Quintin D.E. Davis v. State of Indiana ( 2019 )

FILED
Jul 31 2019, 10:37 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Alan K. Wilson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Quintin D. E. Davis, July 31, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-631
v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marianne Vorhees,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C01-1801-F6-21
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Quintin D.E. Davis (Davis), appeals his conviction for
domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Davis presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Davis’ request for
appointment of counsel made during the bench trial and more than one year
after affirming his request for self-representation.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Davis and L.W. met at their place of employment during June or July 2017.
They began dating one month later and in September 2017, they moved into an
apartment, together with L.W.’s two children from a previous relationship. On
January 1, 2018, Davis and L.W. argued when Davis intended to drink the last
bottle of Pepsi. L.W. squeezed the bottom of the bottle, spilling the Pepsi. In
response, Davis grabbed her bag of Skittles. When L.W. did not react, Davis
banged her phone against the side of the bed and shattered the screen. At that
point, L.W. was “ready to leave.” (Transcript p. 74). However, Davis
apologized and gave L.W. his phone to break, which she did.
[5] The following morning, L.W. started packing her belongings, intending to
move out. Davis grabbed L.W.’s cigarettes and they began to argue. He
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pushed L.W. and caused her to fall on top of her two-year-old son. When L.W.
moved towards her closet, Davis pinned her down and hit her in the face. She
fought her way towards the entrance of the bedroom before Davis pinned her
arms to her legs. L.W.’s daughter, who was down the hall, started crying.
L.W. managed to free herself by biting Davis’ chin and she escaped to the
neighbor’s apartment where she called 911. After making the call, she returned
to the apartment and Davis and L.W. began “going at it again.” (Tr. p. 76).
Davis grabbed L.W.’s laptop out of her hands and broke it in two pieces. L.W.
lost her balance, and fell on a glass table which Davis kicked in an attempt to
shatter it. Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived. While the officers
attempted to arrest him, Davis talked loudly and used profanity directed at the
officers. He tensed his arms, balled his fists, and was non-compliant with the
officers’ orders.
[6] On January 9, 2018, the State filed an Information, charging Davis with Count
I, battery against a public safety officer, a Level 6 felony; Count II, domestic
battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count III, resisting law enforcement, a
Class A misdemeanor. On January 17, 2018, during the pre-trial hearing,
Davis informed the trial court that he intended to represent himself. The trial
court noted the request and set it for a hearing. On January 24, 2018, the trial
court conducted a hearing to address Davis’ request to represent himself. Davis
advised the trial court that he was twenty-six, had a high school diploma, and
had completed some college education. He did not have any learning
disabilities, and understood and read the English language. Davis disclosed
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that he had never before participated in a jury trial, but had been charged with a
Class A misdemeanor in the past. Davis confirmed that although he had the
right to have an attorney appointed for him, he wanted to waive that right and
instead represent himself. He affirmed that he had made that choice voluntarily
and out of his own free will. The trial court proceeded to explain the
disadvantages of self-representation versus the advantages of being represented
by an attorney, trained in the rules of evidence and procedural mechanisms.
Davis acknowledged that he understood the trial court’s cautionary advice but
wanted to proceed pro se. Finding Davis competent, the trial court concluded
that he had voluntarily waived his right to an attorney and advised him that “if
[he] d[id] want an attorney at any time, all [he] ha[d] to do [wa]s send [the
court] a letter, or a motion, and” the trial court would assign Davis an attorney.
(Tr. p. 17).
[7] During the pre-trial hearing of September 12, 2018, the trial court enquired after
Davis’ preferred bench trial date setting, either December 20, 2018 or January
24, 2019. Davis explicitly confirmed the latter date. On November 19, 2018,
Davis signed a discovery receipt acknowledging that he had received the
charging Information and probable cause affidavit, police reports, witness
statements, and videotaped materials on a CD.
[8] On January 24, 2019, the trial court conducted a bench trial. After the State
began presenting its evidence, Davis interrupted, requesting a recess because he
“didn’t even know that we was [sic] coming into trial today.” (Tr. p. 37).
Upon conclusion of the recess, Davis told the trial court “I’m going to just go
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ahead and request for a P.D.” (Tr. p. 37). He advised the court “I’m not
prepared for this. Not, not right now. I’m just going to, you know, with the –
not knowing what to object, I’m just going to go ahead and continue it.” (Tr.
pp. 37-38). The State objected, noting that Davis knew “since September that
this was set. He’s the one that wanted to get it done sooner rather than later. I
think this is a ploy by [Davis] to come in here. He knows our victim flew in
from out of state.” (Tr. p. 39). Although Davis informed the trial court that his
“anxiety [wa]s through the roof,” the trial court denied his request for a public
defender, finding that the
alleged victim has flown in from California. She is here. So I
will deny the request for continuance and to be able to hire
counsel. I think this is exactly what the advisement is intended
to do, is to advise people of the risks of going ahead without an
attorney. And this was set September 12th, 2018. The notice says
Bench trial January 24, 2019 at 1:00 p.m. So we’re all
assembled. . . . My ruling is to deny the continuance, deny the
request for Public Defender.
