Elaine Adams v. Heather Stavropoulos (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 03 2016, 8:28 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gary L. Griner Trevor Q. Gasper
Mishawaka, Indiana May · Oberfell · Lorber
Mishawaka, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Elaine Adams, March 3, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A04-1507-SC-867
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court – Small Claims
Heather Stavropoulos, Division
Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable William J.
Boklund, Senior Judge
The Honorable Elizabeth A.
Hardtke, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
71D05-1412-SC-10819
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] In September of 2013, Appellee-Plaintiff Heather Stavropoulos purchased a
puppy from Appellant-Defendant Elaine Adams. According to the terms of the
contract for the sale of the puppy, Adams warranted that the puppy was being
sold in “good condition” and would not suffer from hip dysplasia before
reaching the age of four. However, nearly immediately after the purchase of the
puppy was completed, Stavropoulos discovered that the puppy suffered from
environmental and food allergies which stemmed from an autoimmune disease.
In addition, when the puppy was just fourteen months old, it was diagnosed
with hip dysplasia. After receiving these diagnoses, Stavropoulos brought the
instant action against Adams alleging a breach of the warranties contained in
the parties’ contract. After finding that breaches of said warranties had
occurred, the small claims court entered a $3286.26 judgment against Adams.
[2] On appeal, Adams challenges the $3286.26 judgment, claiming that the small
claims court erred by ordering her to refund the $1700.00 purchase price of the
puppy to Stavropoulos without also requiring Stavropoulos to return the puppy
to Adams. Adams also claims that the small claims court erred by ordering her
to pay damages relating to certain expenses incurred by Stavropoulos as a result
of the puppy’s allergies. Finding no error by the small claims court, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On September 4, 2013, the parties entered into a contract under the terms of
which Stavropoulos agreed to purchase a Doberman Pinscher puppy
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(hereinafter, the “puppy”) from Adams for the sum of $1700.00. The portion of
the parties’ contract which is relevant to the instant matter provides as follows:
3. Puppy is being sold in good condition with current shots, and
wormings. Puppy is guaranteed against hip d[y]splasia and
cardio for 4 years. If either were to occur seller has option of
replacement or refund of the purchase price.
Appellant’s App. p. 17.
[4] Almost immediately after bringing the puppy home, Stavropoulos noticed that
the puppy seemed to be suffering from some health issues. Specifically, the
puppy would vomit, would not eat “after a certain timeframe,” and broke out in
hives on multiple occasions. Tr. p. 5. After multiple visits to the veterinarian
and the completion of multiple tests, it was determined that the puppy suffered
from environmental and food allergies which fell under “an umbrella of an
autoimmune disease.” Tr. p. 7. This diagnosis resulted in the need for the
puppy to undergo additional veterinary care and for Stavropoulos to purchase
special food, medications, and supplements for the puppy.
[5] In addition to the above-described allergy issues, when the puppy was
approximately three months old, Stavropoulos began hearing a “popping”
sound coming from the puppy’s hips. Tr. p. 19. When these popping sounds
continued, Stavropoulos became concerned about the possibility that the puppy
was suffering from hip dysplasia. When the puppy was approximately fourteen
months old, it was diagnosed with hip dysplasia. This diagnosis was
subsequently confirmed by a second veterinarian.
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[6] On December 29, 2014, Stavropoulos filed an action in the small claims court
against Adams seeking $5000.00 in damages relating to the puppy’s hip
dysplasia diagnosis and the costs associated with the puppy’s other medical
ailments. Although Adams claimed during an April 14, 2015 trial, that she
“would do anything if she could have helped” Stavropoulos with any issues
Stavropoulos experienced with the puppy, nothing in the record indicates that
Adams offered to replace the puppy prior to the date that Stavropoulos initiated
the instant law suit. Tr. p. 62. In addition, Adams testified that she believes
that, at the age of fourteen months, the puppy was too young to be diagnosed
with hip dysplasia but would be happy to take the puppy back and refund the
$1700.00 purchase price if the puppy was diagnosed with hip dysplasia after
reaching its second birthday.
[7] Following the conclusion of the April 14, 2015 trial, the small claims court
determined that there had been a breach of the warranties that the puppy was
sold in good condition and that it would not suffer from hip dysplasia before the
age of four. After reaching this determination, the small claims court entered a
$3286.26 judgment against Adams. Adams subsequently filed a motion to
correct error, which was denied by the small claims court on June 12, 2015.
This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Adams appeals the judgment of the small claims court following the denial of
her motion to correct error.
