Jason Lee DeGroot v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 01 2015, 10:03 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marce Gonzalez, Jr. Gregory Zoeller
Dyer, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Cynthia L. Ploughe
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason Lee DeGroot, October 1, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A03-1412-CR-457
v. Appeal from the Lake County
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Diane Ross
Appellee-Plaintiff Boswell
Trial Court Cause No.
45G03-1111-MR-7
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Following his plea of guilty to Voluntary Manslaughter1 as a class A felony,
Jason Lee DeGroot was sentenced to forty years in the Department of
Correction. DeGroot now appeals, contending that his sentence is
inappropriate pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
[2] We affirm.
[3] Following the death of his wife in 2010, DeGroot resided in Hammond,
Indiana with his ten-year-old son, Jason DeGroot, Jr. (Jason), and a family
friend, Doretta Gonzalez. Sometime between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. on November
14, 2011, DeGroot shot Jason in the back as he lay face-down in bed. Jason
died as a result of his injuries. The following afternoon, DeGroot spoke with
Gonzalez on the telephone. Shortly thereafter, DeGroot shot himself in the
chest and then climbed into bed with his already deceased son. Gonzalez
arrived home a short time later and discovered them both. A Ouija board was
found in the room and a copy of DeGroot’s wife’s obituary was posted on the
wall above the bed.
[4] DeGroot survived his injuries, and on November 29, 2011, the State charged
him with Jason’s murder. On September 16, 2014, the State filed an amended
information charging DeGroot with Count I, murder, and Count II, voluntary
manslaughter. On the same date, DeGroot entered into a plea agreement
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3. We note that, effective July 1, 2014, this offense was reclassified as Level 2
felony. Because DeGroot committed this offense prior to that date, it retains its prior classification as a class
A felony.
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whereby he would plead guilty but mentally ill to voluntary manslaughter and
the State would dismiss the murder charge. The plea agreement left sentencing
to the discretion of the trial court, except that the minimum sentence would be
thirty-two years. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
DeGroot to a term of forty years executed in the Department of Correction.
[5] DeGroot contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his
offense and his character. Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution grants
our Supreme Court the power to review and revise criminal sentences. See
Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 978(2015). Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7, the Supreme Court authorized this
court to perform the same task. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind.
2008). Per App. R. 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration
of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Inman v.
State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7). “Sentence review
under Appellate Rule 7(B) is very deferential to the trial court.” Conley v. State,
972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). DeGroot bears the burden on appeal of
persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. See id.
[6] The determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on
our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
case.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell, 895
N.E.2d at 1224). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to attempt to
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leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is
not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the perceived “correct” sentence in
each case. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1292. Accordingly, “the question under
Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather,
the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State,
894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original).
[7] In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the
statutory range established for the classification of the relevant offense.
DeGroot was convicted of class A felony voluntary manslaughter. The
advisory sentence for a class A felony is thirty years, with the minimum and
maximum sentence being twenty and fifty years, respectively. Ind. Code § 35-
50-2-4. DeGroot’s plea agreement, however, called for a minimum sentence of
thirty-two years. Thus, DeGroot’s forty-year sentence was eight years above
the minimum set forth in his plea agreement, but ten years short of the
maximum. On appeal, DeGroot argues that in light of his mental illness and
lack of criminal history, he should have received the minimum sentence
allowed under the plea agreement.
[8] The nature of DeGroot’s offense is disturbing, to say the least. DeGroot shot
his ten-year-old son in the back as he lay face-down in bed. After doing so,
DeGroot did not call the police or seek medical attention for Jason. Instead, he
remained in the home until the next day, when he shot himself in the chest and
then climbed into bed with Jason’s body. Gonzalez arrived home shortly
thereafter and discovered DeGroot and Jason’s body. DeGroot’s actions were
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the ultimate violation of his position of utmost trust as Jason’s only surviving
parent, and particularly heinous in light of Jason’s young age.
[9] While we acknowledge that DeGroot was diagnosed with depression and an
anxiety disorder following his arrest, he has not established that his mental
illness was significant enough to warrant a revision of his sentence. In Weeks v.
State, our Supreme Court set out a list of factors bearing on the mitigating
weight to be attributed to the defendant’s mental illness. 697 N.E.2d 28, 30
(Ind. 1998). “These factors include: (1) the extent of the defendant’s inability to
control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall
limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the
extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of
the crime.” Id. DeGroot has not directed our attention to any evidence
suggesting that his ability to control his behavior was impaired due to his
depression and anxiety, nor has he established that his functioning was limited
in any way. Indeed, both Gonzalez and DeGroot’s mother reported that
DeGroot was behaving normally the weekend before he killed Jason. Nor has
DeGroot established that he suffered from any longstanding mental illness—
rather, the record establishes that, aside from suffering attention-deficit disorder
as a child, DeGroot had never been diagnosed with any mental illness prior to
committing the instant offense.2 While DeGroot’s actions may have been
2
The cases upon which DeGroot relies in support of his argument that his mental illness warrants a
reduction of his sentence are easily distinguishable from the case before us. See, e.g., Archer v. State, 689
N.E.2d 678, 686 (Ind. 1997) (sentence reduced where defendant’s mental illness was “well-documented and
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motivated to some extent by his depression over the loss of his wife, the trial
court gave DeGroot’s mental illness due consideration when it imposed a
sentence ten years below the maximum.
[10] With respect to his character, DeGroot argues that prior to the instant offense,
he had been a caring and attentive father to Jason. DeGroot’s final actions
toward his son, however, undermine this claim. We also note that DeGroot
was suffering from some degree of mental illness at the time of the offense, and
that he had previously lived a law-abiding life and had been gainfully
employed. DeGroot’s violation of his position of trust and his failure to seek
medical attention for Jason after the shooting, however, reflect negatively on
his character. On balance, we cannot conclude that his forty-year sentence for
class A felony voluntary manslaughter is inappropriate.
[11] Judgment affirmed.
[12] Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
long-standing” and “limit[ed] his ability to function”); Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 678 (Ind. 1996)
(sentence reduced where overwhelming evidence was presented that defendant was gravely mentally ill at the
time of the offense).
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