Antwoin Richmond v. Keith Butts (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 25 2018, 9:53 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Antwoin Richmond Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Frances Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Antwoin Richmond, September 25, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-MI-366
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
Keith Butts, The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane,
Appellee-Respondent Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
33C02-1710-MI-129
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Since the revocation of his parole, Antwoin Richmond has filed several pro se
petitions for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court denied his most recent
habeas petition on grounds of res judicata. On appeal, Richmond, pro se,
delineates seven issues that can be consolidated into one. Did the trial court err
in denying his habeas petition?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] In December 2007, Richmond pled guilty to Class A felony child molesting and
was sentenced to twenty years. Richmond was released on parole in February
2013. His parole was revoked in May 2016,1 and he was ordered to serve the
remainder of his fixed term. In May 2017, Richmond was denied release to
parole.
[4] On October 24, 2016, Richmond, pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus asserting that the Indiana Department of Correction did not properly
award him good-time credit. On January 10, 2017, the trial court granted the
State’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that contrary to Richmond’s
claim, his earned good-time credit did not reduce his fixed term but was to be
applied in determining his eligibility for parole. Richmond filed a second
1
In April 2016, Richmond submitted a urine sample, which authorities determined had been adulterated or
diluted by Richmond. This set into motion a series of events that culminated in the revocation of
Richmond’s parole.
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habeas petition on March 6, 2017, again raising the issue of credit time but also
adding a claim that he was deprived of due process. On May 16, 2017, the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the State concluding that
Richmond’s claim was barred on the basis of res judicata given the prior entry
of summary judgment on Richmond’s first habeas petition. Richmond
appealed, and in a memorandum decision, this court affirmed the entry of
summary judgment in favor of the State. Richmond v. State, 33A01-1707-MI-
1537, slip op. at 6 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017). The court determined that the
second habeas petition was “essentially the same dispute, between the same
parties, repackaged to include a due process argument.” Id. Further, we stated
that “even were we to conclude that the claims in each petition are in fact
different, Richmond could have and should have raised his due process
argument in his first habeas corpus petition.” Id.
[5] On July 10, 2017, Richmond filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
(PCR Petition), which he amended on July 18, 2017. In this petition,
Richmond challenged the procedures used in revoking his parole and in later
denying his release to parole, arguing that they did not comply with due
process. Specifically, Richmond argued that (1) the proper procedures related
to procuring his urine sample were not followed, (2) the evidence was
insufficient to support the revocation/denial of his parole, (3) he was not
provided with the statutory criteria prior to his parole release hearing, (4) the
parole board did not consider the statutory factors for denying his release to
parole, and (5) neither the trial court nor his defense counsel informed him of
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the consequences of his plea agreement. The State filed a motion for summary
disposition as to claims (1) through (4), which the trial court granted on
October 25, 2017.2
[6] Richmond filed the instant habeas petition—his third—on October 16, 2017,
while his PCR Petition was still pending. Richmond again challenged the
revocation of his parole on due process grounds. He specifically argued that
“the process utilized in creating his parole violation report and the evidence
included in the report were invalid and in violation of his due process.”
Appellee’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 2. On November 29, 2017, the State filed its
response to the habeas petition as well as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ind.
Trial Rule 12(B)(6). The State argued, among other things, that Richmond’s
habeas petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On December 18,
2017, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss and denied
Richmond’s habeas petition. Richmond filed a motion for relief from
judgment, which the trial court denied. This appeal ensued. Additional facts
will be provided as needed.
Discussion & Decision
2
On October 24, 2017, Richmond submitted a motion to withdraw his petition for post-conviction relief.
The trial court received the motion on November 13, 2017, and, although the court had already entered
summary disposition on the PCR Petition, the trial court granted Richmond’s motion to withdraw the PCR
Petition without prejudice.
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[7] A T.R. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal
sufficiency of the claim, rather than the facts supporting it. Babes Showclub,
Jaba, Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Ind. 2009). We review a trial court’s
grant of such a motion de novo, viewing the pleadings in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and construing every reasonable inference in
the nonmovant’s favor. Id. T.R. 12 provides that if a trial court considering a
motion under T.R. 12(B)(6) is presented with matters outside the pleadings and
not excluded by the court, the motion to dismiss shall be treated as one for
summary judgment. Review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is de novo. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). As
for the denial of Richmond’s motion for relief from judgment, because the trial
court ruled on a paper record without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the
standard of review on appeal is de novo. Williams v. Tharp, 934 N.E.2d 1203,
1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[8] This appeal is Richmond’s third bite at the apple. Summary judgment was
granted in favor of the State on both of his prior habeas petitions, the first one
based on the merits and the second based on the doctrine of res judicata given
the outcome with the first habeas petition. As with his second habeas petition,
res judicata precludes relief under the instant petition.
[9] “Res judicata serves to prevent litigation of disputes which are essentially the
same. The doctrine of res judicata consists of two distinct components, claim
preclusion and issue preclusion.” Dawson v. Estate of Ott, 796 N.E.2d 1190, 1195
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted).
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Claim preclusion is applicable when a final judgment on the
merits has been rendered and acts to bar a subsequent action on
the same claim between the same parties. When claim
preclusion applies, all matters that were or might have been litigated
are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in the prior
action. Claim preclusion applies when the following four factors
are present: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on
the merits; (3) the matter now at issue was, or could have been,
determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy
adjudicated in the former action was between parties to the
present suit or their privies.
Id. (emphases added) (citations omitted).
[10] The judgment rendered on Richmond’s first habeas petition was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction and on the merits. Richmond’s second habeas
petition presented “essentially the same dispute, between the same parties,
repackaged to include a due process argument.” Richmond, slip op. at 2. This
court held that even if the claims in the first and second habeas petitions were in
fact different, Richmond “could have and should have raised his due process
argument in his first habeas corpus petition.” Id. Thus, it was determined that
the second habeas petition was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata.
[11] In the instant habeas petition, Richmond argues that “the process utilized in
creating his parole violation report and the evidence included in the report were
invalid and in violation of his due process.” Appellee’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 2.
These arguments were known and available to Richmond when he filed his first
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habeas petition and could have been determined at that time. This type of
repetitive litigation is explicitly precluded under the doctrine of res judicata.
[12] Judgment affirmed.
Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.
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