tanya-anderson-and-delmonte-anderson-individually-and-as-personal ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                  ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
    Jeffrey A. Golding                                       CIVIL CITY OF SOUTH BEND,
    Valparaiso, Indiana                                      SOUTH BEND POLICE
    DEPARTMENT, CITY
    ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, ET AL.
    Aladean M. DeRose
    City Attorney
    South Bend, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    ST. JOSEPH COUNTY
    PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,
    MICHAEL DVORAK, KEN COTTER,
    ST. JOSEPH COUNTY CORONER’S
    OFFICE, RANDY MAGDALINSKI,
    ST. JOSEPH COUNTY METRO
    HOMICIDE UNIT, AND TIM
    CORBETT
    James F. Groves
    David E. Ballard
    Lee, Groves & Zalas
    South Bend, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015   Page 1 of 10
    Tanya Anderson and Delmonte                                 October 16, 2015
    Anderson, Individually and as                               Court of Appeals Case No.
    Personal Representatives of the                             71A03-1502-CT-53
    Supervised Estate of Michael                                Appeal from the St. Joseph
    Delshawn Anderson, Deceased,                                Superior Court
    et al.,                                                     The Honorable Jenny Pitts Manier,
    Appellants-Plaintiffs,                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    v.                                               71D05-1407-CT-258
    Civil City of South Bend a/k/a
    “City of South Bend,” South
    Bend Police Department, St.
    Joseph County Prosecuting                                                  Oct 16 2015, 5:48 am
    Attorney, St. Joseph County
    Coroner’s Office, St. Joseph
    County Metro Homicide Unit, et
    al.,
    Appellees-Defendants
    Crone, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   Michael Delshawn Anderson (“Michael”) 1 was allegedly tased and assaulted by
    South Bend police officers and died in police custody. On the last day of the
    statutory limitations period, Michael’s parents, Tanya and Delmonte Anderson,
    filed a wrongful death complaint against various defendants affiliated with the
    1
    Because appellants have a common surname, we refer to Michael by his first name.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015             Page 2 of 10
    Civil City of South Bend (collectively “the City Defendants”) and St. Joseph
    County (collectively “the County Defendants”) on behalf of themselves
    individually and as personal representatives of Michael’s estate, as well as on
    behalf of Michael’s minor children (collectively “the Plaintiffs”). The
    complaint was file-stamped with that date, and the summonses furnished by the
    Plaintiffs were file-stamped eight days later. The City Defendants filed a
    motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint, presumably on the basis that the
    lawsuit was untimely because the summonses were not “filed” with the clerk
    before the limitations period expired. The trial court granted the motion to
    dismiss and later denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to correct error.
    [2]   The Plaintiffs now appeal. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting
    the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss because the Indiana Trial Rules require
    only that a plaintiff “furnish” a summons contemporaneously with the “filing”
    of a complaint, and there is no indication in the record that the Plaintiffs failed
    to do so here. Ind. Trial Rule 4(B). Consequently, we reverse and remand for
    further proceedings.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   By way of background, Indiana Trial Rule 3 states,
    A civil action is commenced by filing with the court a complaint
    or such equivalent pleading or document as may be specified by
    statute, by payment of the prescribed filing fee or filing an order
    waiving the filing fee, and, where service of process is required,
    by furnishing to the clerk as many copies of the complaint and
    summons as are necessary.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015   Page 3 of 10
    And Indiana Trial Rule 4(B) states,
    Contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint or
    equivalent pleading, the person seeking service or his attorney
    shall furnish to the clerk as many copies of the complaint and
    summons as are necessary. The clerk shall examine, date, sign,
    and affix his seal to the summons and thereupon issue and
    deliver the papers to the appropriate person for service.
    Our supreme court has held that a civil action is untimely “if the plaintiff files a
    complaint within the applicable statute of limitations but does not tender the
    summons to the clerk within that statutory period.” Ray-Hayes v. Heinamann,
    
    760 N.E.2d 172
    , 173 (Ind. 2002), reh’g granted on other grounds, 
    768 N.E.2d 899
    .
    [4]   Michael was allegedly tased and assaulted by South Bend police and died in
    their custody on July 22, 2012. The Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death complaint
    against the City Defendants and the County Defendants on July 22, 2014, the
    last day of the statutory limitations period. The trial court’s chronological case
    summary (“CCS”) entry for that date states, “Complaint/Equivalent Pleading
    Filed,” and the complaint is file-stamped July 22, 2014. Appellants’ App. at 5,
    16.
