Charles K. Corn v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited Apr 24 2014, 9:46 am
before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARK SMALL GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KARL SCHARNBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CHARLES K.CORN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 84A01-1304-CR-161
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John T. Roach, Judge
Cause No. 84D01-1209-FB-2978
April 24, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Judge
Case Summary and Issues
Following a jury trial, Charles Corn was convicted of aggravated battery, a Class
B felony. Corn raises two issues on appeal which we restate as: 1) whether comments at
trial on Corn’s invocation of his right to an attorney and subsequent silence amounted to
fundamental error, and 2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to disprove
Corn’s claim of self-defense. Concluding any reference to Corn’s silence was harmless
and the State sufficiently disproved Corn’s claim of self-defense, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History1
Corn resided on Donald Clark’s property in Terre Haute. Clark allowed Corn to
pitch a tent against the backside of Clark’s house and use the kitchen, utensils, and
bathroom in the house as needed. Corn, without Clark’s permission, connected a jump
wire to route electricity to his tent. On September 8, 2012, Clark asked James Brown to
talk to Corn about removing the wire. Around 4 p.m. that day, Brown confronted Corn
about the wire. Corn, who had been drinking from a gallon-sized jug of vodka all day,
started yelling profanities at Brown for getting involved. The altercation soon became
physical, and Brown “knocked the crap” out of Corn. Transcript at 319. Another man
interceded and convinced Brown to stop. As Corn was walking back to his tent, he
continued to yell profanities at Brown and called Brown a “bastard,” id. at 449, at which
point Brown knocked Corn to the ground and kicked him at least once or twice. The
fight ended, and the two shook hands then went their separate ways.
1
We held oral argument on this matter on March 27, 2014, at Indiana State University. We thank the
faculty, staff, and students for their hospitality and commend counsel for the quality of their oral advocacy.
2
About four hours later, around 8:30 p.m., Clark and Brown were sitting in Clark’s
parked van in the driveway. Corn approached Clark to talk and then saw that Brown was
seated in the passenger seat. Corn asked to speak to Brown, and Brown made a comment
to the effect of, “[W]ell, you want some more of what you got earlier,” id. at 321, while
approaching Corn very quickly. Brown did not have his fists up or any weapons on him
when he approached Corn. Corn had an eight inch kitchen knife in his hand and stabbed
Brown in the stomach before anyone could react. After he was stabbed, Brown grabbed a
gun from the van but switched to a sledge hammer when he realized the gun was
unloaded. Brown tried to swing the sledge hammer a couple times but dropped it as he
walked towards his sister’s house across the alley. Corn and Robert King, an
acquaintance who happened to be at Clark’s house, got into Clark’s van, and Clark drove
the two men to Taylorsville before returning home.2 Clark only drove the men because
Corn still was holding the jug of vodka and the knife, and Clark was concerned about
what Corn would do if he refused. Police found Corn walking down a street in
Taylorsville with the bloody kitchen knife stuck in his front pocket. Corn was arrested,
and reported no physical injuries or pain from either the afternoon or evening fight that
needed to be evaluated by medical staff when he was booked at the jail.
On September 11, 2012, the State charged Corn with aggravated battery. Corn
was tried before a jury on February 25-27, 2013, and he was found guilty as charged.
Corn now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
2
King was trying to get Clark to take him to Taylorsville before the stabbing occurred.
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Discussion and Decision
I. Doyle Violation
A. Standard of Review
Corn argues statements by Detective Long, defense counsel, and the prosecutor
during direct examination, cross-examination, and closing argument, respectively,
improperly commented on his right to silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610(1976), and were so prejudicial as to warrant relief. In Doyle, the Supreme Court held
that “the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 619. However, it is not an error when the jury is aware of the
defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent when that knowledge is not used to
subvert the defense. Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),
trans. denied. Since Corn did not object at trial, he relies on the extremely narrow
doctrine of fundamental error.
A fundamental error is a substantial, blatant violation of basic principles of
due process rendering the trial unfair to the defendant. It applies only when
the actual or potential harm cannot be denied. The error must be so
prejudicial to the rights of a defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.
Trice v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Ind. 2002) (citations and internal quotations
omitted). A Doyle violation is inherently prejudicial, so reversal is the norm rather than
the exception. Teague v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “An error
of this type is harmless only when the court, after assessing the record to determine the
probable impact of the improper evidence on the jury, can conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not influence the jury’s verdict.” Id. Our supreme court has
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adopted a non-exclusive, five-factor test to determine whether the Doyle violation is
harmless: 1) the use to which the prosecution puts the post-arrest silence; 2) who elected
to pursue the line of questioning; 3) the quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt; 4)
the intensity and frequency of the reference; and 5) the availability to the trial judge of an
opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or to give curative instructions. Bieghler v.
State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 92 (Ind.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986).
B. Comments on Corn’s Post-Arrest Silence During Case-in-Chief
During the State’s case-in-chief, the State had the following exchange with
Detective Long:
Q: Did you also interview the defendant Charles Corn and see him after
he was arrested?
A: I did not have the opportunity to interview him. I went in and spoke
to him and he advised me at that point he wanted an attorney, so I
wasn’t allowed to ask him any further questions, but yes I did
observe him and speak to him in that manner.
Tr. at 570-71. Defense counsel followed up on those questions on cross-examination with
the following:3
Q: You were not the one that interviewed [Corn]?
A: No, I said I did attempt to interview him, but –
Q: But he asked for an attorney.
A: That’s correct.
Tr. at 575. Corn contends that as a whole, this was an improper line of questioning and
the prejudice was great because the court failed to give curative jury instructions
regarding the right to remain silent. The State argues it was not using this comment to
3
The State argues that these statements on cross-examination were invited error, and that invited error is
not a fundamental error. Brief of the Appellee at 9. In the context of this case, we decline to find the curative
statements made by defense counsel on cross-examination after the State had commented on Corn’s silence, with the
same witness, as invited error.
