Dave Davies v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                     FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             Jan 11 2019, 9:25 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                               Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                          and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Zachary J. Stock                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Evan Matthew Comer
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Dave Davies,                                             January 11, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-1098
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Annie Christ,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G24-1508-FD-28429
    Tavitas, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1098 | January 11, 2019              Page 1 of 8
    Case Summary
    [1]   Dave Davies appeals his conviction for dissemination of a matter harmful to
    minors, a Class A misdemeanor. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   Davies raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the evidence is
    sufficient to convict Davies of dissemination of a matter harmful to minors, a
    Class A misdemeanor.
    Facts
    [3]   Davies was a teacher at Emma Donnan Middle School in Indianapolis. The
    school emphasized to teachers that the teachers “were there to try to build
    special relationships with the students in order to make them feel more secure
    within the educational process . . . .” Tr. Vol. IV p. 128. Generally, the school
    encouraged the teachers to “build relationships with kids who[m] [the teachers]
    felt [the teachers] could become positive mentors to . . . .” 
    Id. The school,
    however, also emphasized limitations in relationship building, such as: (1)
    teachers should not be alone with students while traveling; and (2) teachers
    should avoid traveling with students in the teachers’ personal vehicles.
    [4]   Davies taught biology and Future Farmers of America (“FFA”) in the seventh
    and eighth grades. Davies also was considered one of C.W.’s mentors. Over
    the two years that Davies taught C.W., C.W. would see Davies every day for
    “about [forty] minutes” in class. 
    Id. at 76.
    Davies and C.W. would also
    interact often outside of class. C.W. would stay after school roughly three to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1098 | January 11, 2019   Page 2 of 8
    four times a week and talk to Davies about “work that [C.W.] needed to make
    up,” or about C.W.’s goals and future plans. 
    Id. at 77.
    C.W. thought Davies
    was a “nice guy” and someone C.W. could look up to. 
    Id. C.W. also
    thought
    Davies would help C.W. continue on a path towards college.
    [5]   C.W. considered himself to have a good relationship with Davies, and at
    school, Davies would “do this motion that was kinda [sic] like a ball tap,”
    where Davies would do a “flicking motion” with the back of his hand in the
    area of C.W.’s groin. 
    Id. Davies did
    this on more than one occasion, and it
    was considered in a “joking manner.” 
    Id. at 77-78.
    C.W. just laughed it off
    even though this made him uncomfortable because he did not want his
    relationship with Davies to end. A classmate of C.W. testified that he saw
    Davies often touch C.W. by “pokin[g] [C.W.’s] neck, and like pokin[g] at
    [C.W.’s] sides and stuff.” 
    Id. at 57.
    [6]   Toward the end of C.W.’s eighth grade year, Davies also assisted C.W. with
    several home projects. For example, Davies helped C.W. renovate his
    bedroom. C.W. testified that his mother was home when Davies came to
    C.W.’s house one to two times per week.
    [7]   On one occasion around May 2014, C.W. and Davies went to Lowes to pick up
    supplies to continue the renovations in C.W.’s room. While leaving Lowes,
    Davies indicated to C.W. that he wanted to make C.W. breakfast at Davies’
    apartment. C.W. and Davies went to K-Mart to pick up food to make breakfast
    and then went to Davies’ apartment. Davies and C.W. made breakfast and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1098 | January 11, 2019   Page 3 of 8
    then sat down at the table to eat. After Davies sat down, Davies told C.W. that
    he had to get something. Davies got his laptop and brought it over to the table.
    When Davies opened his laptop, C.W. testified that Davies’ laptop was
    “playing porn.” 
    Id. at 84.
    During the trial, C.W. described what he saw as a
    “Hispanic girl and a Hispanic guy, and she was layin’ [sic] on a table, and they
    were doing sexual acts.” 
    Id. C.W. testified
    that he just continued to eat his
    food and looked down—not wanting to look at the computer. C.W. was
    “really uncomfortable and [] just hoped that [Davies] would just close [the
    laptop]” and remove it from the table. 
    Id. at 85.
    [8]   While Davies had his laptop at the table, Davis said to C.W., “I thought I heard
    you like Hispanic girls” and said: “You just watch it. Just watch it.” 
    Id. C.W. told
    Davies that he did not want to watch and that he was uncomfortable.
    After about ten minutes of having the laptop at the table, Davies took the laptop
    away from the table and said, “‘I’ll just save it for later’ and said that [C.W.]
    must be gay or something.” 
    Id. After finishing
    breakfast, Davies offered to
    watch a movie with C.W., but C.W. declined, so Davies took C.W. home and
    they worked on C.W.’s bedroom.
    [9]   C.W. continued to communicate with Davies for approximately two months
    after the incident. C.W. wanted to “cut it off because [he] felt like it was best
    for [him].” Davies, however, continued email contact with C.W. C.W. did not
    report the incident; C.W. testified that he would “usually joke around about it
    [with friends] to try and get it off [his] mind and try to forget about it.” 
