In Re: The Visitation of H.B., A.B. v. T.S. and A.S. ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not
    be regarded as precedent or cited
    before any court except for the purpose                      May 09 2014, 6:44 am
    of establishing the defense of res
    judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
    of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                             ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    MATTHEW J. MCGOVERN                                 TRISHA S. DUDLO
    Anderson, Indiana                                   KELLY A. LONNBERG
    Bamberger Foreman Oswald and Hahn, LLP
    Evansville, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    IN RE: THE VISITATION OF H.B.,                      )
    )
    A.B.,                                               )
    )
    Appellant-Respondent,                       )
    )
    vs.                                )     No. 87A01-1309-MI-415
    )
    T.S. and A.S.,                                      )
    )
    Appellees-Petitioners.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE WARRICK SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Robert R. Aylsworth, Judge
    Cause No. 87D02-1307-MI-854
    May 9, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BARNES, Judge
    Case Summary
    A.B. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s grant of grandparent visitation to T.S. and
    A.S. (“Grandparents”). We remand.
    Issue
    Father raises two issues, but we find one issue dispositive. We restate that issue as
    whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon are adequate to support
    the grandparent visitation order.
    Facts
    H.B. was born in June 2008 to Father and K.M. (“Mother”). Father and Mother
    were not married.      Mother and H.B. have occasionally lived with her parents,
    Grandparents. Although Mother initially had custody of H.B., an Illinois court modified
    that custody in March 2012 due to Mother’s alcohol abuse and instability. Father was
    awarded sole custody of H.B., and Mother was awarded visitation. In August 2012,
    Mother’s visitation was modified to visitation on the first, second, and third Sundays of
    each month from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. at a restaurant with visitation to be supervised by
    Father or his parents. Grandparents visited with H.B. once a month during Mother’s
    supervised visitation. Grandparents also attended H.B.’s sporting events, and Father
    allowed H.B. to attend a picnic and a birthday party with Grandparents.
    In July 2013, Grandparents filed a petition for grandparent visitation pursuant to
    Indiana Code Chapter 31-17-5. After a hearing, the trial court granted Grandparents’
    request. The trial court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions thereon:
    2
    1.   Upon review of the Illinois parenting time order with
    regard to H.B. and the Mother, it is clear to the Court
    that H.B. is where she needs to be. The Father has
    reasonable concerns with regard to the mother’s
    history, and her parenting time is currently supervised.
    No order in this cause, now or in the future, should be
    interpreted as interfering with or modifying in any way
    the Mother’s parenting time order in the Illinois
    paternity action.
    2.   The Grandparent Petitioners’ relationship with H.B.
    has been close since birth, and until custody was
    changed to the Father.
    3.   The relationship between the Grandparents and the
    Father is not hostile, but likewise not comfortable.
    4.   The Grandparents’ petition for grandparent time is
    granted. The Grandparents shall have one weekend
    per month beginning the second Friday of September
    2013 and continuing each second Friday of the month
    hereafter. The Grandparents shall pick the child up
    from the Father’s residence at 6:00 p.m. and return the
    child at 3:00 p.m. on Sunday of their weekend either to
    the Father’s residence or the location of the Mother’s
    supervised parenting time if she is exercising her
    parenting time at that time.
    5.   In addition, the Grandparents shall be entitled to two
    (2) overnights during the time period of December 26
    through December 31 of each year. At that time she
    can celebrate Christmas with her grandparents and
    extended family on the Mother’s side.
    6.   Finally, the Grandparents shall be entitled to five (5)
    days of extended grandparent time each summer. The
    parties shall work together to coordinate the summer
    parenting time. The Grandparents shall give notice of
    their choice of summer schedule by April 1 each year
    if possible.
    7.   The Grandparents shall be entitled to a telephone call
    with H.B. at least one time per week.
    3
    8.     The Grandparents shall allow no additional contact
    between the child and the Mother so long as the
    Mother is subject to her current supervised and limited
    parenting time.
