In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.F. (Minor Child) S.F. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                       FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    Oct 28 2019, 7:43 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                 CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                     Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Anna Onaitis Holden                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Zionsville, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Abigail R. Recker
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                          October 28, 2019
    of the Parent-Child Relationship                          Court of Appeals Case No.
    of N.F. (Minor Child);                                    19A-JT-770
    S.F. (Father),                                            Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    Appellant-Respondent,
    The Honorable Marilyn A.
    v.                                                Moores, Judge
    The Honorable Scott Stowers,
    Indiana Department of Child                               Magistrate
    Services,                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
    49D09-1809-JT-1083
    Appellee-Petitioner,
    and
    Child Advocates, Inc.,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-770 | October 28, 2019                  Page 1 of 7
    Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
    Najam, Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   S.F. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights over
    his minor child N.F. (“Child”). Father presents a single issue for our review,
    namely, whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) deprived
    him of his right to due process when it failed to make reasonable efforts to
    reunify Father with Child. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On January 23, 2005, Child was born to Father and S.J. (“Mother”). Father
    has a lengthy criminal history, and he has been incarcerated for approximately
    seven of the past ten years. In 2015, a juvenile court found that Child was a
    Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) after substantiating “allegations of abuse
    and neglect,” and the court granted wardship of Child to DCS. Appellant’s
    App. Vol. 2 at 52. Following convictions for five counts of “Felon in
    Possession of a Firearm” in a federal court, in March 2017, Father was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-770 | October 28, 2019   Page 2 of 7
    sentenced to an aggregate term of eighty months in a Kentucky prison. 
    Id. at 53.
    Father’s expected out date is July 24, 2020. Father also has a pending
    “arrest warrant out of Marion County Indiana.” 
    Id. [3] In
    December 2015, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan from
    reunification to adoption, and the court terminated Mother’s parental rights
    over Child. It was not until September 13, 2018, that DCS filed its petition to
    terminate Father’s parental rights over Child. Following a final fact-finding
    hearing, the court granted DCS’ petition. In its findings and conclusions, the
    court stated in part as follows:
    20. [Father] has not seen the child in approximately a year and
    a half.
    ***
    33. [Father] last had telephone contact with [Child] in
    December 2018 or January 2019.
    34. Following that telephone contact with his father, [Child]
    became withdrawn, upset, and depressed.
    35.      [Father] has been incarcerated for the majority of [Child]’s
    life.
    36. [Father] has not had a meaningful role in [Child]’s life and
    is not bonded with the child.
    
    Id. at 53-54.
    The court also found that Child is “comfortable” and “feels loved”
    in his pre-adoptive foster home, where he had lived for fourteen months as of
    the final hearing. 
    Id. at 54.
    This appeal ensued.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-770 | October 28, 2019   Page 3 of 7
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   Father contends that DCS “made no efforts, let alone statutorily-required
    reasonable efforts, to reunify S.F. with his son. [DCS’] failure to follow the
    statutory requirements violated Father’s right to procedural due process.”
    Appellant’s Br. at 14. In particular, Father states that “a parent’s right to DCS’
    reasonable efforts to reunify a family is codified at Indiana Code Section 31-34-
    21-5.5.” 1 
    Id. at 15.
    While Father acknowledges the “challenge” to DCS in
    providing services to Father while he is incarcerated, he finds “troubling” DCS’
    failure to “find a way to fulfill its statutory duty to provide reasonable efforts.”
    
    Id. at 16.
    Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support
    the termination order.
    [5]   We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right
    of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the
    Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe
    Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 
    666 N.E.2d 73
    , 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans.
    denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to
    those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a
    termination. Schultz v. Porter Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
    1
    Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.5 provides in relevant part that DCS “shall make reasonable efforts to
    preserve and reunify families as follows: . . . to make it possible for the child to return safely to the child’s
    home as soon as possible.”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-770 | October 28, 2019                          Page 4 of 7
    [6]   As this Court has explained,
    [w]hen the State seeks the termination of a parent-child
    relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the
    requirements of the Due Process Clause. Hite v. Vanderburgh
    County Office of Family and Children, 
    845 N.E.2d 175
    , 181 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2006). The parent must be afforded the opportunity to be
    heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
    Id. Due process
    in parental rights cases involves the balancing of
    three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding;
    (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and
    (3) the countervailing government interest supporting the use of
    the challenged procedure. 
    Id. A parent’s
    interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her
    children is a fundamental liberty interest; thus, the private
    interest involved is substantial. 
    Id. The government’s
    interest is
    also substantial, as the State of Indiana has a compelling interest
    in protecting the welfare of its children. 
    Id. A.Z. v.
    Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re H.L.), 
    915 N.E.2d 145
    , 147 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2009).
    [7]   In In re H.L., we addressed the father’s contention that he had a right “to receive
    services despite his incarceration” and that he was denied due process when
    DCS did not provide services. 
    Id. Father was
    incarcerated “throughout the
    CHINS proceedings” and, on appeal from the termination of his parental
    rights, he alleged that he “was unable to participate in services,” which were not
    provided at the county jails where he was incarcerated. 
    Id. at 148.
    We
    reiterated that “DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to preserve
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-770 | October 28, 2019   Page 5 of 7
    and reunify families during CHINS proceedings” pursuant to Indiana Code
    Section 31-34-21-5.5. 
    Id. But we
    held as follows:
    Father has not shown that the DCS failed to make reasonable
    efforts toward family preservation. In a strict sense, the record
    supports Father’s assertions that the DCS did not actively
    promote the development of his relationship with H.L., whom
    Father has apparently not met. Nevertheless, the absence of
    services was due to Father’s incarceration and he does not point
    to any evidence that he specifically requested visitation or other
    services.
    ***
    As of the termination hearing, Father had been sentenced to four
    years imprisonment (with one and one-half years suspended) for
    Forgery and Theft committed in Carroll County and two years
    for Residential Entry committed in Cass County. Thus, the DCS
    was unable to offer services to Father or fully evaluate him to
    determine what services might have been needed. The inability to
    provide services in such circumstances does not amount to a denial of due
    process. See Castro v. State Office of Family and Children, 
    842 N.E.2d 367
    , 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    [8]   Likewise, here, Father blames DCS for its failure to facilitate contact between
    Father and Child in an effort at reunification. But Father does not direct us to
    any evidence that he had made any effort to contact Child after their last phone
    call in December 2018 or January 2019 or after their last visit more than one
    year prior to the final hearing. And Father does not direct us to any evidence
    that he sought help from DCS or other sources in finding appropriate services
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-770 | October 28, 2019     Page 6 of 7
    that might have been available to him in prison. Moreover, as DCS points out,
    once the juvenile court changed the permanency plan from reunification to
    adoption in December of 2015, DCS was not thereafter required to provide
    services to Father towards reunification. Wedding v. Dep’t of Child Servs. of
    Vanderburgh Cty. (In re A.D.W.), 
    907 N.E.2d 533
    , 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
    (citing I.C. § 31-34-21-5.8). We hold that Father was not denied his right to due
    process as the result of DCS’ inability to provide Father with services while
    incarcerated. See 
    id. [9] Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-770 | October 28, 2019   Page 7 of 7