Martell Williams v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                         FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    Nov 25 2019, 9:07 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                   CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                       Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Leanna K. Weissmann                                     Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Lawrenceburg, Indiana                                   Attorney General of Indiana
    J.T. Whitehead
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Martell Williams,                                       November 25, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-115
    v.                                              Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G06-1710-MR-41035
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019                   Page 1 of 25
    Case Summary
    [1]   Martell Williams (“Williams”) appeals his convictions for three counts of
    Murder, felonies,1 and one count of Robbery, as a Level 5 felony.2 We affirm.
    Issues
    [2]   Williams presents eight issues for review:
    I.           Whether he is entitled to discharge under Indiana
    Criminal Rule 4;
    II.          Whether sufficient evidence supports his convictions;
    III.         Whether the trial court abused its discretion in evidentiary
    rulings;
    IV.          Whether the trial court became an advocate for the State
    to achieve admission of a video;
    V.           Whether the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
    sentences is an abuse of discretion;
    VI.          Whether his aggregate sentence is inappropriate pursuant
    to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B);
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2).
    2
    I.C. § 35-42-5-1.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 2 of 25
    VII.    Whether his Robbery conviction must be vacated under
    the continuous crime doctrine; and
    VIII. Whether he, as an indigent defendant, is entitled to a
    transcript at public expense.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   In 2017, Sha-Lynn Poindexter (“Poindexter”), Jordan Wright (“Wright”),
    Justin Crowder (“Crowder”), and Dominique Miller (“Miller”) shared an
    apartment in Indianapolis. Crowder’s girlfriend, Zoe Radford (“Radford”) was
    a frequent visitor.
    [4]   Crowder supplemented his income by selling marijuana. One of his regular
    customers was a resident of the same complex, Sean Jones (“Jones”). Jones
    became aware that Crowder kept a safe and a gun in his apartment, and Jones
    suspected that the safe contained cash and marijuana. Jones and his friend,
    Stanley Williams (“Stanley”), began to discuss robbing Crowder.
    [5]   On July 16, 2017, Jones contacted Devante Gilbert (“Gilbert”) to convey that
    he “wanted to rob someone” and needed a driver. (Tr. Vol. IV, pg. 117.)
    Gilbert agreed to be the driver. Jones also texted Stanley that he had been
    “casing [Crowder’s apartment] all day” and needed “help [to] get some guns for
    this robbery.” (Tr. Vol. V, pg. 209.) Stanley then called Williams, and
    Williams called Troy Ward (“Ward”). Gilbert drove to pick up each of the
    others; when Williams and Ward approached the vehicle, they were carrying
    backpacks with weapons inside.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 3 of 25
    [6]   Gilbert drove back to Somerset Bay Apartments, where he had first picked up
    Jones, and backed into a parking space near Crowder’s apartment. Gilbert and
    Stanley remained in the vehicle. Jones used a code to access Crowder’s
    apartment building3 and walked up the stairs, with Williams and Ward
    crouching beside him. Jones knocked on the door and, when it was opened, the
    trio pushed their way inside.
    [7]   In a bedroom, Poindexter heard gunshots. Wright armed himself with a sword
    and told Poindexter to hide; he then left the room. Poindexter hid between two
    dog crates, emerging when Radford came running into the room saying that
    “everyone was shot.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 161.) In the dining room and living
    room, Miller, Wright, and Crowder lay dead from gunshots wounds to the
    head.
    [8]   Jones, Williams, and Ward returned to Gilbert’s vehicle. Jones had a wad of
    cash and an assault rifle, which he placed in the trunk. Ward was carrying a
    safe. Gilbert drove to a wooded area and everyone exited the vehicle with a
    plan to open the safe. However, Gilbert and Jones soon left to seek assistance
    because Jones had been shot and could not staunch the bleeding. Ward fired
    shots at the safe and it eventually opened. It was empty. The empty-handed
    trio walked to a nearby Target store and got rides to home and work.
