In the Matter of: S.M. (Minor Child), and D.M. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                            FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                   May 04 2017, 9:02 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                 and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Justin L. Froedge                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Goebel Law Office                                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Crawfordsville, Indiana                                  Abigail R. Recker
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of:                                        May 4, 2017
    S.M. (Minor Child),                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    54A01-1612-JC-2795
    And
    Appeal from the Montgomery
    D.M. (Father),                                           Circuit Court
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    The Honorable Harry A. Siamas,
    Judge
    v.                                               Trial Court Cause No.
    54C01-1606-JC-190
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017     Page 1 of 13
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Respondent, D.M. (Father), appeals the trial court’s Order
    adjudicating his minor child, S.M. (Child), as a Child in Need of Services
    (CHINS). 1
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUES
    [3]   Father presents us with two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
    (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain exhibits
    pertaining to Father’s oral drug screens; and
    (2) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
    determination of the Child as a CHINS.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   S.D. (Mother) and Father are the biological parents of S.M., born on February
    16, 2016. Since the birth of S.M., the parents had been residing together in
    Crawfordsville, Indiana. On June 13, 2016, the Indiana Department of Child
    Services (DCS) received a report regarding the Child, alleging that both parents
    were abusing substances while caring for S.M. and that Father was recently
    1
    Mother is not participating in this appeal. However, facts pertaining to Mother are included where
    necessary for our decision.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017             Page 2 of 13
    released from jail where he had been incarcerated on a probation violation due
    to a failed drug screen for methamphetamine.
    [5]   Upon receiving the report, J.T. Chadd, Family Case Manager with DCS (FCM
    Chadd), made multiple attempts to contact the family. Eventually, on June 20,
    2016, Father contacted FCM Chadd. That same day, FCM Chadd made an
    announced visit to the residence to meet the parents and observe the Child.
    Both parents denied the drug use and agreed to submit to oral drug screens, as
    administered by FCM Chadd in their residence. Father confirmed that he was
    recently released from jail, but denied the use of illegal substances. He
    informed FCM Chadd that he had recently taken a drug screen for his
    employer, which had tested negative.
    [6]   Father’s oral drug screen, administered on June 20, 2016, returned positive for
    morphine. On June 23, 2016, FCM Chadd and Father met at the family home
    where Father continued to deny any drug use. In fact, Father alleged that
    “someone he used to be friends with may have slipped something in his drink
    because they were mad at him.” (Transcript p. 37). That same day, Father
    agreed to take another oral drug screen, which returned positive for
    hydrocodone, a medication for which Father presented a prescription.
    [7]   On June 27, 2016, FCM Chadd met again with Father and Mother at the DCS
    office to address the positive drug screen and to develop a plan for the safety of
    the Child. Because Father reiterated that someone must have spiked his drink,
    DCS restricted Father’s access to the home and the Child. Father agreed to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 3 of 13
    remove himself from the home, so the Child could remain in the residence with
    Mother. The following day, on June 28, 2016, the DCS filed its verified
    petition alleging Child to be a CHINS due to the substance abuse of Child’s
    parents. On June 29, 2016, the trial court ordered the Child’s continued
    placement with Mother, while Father was ordered to remain outside the home.
    [8]   On July 7, 2016, an oral drug screen was administered to Father at the DCS
    office, which returned positive for amphetamine and hydrocodone. Father
    provided a valid prescription for hydrocodone. David Fissell, Family Case
    Manager with DCS (FCM Fissell), inherited the case from FCM Chadd on July
    28, 2016. FCM Fissell recommended Father to participate at substance abuse
    intake at Wabash Valley and the treatment plan associated with that, as well as
    parenting classes, home based case management, and supervised visits. Father
    “vehemently denied” needing parenting classes. (Tr. p. 67). However, Father
    agreed to do the substance abuse intake and do the visits. Father completed the
    intake at Wabash Valley, and it was recommended that he participate in the
    intensive outpatient program and relapse prevention. An oral drug screen
    conducted on July 28, 2016, by FCM Fissell returned positive for
    amphetamine.
