D'andrae Robinson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 28 2019, 7:32 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Rory Gallagher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Tiffany A. McCoy
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
D’andrae Robinson, October 28, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1240
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa F. Borges,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G04-1710-MR-42006
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1240 | October 28, 2019 Page 1 of 6
Statement of the Case
[1] D’andrae Robinson appeals his sentence following his convictions for murder, a
felony; burglary, as a Level 4 felony; and robbery, as a Level 5 felony.
Robinson presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it sentenced him. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 16, 2017, Robinson was hanging out with his friend Christopher
Taliefer and Taliefer’s half-sisters, S.T. and P.W. At some point, S.T. called
her mother’s boyfriend, Dallis Coleman, and asked him whether he would take
her and P.W. to get something to eat. Coleman agreed to pick up the girls, who
met him at a gas station. In the meantime, Tariona Brown picked up Robinson
and Taliefer in her car, and they drove to the gas station where S.T. and P.W.
were waiting to meet Coleman.
[3] After S.T. and P.W. got into Coleman’s car, he drove them to his house to eat.
Without Coleman’s knowledge, Brown, Robinson, and Taliefer followed them
to Coleman’s house, and they parked in a neighbors’ driveway. After some
time had passed, Robinson and Taliefer exited Brown’s car wearing gloves and
carrying handguns. The two men entered Coleman’s house, unannounced, and
Coleman yelled at S.T. and P.W. to run, which they did. Coleman then
struggled with Robinson, who punched and hit Coleman with a gun, knocking
him to the ground. Robinson also kicked Coleman, and Taliefer soon joined
the fight and hit Coleman in the head with a gun.
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[4] Ultimately, Robinson shot Coleman in the head. Coleman died as a result of
the gunshot wound and multiple blunt force injuries to his head. Before leaving
Coleman’s house, Robinson and Taliefer stole several items, including two
televisions and Coleman’s wallet. The next day, Coleman’s son found
Coleman’s corpse lying in a pool of blood, and he observed a towel wrapped
around Coleman’s neck. An ensuing investigation led law enforcement to
identify Robinson and Taliefer as the assailants.
[5] The State charged Robinson with murder; felony murder; burglary, as a Level 1
felony; robbery, as a Level 2 felony; and carrying a handgun without a license.
The State dismissed the carrying a handgun without a license charge before
trial. A jury found Robinson guilty as charged. However, the trial court
entered judgment of conviction on the counts of murder, burglary, and robbery,
and the court reduced the level of the burglary and robbery convictions to a
Level 4 felony and a Level 5 felony, respectively. At sentencing, the trial court
identified six aggravators and two mitigators, and the court imposed the
following consecutive sentences: sixty years for murder; six years for burglary;
and three years for robbery. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Robinson contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced
him for murder and asks that we either remand for resentencing or revise his
sentence from sixty years to fifty-five years. Sentencing decisions lie within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222
(Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the
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logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v.
State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
[7] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:
(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a
sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating
factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3)
enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4)
considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh’g
other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).
[8] The sentencing range for a murder conviction is forty-five to sixty-five years,
with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (2019).
Here, at sentencing, the trial court identified the following aggravating factors:
“[t]he harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim . . . was: (A)
significant; and (B) greater than the elements necessary to prove” murder;
Robinson’s criminal history; and Robinson’s violation of the terms of his
pretrial release. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 122. The trial court also noted that
the “nature [and] circumstances of the crime were egregious [and] the victim
was beaten [and] tortured prior to the gunshot wound to the head that ended his
life.” Id. The trial court noted that Robinson “is youthful[,] however he has
had multiple opportunities for rehabilitation[,]” and he “has a history of illegal
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substance abuse, despite his youth.” Id. Finally, in its oral sentencing
statement, the trial court identified as mitigating Robinson’s young age and his
lack of a stable home life growing up.
[9] Robinson asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it identified as
aggravating circumstances his “torture” of Coleman and that Coleman suffered
harm beyond what was required to prove the elements of murder. We address
each contention in turn.
[10] Robinson first contends that the trial court’s identification of “torture” as an
aggravator is unsupported by the evidence. Robinson correctly states that, in
support of the death penalty or a sentence of life without parole under Indiana
Code Section 35-50-2-9(11)(1), the State must present evidence that the victim
suffered “an appreciable period of pain or punishment” that was “designed
either to coerce the victim or for the torturer’s sadistic indulgence.” Nicholson v.
State, 768 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 2002). But that statutory aggravator is
inapplicable here. Rather, in identifying the nature and circumstances of the
offenses as aggravating, the trial court emphasized that Coleman was “beaten
[and] tortured” before he was shot. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 122. In this
context, the court’s reference to “torture” was not made in the context of the
death penalty statute. Merriam-Webster defines the verb “torture” as “to cause
intense suffering to,” which aptly describes what Robinson did to Coleman
before he shot him. Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/torture (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). In addition to
having been hit with a gun and kicked multiple times, the evidence suggested
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that Coleman might have been strangled with a towel. We cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion when it used the word “torture” to describe
Robinson’s actions.
[11] Robinson next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
identified as an aggravator the fact that Coleman suffered harm beyond what
was required to prove the elements of murder. In support, Robinson avers that,
“[a]side from the gunshot wound, which killed Coleman instantly, his injuries
were mostly superficial.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. However, again, the State
presented evidence that Robinson struck Coleman with a gun and kicked him
multiple times, and there was evidence of possible strangulation. Because
Robinson inflicted multiple serious injuries to Coleman prior to shooting him in
the head, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it found that
Coleman suffered harm beyond what was required to prove the elements of
murder. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced
Robinson for murder. Thus, we decline either to remand for resentencing or to
revise Robinson’s sentence.
[12] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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