Shemika L. Boyd v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development and Amazon Com INDC, LLC ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 04 2014, 10:08 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
SHEMIKA L. BOYD GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KATHY BRADLEY
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
SHEMIKA L. BOYD, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1310-EX-886
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT and )
AMAZON COM INDC, LLC, )
)
Appellees-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT
OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
The Honorable Steven F. Bier, Chairperson
Cause No. 13-R-3384
June 4, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Petitioner, Shemika Boyd (Boyd), appeals the decision of the
Unemployment Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the
Board) that Boyd is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits following her
termination by Appellee-Respondent, Amazon COM INDC LLC (Amazon).
We affirm.
ISSUE
Boyd raises one issue on appeal, which we restate the following: Whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the Board’s determination that Boyd was ineligible for
unemployment compensation benefits because she was discharged for just cause.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 11, 2011, Boyd began working at Amazon as a full time warehouse
associate. On June 21, 2013, Boyd requested five hours of unpaid personal time to be used
on June 23, 2013. Her vacation was approved by her manager. However, the manager did
not know she had only two hours available. From June 24 to June 26, 2013, Boyd worked
her normal shift from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On June 26, 2013, Amazon discharged Boyd
around 5:45 p.m.
Boyd subsequently filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits with the
Indiana Department of Workforce Development (DWD). On July 19, 2013, the DWD
found Boyd eligible for unemployment compensation benefits because Amazon had not
provided sufficient evidence to “establish that the discharge was as a result of willful
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misconduct.” (Exhibit p. 1). On July 29, 2013, Amazon appealed that decision. In a
hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on September 6, 2013, Amazon was
present, but Boyd failed to attend despite being given notice. Following the hearing, the
ALJ entered the following findings of facts and conclusions of law, reversing the DWD’s
decision:
Finding of Fact
[Amazon] has an attendance policy that provides []all absences must be scheduled
using paid time off, which the employees get 40 hours to start and vacation
depending on tenure. There is also a bank of time for emergencies that is unpaid.
Employees start at 40 hours available unpaid time [] . Any negative balance of
unpaid time [] is grounds for termination under the policy. [Boyd] received three
letters warning her that her time was low. The last came on May 14, [2013]
[warning] her that she only had two hours of unpaid time off left.
The last absence that put [Boyd] into negative unpaid time off balance was on June
23, 2013. [Boyd] requested for five hours off that was approved ahead of time by a
manager, but the manager did not know that [Boyd] only had two hours available.
[] [Boyd] knew she had only two hours available from the latest warning letter she
received. The hour balance is also available on the work computer system for
employees to look at their available time and they are responsible for keeping track,
and not managers. []
Conclusion of Law
A claimant is disqualified for unemployment benefits if he or she has been
discharged for “just cause[.]” [Amazon] asserted that it discharged [Boyd] for
violating a work rule. Pursuant to the Indiana Code, “just cause” includes a
“knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer,
including a rule regarding attendance.”
***
The ALJ concludes: [Amazon] cited [a] work rule [that was] reasonable [,] that
places no harsh requirements on employees, and [that] prevents poor attendance by
employees. The rule can be and is uniformly enforced because any employee who
uses up paid time off and goes into a negative balance with unpaid time off is
discharged. [] [Boyd] was aware of the rule. [Boyd] knowingly violated a known,
reasonable, and uniformly enforced rule of [Amazon]. [Amazon] discharged
[Boyd] for just Cause.
Decision
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The [d]etermination of [e]ligibility dated July 19, 2013, is [reversed]. [Amazon]
discharged [Boyd] for just cause. [Boyd’s] weekly benefit amount is suspended
effective week ending June 29, 2013 . . .
(Exhibit pp. 18-19). Boyd appealed the decision of the ALJ to the Board, which affirmed
the ALJ’s decision.