    3
    Jones explained that he had learned the maintenance code that permitted access to multiple buildings, after
    a family friend lost her key and was provided with the code.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019                 Page 4 of 25
    [9]    In the ensuing police investigation, Radford identified Jones as one of the
    intruders. Jones, who had been shot and was receiving treatment at Methodist
    Hospital in Indianapolis, was arrested the following day. He confessed to his
    involvement in the murders and robbery, and implicated Williams, Ward,
    Gilbert, and Stanley. Ultimately, Gilbert, Stanley, and Jones each entered a
    plea bargain with the State, agreeing to plead guilty to a felony other than
    Murder and provide testimony in the prosecution of Williams and Ward.
    [10]   Williams and Ward were tried before a jury on October 9 through October 15,
    2018, on charges of Murder, Robbery, and Carrying a Handgun without a
    License. The jury convicted Williams as charged, but to avoid double jeopardy
    concerns, the trial court did not enter a judgment of conviction upon the latter
    charge and entered the Robbery conviction as a Level 5 felony. Upon his
    conviction for three counts of Murder, Williams received consecutive sentences
    of fifty-five, forty-five, and fifty-five years. Upon his conviction for Robbery,
    Williams received a concurrent sentence of five years, thus providing for an
    aggregate sentence of 145 years. He now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    Motion for Discharge – Criminal Rule 4
    [11]   Williams’s trial was initially set for June 25, 2018. At a June 19, 2018 pretrial
    conference, the State and defense counsel made a joint motion to continue the
    trial. The trial was set for August 20, 2018. At the same pretrial conference,
    after a continuance was requested but the trial date had not been set, Williams
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 5 of 25
    requested a speedy trial. The trial court acknowledged that both defendants had
    requested an early trial date pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) (requiring the
    trial of an incarcerated defendant within seventy days) and noted “70th day
    should be the 28th of August.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 12.)
    [12]   At a July 31, 2018 pretrial conference, the August trial setting was confirmed.
    At a pretrial conference on August 17, 2018, the State moved for a continuance
    to permit the Marion County Cyber Crimes Unit to conduct additional
    investigation related to cell phone contact between some of the alleged co-
    conspirators.
    [13]   The trial court granted the State’s motion for a continuance despite Williams’s
    assertion of his speedy trial rights, finding that delay attributable to the jointly
    requested continuance was chargeable to Williams. The trial court reasoned
    that a defendant “cannot ask for a continuance and ask for a speedy trial
    simultaneously” and the seventy-day computation as to Williams “does not go
    to the day the request is made,” June 19, 2018, but rather began on the agreed-
    upon trial date of August 20, 2018. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 47.) After providing its
    reasoning, the trial court reset the trial for October 9, 2018.
    [14]   An accused’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by Article 1, Section 12 of the
    Indiana Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution. Leek v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 276
    , 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Criminal
    Rule 4 was adopted to implement this speedy trial right. 
    Id. Williams Court
    of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 6 of 25
    unsuccessfully moved for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B)(1), which
    provides in pertinent part:
    If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall
    move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to
    trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such
    motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on
    his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where
    there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70)
    calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.
    Williams claims that his June 19, 2018 motion started the seventy-day clock,
    and he did not thereafter cause any delay but remained ready for the August
    trial setting; thus, the October trial setting violated his speedy trial rights and he
    is entitled to discharge.
    [15]   A trial court’s decision denying a motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4 is
    reviewed for clear error, after according the trial court’s findings reasonable
    deference. Austin v. State, 
    997 N.E.2d 1027
    , 1040 (Ind. 2013). Clear error is
    that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    made. 
    Id. Where the
    issue is a question of law applied to undisputed facts, the
    review is de novo. 
    Id. at 1039.
    Here, the parties do not dispute the facts.
    Williams requested a continuance, the grant of which reset his trial to August
    20, 2018. The same day, he requested a speedy trial.
    [16]   Criminal Rule 4(F) provides for an extension of time as follows:
    When a continuance is had on motion of the defendant, or delay
    in trial is caused by his act, any time limitation contained in this
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 7 of 25
    rule shall be extended by the amount of the resulting period of
    such delay caused thereby.