    [9]   A drug screen performed on August 8, 2016, returned negative for drugs. At
    the time, Father also expressed that in his opinion the recommendation for a
    substance abuse program at Wabash Valley was “nonsense.” (Tr. p. 68). Two
    days later, on August 10, 2016, FCM Fissell conducted a home visit with
    Mother. During the visit, Mother informed FCM Fissell that Father abuses
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 4 of 13
    illegal substances. She advised FCM Fissell that “the morphine came from him
    working on a truck in Indy and he was paid in heroin.” (Tr. p. 70). She also
    admitted that Father’s positive screens for amphetamine came from using her
    prescription drugs.
    [10]   On August 19, 2016, Father returned for another oral drug screen. Father was
    agitated because he believed FCM Chadd was tampering with his drug screens
    and he wanted someone else to administer the tests. Father “believed that
    [FCM Chadd] was actually on drugs and was tampering with his drug screen by
    spitting in the drug screen himself because [FCM Chadd] is on drugs which was
    making his drug screens test positive.” (Tr. p. 56). Father “brought in some
    glue with him which was actually some kind of like rubber cement or some kind
    of glue that he was requesting that he glue the label onto the drug screen with
    that glue[.]” (Tr. p. 56). The drug screen returned positive for hydrocodone,
    for which Father could not provide a prescription. Although Father initially
    participated in supervised visitations with the Child, there had been one or two
    cancellations and he had ceased all visits since September 21, 2016.
    [11]   On October 19, 2016, the trial court conducted a fact finding hearing where
    Mother entered an admission to DCS’s allegations. On November 10, the trial
    court entered its Order, concluding Child to be a CHINS. The trial court
    found, in pertinent part, that
    Father has used controlled substances including
    methamphetamine, since the baby’s birth. The child needs sober
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 5 of 13
    caregivers or he is at risk. Parents will not participate in services
    without the coercive intervention of the court.
    (Appellant’s Rec. Appendix, p. 13).
    [12]   Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Admission of Evidence
    [13]   First, Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
    the results of his oral drug screen over his objection as these drug screens were
    not administered in accordance with the protocol for such screens. The
    admission of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and is
    reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. In re Involuntary Termination of
    Parent Child Relationship of A.H., 
    832 N.E.2d 563
    , 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). An
    abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the
    logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. 
    Id.
    [14]   When an exhibit is offered for an evidentiary purpose, the exhibit must be
    separately authenticated pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 901. The Rule
    provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a
    condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support
    a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Absolute
    proof of authenticity is not required. In re Paternity of B.B., 
    1 N.E.3d 151
    , 156
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). When evidence establishes a reasonable probability that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 6 of 13
    an item is what it is claimed to be, the item is admissible. 
    Id.
     Ind. Evid. R.
    901(b) provides “[b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
    following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
    requirements of this rule” and includes “(9) Evidence About a Process or
    System.”
    [15]   During the evidentiary hearing, Bridget Lemberg (Lemberg), lab director at
    Forensic Fluids Laboratories, testified to the process used when administering
    oral drug screens. She explained:
    A test kit consists of a piece of paper called the chain of custody,
    a clear plastic specimen bag that’s tamper proof when it’s sealed
    and a collection device that’s sealed. The donor is instructed to []
    open the collection device. The donor is instructed to put the
    cotton pad in their mouth. First there’s a ten minute observation
    period to make sure there isn’t anything in the donor’s mouth.
