Matthew McKinney v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of                           Apr 09 2014, 6:16 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    LEANNA WEISSMANN                                 GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Lawrenceburg, Indiana                            Attorney General of Indiana
    RICHARD C. WEBSTER
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    MATTHEW McKINNEY,                                )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                      )
    )
    vs.                                )      No. 15A01-1309-CR-399
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                       )
    APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Sally A. Blankenship, Judge
    Cause No. 15D02-1302-FA-8
    April 9, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BAKER, Judge
    Appellant-defendant Matthew McKinney appeals the thirty-year aggregate
    sentence imposed by the trial court after he pleaded guilty to Count I, Dealing in a
    Schedule II Controlled Substance,1 a class A felony, Count II, Dealing in a Schedule II
    Controlled Substance,2 a class B felony, and Count III, Dealing in Marijuana,3 a class C
    felony.        More particularly, McKinney argues that the cumulative sentence was
    inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. Concluding that
    McKinney’s sentence was not inappropriate, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    FACTS
    In April 2012, the Dearborn County Special Crimes Unit received tips that
    McKinney was dealing drugs from his apartment and at a park in Lawrenceburg.
    Consequently, an undercover officer made contact with McKinney and purchased
    hydrocodone and marijuana from him on several occasions, including January 3, 2013,
    January 4, 2013, January 8, 2013, January 11, 2013, January 17, 2013, January 24, 2013,
    and February 6, 2013. On February 13, 2013, the State charged McKinney with Count I,
    dealing in a schedule II controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a family housing
    complex as a class A felony; Count II dealing in a schedule II controlled substance as a
    class B felony; and Count III dealing in marijuana within 1,000 feet of a family housing
    complex as a class C felony.
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-2
    (a)(1)(C), (b)(2)(B)(iii)
    2
    I.C. § 35-48-4-2(a)(1)(C)
    3
    I.C. § 35-48-4-10(b)(2)(B)(ii)
    2
    On July 10, 2013, McKinney pleaded guilty to all counts. The trial court held a
    sentencing hearing on August 20, 2013. At the hearing, McKinney testified that he could
    neither read nor write, and that, while he had been able to briefly work at jobs where
    reading was not required, he had trouble holding down a job. McKinney and his mother
    both testified that his literacy difficulties might be the result of a childhood injury to his
    head caused by a two-story fall. McKinney further testified that he was injured while
    working at Midwest Cylinder and that the injury led to his addiction to painkillers, as he
    was prescribed Vicodin for pain, though McKinney never sought effective treatment for
    his drug addiction. Additionally, McKinney had prior convictions for possession of
    marijuana in 2004 and possession of paraphernalia in 2006.              McKinney received
    probation for both convictions.
    On August 21, 2013, the trial court held a pronouncement of sentencing hearing.
    At the hearing, the trial court considered McKinney’s limited I.Q. and learning
    disabilities as mitigating factors. However, the trial court also found that McKinney’s
    ability to participate in an ongoing illegal drug operation showed an ability to plan,
    coordinate, and communicate. The trial court believed this ability showed that McKinney
    did indeed have the ability to pursue a legal vocational career and instead chose to
    participate in illegal activities. The court considered as aggravating factors McKinney’s
    criminal history, that he sold illegal substances in a family housing complex, and that
    McKinney failed to effectively seek drug treatment. After weighing the mitigating and
    aggravating factors, the trial court sentenced McKinney to thirty years of incarceration
    3
    with ten years suspended and the final two years to be served on probation on Count I, to
    ten years on Count II, and to four years on Count III with all sentences to be served
    concurrently for an aggregate of thirty years with ten years suspended.
    McKinney now appeals.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    McKinney argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate in
    light of the nature of his offenses and his character pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule
    7(B). More particularly, McKinney argues that, as his longest sentence is for dealing in a
    schedule II controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a family housing complex as a class
    A felony, this court should consider the fact that the legislature has revised the criminal
    code concerning drug offenses. McKinney points the Court to revised Indiana Code
    section 38-48-4-2(a), effective July 1, 2014, which classifies the sale of a schedule II
    controlled substance, absent enhancing circumstances, as a Level 5 felony with an
    advisory sentence of two years. Additionally, McKinney argues that the trial court did
    not adequately consider his level of mental functioning when it decided to give him the
    advisory sentence.    McKinney asks that this Court reverse the trial court’s order
    sentencing him to the advisory terms for each of his offenses and resentence him to the
    minimum term of imprisonment to be served concurrently.
    On appeal, this Court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
    consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind.
    4
    Appellate Rule 7(B). However, this court does not substitute its judgment for that of the
    trial court.   Foster v. State, 
    795 N.E.2d 1078
    , 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).          Under
    Appellate Rule 7(B), the question is not whether it is more appropriate to impose a
    different sentence upon the defendant, but whether the defendant’s sentence is
    appropriate.   Steinberg v. State, 
    941 N.E.2d 515
    , 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).           The
    defendant bears the burden of persuasion on appeal that the sentence he received is
    inappropriate. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006).
    We start by noting that, when considering the nature of the offense, “the advisory
    sentence is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for
    the crime committed.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007). McKinney
    pleaded guilty to Count I, II, and III, and on each was given the advisory sentence: thirty
    years is the advisory sentence for a class A felony under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-4,
    ten years is the advisory sentence for a class B felony under Indiana Code section 35-50-
    2-5, and four years is the advisory sentence for a class C felony under Indiana Code
    section 35-50-2-6.
    McKinney argues that these advisory sentences should be eschewed by this Court
    as a result of the recent revisions the legislature has made concerning drug offenses.
    However, McKinney committed his crimes and was sentenced before the legislature
    made these revisions, and while McKinney is correct that, “had McKinney committed his
    crime after July 1, 2014, he would no longer be eligible” for the enhancement for selling
    within 1,000 feet of a housing complex, he fails to note that he might still be eligible for
    5
    an enhancement for selling within 500 feet of a public park while a person under eighteen
    years of age was reasonably expected to be present under the Indiana Code section 35-48-
    1-16.5, effective July 1, 2014. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. Regardless, Courts must generally
    sentence defendants under the sentencing statutes in effect at the time the defendant
    committed the offense.4 Barber v. State, 
    863 N.E.2d 1199
    , 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
    Therefore, McKinney’s argument concerning the nature of his offenses avails him of
    nothing.
    McKinney also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character
    and avers that the trial court did not give apt consideration to the possibility of a lesser
    rehabilitative sentence in light of McKinney’s mental struggles. However, the record
    shows that the court did indeed consider McKinney’s mental problems and that it
    recognized his educational struggles and low I.Q. Tr. p. 71. However, after considering
    McKinney’s criminal history and his extensive pattern of selling illegal controlled
    substances, the trial court determined that he was “not likely to respond to short term
    incarceration.” Id. at 72. In light of McKinney’s criminal history and pattern of selling
    drugs, we do not find that the trial court’s sentence was inappropriate.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    BAILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
    4
    An exception to this rule exists. The doctrine of amelioration provides that “a defendant who is
    sentenced after the effective date of a statute providing for more lenient sentencing is entitled to be
    sentenced pursuant to that statute rather than the sentencing statute in effect at the time of the commission
    or conviction of the crime.” Richards v. State, 
    681 N.E.2d 208
    , 213 (Ind. 1997). However, McKinney
    was sentenced before the effective date of the revised Indiana Code section 38-48-4-2(a), which is
    effective July 1, 2014. Thus, the doctrine of amelioration does not apply.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15A01-1309-CR-399

Filed Date: 4/9/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021