    [17]   Williams focuses solely upon the timing of his motion for a speedy trial. In the
    specific sequence of events, Williams requested a continuance before the trial
    date was set, and before making his motion for a speedy trial. But Criminal
    Rule 4 “makes no distinction regarding when the trial date is set” and “delays
    caused by action taken by the defendant are chargeable to the defendant
    regardless of whether a trial date has been set.” Cook v. State, 
    810 N.E.2d 1064
    ,
    1067 (Ind. 2004). And Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) contemplates a “continuance
    within said period” that is “had on [defendant’s] motion” and does not specify
    that the motion must be made within the seventy-day period.
    [18]   The salient fact here is that Williams initiated the delay that took place after his
    motion. Williams cannot receive a continuance without accountability. See
    Brown v. State, 
    725 N.E.2d 823
    , 825 (Ind. 2000) (“The objective of the rule is to
    move cases along and to provide the defendant with a timely trial, not to create
    a mechanism to avoid trial.”) The delay up until August 20, 2018 was
    chargeable to Williams and the seventieth day thereafter was October 29, 2018.
    Williams was tried within this period; therefore, he is not entitled to discharge.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [19]   To convict Williams of murder, as charged, the State was required to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams killed Wright, Crowder, and Miller
    while committing or attempting to commit robbery. I.C. § 35-42-1-1. To
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 8 of 25
    convict Williams of robbery, as charged, the State was required to prove beyond
    a reasonable doubt that Williams knowingly or intentionally took a safe or
    firearm from Crowder by the use or threat of force. I.C. § 35-42-5-1.
    [20]   When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither
    reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Gibson v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 204
    ,
    210 (Ind. 2016). We view the “evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
    therefrom in a light most favorable to the conviction, and will affirm ‘if there is
    substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime
    from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Walker v. State, 
    998 N.E.2d 724
    , 726 (Ind. 2013)
    (quoting Davis v. State, 
    813 N.E.2d 1176
    , 1178 (Ind. 2004)).
    [21]   Williams does not claim that the State failed to present evidence to establish
    any element of the charged crimes. Rather, he argues that much of the
    testimony against him should be disregarded because the occurrence witnesses
    – Jones, Stanley, and Gilbert – were motivated to falsely identify him. That is,
    they needed to please prosecutors who had extended lenient plea offers.
    According to Williams, Jones eventually received a sentence of thirty years
    imprisonment, while Stanley and Gilbert each received a nine-year sentence.
    [22]   Williams also argues that the trio’s testimony contained discrepancies and was
    inconsistent with a neighbor’s testimony that she had seen only two men fleeing
    the apartment building. He contends that the testimony of Jones, Stanley, and
    Gilbert “cannot withstand scrutiny.” Appellant’s Brief at 25. At bottom,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 9 of 25
    Williams is asking that we judge witness credibility and reweigh evidence. We
    cannot do so. 
    Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 210
    .
    Evidentiary Rulings
    [23]   Williams argues that the trial court made “several serious evidentiary
    mistakes,” including the failure to exclude, as a discovery sanction, “phone
    records given to the defendants on the eve of their speedy trial date,” and the
    exclusion of evidence that Jones and Gilbert had once before robbed a drug
    dealer. Appellant’s Brief at 30.
    [24]   Questions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are entrusted to the
    sound discretion of the trial court. Harrison v. State, 
    32 N.E.3d 240
    , 250 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2015). We review the court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion.
    
    Id. A trial
    court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the effect of
    the facts and circumstances before it, or if it misinterprets the law. 
    Id. [25] Also,
    a trial court has broad discretion regarding discovery violations, and its
    ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion involving clear error
    and resulting prejudice. Berry v. State, 
    715 N.E.2d 864
    , 866 (Ind. 1999). In
    general, the proper remedy for a discovery violation is a continuance. 
    Id. Exclusion of
    the evidence is an extreme remedy that is to be used only if the
    State’s actions were deliberate and the conduct prevented a fair trial. 