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Judgments in small claims actions are “subject to review as
prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small
Claims Rule 11(A). In the appellate review of claims tried by the
bench without a jury, the reviewing court shall not set aside the
judgment “unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). In determining whether
a judgment is clearly erroneous, the appellate tribunal does not
reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but
considers only the evidence that supports the judgment and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. See Estate
of Reasor v. Putnam County (1994), Ind., 635 N.E.2d 153, 158; In re
Estate of Banko (1993), Ind., 622 N.E.2d 476, 481. A judgment in
favor of a party having the burden of proof will be affirmed if the
evidence was such that from it a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that the elements of the party’s claim were established
by a preponderance of evidence. This deferential standard of
review is particularly important in small claims actions, where
trials are “informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy
justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive
law.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A).
City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep’t v. Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995).
Further, although rulings on motions to correct error are usually reviewable
under an abuse of discretion standard, we review a case de novo when the issue
on appeal is purely a question of law. Eagle Aircraft, Inc. v. Trojnar, 983 N.E.2d
648, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919
N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). “The interpretation of a contract is a
pure question of law.” Id. (citing Dunn v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d
249, 251 (Ind. 2005)).
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I. Authority Relating to the Interpretation of a Contract
[9] In order to resolve the issues presented below, the small claims court was faced
with the task of interpreting the parties’ contract relating to the sale of the
puppy. In order to review the propriety of the small claims court’s judgment,
we must do the same. “‘The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to
ascertain the intention of the parties, as expressed in the language used, and to
give effect to that intention, if it can be done consistent with legal principles.’”
Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp. v. Moll, 264 Ind. 356, 362, 344 N.E.2d 831, 837
(1976) (quoting Walb Constr. Co. v. Chipman, 202 Ind. 434, 441, 175 N.E. 132,
134 (1931)). Thus, “[w]hen construing the meaning of a contract, our primary
task is to determine and effectuate the intent of the parties.” Ryan v. Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp., 959 N.E.2d 870, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[10] “Where the terms of a contract are clear the court merely applies its
provisions.” Turnpaugh v. Wolf, 482 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
“Unambiguous language is conclusive upon the parties to the contract and the
courts.” Id. “In the absence of an ambiguity it is not within the function of the
judiciary to look outside of the instrument to get at the intention of the parties.”
Moll, 264 Ind. at 362, 344 N.E.2d at 837. As such, “[i]f the language of the
instrument is unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be determined from
its four corners,” Turnpaugh, 482 N.E.2d at 508, and “[w]e will not construe the
contract or look to extrinsic evidence, but will merely apply the contractual
provisions.” Kessel v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 871 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007).
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[11] “The terms of a contract are ambiguous only when reasonably intelligent
persons would honestly differ as to the meaning of those terms.” Bressler v.
Bressler, 601 N.E.2d 392, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). “‘The meaning of [an
instrument] may be said to be clear, when it fairly expresses an intention on a
reasonable interpretation of the language used, regardless of other possible
intentions not apparent, but which must be reached through a forced
construction or circuitous reasoning.’” Id. (quoting Hauck v. Second Nat’l Bank of
Richmond, 153 Ind. App. 245, 286 N.E.2d 852, 863 (1972), trans. denied). “An
instrument is not rendered ambiguous by the mere fact the parties disagree as to
its proper construction.” Id. “In determining whether an instrument is
ambiguous, we must reference the whole instrument rather than only individual
clauses.” Id. at 395-96.
[12] Any ambiguity in a contract is construed against its drafter. Barney v. StoneMor
Operating LLC, 953 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Further,
in construing a contract we presume that all provisions were
included for a purpose, and if possible we reconcile seemingly
conflicting provisions to give effect to all provisions. Magee v.
Garry-Magee, 833 N.E.2d 1083, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We
must accept an interpretation of the contract that harmonizes all
the various parts so that no provision is deemed to conflict with,
to be repugnant to, or to neutralize any other provision. Id.When a contract contains general and specific provisions relating
to the same subject, the specific provision controls. Id. “It is well
settled that when interpreting a contract, specific terms control
over general terms.” Burkhart Advertising, Inc. v. City of Fort
Wayne, 918 N.E.2d 628, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing GPI at
Danville Crossing, L.P. v. West Cent. Conservancy Dist., 867 N.E.2d
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645, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), reh’g denied, trans. denied), trans.
denied.
Ryan, 959 N.E.2d at 875.
II. Analysis
A. Return of Puppy
[13] Adams argues on appeal that the small claims court erred in ordering her to
refund the $1700.00 purchase price to Stavropoulos without also requiring
Stavropoulos to return the puppy to Adams. For her part, Stavropoulos argues
that return of the puppy was not required by the terms of the contract.