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impeach Corn; rather, this line of questioning was elicited to show Corn had no visible
injuries from the afternoon fight, and thus discredit his claim of self-defense:
Q: Did you inspect him, see him, examine him from the standpoint of
looking at him at that time?
A: Yes. I was in the same small room with him.
Q: Tell me whether he showed any outward signs of injury on his face,
arms, hands, anything you could see that indicated there was any
evidence of an injury that was visible to you.
A: I did not see any visible injuries at all.
Tr. at 571. We agree with Corn that the State’s question constituted a Doyle violation.
Despite the State’s argument that the question was actually if the detective had seen Corn
and was able to observe any injury, that is not what was asked. The error was
compounded by defense counsel’s follow up question. We now must consider these
statements in the context of the Bieghler factors to determine whether the admission of
such statements was harmless.
1. Use
The comments were not used to impeach Corn’s exculpatory testimony. Detective
Long’s testimony was to explain his knowledge that Corn was not injured or complaining
of injury when he was booked into jail, and defense counsel’s cross-examination was a
follow-up to the State’s question.
2. Who Elected to Pursue Questioning
The statements made during Detective Long’s examination were made by both the
State and defense, and each side made the statements once.
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3. Quantum of Other Evidence of Guilt
It is undisputed that Corn stabbed Brown; the case was simply a matter of self-
defense. There was ample other evidence of Corn’s guilt, including testimony from
several witnesses.
4. Intensity and Frequency of the Reference
The references to Corn’s silence were brief and made in passing. Both sides, in
questioning Detective Long, made one reference to Corn asking for an attorney, and then
moved on with their questioning without revisiting the topic. In the context of a three-
day trial, the references were infrequent and very slight.
5. Opportunity to Give Curative Instructions
Corn did not request a mistrial based on these statements. He had the opportunity
to present curative final instructions to the jury. Corn raised his concerns about the
statements to the trial court and asked if there was a pattern jury instruction that an
inference of guilt could not be made from the fact that the defendant asked for an
attorney. The court was willing to offer an instruction but found no such pattern in its
own search. The court also offered to give an appropriate instruction supported by case
law if Corn provided one. The State agreed that such an instruction would be appropriate
and that if Corn wanted to argue that position during closing arguments, the State would
not argue the contrary position. Corn did not present any such instruction for the court’s
review, nor did he make any statements during closing arguments to this effect. The
instruction was therefore not given.
Given the infrequency of the statements, the relatively minor references, the
opportunity for Corn to give curative instructions to the jury and opportunity to advance
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any argument in closing argument on the topic, the Doyle violation during the State’s
case-in-chief, compounded by defense counsel’s follow up, question was harmless.
C. Comments During Closing Arguments
Corn also makes an argument that part of the prosecutor’s closing argument
amounted to a Doyle violation. In closing, the prosecutor stated:
[Corn] wants your sympathy. He wants you to think that he was hurt so
bad, it justifies virtually killing somebody. He, he’s a fraud. He’s made
this up as a defense saying, I was so injured that I couldn’t do anything but
stab the guy back. That’s the defense argument in this case. Said I
couldn’t possibly defend myself because I was so impaired I couldn’t do
anything but kill him or stab him. . . . He’s saying, I’m going to get him.
I’m going to kill him. That’s what he was saying. And he just about did.
Tr. at 786. These statements do not amount to a Doyle violation. The references to
Corn’s defense are based on Corn’s theory of the case: that Corn was beat up earlier in
the day by Brown, so he reasonably feared great bodily injury during the confrontation at
night; this then justified Corn’s use of self-defense. Further, the comment of “I’m going
to get him. I’m going to kill him,” was a recap of Robert King’s testimony at trial, though
inartfully worded since it did not attribute the statements to the witness. Since neither of
these statements improperly commented on Corn’s silence for impeachment purposes,
there was no Doyle violation.
II. Self-Defense
A. Standard of Review
Corn next argues the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense. Our standard
of review is as follows:
The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
rebut a claim of self defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency
of the evidence claim. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the
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credibility of the witnesses. We consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that support the verdict. If a
defendant is convicted despite a claim of self defense, we reverse only if no
reasonable person could say that self defense was negated by the State
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted), trans.
denied.
B. Corn’s Self-Defense Claim
To prevail on a claim of self-defense, Corn had to present evidence that he: (1)
was in a place he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly
in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Id. The
State then had the burden of disproving at least one of the elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. Mateo v. State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
It is undisputed that Corn had the right to be on Clark’s property that night. Corn
argues that he did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence because
Corn simply stated he wanted to talk to Brown, and Brown instigated by saying
something like “[W]ell, you want some more of what you got earlier.” Tr. at 321. Corn
also argues that he had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm because Brown is
much larger, Corn has a number of health issues, and Brown had already beaten him up
that day.
Corn has not met the high burden of proving no reasonable person could say the
State failed to disprove at least one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. A reasonable person could have determined Corn provoked, instigated, or
willingly participated in the evening fight. The State offered several witnesses who
testified about the stabbing and Corn calling Brown out of the van. Witnesses also
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testified about seeing no physical threat from Brown before Corn stabbed him. A
reasonable person could also have concluded the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
it was unreasonable for Corn to fear great bodily harm or death, because even if Brown
did intend to give Corn “some more of what [he] got earlier,” tr. at 321, the fight, like
those in the afternoon, would not be so severe as for Corn to need medical attention or be
motivated to call the police.
Conclusion
Concluding any reference to Corn’s silence was harmless and the State sufficiently
disproved Corn’s claim of self-defense, we affirm.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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