    Id. [26] Jones
    , Stanley, and Gilbert testified regarding contacts on the day of the
    murders among themselves and Williams and Ward, using Snap Chat, text
    messages, and cellular phone calls. The testimony was that Jones and Stanley
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 10 of 25
    agreed to meet up, Jones contacted Gilbert, Stanley contacted Williams, and
    Williams contacted Ward. Some of the testimony of the various
    communications was corroborated by cell phone records. There was also
    testimony that Jones, Gilbert, Ward, Williams, and Stanley traveled together to
    the apartment where the murders took place. This was partially corroborated
    by mapping cell phone tower locations nearest the cell phones of many of the
    participants4 near the time of the murders.
    [27]   Williams’s description of the challenged records is vague. Apparently, the State
    shared its discovery of cell phone records in stages and some materials were
    provided to the defense shortly before trial. However, contrary to Williams’s
    assertion that the State was merely admonished for a lack of diligence, our
    reading of the record indicates that some records were excluded. Specifically,
    the trial court ruled that the “Tuesday documents” were excluded and advised
    the State that, due to late discovery, it had “lost the benefit of Troy Ward’s
    phone records” as corroborative evidence. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 200.) With respect
    to other phone records, Williams asserts that the State was neglectful because
    four months passed before he received any documents. But he does not explain
    how this pace prevented a fair trial. Indeed, the testimony and most of the
    exhibits demonstrating contacts between the quintet were admitted without
    objection. We discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion here.
    4
    Jones was not in possession of a cell phone. His phone had been confiscated by his parents as a disciplinary
    measure.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019               Page 11 of 25
    [28]   Additionally, Williams argues that the trial court should have allowed evidence
    that Jones and Gilbert had previously robbed a drug dealer. According to
    Williams, this would have aided his defense that he was not present at the
    crime scene by showing that Jones and Gilbert were a team that did not need
    assistance.
    [29]   In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel for Williams and
    Ward recounted a revelation from Gilbert’s pre-trial deposition. When
    deposed, Gilbert had purportedly admitted that he and Jones “once before”
    committed a robbery when they “just pulled [off] from somebody” who had
    intended to sell them marijuana. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 118.) Defense counsel could
    not provide a specific time or name the victim; accordingly, the trial court ruled
    that the evidence of a prior robbery was so vague as to lack probative value.
    [30]   Defense counsel suggested that the evidence was admissible to show Jones’s
    character and reputation, “because he is known for robbing people.” 
    Id. at 116.
    The trial court advised counsel that admission of such evidence would promote
    drawing a forbidden inference prohibited by Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b),
    which provides in pertinent part:
    Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
    prove the character of a person in order to show action in
    conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
    purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan,
    knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 12 of 25
    Traditionally, Rule 404(b) has been used to protect a defendant from being
    convicted based on unrelated prior bad acts; that is, the jury should not be
    permitted to “infer that the defendant is a bad person who should be punished
    for other, uncharged misdeeds.” Garland v. State, 
    788 N.E.2d 425
    , 428 (Ind.
    2003). In Garland, our Indiana Supreme Court held that “the admissibility of
    evidence about prior bad acts by persons other than defendants is subject to
    Rule 404(b).” 
    Id. at 430.
    [31]   Williams simply sought to show with sparse detail that, when Jones robbed
    Crowder, he was acting in conformity with his past misconduct and his bad
    character. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered
    evidence.
    Target Store Surveillance Video
    [32]   Jones, Gilbert, and Stanley testified that Ward was in possession of a safe when
    he returned to Gilbert’s vehicle and Gilbert then drove the group to a wooded
    area where they could attempt to open the safe. Gilbert and Jones soon left the
    others because of the need to obtain assistance for Jones’s gunshot wound. This
    testimony was partially corroborated by a surveillance video from a nearby
    Target store. Target asset protection employee Kyle Hanephin (“Hanephin”)
    testified as the keeper of the video.
