Tawanda Nyanhongo v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                             FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    Jun 06 2019, 6:13 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                       CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                           Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Brian A. Karle                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Ball Eggleston, PC                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Lafayette, Indiana
    Samantha M. Sumcad
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Tawanda Nyanhongo,                                       June 6, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-2539
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Christina
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Klineman, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G17-1804-F6-12536
    May, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2539 | June 6, 2019                       Page 1 of 8
    [1]   Tawanda G. Nyanhongo appeals his conviction of Level 6 felony operating a
    vehicle while intoxicated with a previous conviction within five years. 1
    Nyanhongo argues the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his
    conviction. 2 We affirm and sua sponte remand for correction of the Abstract of
    Judgment.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On April 13, 2018, Nyanhongo and Yazmin Robinson went to the park to grill
    and eat dinner. During dinner, Nyanhongo drank a couple beers, so Robinson
    drove them to her house. While there, Nyanhongo had trouble walking. After
    ten to fifteen minutes at the house, Nyanhongo wanted to go to the liquor store.
    Robinson offered to drive, but they left Robinson’s house with Nyanhongo
    driving the vehicle. Robinson tried to convince Nyanhongo to stop driving.
    She called 911. She also made multiple attempts to pull the keys from the
    ignition, causing the vehicle to swerve.
    [3]   At approximately 11:30 p.m., Officer Harris was on his way to investigate
    Robinson’s 911 call when he observed Nyanhongo’s vehicle make a left turn,
    cross a double yellow line, and partially leave the lane of traffic. Nyanhongo
    corrected the vehicle’s path. Officer Harris then saw Nyanhongo’s vehicle
    1
    Ind. Code §§ 9-30-5-2(a), 9-30-5-3(a)(1).
    2
    Nyanhongo was also convicted of Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11.
    He received a suspended sentence of 180 days. Nyanhongo does not appeal that conviction or sentence, and
    accordingly we need not elaborate the facts and procedure related to that crime.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2539 | June 6, 2019                  Page 2 of 8
    swerve across the double yellow line a second time, and he initiated a traffic
    stop. Nyanhongo told Officer Harris that Robinson was trying to pull the keys
    out of the ignition. Officer Harris asked Nyanhongo to exit the vehicle and
    noticed a strong smell of alcohol. Nyanhongo’s eyes were glassy and
    bloodshot.
    [4]   Officer Alexander Redding also arrived at the scene. He noticed Nyanhongo
    leaning against the vehicle. Officer Redding administered a series of field
    sobriety tests. He conducted the horizontal gaze nystagmus test at the scene,
    and Nyanhongo failed that test. Officer Redding then transferred Nyanhongo
    to the Speedway Police Department because it was dark and raining at the
    scene. There, Officer Redding administered the walk and turn test and the one-
    legged stand test. Nyanhongo failed the walk and turn test but passed the one-
    legged stand test. Officer Redding concluded there was probable cause to
    invoke Indiana’s Implied Consent Law and offered Nyanhongo a chemical
    breath test. Nyanhongo refused the chemical breath test, so Officer Redding
    obtained a warrant authorizing a blood draw. The sample showed
    Nyanhongo’s whole body blood alcohol concentration to be in the range of .059
    to .071% (0.059 to 0.071 g/100mL). (Tr. Vol. II at 32-33.)
    [5]   The State charged Nyanhongo with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle
    while intoxicated endangering a person, pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-30-
    5-2. The State also charged Nyanhongo with a Level 6 Felony enhancement of
    that operating charge based on Nyanhongo having another conviction of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2539 | June 6, 2019   Page 3 of 8
    operating while intoxicated within the prior five years, pursuant to Indiana
    Code section 9-30-5-3(a)(1). 3
    [6]   The court found Nyanhongo guilty of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while
    intoxicated. The court sentenced Nyanhongo to concurrent terms of 365 days
    for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and 180 days for possession of
    marijuana. After giving Nyanhongo credit for time served, the trial court
    suspended the remainder of his sentence.
    Discussion and Decision
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [7]   Our standard of review for assessing sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled.
    We look only at the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences
    supporting the verdict. Love v. State, 
    73 N.E.3d 693
    , 696 (Ind. 2017). We
    neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. 
    Id. We affirm
    the trial court unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
    the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id. [8] Operating
    a vehicle while intoxicated with a previous conviction in the last five
    years is a Level 6 felony. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a) (operating while intoxicated);
    Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3(a)(1) (enhancement for prior conviction). Nyanhongo
    3
    The State also charged Nyanhongo with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, but it dismissed that
    charge prior to trial.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2539 | June 6, 2019                 Page 4 of 8
    does not dispute he had another conviction within the prior five years. Instead
    he argues the State presented insufficient evidence of intoxication.
