G.T. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                   Oct 19 2015, 5:44 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Lisa M. Johnson                                           Gregory F. Zoeller
    Brownsburg, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Richard C. Webster
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    G.T.,                                                     October 19, 2015
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1504-JV-239
    v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Marilyn Moores,
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                      Judge
    The Honorable Gary Chavers,
    Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49D09-1412-JD-3069
    Vaidik, Chief Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-239 | October 19, 2015          Page 1 of 5
    Case Summary
    [1]   G.T. was ordered to pay $250 in restitution as a condition of his probation for
    stealing a van. G.T. was unable to pay the restitution at the time of the
    restitution hearing, but there was evidence that he was able to work, was
    looking for a job, and had no living expenses. We conclude, therefore, that it
    was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that he would be
    able to pay a nominal amount in the future and to order restitution as a
    condition of probation so long as G.T. would not be detained or have his
    probation revoked if he remained unable to pay restitution despite his best
    efforts.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On the morning of December 27, 2014, sixteen-year-old G.T. stole a van that
    belonged to Donald and Breanna Coffey. Mr. Coffey immediately reported the
    theft to the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. Later the same day,
    Mr. Coffey saw his van parked in an alley, and he called the police again.
    Officer Shane Decker came to help Mr. Coffey recover his van and he spoke
    with the owner of the home adjacent to the alley where the stolen van was
    parked. While Officer Decker was talking with the homeowner, there was a
    loud crash in the kitchen caused by drywall and insulation falling from the
    ceiling. Officer Decker checked the attic above the kitchen, found G.T. hiding
    there, and took him into custody.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-239 | October 19, 2015   Page 2 of 5
    [3]   The State filed a petition alleging that G.T. committed auto theft, which would
    have been a Level 6 felony if it was committed by an adult. At the denial
    hearing the court entered a true finding. At the dispositional hearing, the court
    sentenced G.T. to probation, among other things, and left open the question of
    restitution.
    [4]   The following month at the restitution hearing, Ms. Coffey testified to damages,
    which included Christmas presents that were taken from the van and physical
    damage to the van that cost the Coffeys $250 to repair. The trial court limited
    the restitution order to the Coffeys’ costs for van repairs because the Christmas
    presents were not included in either the petition or the probable-cause affidavit.
    [5]   G.T. presented substantial evidence regarding his ability to pay. G.T. is a
    sixteen-year-old ward of the State who lives with his grandmother and three
    younger siblings. He has never held a job, has neither a bank account nor any
    assets, and his sixteen-year-old girlfriend was in labor with his child at the time
    of the hearing. He had, however, been applying for work and was hopeful that
    he might be hired at a nearby grocery store. Finally, G.T. was attending night
    school, which would allow him to work more hours than a traditional high-
    school student when he found a job.
    [6]   The court ultimately ordered G.T. to pay restitution of $250—the Coffeys’
    insurance deductible—as a condition of his probation. G.T. appeals the
    restitution order.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-239 | October 19, 2015   Page 3 of 5
    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   G.T. argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay
    $250 in restitution as a condition of his probation because he had no present
    ability to pay at the time of the hearing. Indiana Code section 31-37-19-5(b)(4)
    permits a juvenile court to order a child to “pay restitution if the victim provides
    reasonable evidence of the victim’s loss, which the child may challenge at the
    dispositional hearing.” A restitution order is within the trial court’s discretion,
    and this Court will only reverse upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. P.J.
    v. State, 
    955 N.E.2d 234
    , 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). An abuse of discretion
    occurs when the trial court’s determination is clearly against the logic and effect
    of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and
    actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. 
    Id. [8] Equal-protection
    and fundamental-fairness concerns require a juvenile court to
    consider the juvenile’s ability to pay before ordering restitution as a condition of
    probation. The juvenile court’s inquiry is intended to prevent indigent juveniles
    from being imprisoned because of their inability to pay. J.H. v. State, 
    950 N.E.2d 731
    , 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
    [9]   However, the statute authorizing restitution in juvenile proceedings does not
    address the juvenile’s ability to pay. See Ind. Code § 31-37-19-5(b)(4). Under
    similar circumstances, this Court has taken guidance from the adult restitution
    statute where the juvenile statute was silent. See M.L. v. State, 
    838 N.E.2d 525
    ,
    529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. The adult statute requires the court to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-239 | October 19, 2015   Page 4 of 5
    consider what the person can pay or “will be able to pay” before ordering
    restitution as a condition of probation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6).
    [10]   It is clear from the record that the court inquired into G.T.’s ability to pay and
    also that G.T. lacked the present ability to pay restitution at the time of the
    hearing. He was sixteen years old, his girlfriend was in labor with his first child
    on the day of the hearing, and he had no job, no bank account, and no assets.
    However, the record also indicates that G.T. was able to work and was looking
    for jobs at the time of the hearing. Additionally, G.T. was living with his
    grandmother and had no living expenses. It was, therefore, reasonable for the
    trial court to determine that he would have the ability to repay the victims’ $250
    insurance deductible in the near future.
    [11]   Requiring G.T. to be responsible for the financial consequences of his
    delinquent conduct is consistent with the purpose of restitution and is not an
    abuse of discretion so long as he will not be detained or have his probation
    revoked if he remains unable to pay restitution despite his best efforts. We
    conclude, therefore, that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it
    ordered G.T. to pay restitution as a condition of his probation.
    [12]   Affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1504-JV-239 | October 19, 2015   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1504-JV-239

Filed Date: 10/19/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2015