    [33]   The State asked Hanephin a number of foundational questions, Williams’
    counsel objected to the tape’s admission for lack of foundation, and the trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 13 of 25
    court asked a series of questions of Hanephin before admitting the video.
    According to Williams,
    [H]ad the court not taken on the role of advocate, the court
    would not have had a basis to admit the video. The video stands
    as the single piece of evidence, outside of the questionable
    testimony of the co-defendants, that links [Williams] to the
    crimes. The State used the video to aid Stanley in identifying the
    three men walking from the woods as himself, [Ward], and
    [Williams].
    Appellant’s Brief at 34.
    [34]   Indiana law presumes that a trial court judge is unbiased and without prejudice.
    Everling v. State, 
    929 N.E.2d 1281
    , 1287 (Ind. 2010). To rebut this presumption,
    a defendant must establish from the judge’s conduct that the judge’s actual bias
    or prejudice has placed the defendant in jeopardy. 
    Id. “A trial
    before an
    impartial judge is an essential element of due process.” 
    Id. However, “[b]ias
    and prejudice violate a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial only where
    there is an undisputed claim or where the judge expressed an opinion of the
    controversy over which the judge was presiding.” 
    Id. [35] The
    conduct and strategy of the parties is left to them and the ultimate decision
    is to be left to the jury. 
    Id. at 1289.
    But a trial judge may in any case, within
    reasonable limits, interrogate a witness. Kennedy v. State, 
    280 N.E.2d 611
    , 620
    (Ind. 1972). “The purpose of the judge’s discretionary power to examine
    witnesses is to be an aid to the jury in its fact finding duties, however this must
    be done in an impartial manner so that the judge does not improperly influence
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 14 of 25
    the jury with his own contentions.” 
    Id. In Kennedy,
    the judge employed a
    highly argumentative manner and repeatedly questioned an expert witness
    about his credentials and ability to testify accurately. 
    Id. at 613.
    In so doing,
    the trial judge “lost his appearance of impartiality [and] removed his robes and
    donned the cap of the prosecutor,” resulting in a reversal of the defendant’s
    murder conviction upon appeal. 
    Id. at 618.
    Williams claims that a similar
    scenario ensued here.
    [36]   The State offered the Target surveillance video as a silent witness to several
    young men, whom the State alleged to be Williams, Ward, and Stanley, leaving
    a wooded area near the Target store together. The “silent witness” theory,
    adopted by Indiana courts in 1979, permitted relevant photographs supported
    by a proper evidentiary foundation to be considered substantive evidence rather
    than merely demonstrative evidence. Wise v. State, 
    26 N.E.3d 137
    , 141 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2015). The theory has since been extended to the use of video recordings.
    
    Id. As applied
    to video recordings:
    “[T]here must be a strong showing of authenticity and
    competency” and … when automatic cameras are involved,
    “there should be evidence as to how and when the camera was
    loaded, how frequently the camera was activated, when the
    photographs were taken, and the processing and changing of
    custody of the film after its removal from the camera.”
    McHenry v. State, 
    820 N.E.2d 124
    , 128 (Ind. 2005) (citing Edwards v. State, 
    762 N.E.2d 128
    , 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). The standard is applicable because a
    silent witness cannot be cross-examined. 
    Wise, 26 N.E.3d at 141
    (citing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 15 of 25
    
    Edwards, 762 N.E.2d at 136
    ). A trial witness need not testify that the depicted
    image is an accurate representation of the scene when the image was taken;
    rather, the witness must provide testimony identifying the scene that appears in
    the images “sufficient to persuade the trial court … of their competency and
    authenticity to a relative certainty.” Knapp v. State, 
    9 N.E.3d 1274
    , 1282 (Ind.
    2014) (emphasis in original) (citations and quotations omitted).