    The donor is instructed to place the cotton pad in their mouth to
    saturate the cotton pad, it has a plastic handle. Then to take it
    out after it is saturated by the handle, place it in a tube of buffer
    which keeps it stable for twenty-three days, place the lid on it and
    then place [sic] there’s evidence sealing tape that’s on the
    paperwork or the chain of custody that has a spot for the donor
    name and the date and it as a specimen ID on it. That sealed
    sample tube then goes into the clear plastic specimen bag, the
    paperwork or the chain of custody that the caseworker and the
    donor have signed and dated also goes into the clear plastic
    specimen bag then goes into a UPS bag that gets sealed and
    delivered to the laboratory the next day.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 7 of 13
    (Transcript p. 15). When DCS offered exhibits two, three, four, five, and six,
    containing Father’s drug screen results, into evidence, Father objected based on
    a lack of foundation to authenticate the exhibits.
    [16]   With respect to exhibits two, three, and four, containing Father’s drug screens
    collected on June 20, June 23, and July 7, 2016, by FCM Chadd, Father
    asserted that FCM Chadd had not abided by the ten-minute observation period
    necessary to ensure the donor’s mouth is empty. During his testimony, FCM
    Chadd stated that prior to administering the oral drug screen, he had observed
    Father “for twenty to thirty minutes[.]” (Tr. p. 33). Accordingly, as the
    procedure was established for exhibits two, three, and four, the trial court
    properly admitted these exhibits over Father’s objection.
    [17]   Next, DCS offered exhibit six, which contained Father’s drug screen collected
    on August 19, 2016, by DCS Supervisor Harmony Jenson (Supervisor Jenson).
    Father objected, again claiming that the ten-minute observation period had not
    been followed. Supervisor Jenson testified that when people show up at the
    DCS office for a drug screen, “you just tell the folks to sit there in the waiting
    room . . . like ten or fifteen minutes” to make sure that they do not have
    anything in their mouth. (Tr. pp. 52-53). Supervisor Jenson clarified that they
    are observed by the clerk working the front desk that “they’re not going in and
    out of our bathroom[.]” (Tr. p. 53). She added that there was no concern that
    Father had tainted his sample by having something in his mouth. After hearing
    the testimony, the trial court found that the procedure was substantially
    followed and admitted the exhibit. We agree.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 8 of 13
    [18]   Lastly, with respect to exhibit five, Father’s July 28, 2016 drug screen
    administered by FCM Fissell, Father objected and argued that FCM Fissell had
    tainted the sample by handling “the vial or the tube in which the swab is
    inserted and taken out[.]” (Tr. p. 64). During the hearing, FCM Fissell
    explained that “[s]ometimes I do I do open the vial, it twists off. Sometimes
    when they have the swab in the mouth and they say they’re done you know
    trying to do that one handed can be difficult so I will hold the bottom of the vial
    and twist the top off. I do not touch the inside of the vial or anything.” (Tr. p.
    63). After hearing this testimony, the trial court admitted exhibit five. We
    agree with the trial court’s decision. Because FCM Fissell complied
    substantially with the procedure and merely twisted the top of the vial without
    touching the inside, he did not contaminate the sample. Accordingly, all
    contested exhibits were properly authenticated and admitted.
    II. CHINS Determination
    A. Standard of Review
    [19]   DCS bears the burden of proving that a child is a CHINS by a preponderance of
    the evidence. In re K.B., 
    24 N.E.3d 997
    , 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In
    reviewing a CHINS determination, our court does not reweigh evidence or
    assess witness credibility. 
    Id.
     We consider only the evidence in favor of the
    trial court’s judgment, along with any reasonable inferences derived therefrom.
    
    Id.
     Further “a CHINS adjudication may not be based solely on conditions that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 9 of 13
    no longer exist. The trial court should also consider the parents’ situation at the
    time the case is heard.” In re R.S., 
    987 N.E.2d 155
    , 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    [20]   When a trial court, as here, enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon
    pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we may not set aside the findings or
    judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. In re K.B., 24 N.E.3d at 1001. In
    our review, we first consider whether the evidence supports the factual findings
    and whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly
    erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either
    directly or by inference.” Id. at 1002. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it
    relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id. We give due regard to the trial court’s
    ability to assess the credibility of the witnesses. T.R. 52(A). While we defer
    substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so for conclusions of law. In re
    K.B., 24 N.E.3d at 1002.