    [5]   On August 19, 2014, the City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
    Plaintiffs’ complaint, presumably under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure
    to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To our dismay, the motion
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015   Page 4 of 10
    does not appear in the record before us. 2 We presume that it asserts that the
    Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely because the summonses were not “filed” on
    July 22, 2014. The summonses are file-stamped July 30, 2014. City
    Defendants’ App. at 4-6. But the CCS does not state that the summonses were
    furnished to the clerk on that date; it simply states that service was issued.
    Appellants’ App. at 5.
    [6]   On October 23, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss.
    The Plaintiffs’ counsel appeared by telephone due to illness. When the court
    asked him to respond to the City Defendants’ argument that the summonses
    were untimely “filed,” he said, “I don’t know how to respond because I don’t
    have that in front of me,” and, “I believe that everything was filed at the same
    time.” Tr. at 6, 7. That same day, the trial court issued an order granting the
    City Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the summonses were
    untimely “filed.” 3 Appellants’ App. at 11.
    [7]   Trial Rule 59(C) states that a
    motion to correct error, if any, shall be filed not later than thirty
    (30) days after the entry of a final judgment is noted in the
    2
    Cf. Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2) (stating that appellant’s appendix “shall contain … pleadings and other
    documents from the Clerk’s Record in chronological order that are necessary for resolution of the issues
    raised on appeal”); Ind. Trial Rule 50(A)(3) (stating that appellee’s appendix “may contain additional items
    that are relevant to either issues raised on appeal or on cross-appeal”).
    3
    In the same order, the trial court also granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the County
    Defendants. The Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal and appellate brief do not mention this ruling, but the County
    Defendants filed an appellees’ brief, apparently out of an abundance of caution.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015            Page 5 of 10
    Chronological Case Summary. A copy of the motion to correct
    error shall be served, when filed, upon the judge before whom the
    case is pending pursuant to Trial Rule 5.
    Trial Rule 5(E) states, “Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2)
    hereof, all pleadings and papers subsequent to the complaint which are required
    to be served upon a party shall be filed with the Court either before service or
    within a reasonable period of time thereafter.”
    [8]   The CCS indicates that the Plaintiffs filed a motion to correct error on
    November 24, 2014, which was the latest possible date under Trial Rule 59(C).
    The CCS also indicates that a motion to correct error was filed on November
    26, 2014. The appellants’ appendix contains a copy of the motion to correct
    error that is file-stamped November 24, 2014, and states in pertinent part,
    14. Counsel for the “City Defendants” argued both orally, and
    within the written motion to dismiss that T.R. [Trial Rule] 3
    requires that Plaintiffs “file” summons along with “filing” the
    complaint and pay the appropriate filing fee.
    15. This matter was filed by Plaintiffs by certified mail, and
    pursuant to T.R. 3, there were “as many copies of the complaint
    and summons” as were necessary and the proof of mailing are a
    part of the Court’s file.
    16. All necessary documents and filing fees were included in
    one mailing which was received by the clerk of the court on or
    about July 24, 2014.
    17. No other filings were made by Plaintiffs after July 22,
    2014, other than two motions to continue hearings.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015   Page 6 of 10
    18. Counsel for Plaintiffs has spoken to clerks in three
    different counties and has learned that the file stamp on the
    summons signifies the date that the summons and complaint are
    sent out by the clerk’s office.
    19. The file stamp of July 30, 2014 indicates the day that the
    clerk’s office mailed the complaints and summons to the
    respective defendants and not the day that the summonses were
    furnished to the clerk of the Court.
    20. The “City Defendants” and the Court have erred by
    requiring that a plaintiff must “file” the summons rather than
    “furnish” as T.R. 3 requires.
    Appellants’ App. at 41-42.
    [9]   The appellants’ appendix also contains an identical copy of the motion to
    correct error, a supporting memorandum, and an affidavit from the Plaintiffs’
    counsel, all of which are file-stamped November 26, 2014. Curiously, the
    appendix also contains an affidavit from the typist who prepared the complaint
    and summonses that is file-stamped November 23, 2014. 
    Id. at 52.
    The CCS
    does not have an entry for that date. In their response to the motion to correct
    error, the City Defendants argued that the motion was untimely filed on
    November 26. The trial court did not rule on the motion, and thus it was
    deemed denied pursuant to Trial Rule 53.3. 4 This appeal ensued.