    [37]   Here, Hanephin testified that he had created the video of events on July 16,
    2017, the system was working properly, the system was checked daily, the
    system was locked within the asset protection services office, and he was
    familiar with the area under surveillance. He described State’s Exhibit 267 as
    “a disk that I downloaded for [sic] the incident” and testified that it was an
    accurate copy and he had not altered it. (Tr. Vol. V, pg. 144.) Williams’
    counsel objected to admission of the exhibit:
    I would object that this is not a proper foundation. This witness
    testified he secures the outside, there’s a foot path. I’m sure
    people walk that foot path often. So I’m not sure it’s a proper
    foundation for playing a video. It’s out of context in my opinion.
    
    Id. at 146.
    [38]   The trial court sustained the objection, concluding: “him making the bare bones
    assertion that it was working is not sufficient for the silent witness foundation.”
    
    Id. The prosecutor
    then questioned Hanephin as to how he knew the camera
    was working properly and he responded that there “is a health monitor
    function” at the top of the screen and “if that camera was down, I wouldn’t
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 16 of 25
    have been able to review video or save video.” 
    Id. at 147.
    At this point, the
    trial court began to question Hanephin, without additional objection from
    defense counsel. The judge asked Hanephin about the method for time
    tracking, whether the system was in-house or third party, how often the system
    was checked, and whether there was periodic maintenance. Hanephin
    responded that the system was third-party, and he checked it on each of his
    shifts but was not involved in the third-party maintenance. He described for the
    jurors a digital calendar and, at the State’s instance, re-affirmed his assessment
    of accuracy.
    [39]   Williams’s counsel interjected that there was “nothing to show that [on] that
    particular day that he had the ability to look at the accuracy of the time,” 
    id. at 150,
    prompting the court to ask additional questions. The court inquired about
    the frequency with which Hanephin checked the date and time, and asked
    whether, if Hanephin found the time or date to be inaccurate, there was a
    process for reporting the error to the third-party software programmer.
    Hanephin testified that such an error-reporting process existed but he had not
    experienced a problem of that nature during the relevant time frame. The trial
    court admitted the challenged exhibit into evidence, stating that defense
    counsel’s objections concerned the weight, not the admissibility of, the exhibit.
    [40]   Our review of the record indicates that the State elicited testimony to establish
    that Hanephin was the creator and custodian of the video, he regularly checked
    for accuracy of the system, and he had no reason to doubt the time and date
    depicted. Hanephin described the setting, an outdoor area included in Target’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 17 of 25
    regular surveillance. He established the authenticity of the scene depicted and
    the accuracy of the video equipment. In sum, the State met the foundational
    requirements of McHenry apart from the trial court’s intervention. And
    although the trial court took an active role in questioning a witness, the
    questions and answers provided clarification. The trial judge did not suggest
    answers, evince bias, or invade the province of the jury. Williams has identified
    no conduct akin to that of the Kennedy trial court. Here, the appearance of
    impartiality was never surrendered.
    [41]   Finally, with respect to evidentiary rulings, Williams claims that “cumulative
    error” warrants reversal in a case where the “evidence was hardly
    overwhelming.” Appellant’s Brief at 35. We disagree with Williams on both
    points; that is, he did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion or error in
    evidentiary rulings, and the evidence against him was strong – inclusive of
    testimony from three occurrence witnesses.
    Consecutive Sentences
    [42]   Williams claims that “concurrent sentences more properly reflect the
    circumstances of the crimes” explaining:
    [t]he imposition of consecutive sentences rests on shaky grounds
    because the judge sent a teenager to prison for life to pay for
    homicides he didn’t commit in an apartment he reasonably
    thought would be empty, for a crime where no one was supposed
    to die.