(Tr. p. 40). At the close of the evidence, the trial court took the matter under
advisement.
[9] On February 26, 2019, the trial court issued its judgment, finding Davis guilty
of domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, but not guilty of battery against a
law enforcement officer, a Level 6 felony, and resisting law enforcement, a
Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Davis to pay a fine, court
costs, and domestic violence prevention and treatment fee.
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[10] Davis now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[11] Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request
for a public defender after the bench trial had started and more than a year after
Davis had waived his right to counsel.
[12] The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 13 of the
Indiana Constitution guarantee the right to counsel at any critical stage of
prosecution where counsel’s absence “might derogate from the accused’s right
to a fair trial.” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18
L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967). Correlative to this constitutional right to counsel is
the right of a defendant in a criminal proceeding to appear pro se. “The right to
defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the
personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must
be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his
advantage.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45
L.Ed.2d 562, 581 (1975).
[13] It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a defendant may
abandon his pro se defense after trial has begun and reassert his right to counsel.
Koehler v. State, 499 N.E.2d 196, 198-99 (Ind. 1986). We will reverse only if we
conclude that the trial court abused that discretion. Id. In Koehler, our supreme
court identified five factors to be considered by a trial court in order to exercise
meaningful discretion in ruling on a defendant’s request to change from self-
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representation to counsel-representation. Id. Specifically, the trial court should
consider: (1) the defendant’s prior history in the substitution of counsel and in
the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation, (2) the
reasons set forth in defendant’s request, (3) the length and stay of the trial
proceedings, (4) any disruption or delay in the trial proceedings which might be
expected to ensue if the request is granted, and (5) the likelihood of defendant’s
effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as
his own attorney. Id. at 199.
[14] Initially, and reflecting on Koehler’s first factor, we note that Davis was fully
advised of the dangers and disadvantages of waiving his right to counsel, a full
year prior to the commencement of the bench trial. The trial court explained
the charges to him and the consequences of proceeding pro se. Although Davis
acknowledged that he understood the charges and the trial court’s cautionary
advice, he indicated that he wanted to waive his right to counsel. During this
intermediate time leading to trial, Davis did not waiver in his decision to
proceed pro se. Davis was presented with an option of trial dates and the bench
trial was set for the date and time he selected. Davis filed motions and obtained
court orders in his favor. Even when the bench trial was convened and the
State started its presentation of the evidence did Davis remain silent and
proceeded pro se. At the commencement of the bench trial, Davis
competently—albeit unsuccessfully—addressed the State’s addition of a
foundational witness. Only during the State’s examination of its first witness
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did Davis change his mind. After requesting a recess, Davis returned and asked
for counsel to be appointed.
[15] Davis’ reason for his request to retract his waiver of counsel was his
unpreparedness and anxiety. The State objected, referencing the ample
opportunity to get prepared as the date of the bench trial had been set four
months earlier and the inconvenience to the victim who had flown in from out
of state if the case were to be continued. Granting Davis’ request would most
likely have resulted in a substantial continuance in order for counsel to get
familiar with the facts of the case and would have required additional sacrifice
from the victim who would have to make an additional trip to Indiana.
Although Davis relies on the trial court’s statement that he could request an
attorney “at any time” to support his contention that he should have been
assigned an attorney midway through the bench trial, the trial court tempered
that broad statement with the qualifier that Davis had to send the court “a letter
or a motion.” (Tr. p. 17). Accordingly, unlike Davis’ claim, the trial court’s
option to assign counsel did not span the entire trial after a full year of pre-trial
proceedings; but rather appears to be limited to the legal proceedings prior to
the commencement of trial. Despite the trial court’s denial of his request for
counsel, Davis effectively defended against the charges pro se. Not only did he
manage to impeach the victim during cross-examination, but he also was found
not guilty on two of the three charges the State brought against him.
[16] Mindful of the Koehler factors, and given the tardiness of Davis’ request and the
trial court’s previous warnings about self-representation, we conclude that the
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis’ midtrial request for
appointment of counsel.
CONCLUSION
[17] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Davis’ request for an attorney made during the bench trial and more
than one year after affirming his request for self-representation.
[18] Affirmed.
[19] Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur
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