Boyd now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Waiver
Boyd, who is appealing pro se, filed an appellant’s brief that entirely fails to comply
with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, including arguments are not “[un]supported
by cogent reasoning” and without appropriate citations to legal authority. Ind. Appellate
Rule 46(A)(8)(a). A pro se appellant is bound by the procedural rules in the same
manner as a licensed attorney. Ramsey v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 789
N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). It is not the role of this court to act as an advocate
for a pro se party or address arguments that are “too poorly developed or improperly
expressed to be understood.” Id. Accordingly, where a party’s non-compliance with the
appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our review, we will consider her alleged errors
waived. Id. In this case, Boyd’s brief disregards the applicable provision of Appellate
Rule 46, and it would be well within our province to find she has waived her argument for
appeal. However, it is well-established that our court prefers to decide cases based on their
merits. Moore v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 951 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011). Because we are able to discern the gist of Boyd’s claim, we elect to
consider the merits of this case, waiver notwithstanding.
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II. Standard of Review
Pursuant to the Indiana Compensation Act (Act), “[a]ny decision of the [Board]
shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.” Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12(a).
When the Board’s decision is challenged as contrary to law, we must consider whether
there is sufficient evidence to support the Board’s factual findings and whether there are
sufficient facts to sustain the decision. S.S. LLC v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce
Dev., 953 N.E.2d 597, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). On review, “(1) findings of basic fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed questions of law and fact—
ultimate facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal propositions are reviewed
for correctness.” Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136,
1139 (Ind. 2011). Accordingly, we will affirm the Board’s decision if there is substantial
evidence to support its findings and if the decision is reasonable in light of those findings.
Coleman v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 905 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh evidence, and we consider
only the evidence most favorable to the Board’s decision. Id.
III. Just Cause for Termination
Here, Boyd argues that she is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits
because she was discharged by Amazon for an unjust cause. In her brief, Boyd asserts that
the ALJ’s finding that she knowingly violated Amazon’s attendance policy was erroneous.
Boyd explains that she cumulatively had “2.54 hours of personal time” and “3.35 hours of
vacation time,” and “2 hours of unpaid time.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 6). Thus, Boyd argues
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that she had a total of “7.89 hours to use before she would reach a negative balance to be
terminated.” Id.
Turning to Boyd’s argument, we first note that Boyd raises these issues for the first
time on appeal. A party who fails to raise an issue before an administrative body waives
the issue on appeal. See Cunningham v. Review Bd. of Ind. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce
Dev., 913 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Thus, Boyd should have presented these
facts to the ALJ, but because Boyd did not return the written acknowledgement or leave
her telephone number, she did not participate in the hearing. Consequently, Amazon
presented to the ALJ the following evidence: In April 2013, Amazon rolled out an
attendance policy assigning to all of its employees, forty hours of unpaid personal time.
Any negative balance of unpaid personal time, per the policy is grounds for termination.
Boyd used her unpaid personal time for the year 2013 as follows: April 7, five hours; April
9, three hours; April 11, five hours; April 12, ten hours; April 16, five hours; May 3, five
hours; May 5, two hours; May 12, three hours; June 1, one hour; June 23, five hours.
Cumulatively, Boyd had taken forty-four hours of unpaid personal time.
In addition, Amazon presented that on May 14, 2013, it had sent a warning letter to
Boyd informing her that she only had two hours of unpaid personal time left. Despite the
notice, Boyd requested five hours of vacation time, all to be used on June 23, 2013.
Knowing that she only had two hours of unpaid personal time, Boyd took five hours. We
find that her actions were a direct violation of Amazon’s attendance policy. After Boyd
returned from her vacation, she had a negative balance of unpaid personal time; thus,
Amazon had sufficient grounds to terminate her employment.
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Therefore, we find that in affirming ALJ’s decision, the Board had substantial
evidence to conclude that Boyd had used up all her unpaid personal time, thus it merited
her discharge.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the
Board’s determination that Amazon terminated Boyd’s employment for just cause, thus
disqualifying her from unemployment compensation benefits.
Affirmed.
ROBB, J. and BRADFORD, J. concur
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