Jasmine Davis v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 08 2014, 6:04 am
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JAY RODIA GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JAMES B. MARTIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JASMINE DAVIS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1312-CR-000610
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Annie Christ-Garcia, Judge
Cause No. 49F24-1302-FD-013447
July 8, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FRIEDLANDER, Judge
Jasmine Davis appeals her conviction for Theft,1 a D felony. She challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence as her sole issue on appeal.
We affirm.
Susan Brotherton left her Westside Indianapolis home on February 6, 2013 around
8:20 in the morning. She returned home about 12:40 p.m. and discovered that her home
had been burglarized. Several items were missing, including a red Nikon camera.
Brotherton provided police with the serial number for the camera. Detective Brian
Hofmeister ran a database search of pawn shops in Marion County and discovered that the
camera had been sold by Davis to Indy Pawn at 4:15 on the afternoon of the burglary. The
pawn shop is in Lawrence, across town from the site of the burglary and Davis’s Avon
residence.
Police brought Davis in for questioning on February 26, 2013. Davis gave a
voluntary, though evasive, statement to Detective Hofmeister. When asked where the
camera had come from, Davis indicated that a man was on the street selling a trunk full of
electronics for $200. She stated that she purchased this lot of items with her brother and a
friend in January. Davis pawned several of these items on January 25 and became the
subject of a Hendricks County investigation involving an Avon burglary.
Davis claimed that the camera was in the same lot of electronics that she purchased
in January, but Detective Hofmeister alerted her to the fact that this could not be because
the camera was not stolen until February 6 and pawned that same day. Davis indicated that
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Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-4-2 (West, Westlaw current with all legislation of the 2nd Regular Session of the
118th General Assembly (2014) with effective dates through May 1, 2014).
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she had been terminated and left work before noon on February 6. She went home after
picking up her daughter. According to Davis, she then retrieved the camera from her home
and pawned it across town. Other than her claim that she thought the camera came out of
the lot of electronics purchased from a man’s trunk, Davis did not explain her possession
of the camera.
The State charged Davis with class D felony theft. The case was tried to the bench
on August 12, 2013. The trial court found Davis guilty as charged. Thereafter, the trial
court ordered alternative misdemeanor sentencing and imposed a sixty-day term of
imprisonment in the Marion County Jail. Davis now appeals on sufficiency grounds.
Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence is well
settled.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal
conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.
Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008). “We consider only the
evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from such evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there is substantial
evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009).
In order to convict Davis of theft as charged in this case, the State was required to
prove that she knowingly exerted unauthorized control over another’s property, with intent
to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a). “A person
engages in conduct knowingly if, when she engages in the conduct, she is aware of a high
probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(b) (West, Westlaw current
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with all legislation of the 2nd Regular Session of the 118th General Assembly (2014) with
effective dates through May 1, 2014).
Davis contends that the State failed to sufficiently establish that she had knowledge
that the camera was stolen at the time she pawned it. We have explained:
“Knowledge that property is stolen may be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the possession.” Bennett v. State, 787 N.E.2d 938, 946 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), trans. denied. The test of knowledge is not whether a reasonable
person would have known that the property had been the subject of theft but
whether, from the circumstances surrounding the possession of the property,
the defendant knew that it had been the subject of theft. Possession of
recently stolen property when joined with attempts at concealment, evasive
or false statements, or an unusual manner of acquisition may be sufficient
evidence of knowledge that the property was stolen.
Purifoy v. State, 821 N.E.2d 409, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (some citations omitted), trans.
denied.
Here, the camera was taken across town and pawned by Davis within hours of the
burglary. Davis’s own statement about how she obtained the stolen camera was evasive.
She initially claimed to have purchased it along with a trunk full of other electronics in a
one-time transaction with a man on the street. Davis indicated that she knew the electronics
could be resold for much more. A trier of fact could reasonably conclude that this
constitutes an unusual manner of acquisition. Further, when this explanation was
questioned by the detective, Davis stated that she could not otherwise explain her
possession of the camera. She simply said that the camera was at her home when she
returned from being terminated at work, and she took it to the pawn shop that afternoon.
The circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that Davis
knew the camera was stolen.
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Judgment affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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