    B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [21]   The purpose of the CHINS adjudication is to “protect the children, not punish
    parents.” In re A.I., 
    825 N.E.2d 798
    , 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
    When it is in the child’s best interest, the State may exert its parens patriae power
    and intervene to safeguard the child’s welfare. In re K.B., 24 N.E.2d at 1002.
    However, trial courts must balance the child’s needs against the due process
    rights of the parents. Id. To support a CHINS adjudication, the CHINS statute
    provides that DCS must establish that, before the child becomes eighteen years
    of age:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 10 of 13
    (1) The child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
    or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
    neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply
    the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
    education, or supervision; and
    (2) The child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
    (A)The child is not receiving; and
    (B) Is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
    coercive intervention of the court
    
    Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1
    . “That final element guards against unwarranted State
    interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents
    lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter
    difficulty in meeting a child’s needs.’” In re S.D., 
    2 N.E.3d 1283
    , 1287 (Ind.
    2014).
    [22]   Father now challenges the sufficiency of the DCS’s evidence supporting the
    conclusion that the Child is a CHINS. In essence, Father asserts that “[o]verall,
    the screens that the DCS has amassed do not show an abuse of substances by
    the Appellant, as they alleged in their petition, and therefore, do not meet their
    burden of proof in this case.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). He likens his situation to
    B.N. v. Marion Cnty., Dept. of Child Servs., 
    969 N.E.2d 1021
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),
    where we reversed the trial court’s CHINS determination. We deemed it
    important that although the mother had been charged with possession of
    oxycodone and marijuana, the mother presented DCS with current
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 11 of 13
    prescriptions for oxycodone and Xanax. 
    Id. at 1023
    . She voluntarily submitted
    to drug screens, which all tested negative, and she voluntarily participated in
    home-based services. 
    Id.
     The mother was employed and had taken care of an
    abusive situation. 
    Id. at 1024
    . Accordingly, as the mother had been proactive
    in remedying her situation and participating with DCS, we concluded that there
    was no evidence to support the trial court’s determination. 
    Id. at 1026
    .
    [23]   We find B.N. to be inapposite to the case at hand. Unlike in B.N., Father’s drug
    screens were not all negative. In fact, Father had four positive drug screens for
    which he was unable to provide valid prescriptions. Although Father initially
    seemed receptive to participating in services, after an initial intake assessment at
    Wabash Valley, he changed his mind, determining the substance abuse
    determination to be “nonsense.” (Tr. p. 68). He also “vehemently denied”
    needing parenting classes and refused to participate. (Tr. p. 67). Even though
    Father initially participated in supervised visitations with Child, he had not
    visited S.M. in almost a month prior to the fact-finding hearing.
    [24]   The CHINS statute does not require the trial court and DCS to wait until a
    child is physically or emotionally harmed to intervene; rather, a child may be
    determined to be CHINS if his or her physical or mental condition is
    endangered. In re R.P., 
    949 N.E.2d 395
    , 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Children
    who are “endangered by parental action or inaction” are protected under the
    CHINS statute. In re A.H., 
    913 N.E.2d 303
    , 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Here, we
    conclude that Father’s positive drug screens and his refusal to participate in
    services, as well as his recent abandonment of the supervised visitations,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 12 of 13
    highlights his inability or refusal to properly care for the Child. See, e.g., In re
    K.B., 24 N.E.2d at 1007. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court’s
    adjudication of the Child as a CHINS is clearly erroneous.
    CONCLUSION
    [25]   In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s Order adjudicating
    Child as a CHINS is not erroneous.
    [26]   Affirmed.
    [27]   Najam, J. and Bradford, J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 54A01-1612-JC-2795 | May 4, 2017   Page 13 of 13