Eric Butler, $236.00 in U.S. Currency, and One 2004 Pontiac Grand Prix v. State of Indiana, Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Law Enforcement Agency ( 2019 )

FILED
Dec 27 2019, 8:37 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
ERIC BUTLER THE STATE OF INDIANA
Stephen Gerald Gray Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Eric Butler, $236.00 in U.S. December 27, 2019
Currency, and One 2004 Pontiac Court of Appeals Case No.
Grand Prix, 19A-MI-5
Appellants-Defendants, Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
v. The Hon. James Joven, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
State of Indiana, the 49D13-1702-MI-7676
Consolidated City of
Indianapolis/Marion County,
and the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Law Enforcement
Agency,
Appellees-Plaintiffs.
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-MI-5 | December 27, 2019 Page 1 of 12
Case Summary
[1] In December of 2016, Eric Butler was pulled over while driving his 2004
Pontiac Grand Prix (“the Car”), and a search revealed thirty-four grams of
marijuana, approximately forty-six grams of heroin, and $236 in cash. The
State, the Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Law Enforcement Agency (collectively,
“Appellees”), filed a civil forfeiture action against Butler, $236.00 in U.S.
Currency, and one 2004 Pontiac Grand Prix (collectively, “Appellants”).
[2] While the civil forfeiture action was pending, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana found Indiana’s civil-forfeiture scheme to
be unconstitutional in several respects. Effective July 1, 2018, several
amendments took effect which were intended to cure the constitutional
infirmities in Indiana’s civil forfeiture laws (“the 2018 Amendments”). When
the trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellants based on the old statutes,
Appellees refiled pursuant to the amended statutes. In December of 2018, the
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Appellants argue
that the trial court erroneously entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees
and abused its discretion in failing to award Appellants attorney’s fees. Because
Appellants have failed to establish that the trial court erred in concluding that
the 2018 Amendments cured the constitutional defects in Indiana’s civil-
forfeiture statutes and have waived any claim regarding attorney’s fees in the
trial court, we affirm. Moreover, we decline Appellants’ request for an award
of appellate attorney’s fees.
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Facts and Procedural History
[3] On December 8, 2016, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officers conducted a
traffic stop of the Car, which was driven and owned by Butler. During the stop,
police discovered approximately thirty-four grams of marijuana in the vehicle,
approximately forty-six grams of heroin in a baggy in Butler’s pocket, and $236
in cash. The State charged Butler with Level 2 felony dealing a narcotic drug
and Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, and the Car and the cash were
seized by law enforcement and held for forfeiture. On February 23, 2017,
Appellees filed a civil complaint seeking forfeiture of the Car and the $236. In
April of 2017, Appellees moved for default judgment, which the trial court
granted on April 28, 2017.
[4] On August 18, 2017, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana ruled Indiana’s statutory forfeiture scheme unconstitutional. See
Washington v. Marion Cty. Prosecutor, et al., 264 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961, 975–80
(S.D. Ind. 2017). The district court concluded that “Indiana Code Section 34-
24-1-1(a)(1), read in conjunction with the Indiana Code provisions of the same
chapter, violates the Due Process Clause” and permanently enjoined the
Marion County Prosecutor from “enforcing Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-
1(a)(1), as read in conjunction with Indiana Code provisions of the same
chapter.” Id. at 980. In September of 2017, the Marion County Prosecutor
appealed from the district court’s determination. Appellants moved for relief
from the default judgment on December 12, 2017. Appellees filed an objection
to the motion, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion on February 26,
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2018. While that motion was pending, Butler pled guilty to Level 4 felony
dealing in a narcotic drug in his criminal case.
[5] Effective July 1, 2018, the 2018 Amendments took effect, which were an
apparent attempt to address the due-process problems identified by the district
court in Washington. See Ind. P.L. 47-2018, §§ 1-2. On July 11, 2018, the trial
court granted Appellants’ motion for relief from judgment, vacating the default
judgment. Appellees filed a probable-cause affidavit, and, on July 16, 2018, the
trial court found probable cause for the seizure of the Car. The parties cross-
moved for summary judgment. In Butler’s memorandum submitted in support
of his summary-judgment motion, he did not acknowledge the 2018
Amendments, much less argue that they failed to cure Indiana Code chapter 34-
24-1’s constitutional deficiencies. On December 4, 2018, without a hearing, the
trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, ordering
forfeiture of both the $236 and the Car. On January 2, 2019, Appellants
appealed from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Appellees.
[6] Meanwhile, on February 19, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit issued its disposition of the Marion County Prosecutor’s appeal
in Washington. See Washington v. Marion Cty. Prosecutor, 916 F.3d 676 (7th Cir.