    Id. at 86.
    A few years later, C.W.’s band teacher overheard C.W. discussing the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1098 | January 11, 2019   Page 4 of 8
    incident with his friends. C.W.’s band teacher reported what he heard to the
    school principal. The principal reported the allegations to law enforcement to
    investigate. There was no evidence presented regarding any video on Davies’
    computer; nor was any video played at the trial. There was no additional
    context given to the video C.W. claims Davies showed him.
    [10]   Davies was charged with Count I, dissemination of a matter harmful to minors,
    a Class D felony; Count II, battery, a Class B misdemeanor; Count III, battery,
    a Class B misdemeanor; and Count IV, battery, a Class B misdemeanor. A jury
    found Davies guilty of Count I, not guilty of Counts II and III, and the State
    dismissed Count IV. At sentencing, the trial court acknowledged that the jury
    found Davies guilty of a Class D felony, but the Court reduced Davies’
    conviction to a Class A misdemeanor and entered judgment accordingly.
    Davies was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with 361 days suspended.
    Analysis
    [11]   Davies challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on his conviction for
    dissemination of a matter harmful to minors, a Class A misdemeanor. When
    there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh
    evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 204
    , 210
    (Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 
    481 N.E.2d 78
    , 84 (Ind. 1985)). Instead, “we
    ‘consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all
    reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’” 
    Id. (quoting Bieghler,
    481 N.E.2d at
    84). “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by ‘substantial evidence of
    probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.’” 
    Id. (quoting Court
    of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1098 | January 11, 2019   Page 5 of 8
    
    Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84
    ); see also McCallister v. State, 
    91 N.E.3d 554
    , 558 (Ind.
    2018) (holding that, even though there was conflicting evidence, it was “beside
    the point” because that argument “misapprehend[s] our limited role as a
    reviewing court”). Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no
    reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 
    73 N.E.3d 693
    , 696 (Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v.
    State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind. 2007)).
    [12]   Davies does not challenge every element of the offense. 1 Instead, Davies only
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the harmfulness of the
    disseminated material. Indiana Code Section 35-49-3-3 states, “[e]xcept as
    provided in subsection (b), a person who knowingly or intentionally: (1)
    disseminates matter to minors that is harmful to minors; . . . commits a Level 6
    felony.” Whether the material is harmful to minors is determined by Indiana
    Code Section 35-49-2-2, which states:
    A matter or performance is harmful to minors for purposes of this
    article if:
    1
    In fact, Davies concedes that the first two elements were met, and specifically states:
    In this case, the State was required to prove three material elements, but it only succeeded
    in proving two. The elements of the crime at issue are (1) knowingly or intentionally (2)
    disseminating matter to a minor (3) that is harmful to the minor.
    Appellant’s Br. p. 8 (emphasis supplied).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1098 | January 11, 2019                      Page 6 of 8
    (1) it describes or represents, in any form, nudity, sexual conduct,
    sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse;
    (2) considered as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest in sex
    of minors;
    (3) it is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
    community as a whole with respect to what is suitable matter for
    or performance before minors; and
    (4) considered as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic,
    political, or scientific value for minors.
    [13]   Davies seems to be arguing that it was wrong for the jury to accept C.W.’s
    classification of the video as pornography without any other evidence. C.W.
    testified that the video he was shown was “porn.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 84. C.W. also
    testified that the video he saw was of a Hispanic male and Hispanic female who
    were engaged in “sexual acts.” 
    Id. Further, the
    State introduced emails from
    Davies to C.W. that said:
    I now know through a few people that you have blocked me and
    are not returning messages because I have done something to
    aggravate you or have “turned weird.” I can respect that and am
    okay with that. However, I do ask this, if you would, let me
    explain a few things and ask that you can look past it when you
    see it through my eyes.
    State’s Ex. 2.
    [14]   Davies’ argument that C.W.’s description of “sexual acts” or “porn” is not
    descriptive enough is simply an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1098 | January 11, 2019   Page 7 of 8
    we cannot do. 2 See 
    Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 210
    . Under these circumstances, the
    jury could reasonably have found that Davies showed C.W. material that was
    harmful to a minor, as defined by Indiana Code Section 35-49-2-2.
    Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient.
    Conclusion
    [15]   Based on the foregoing, we find the evidence was sufficient to convict Davies of
    dissemination of a matter harmful to minors, a Class A misdemeanor. We
    affirm.
    Affirmed.
    Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    2
    Although we find that the evidence was sufficient to convict Davies of disseminating matter harmful to
    minors, we encourage the State to elicit more facts regarding each element of the offense charged during trial.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1098 | January 11, 2019                   Page 8 of 8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-1098

Filed Date: 1/11/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/11/2019