    Appellant’s Brief at 40-41.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 18 of 25
    [43]   The argument presupposes that Williams fired none of the shots that killed any
    of the three victims. There was evidence that both Ward and Williams entered
    the apartment armed with guns, and three men died, but Jones disavowed
    seeing Williams fire a kill shot. But even if the evidence does not definitively
    establish that Williams fired a fatal shot, there is abundant evidence that he
    acted in concert with Ward. Williams’s subjective expectations aside, he was
    sentenced for the events that unfolded within the apartment. As to the sentence
    for that criminal conduct, we reiterate what our Indiana Supreme Court has
    observed: “when the perpetrator commits the same offense against [multiple]
    victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to vindicate the
    fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one
    person.” Serino v. State, 
    798 N.E.2d 852
    , 857 (Ind. 2003). And, “[a]lthough
    consecutive sentences are not always a given when there are multiple murder
    victims, concurrent sentences are undoubtedly the exception.” Lewis v. State,
    
    116 N.E.3d 1144
    , 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
    [44]   Williams suggests that we should employ a “single incident analysis” when
    reviewing the consecutive sentences. Appellant’s Brief at 41. He directs our
    attention to Beno v. State, 
    581 N.E.2d 922
    (Ind. 1991). There, the Indiana
    Supreme Court found the imposition of three maximum, consecutive sentences
    for three drug dealing convictions based upon nearly identical State-sponsored
    drug sales to be manifestly unreasonable. See 
    id. at 923.
    The conduct of a
    participant in a police sting, who was ultimately accorded some sentencing
    leniency, bears no relevancy to the brutal and senseless murders here. Williams
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 19 of 25
    has identified no grounds for reversal of the order that his sentences be served
    consecutively.
    Appropriateness of Sentence
    [45]   Williams also asks that his murder sentences be reviewed for inappropriateness.
    He claims that he received “almost the maximum sentence even though he was
    not the shooter.” Appellant’s Brief at 43. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section
    35-50-2-3, a person who commits murder is subject to a sentencing range of
    forty-five years to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years.
    Williams received a fifty-five-year sentence for Crowder’s murder, and two
    forty-five-year sentences for the murders of Wright and Miller.
    [46]   Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this “Court may revise a sentence
    authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
    Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
    and the character of the offender.” In performing our review, we assess “the
    culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
    others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v.
    State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of such review is
    to attempt to leaven the outliers. 
    Id. at 1225.
    The “considerable deference”
    given to the trial court’s sentencing judgment “should prevail unless overcome
    by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense
    (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
    defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 20 of 25
    of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 
    29 N.E.3d 111
    , 122 (Ind. 2015) (citing
    
    Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222
    ).
    [47]   Williams received one advisory sentence and two minimum sentences. At
    bottom, his contention is that the aggregate sentence is inappropriate because
    the individual sentences are to be served consecutively. In Cardwell, the Court
    explained that it is the aggregate sentence under review:
    In the case of some crimes, the number of counts that can be
    charged and proved is virtually entirely at the discretion of the
    prosecutor. For that reason, appellate review should focus on the
    forest – the aggregate sentence – rather than the trees –
    consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the
    sentence on any individual count.
    The circumstances do, however, bear on whether consecutive
    sentences are appropriate. Whether the counts involve one or
    multiple victims is highly relevant to the decision to impose
    consecutive sentences if for no other reason than to preserve
    potential deterrence of subsequent 
    offenses. 895 N.E.2d at 1225
    .
    [48]   As for the nature of the offenses, Williams armed himself and invaded an
    apartment for the specific purpose of robbing Crowder. Three young men were
    fatally shot in their own home, without provocation or warning. The two
    young women inside the apartment hid in terror and emerged to find Crowder,
    Miller, and Wright dead of gunshot wounds to the head. The horrific crimes
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 21 of 25
    netted the murderers a semi-automatic rifle, a few hundred dollars,5 and an
    empty safe. Whether or not Williams fired a fatal shot, he was by all accounts a
    willing participant.
    [49]   As for nineteen-year-old Williams’s character, these were his first felony
    offenses. However, he had not remained a law-abiding citizen up until the
    current offenses. At age sixteen, he was adjudicated a delinquent child for
    having committed an act that would be burglary if committed by an adult. As
    an adult, Williams had a misdemeanor conviction for theft. At the time of
    sentencing, he also had pending charges for handgun and marijuana possession.
    [50]   Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that the trial court did not impose an
    inappropriate sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), and the aggregate sentence
    does not warrant appellate revision. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the
    sentence imposed by the trial court.