    4
    See Ind. Trial Rule 53.3 (“In the event a court fails for forty-five (45) days to set a Motion to Correct Error
    for hearing, or fails to rule on a Motion to Correct Error within thirty (30) days after it was heard or forty-five
    (45) days after it was filed, if no hearing is required, the pending Motion to Correct Error shall be deemed
    denied.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015                 Page 7 of 10
    Discussion and Decision
    [10]   The Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to
    correct error and in granting the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The City
    Defendants argue that the motion to correct error was untimely and that we
    should not consider the supporting evidence in any event because “affidavits
    may not be used to present evidence the party neglected to offer during the
    proceeding.” Mid-States Aircraft Engines, Inc. v. Mize Co., 
    467 N.E.2d 1242
    , 1245
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Assuming without deciding that the City Defendants’
    arguments have merit, 5 we nevertheless conclude that the trial court erred in
    granting their motion to dismiss.
    [11]   Resolution of this issue requires interpretation of the Trial Rules, which is a
    question of law that we review de novo. In re Paternity of V.A., 
    10 N.E.3d 61
    , 63
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “[A]s with statutes, our objective when construing the
    meaning of a rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intent underlying the
    rule.” Carter-McMahon v. McMahon, 
    815 N.E.2d 170
    , 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
    The Trial Rules are to be construed together and harmoniously if possible. 
    Id. “If the
    language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial
    interpretation. Moreover, in construing a rule, it is just as important to
    5
    According to the Plaintiffs’ counsel, both copies of the motion to correct error and the accompanying
    documents “were all mailed in the same envelope,” and “[o]ne might assume that the documents which were
    file stamped November 26, 2014 were perhaps the documents which went to [the trial court] prior to being
    received at the clerk’s office.” Appellants’ Br. at 5.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015       Page 8 of 10
    recognize what it does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    [12]   To reiterate, Trial Rule 3 provides that a civil action is commenced by “filing …
    a complaint,” by payment of the filing fee, and, “where service of process is
    required, by furnishing to the clerk as many copies of the complaint and
    summons as are necessary.” (Emphases added.) And Trial Rule 4(B) provides
    that, “[c]ontemporaneously with the filing of the complaint,” an attorney
    seeking service “shall furnish to the clerk as many copies of the complaint and
    summons as are necessary.” (Emphases added.) These rules do not require
    that a summons be filed; they require only that it be furnished to the clerk with
    the complaint. In this case, the CCS does not indicate when the summonses
    were furnished to the clerk; it indicates only when the complaint was filed (July
    22) and when service was issued (July 30). 6 Notably, Trial Rule 4(B) does not
    say that service must be issued on the same day that the summons is furnished;
    it says only that the clerk “shall examine, date, sign, and affix his seal to the
    summons and thereupon issue and deliver the papers to the appropriate person
    for service.”
    [13]   “[I]t is well settled that the trial court speaks through its CCS or docket[.]” City
    of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 
    932 N.E.2d 227
    , 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied
    6
    Trial Rule 77(B) states, “Notation of judicial events in the Chronological Case Summary shall be made
    promptly, and shall set forth the date of the event and briefly define any documents, orders, rulings, or
    judgments filed or entered in the case.” Because a summons is furnished, rather than filed, this might explain
    the omission.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015            Page 9 of 10
    (2011). Here, the CCS is silent as to when the summonses were furnished to
    the clerk, and there is no CCS entry evidencing the submission of any papers to
    the clerk by the Plaintiffs other than the July 22, 2014 filing. If, as the City
    Defendants assert, the summonses were not furnished with the complaint, there
    is no notation to this effect. As the party seeking dismissal, the City Defendants
    had the burden of establishing that the summonses were furnished after the
    statute of limitations expired, and on this record they failed to carry that
    burden. 7 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of the City Defendants’
    motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings.
    [14]   Reversed and remanded.
    May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
    7
    Because the clerk of the circuit court is responsible for maintaining the CCS pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule
    77(B), and because a defendant has the burden of establishing sufficient grounds for dismissal, we reject the
    City Defendants’ suggestion that a plaintiff must bear the burden of proving something that the clerk did not
    record. It is unfortunate that there is no evidence from the clerk’s office regarding when it received the
    summonses and its policies and procedures for recording such events in the CCS.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1502-CT-53 | October 16, 2015            Page 10 of 10