
    Id. at 40-41. Scott also testified that Reith was not a good candidate to continue
    on probation.
    [10]   In closing remarks to the trial court, defense counsel acknowledged that Reith
    “did not successfully complete all of the Northeastern Center [substance abuse
    counseling], but he did complete a substantial portion of that and wants to
    continue that.” Id. at 51. Reith also addressed the trial court and stated: “I’m
    willing to go through with, with the Northeastern Center, uh, complete the rest
    of my, my classes that I need to attend.” Id. At the close of the evidence, the
    trial court stated:
    Um, Devin, while . . . I say this at every probation violation
    hearing. While I don’t specifically remember telling you thing
    [sic], it’s part of my mantra, it’s part of what I say, it’s part of
    what I do at every sentencing hearing. Um, before you sign
    those rules of probation, read them over, make certain you
    understand them and then if you have any questions, don’t sign
    them until you’ve got those questions answered either by the
    probation officer or by your lawyer. And the reason I say that is
    because, as I continue on to tell people, um, those are rules that
    you must abide by and if you fail to do that, there is a price to
    pay and I don’t want you to have to pay that price, that’s why I
    want you to read ‘em (sic) and understand ‘em (sic) because as I
    say, I’m going to hold your feet to the fire and that’s what I’m
    going to do. Probation Department is, uh, unwilling to, um,
    work with you any further. They think they’ve gone as far as
    they can do considering your willingness and your, um,
    commitment to the use and, um, clearly you have violated, uh,
    the two (2) allegations made in the Petition in that, uh, you failed
    to fully participate in the NEC programs and you failed, um, a
    chemical test by testing positive for amphetamine and
    methamphetamine[.]
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 8 of 13
    Id. at 54. The trial court then revoked Reith’s probation and ordered him to
    serve the balance of his previously-suspended sentence. Reith now appeals.
    Analysis
    [11]   Reith argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his
    suspended sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his previously-
    suspended sentence. Probation serves as an “alternative[ ] to commitment to
    the Department of Correction[,]” and is “[granted] at the sole discretion of the
    trial court.” Cox v. State, 
    706 N.E.2d 547
    , 549 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied. “Once a
    trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than
    incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to
    proceed.” Prewitt v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188 (Ind. 2007).
    [12]   A trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation
    if the conditions are violated. Id.; see also 
    Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3
    (a). Violation of
    a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. Gosha v. State,
    
    873 N.E.2d 660
    , 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Upon determining that a
    probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder
    execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial
    sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).
    [13]   When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a probation
    revocation, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment
    without reweighing the evidence or judging witnesses’ credibility. Figures v.
    State, 
    920 N.E.2d 267
    , 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A probation revocation
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 9 of 13
    hearing is civil in nature, and the State’s burden is to prove the alleged
    violations by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id.
     “If there is substantial
    evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a
    defendant has violated any terms of probation, we will affirm its decision to
    revoke probation.” 
    Id.
     Our Supreme Court has held that “a trial court’s
    sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of
    discretion standard.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. An abuse of discretion occurs
    where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances before the court. Id.
    [14]   Reith was found to have violated his probation by failing to comply with the
    rules of probation by satisfactorily completing substance abuse counseling with
    the Northeastern Center. 2 Reith does not appeal the revocation based upon his
    use of amphetamine and methamphetamine. Revocation based on one
    violation is sufficient. See Gosha, 
    873 N.E.2d at 663
    . Nevertheless, we will
    address Reith’s argument regarding the trial court’s other basis for revoking his
    probation.
    [15]   Reith contends that “[o]ther than the anger management program which Reith
    was ordered to complete and did complete, it is not clear which additional
    program he was ordered to complete.” Appellant’s Br. p. 7. We cannot agree.
    2
    The State did not allege that Reith failed to meet his Recovery Works obligation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019          Page 10 of 13
    [16]   When the trial court places a person on probation, the court must specify on the
    record the conditions of the probation and give the person a written statement
    specifying his conditions of probation. I.C. §§ 35-38-2-1; -2.3. “Thus, the law
    generally requires that if a person is placed on probation, the trial court must
    provide the defendant a written statement containing the terms and conditions
    of probation at the sentencing hearing.” Gil v. State, 
    988 N.E.2d 1231
    , 1234
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). However, we have previously held that the trial court’s
    failure to provide written probation terms may be harmless error if the
    defendant has been orally advised of the conditions and acknowledges that he
    understands them. 
    Id.
    [17]   We initially note that, during the trial court’s hearing on the State’s petition to
    revoke Reith’s probation, Reith did not assert that the trial court failed to advise
    him of an explicit condition of probation. It is well settled that a party may not
    present an argument or issue to an appellate court unless the party raised the
    same argument or issue before the trial court. See Craig v. State, 
    883 N.E.2d 218
    , 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Therefore, Reith has waived his claim.
    [18]   Waiver notwithstanding, Reith’s claim fails on the merits. Reith’s signed plea
    agreement provided, “[ ]As a term of probation, [Reith] must get counseling . . .
    .” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 31. The trial court also advised Reith that, as a
    term of his probation, he was required to undergo an assessment for services
    and satisfactorily complete any programs that were recommended as a result of
    the assessment. See Gil, 988 N.E.2d at 1234. Additionally, Reith signed written
    rules of probation, which stated: “You shall undergo assessment for possible
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 11 of 13
    program placement, if assessment is deemed necessary . . . .[y]ou shall
    satisfactorily complete any program indicated by [the] assessment.”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 96.
    [19]   Probation officer Scott testified that Reith was referred for anger management
    as well as substance abuse programming. Although Reith completed anger
    management classes, he failed to complete substance abuse treatment through
    the Northeastern Center and also tested positive for methamphetamine and
    amphetamine. The State, thus, proved two probation violations. See Gosha,
    
    873 N.E.2d at 663
     (holding that proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit
    a trial court to revoke probation). The trial court properly revoked Reith’s
    probation.
    [20]   As for the trial court’s imposition of Reith’s previously-imposed sentence, it is
    well-settled that, upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition
    of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence
    that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3); see
    Knecht v. State, 
    85 N.E.3d 829
    , 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the trial court
    did not abuse its discretion in ordering probationer to serve his previously-
    suspended sentence after the trial court revoked the probationer’s probation).
    [21]   In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s revocation of Reith’s probation and
    imposition of Reith’s previously-suspended sentence is not clearly against the
    logic and effect of the circumstances before the court.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 12 of 13
    Conclusion
    [22]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Reith’s probation
    and imposed his previously-suspended sentence. We affirm.
    [23]   Affirmed.
    [24]   Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2440 | March 11, 2019   Page 13 of 13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-2440

Filed Date: 3/11/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/11/2019