[14] Again, the relevant portion of the parties’ contract expressly provides as
follows: “Puppy is guaranteed against hip d[y]splasia and cardio for 4 years. If
either were to occur seller has option of replacement or refund of purchase
price.” Appellant’s App. p. 17. The puppy was diagnosed with hip dysplasia
when it was approximately fourteen months old, well before reaching its fourth
birthday. As a result of the diagnosis, Stavropoulos sought and was granted a
refund of the purchase price.
[15] Adams attempts to frame the issue relating to the return of the puppy as one
arising out of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). In attempting to do so,
Adams cites to this court’s opinion in Michiana Mack, Inc. v. Allendale Rural Fire
Protection District, 428 N.E.2d 1367 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). However, in Michiana
Mack, the issue before the court did not involve a question as to what remedies
were available following a breach of an express warranty, as is the issue in the
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instant case, but rather a question as to what remedies were available under the
UCC following the tender of non-conforming goods. Id. at 269-70. As such,
we find Adams’s reliance on Michiana Mack to be unavailing.
[16] Upon review, we conclude that the terms of the parties’ contract are
unambiguous and, as a result, we will look no further than the four corners of
the contract to determine the parties’ intent. See Turnpaugh, 482 N.E.2d at 508.
The contract at issue expressly warranted against hip dysplasia, the condition
with which the puppy was diagnosed when it was only fourteen months old.
The contract also expressly provides that if the puppy was diagnosed with hip
dysplasia before reaching the age of four, one method of recourse was a refund
of the $1700.00 purchase price. To give a refund is to “reimburse” or “to give
or put back.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1910 (1964). The
contract, which appears to be drafted by Adams, makes no mention of return of
the puppy as a condition for payment of the refund. We therefore conclude that
the small claims court did not err in ordering that Adams refund the $1700.00
purchase price to Stavropoulos without also requiring that Stavropoulos return
the puppy to Adams.
B. Additional Damages
[17] Adams also argues that the small claims court erred in ordering her to pay an
additional $1586.26 in damages to Stavropoulos. For her part, Stavropoulos
argues that the trial court did not err in awarding her the $1586.26 in additional
damages because said damages reflected expenses incurred as a direct result of
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the breach of Adams’s express warranty that the puppy was being sold “in good
condition.”
[18] In arguing that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay the $1586.26 in
damages to Stavropoulos, Adams claims that because a puppy is personal
property, damages relating to said puppy cannot exceed the fair market value of
the puppy. In support of this claim, Adams cites to Ridenour v. Furness, 546
N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) for the proposition that damages for the
total destruction of personal property are measured by the fair market value of
said property at the time of loss. Adams’s reliance on Ridenour, however, is
misplaced because the damages included in the small claims court’s order do
not stem from the destruction of any personal property belonging to
Stavropoulos. Rather, the damages stem from a breach of the express warranty
contained in the parties’ contract relating to the condition of the puppy at the
time of the sale. Accordingly, despite Adams’s claim to the contrary, the small
claims court’s order must be considered for what it is, i.e., an award of damages
which were incurred as a direct result of a breach of an express warranty.
[19] The small claims court found that Adams had warranted that the puppy was
being sold in good condition. The small claims court determined that a breach
of this warranty had occurred, finding that because the puppy suffered from an
autoimmune disease which caused what appear to be significant allergy issues,
the puppy had not been sold in good condition. The small claims court then
awarded $1586.26 in damages to Stavropoulos for costs incurred as a direct
result of the breach of that warranty. Adams does not challenge the small
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claims court’s determination that a breach of the warranty occurred, only the
award of damages.
[20] With respect to potential damages which may be awarded following a breach of
warranty, Indiana Code 26-1-2-715 provides as follows:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller’s breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt,
transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected,
any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions
in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense
incident to the … breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller’s breach
include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular
requirements and needs of which the seller at the
time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty.
(Emphasis added).
[21] In the instant matter, Stavropoulos presented evidence during trial setting forth
the costs she incurred as a direct result of the breach. The small claims court
found this evidence to be credible and awarded damages accordingly. We
cannot say that the small claims court erred in doing so. As such, we conclude
that the small claims court did not err in awarding $1586.26 in damages to
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Stavropoulos for costs incurred as a direct result of the breach of Adams’s
warranty that the puppy was being sold to Stavropoulos in good condition.
[22] The judgment of the small claims court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.
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