    [9]    Our legislature defined intoxication as “under the influence of: (1) alcohol…so
    that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal
    control of a person’s faculties.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86. This statute does not
    require separate proof of impairment of action, impairment of thought, and loss
    of control of faculties. Curtis v. State, 
    937 N.E.2d 868
    , 873-874 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2010). Rather, “impairment is established by proof of certain behaviors and
    traits evincing impairment, irrespective of whether that evidence established
    particularized impairment of action, thought, and loss of control of faculties.”
    
    Id. (emphasis in
    original).
    [10]   Nyanhongo asks us to reconsider Curtis and hold the State must demonstrate
    separately proof of (1) impairment of action, (2) impairment of thought, and (3)
    loss of control of faculties. We decline to do so. For one, our reasoning in
    Curtis is sound. As we explained, “a person’s unfitness to operate a vehicle, i.e.,
    his impairment, is to be determined by considering his capability as a whole,
    not component by component, such that impairment of any of the three abilities
    necessary for the safe operation of a vehicle equals impairment.” 
    Id. at 873.
    Second, we will follow our previous decisions unless provided with a strong
    justification not to do so. Lincoln Utils., Inc. v. Office of Util. Consumer Counselor,
    
    661 N.E.2d 562
    , 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2539 | June 6, 2019    Page 5 of 8
    [11]   Third, Nyanhongo’s claim would fail even if we were to adopt his suggested
    interpretation of the statute. The State can demonstrate impairment by
    showing: “(1) the consumption of a significant amount of alcohol; (2) impaired
    attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of alcohol on
    the breath; (5) unsteady balance; (6) failure of field sobriety tests; and (7) slurred
    speech.” Vanderlinden v. State, 
    918 N.E.2d 642
    , 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
    denied. Robinson observed Nyanhongo drink alcohol and have trouble walking
    before he started driving. Nyanhongo’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Both
    Officer Harris and Officer Redding smelled alcohol on him. Nyanhongo had to
    lean against the vehicle for support. Nyanhongo failed two field sobriety tests,
    the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and the walk and turn test. This evidence
    demonstrates impairment of Nyanhongo’s actions, impairment of Nyanhongo’s
    thoughts, and loss of control of his faculties. See Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86
    (definition of intoxicated).
    [12]   Nyanhongo notes his blood alcohol concentration was below .08. However,
    the offense with which he was charged does not require proof of a specified
    blood alcohol content. Compare Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 (operating while
    intoxicated) with Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1 (operating with blood alcohol
    concentration of .08 or higher). Sufficient evidence supports Nyanhongo’s
    conviction. See Burnett v. State, 
    74 N.E.3d 1221
    , 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)
    (holding defendant’s slow and slurred speech, glassy eyes, and alcohol smell on
    breath, combined with officer’s observations at the scene, were sufficient
    evidence of intoxication).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2539 | June 6, 2019   Page 6 of 8
    Abstract of Judgment
    [13]   Sua sponte, we observe the Abstract of Judgment does not accurately reflect the
    judgment announced at the conclusion of trial. 4 At trial, after Nyanhongo
    conceded the required prior conviction, the court indicated it would enter the
    conviction as a Level 6 felony. (See Tr. Vol. II at 65.) However, the Abstract
    lists the charged crime for Count I as “9-30-5-2(a)(b)/F6: Operating a Vehicle
    While Intoxicated: Endangering a Person.” (App. Vol. 2 at 11.) It lists the
    statutory citation for the charge as “9-30-5-2(a)(b)” and notes disposition as
    “Finding of Guilty Lesser Included.” 5 (Id.) The Abstract of Judgment contains
    no reference to Indiana Code section 9-30-5-3(a)(1), which permitted the Class
    C misdemeanor crime to be enhanced to a Level 6 felony conviction.
    Therefore, we remand for the trial court to amend the Abstract of Judgment to
    reflect Nyanhongo is guilty of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while
    intoxicated with a previous conviction, in violation of Indiana Code section 9-
    30-5-3(a)(1). See Borum v. State, 
    951 N.E.2d 619
    , 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
    (remanding for trial court to correct the abstract of judgment).
    Conclusion
    4
    Nor, as written, does it support the one-year sentence imposed for Count I.
    5
    “Finding of Guilty Lesser Included” is a reference to the trial court’s refusal to find Nyanhongo endangered
    a person as required for the Class A misdemeanor conviction under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2(b).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2539 | June 6, 2019                       Page 7 of 8
    [14]   We affirm Nyanhongo’s conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated
    because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
    However, we remand for the trial court to amend the Abstract of Judgment to
    accurately reflect the verdict announced at trial.
    Affirmed and remanded.
    Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2539 | June 6, 2019   Page 8 of 8