Cary Lane Lawson v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Apr 29 2014, 10:23 am
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DERICK W. STEELE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Kokomo, Indiana
JAMES B. MARTIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CARY LANE LAWSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 34A02-1311-CR-990
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee/Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable William C. Menges, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 34D01-0903-FB-349
April 29, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
On November 4, 2009, Appellant-Defendant Cary Lane Lawson pled guilty to Class B
felony dealing in cocaine. Pursuant to the terms of Lawson’s plea agreement, the trial court
sentenced Lawson to a term of six years with two years executed on home detention and the
remaining four years suspended to probation. While on home detention, Lawson committed
numerous violations of the terms of his home detention.
Lawson’s probation began on October 20, 2011. Once on probation, Lawson
committed numerous violations of the terms of his probation. On September 23, 2013,
Lawson admitted to violating the terms of his probation. The trial court accepted Lawson’s
admission to one of the violations and ordered him to serve the balance of his suspended
sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). On appeal, Lawson contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the balance of his suspended
sentence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 31, 2009, Lawson was charged with one count each of Class B felony
dealing in cocaine, Class C felony possession of cocaine, and Class D felony possession of
cocaine. On November 4, 2009, Lawson pled guilty to Class B felony dealing in cocaine.
Pursuant to the terms of Lawson’s plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Lawson to a term
of six years with two years executed on home detention and the remaining four years
suspended to probation, and the remaining charges were dismissed. Also, as a specific
condition of probation, the trial court ordered Lawson to complete the Howard County Drug
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and Alcohol Program.
While on home detention, Lawson committed numerous violations of the terms of his
home detention. On May 19, 2010, the State filed a notice of non-compliance with the
Howard County Community Corrections Home Detention Division (“HC CCHDD”),
alleging that Lawson violated the terms of his home detention by testing positive for cocaine
on November 19, 2009 and May 4, 2010. The State also alleged that Lawson owed a balance
of $329.00 in fees. On June 9, 2010, the State filed a second notice of non-compliance with
the HC CCHDD, alleging that Lawson violated the terms of his home detention by testing
positive for cocaine on May 23, 2010. Lawson subsequently admitted that he committed the
alleged violations and the trial court ordered him to serve 174 days of his previously
suspended sentence. After completion of this sentence, Lawson was returned to home
detention for the remainder of his sentence that was ordered to be completed on home
detention.
Lawson’s probation began on October 20, 2011. Once on probation, Lawson
committed numerous violations of the terms of his probation. On March 16, 2012, the Stated
filed a petition to revoke Lawson’s suspended sentence, alleging that on or about December
31, 2011, Lawson violated his probation because he was arrested and charged with new
crimes, including possession of cocaine, possession of paraphernalia, and driving while
suspended. The State subsequently agreed to dismiss the March 16, 2012 petition to revoke.
The State filed a second petition to revoke Lawson’s suspended sentence on June 26,
2013, alleging that Lawson had tested positive for cocaine on June 13, 2013. On September
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23, 2013, Lawson admitted to violating the terms of his probation. The trial court accepted
Lawson’s admission to this violation and subsequently ordered him to serve the balance of
his suspended sentence in the DOC. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Lawson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the balance of
his suspended sentence after he admitted to violating the terms of his probation.
Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court determines the conditions of
probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Once a trial
court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration,
the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed. If this
discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too
severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to
future defendants. Accordingly, a trial court’s sentencing decisions for
probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. An
abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances.
Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court noted Lawson’s numerous past violations and stated that the court
was “in a situation where [it] really [has] to start examining how many additional chances
Mr. Lawson’s going to get.” Tr. p. 26. The trial court noted Lawson’s continued possession
and use of cocaine, stating that it is clear that Lawson is “still around it.” Tr. p. 27. The trial
court further noted that Lawson was in a position “of being offered treatment but not being
willing to accept it, not being willing to follow through with it.” Tr. p. 27. The trial court
indicated that it believed that in light of Lawson’s continued possession and use of cocaine
coupled with his numerous violations of the terms of both his home detention and his
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probation, it had “run out of options.” Tr. p. 27. Accordingly, the trial court ordered Lawson
to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the DOC.
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the
remainder of his suspended sentence, Lawson claims that the trial court had other options
available to it that would more closely align with the policy favoring rehabilitation. In
making this claim, Lawson is merely requesting this court to substitute our judgment for that
of the trial court, which we will not do without a showing of abuse of the trial court’s
discretion. Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) provides that if the trial court determines that a
person has violated the terms of their probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all
or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” (Emphasis
added). Thus, pursuant to the clear language of Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h), the trial
court acted within its discretion in ordering execution of all of Lawson’s suspended sentence.
Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Lawson to serve the
remainder of his suspended sentence following Lawson’s latest violation of the terms of his
probation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
RILEY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
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