    Continuous Crime Doctrine
    [51]   The continuous crime doctrine provides, in essence, some actions sufficient in
    themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may nonetheless be so
    compressed in time, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action that they
    constitute a single transaction. Gomez v. State, 
    56 N.E.3d 697
    , 703 (Ind. Ct.
    5
    Jones did not divide the cash with his cohorts.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 22 of 
    25 Ohio App. 2016
    ). Application of the doctrine invokes a fact-sensitive inquiry. 
    Id. at 704.
    [52]   Williams contends that the events inside the apartment were so compressed that
    his independent conviction for Robbery cannot stand. According to Williams,
    “because [Jones] stole items while [Ward] killed the three men, the continuous
    crime doctrine applies.” Appellant’s Brief at 38.
    The continuous crime doctrine is a rule of statutory construction
    and common law limited to situations where a defendant has
    been charged multiple times with the same offense. “The
    continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double
    jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeable crimes; rather, it
    defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts
    only to a single chargeable crime.” Boyd v. State, 
    766 N.E.2d 396
    ,
    400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)[.]
    Hines v. State, 
    30 N.E.3d 1216
    , 1218 (Ind. 2015). The continuous crime
    doctrine may not be judicially extended to two distinct criminal offenses. 
    Id. at 1220.
    “The continuous crime doctrine applies only where a defendant has been
    charged multiple times with the same ‘continuous’ offense.” 
    Id. [53] Williams
    was convicted of three counts of Murder, for three separate deaths,
    and he does not challenge those convictions under the continuous crime
    doctrine. Murder and Robbery are distinct crimes, with distinct elements.
    Williams was not convicted of multiple counts of Robbery. The continuous
    crime doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 23 of 25
    Transcript
    [54]   The final articulated issue concerns an order that Williams’s appellate counsel
    partially reimburse the Indiana Public Defender’s Office for a transcript
    prepared for Williams before he retained private appellate counsel. The State
    responds that it is not a party to a collateral order for payment. It is unclear as
    to whether there is an appealable final judgment against counsel. Nevertheless,
    the order is not integral to the merits of the criminal conviction on appeal.
    [55]   To the extent that the controversy pertains to Williams, we observe that a party
    who was permitted to proceed in the trial court in forma pauperis may proceed in
    like manner on appeal without prior authorization from the trial court or the
    appellate court. Ind. Appellate Rule 40(A)(1). If a party is granted in forma
    pauperis status by this Court, the effect is that the party “is relieved of the
    obligation to prepay filing fees or costs in either the trial court or the Court on
    Appeal or to give security therefor[.]” App. R. 40(D)(1) (emphasis added).
    Costs are defined, in relevant part, in the Appellate Rules as “the cost of
    preparing the Record on Appeal, including the Transcript[.]” App. R. 67(B)(2).
    Thus, a defendant who has been determined to be indigent is entitled to a
    transcript on appeal at public expense. See I.C. § 33-40-8-5; see also Hollowell v.
    State, 
    19 N.E.3d 263
    , 266-67 (Ind. 2014) (noting that, after the Court of Appeals
    had granted him in forma pauperis status, Hollowell was entitled to a transcript
    of his post-conviction relief hearing at public expense); Wright v. State, 
    772 N.E.2d 449
    , 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“[C]riminal defendants in Indiana who
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 24 of 25
    cannot afford to pay for a transcript are still entitled to one if they are found to
    be indigent.”).
    [56]   Because Williams had been granted in forma pauperis status at the time the
    transcript was prepared by the Public Defender’s Office, he is entitled to the
    transcript at public expense.
    Conclusion
    [57]   Williams is not entitled to discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4. Sufficient
    evidence supports his convictions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    evidentiary rulings nor did the trial judge become an advocate for the State.
    Williams has demonstrated no abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion,
    and his aggregate sentence is not inappropriate. He is not entitled to vacation
    of his Robbery conviction under the continuous crime doctrine. As an indigent
    criminal litigant, he is entitled to a transcript at public expense.
    [58]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-115 | November 25, 2019   Page 25 of 25