2019). While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the parties’
arguments regarding whether the 2018 Amendments cured Indiana Code
chapter 34-24-1’s constitutional infirmities, it declined to address them:
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The district court did not have a chance to address the
amendments. Given that the record and arguments regarding the
amendments are under-developed, we remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings. See Restoration Risk Retention
Grp. v. Gutierrez, 880 F.3d 339, 349 (7th Cir. 2018) (remanding to
district court “to determine the operation and effect of the
amended statute” and to “determine whether the case is moot”);
Hager v. Nat’l Union Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 259, 262–63 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“We believe that the district court ought to have the opportunity
to reconsider its decision in light of this most significant
pronouncement from the Supreme Court of Indiana.”); United
States v. Elrod, 627 F.2d 813, 819–20 (7th Cir. 1980) (remanding to
district court given enactment of statute during pendency of
appeal).
On remand, the district court should address the parties’
contentions regarding the amendments. Do the amendments
ameliorate the constitutional problems the district court identified?
The district court should resolve these contentions to the extent
necessary and proper.
If appropriate, the district court should also revisit the class to
determine whether it should be decertified or redefined in light of
the amendments.
At present, we express no opinion regarding the constitutionality
of the old or new versions of the statute, regarding mootness, or
regarding the class. Also, our argument summaries do not limit
the arguments the parties may raise on remand. We leave latitude
to the district court to conduct further proceedings it deems
necessary and proper given the amendments and the parties’
positions. Any review we are subsequently called upon to make
will benefit from these proceedings and the reasoning of the
district court.
Id. at 679–80. On December 13, 2019, however, the parties issued a joint
stipulation of dismissal in Washington, having agreed to a settlement. In other
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words, the district court never had the opportunity to determine the effect of the
2018 Amendments in Washington.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Appellants challenge the forfeiture of the Car pursuant to Indiana Code chapter
34-24-1. While Appellants acknowledge the 2018 Amendments, they argue, at
most, that the amended statutes do not apply to the seizure of the Car because it
was originally seized in December of 2016. Appellants make no claim or
argument whatsoever that the 2018 Amendments failed to cure the
constitutional defects of Indiana Code chapter 34-24-1. Appellees argue that
the 2018 Amendments do apply to the 2016 seizure and that they cured
whatever constitutional infirmities existed in the previous statutes, rendering
the second forfeiture proper.
I. Whether the Amended Statutes
Apply to the Seizure of the Car
[8] Appellants contend that the 2018 Amendments do not apply to this case
because the initial seizure of the Car occurred in December of 2016. We
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interpret this as a challenge on the ground that use of the amended chapter 34-
24-1 to seize the Car would amount to an impermissible ex post facto law.1
We have previously stated that the constitutional prohibitions
against ex post facto criminal sanctions require that criminal
proceedings be governed by the statutory provision in effect at the
time of the offense.[2] Settle v. State, 709 N.E.2d 34, 35 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999). […] However, we have noted that the ex post facto
clause “‘does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in all respects,
by the law in force when the crime charged was committed.’”
Hayden v. State, 771 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d
344 (1977)), trans. denied. The clause is not designed “to limit
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do
not affect matters of substance.” Id. “Even though it may work to
the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post
facto.” Id.
Our first task then is to determine whether [the changes are]
procedural or substantive for purposes of the ex post facto provisions
of both the Indiana and United States Constitutions. We have
previously noted that “‘[p]rocedural, adjective or remedial law is
that portion of the law which prescribes the method of enforcing a
1
We acknowledge that Butler, in his Brief of Appellant, fails to support this claim with any authority.
Although Butler does use the term ex post facto and support this argument with authority in his Reply Brief, it
is generally true that “[a]n issue not raised in an appellant’s brief may not be raised for the first time in a reply
brief.” Chupp v. State, 830 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). That said, our preference for addressing
claims on the merits is well-established, see, e.g., Rexroad v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., 36 N.E.3d 1181, 1183
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]here possible, we prefer to address cases on their merits.”), and we choose to
directly address his claim nonetheless.
2
The United States Supreme Court recently rejected the State of Indiana’s argument that Indiana Code
chapter 34-24-1 is not covered by the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Timbs v. Indiana, --- U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689–91 (2019). Because the civil forfeiture of
property related to the commission of crimes—including an in rem action against the property—is at least
partially punitive, it is subject to the coverage of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 689, see also State v. Timbs,
2019 WL 5540987 at *4 (Ind. Oct. 28, 2019) (“[F]orfeitures under Section [34-24-1-]1(a)(1)(A) are fines to
which the Excessive Fines Clause applies.”).
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right or obtaining a redress for the invasion of that right.
Substantive law, on the other hand, is that portion of the law
which creates, defines and regulates rights.’” Id. (quoting State v.
Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 717 P.2d 866, 870 (1986)). “An
amendment is ‘procedural in nature for purposes of the ex post facto
doctrine, and may be applied to crimes committed before the
effective date’ if it ‘neither changes the elements of the crime nor
enlarges its punishment.’” Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066, 1070
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 264
(Ind. 2004), reh’g denied, cert. denied 546 U.S. 828, 126 S. Ct. 42,
163 L. Ed. 2d 76 (2005)), trans. denied.
Abernathy v. Gulden, 46 N.E.3d 489, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Without
addressing the question of whether the 2018 Amendments cured the
constitutional infirmities identified by the Washington court, we have little
hesitation in at least concluding that the 2018 Amendments were all procedural
in nature. To summarize, the amended statutes (1) now require a prosecutor to
file a probable-cause affidavit within seven days of the seizure and the trial
court to make a probable-cause determination, (2) now allow owners who were
not in possession of the property when it was seized to file a petition for
provisional release of their property, and (3) significantly shorten the amount of
time permitted between the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the forfeiture
complaint. See Ind. Code § 34-24-1-2(b), -2(d), -3(a). The 2018 Amendments
do nothing to create, define, or regulate the State’s inherent power to seize
property from citizens under certain circumstances; they affect only the
procedures for enforcing that right and/or obtaining redress. Because the 2018
Amendments are procedural in nature, we conclude that applying them to the
seizure of the Car does not constitute an ex post facto law.
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II. Whether the 2018 Amendments Cured the
Defects in Indiana’s Civil Forfeiture Law
[9] The next question is whether the 2018 Amendments cured the constitutional
infirmities of chapter 34-24-1 as identified by the Washington court. As
Appellees point out, however, Appellants do not even claim, much less develop
an argument, that the 2018 Amendments failed to adequately address the
defects identified by the district court. For a question of this importance, i.e.,
the constitutionality of Indiana’s civil forfeiture statutes, we are not inclined to
supply one side with its argument. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 965 N.E.2d 70, 77
n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (stating that this court should not “‘make up its own
arguments’” when a “‘party has not adequately presented them’” because this
causes the court to become “‘an advocate rather than an adjudicator’”) (quoting
Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)); Shepherd v. Truex, 819
N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that we will not “become an
advocate for one of the parties” by developing a cogent argument on a party’s
behalf).
[10] Moreover, again because Appellants did not advance this claim in the trial
court either, the record is inadequately developed. In Washington, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals declined to address the question of whether the 2018
Amendments repaired Indiana Code chapter 34-24-1 because the district court
had not yet had an opportunity to address the question or develop a record.
Because we are faced with similar circumstances, we will follow the same path
and decline to address a constitutional question that was not raised or argued to
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the trial court or addressed by it, much less with an adequately-developed
record. We will diverge from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
in that we will not remand for further proceedings on the effect of the 2018
Amendments; Butler, unlike Washington, had the opportunity to raise the issue
but did not. It is well-settled that “[f]ailure to raise an issue before the trial
court will result in waiver of that issue.” Heaphy v. Ogle, 896 N.E.2d 551, 555
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Because the argument has been waived, we express no
opinion whatsoever on the question of whether the 2018 Amendments cured
the constitutional defects of Indiana Code chapter 34-24-1. Butler has failed to
carry his burden to establish that the seizure of the Car was in any way
improper.
III. Attorney’s Fees
[11] Appellants are seemingly requesting an award of both trial attorney’s fees and
appellate attorney’s fees. To the extent Appellants rely on Indiana Code section
34-52-1-1, this claim is waived because it is raised for the first time on appeal.
See, e.g., Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004); Evans v. Tuttle,
645 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (applying this rule specifically to a
challenge regarding attorney’s fees). Second, a trial court in a civil action may
award attorney’s fees “to the prevailing party[,]” see Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b),
and Appellants did not prevail below.
[12] To the extent Appellants seek attorney’s fees under Indiana Appellate Rule
66(E), that rule provides that “the Court may assess damages if an appeal,
petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be
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in the Court’s discretion and may include attorney’s fees.” The discretion to
award attorney’s fees is limited to instances “when an appeal is permeated with
meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of
delay.” In the Matter of Guardianship of Lamey, 87 N.E.3d 512, 527 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2017). We use “extreme restraint” when exercising this power because of
the “potential chilling effect on the exercise of the right to appeal.” Id. The
sanction is not imposed to punish “mere lack of merit, but something more
egregious.” Id. To prevail on a substantive bad faith claim, such as
Appellants’, “the party must show that the appellant’s contentions and
arguments are utterly devoid of all plausibility.” Id.; see also Landmark Legacy,
LP v. Runkle, 81 N.E.3d 1107, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
[13] We conclude that this is not a case where an award of appellate attorney’s fees
is warranted. Appellees presented a legal argument explaining why Washington
did not prohibit the forfeiture of the Car, which forfeiture was proceeding under
the newly-amended statutes that had been passed in response to Washington.
The amended statutes have not been declared unconstitutional, nor has the
State been enjoined from enforcing or proceeding under the amended statutes.
This is an entirely legitimate legal argument for Appellees to pursue.
Appellants have fallen short of establishing that Appellees’ arguments on appeal
are frivolous or made in bad faith.
[14] We affirm the judgment of the trial court and decline Appellants’ request for
appellate attorney’s fees.
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Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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