    9.     The parties shall use good faith and fair dealing with
    each other. Neither party shall argue, criticize or speak
    negatively of the other party in the child’s presence.
    10.    The parties shall cooperate reasonably when a change
    in grandparent time is needed due to conflicts in the
    parties’ schedules.
    Appellant’s App. pp. 81-83. Father now appeals.
    Analysis
    Father argues that the trial court’s findings are inadequate to support the
    grandparent visitation order.     The “Grandparent Visitation Act contemplates only
    occasional, temporary visitation that does not substantially infringe on a parent’s
    fundamental right to control the upbringing, education, and religious training of their
    children.” In re Visitation of M.L.B., 
    983 N.E.2d 583
    , 586 (Ind. 2013). “Because the
    Grandparent Visitation Act requires specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
    Ind. Code § 31-17-5-6
    , we apply the two-tiered Indiana Trial Rule 52 standard of review.” 
    Id. at 585
    . We first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether
    the findings support the judgment. 
    Id.
     We set aside findings of fact only if they are
    clearly erroneous, and we defer to the trial court’s superior opportunity to judge the
    credibility of the witnesses. 
    Id.
     A judgment is clearly erroneous when the findings fail to
    support the judgment or when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly
    found facts. 
    Id.
    4
    Our supreme court recently discussed the four factors that a grandparent visitation
    order should address, which include:
    (1)    a presumption that a fit parent’s decision about
    grandparent visitation is in the child’s best interests
    (thus placing the burden of proof on the petitioning
    grandparents);
    (2)    the “special weight” that must therefore be given to a
    fit parent’s decision regarding nonparental visitation
    (thus establishing a heightened standard of proof by
    which a grandparent must rebut the presumption);
    (3)    “some weight” given to whether a parent has agreed to
    some visitation or denied it entirely (since a denial
    means the very existence of a child-grandparent
    relationship is at stake, while the question otherwise is
    merely how much visitation is appropriate); and
    (4)    whether the petitioning grandparent has established
    that visitation is in the child’s best interests.
    
    Id. at 586
     (quoting McCune v. Frey, 
    783 N.E.2d 752
    , 757-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), and
    discussing Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2054
     (2000)). The court noted
    that a grandparent visitation order “must address” these factors in its findings and
    conclusions. 
    Id.
     (citing K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 
    903 N.E.2d 453
    , 462 (Ind. 2009)).
    Here, the trial court’s findings only note that Father has reasonable concerns
    regarding Mother, that Grandparents previously had a close relationship with H.B., and
    that the relationship between Father and Grandparents is not hostile but is also not
    comfortable. Despite Grandparents’ strained interpretation to the contrary, we conclude
    that the trial court’s findings do not expressly or implicitly address the presumption that
    Father’s decision was in H.B.’s best interests, the heightened standard of proof by which
    5
    Grandparents must rebut that presumption, the fact that Father has allowed some
    visitation between H.B. and Grandparents, and whether Grandparents demonstrated that
    visitation was in H.B.’s best interests.
    “[W]hen a trial court fails to issue specific findings in accordance with McCune,
    the order is voidable, and the remedy on appeal is a remand to the trial court instructing it
    to enter a proper order containing the required findings.” 
    Id. at 588
     (quoting In re
    Guardianship of A.L.C., 
    902 N.E.2d 343
    , 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). We therefore
    remand to the trial court for entry of new findings and conclusions revealing its
    consideration of all four relevant factors, without conducting a new hearing. See, e.g., id.
    at 589 (remanding for the entry of new findings and conclusions).
    Conclusion
    The trial court’s findings and conclusions thereon regarding the relevant factors
    are incomplete. We remand this case to the trial court for new findings and conclusions
    as required by M.L.B., without hearing new evidence.
    Remanded.
    BAKER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 87A01-1309-MI-415

Filed Date: 5/9/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021