Gayle Clark, Jr. v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be                   Mar 18 2014, 9:19 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                            ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    HUGH N. TAYLOR                                     GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Hugh N. Taylor, P.C.                               Attorney General of Indiana
    Auburn, Indiana
    RICHARD C. WEBSTER
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    GAYLE CLARK, JR.,                                  )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                        )
    )
    vs.                                 )       No. 76A05-1305-CR-261
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                  )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                         )
    APPEAL FROM THE STEUBEN CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Allen N. Wheat, Judge
    Cause No. 76C01-1110-FD-970
    March 18, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    KIRSCH, Judge
    Gayle Clark, Jr. appeals from the trial court’s sentencing order following Clark’s
    jury trial at the conclusion of which he was found guilty of one count of possession of
    marijuana1 as a Class D felony and one count of possession of paraphernalia 2 as a Class A
    misdemeanor, contending that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by failing
    to find a significant mitigating circumstance.
    We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On October 5, 2011, Steuben County Deputy Sheriff Phillip Nott received a tip that
    Clark had marijuana at his residence located at 4210 West County Road 150 South in
    Steuben County. Acting on that tip, Deputy Nott and Deputy Michael Meeks drove toward
    Clark’s residence at approximately 9:00 a.m. and encountered Clark on Golden Lake Road.
    After speaking with Clark, the deputies followed Clark to his residence, where they were
    joined by another deputy shortly after arriving there. Deputy Nott told Clark that he had
    received information that there may be marijuana in Clark’s residence. Clark admitted that
    he might have some cut marijuana in his residence. Deputy Nott obtained Clark’s consent
    to search the residence, and the officers entered the residence and proceeded to conduct
    their search.
    In the kitchen area, the deputies observed two paper plates sitting on a table, with
    one plate stacked on top of the other. Each plate contained an amount of green, cut, plant
    material. The deputies also observed on top of a portable stereo, a packet of rolling papers
    1
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11
    (1).
    2
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8
    .3(b).
    2
    used to smoke marijuana. Next to the stereo, the deputies observed a metal pipe also used
    to smoke marijuana. The pipe contained what the deputies observed to be residue in the
    bowl of the pipe, which smelled like burnt marijuana. In a cabinet in the kitchen area, the
    deputies discovered two zip-lock plastic bags containing green, leafy, plant material.
    Clark admitted that he smoked marijuana and claimed that he obtained the
    marijuana from plants in the area. He further admitted that the amount he possessed was
    more than thirty grams. All of the green cut plant material, rolling papers, and metal pipe
    were recovered by Deputy Nott. The green, cut plant material was submitted for chemical
    analysis, after which it was determined to be marijuana with an aggregate weight of 194
    grams.
    The State charged Clark as detailed above, and after his jury trial, Clark was found
    guilty as charged. At Clark’s sentencing hearing, he argued that despite having a lengthy
    criminal history, the facts of this case were not particularly aggravating. Clark admitted
    possession of the marijuana and requested that less than the maximum sentence be imposed
    for the offenses. The trial court found Clark’s substantial, prior criminal history to be an
    aggravating circumstance and found no mitigating circumstances. Clark was sentenced to
    three years executed for his Class D felony conviction and to a one-year sentence for his
    Class A misdemeanor conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. Clark now
    appeals.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    Clark appeals from the trial court’s sentencing order contending that the trial court
    abused its discretion by failing to find what he claims was a significant, mitigating
    3
    circumstance.    Clark argues that the trial court should have found as a mitigating
    circumstance that his crime did not cause or threaten to cause serious harm to persons or
    property.
    Trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing sentence
    for a felony offense. Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on
    reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
     (Ind. 2007). The statement must include a reasonably detailed
    recitation of the trial court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence. 
    Id.
     If the recitation
    includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must
    identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each
    circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating. 
    Id.
     Sentencing
    decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only
    for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
     An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly
    against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the
    reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” 
    Id.
    A trial court may abuse its discretion by entering a sentencing statement that omits
    mitigating factors that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration.
    
    Id. at 490-91
    . Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to “weigh” aggravating
    and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot
    now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to “properly weigh” such factors. 
    Id. at 491
    . Once the trial court has entered a sentencing statement, which may or may not
    include the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, it may then “impose any
    4
    sentence that is . . . authorized by statute; and . . . permissible under the Constitution of the
    State of Indiana.” 
    Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7
    .1(d).
    The finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory and rests within the trial court’s
    discretion. Storey v. State, 
    875 N.E.2d 243
    , 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “The trial court is
    not obligated to accept the defendant’s arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating
    factor.” 
    Id.
     Additionally, the trial court is not required to attribute the same weight to
    proffered mitigating factors as does the defendant. 
    Id.
     Nonetheless, the trial court may not
    ignore factors in the record that would mitigate an offense. 
    Id.
     To fail to find mitigating
    circumstances that are clearly supported by the record may imply that the trial court did
    not consider those circumstances. 
    Id.
     In order to prevail on appeal, the defendant must
    establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the
    record. 
    Id.
    We observe as an initial matter that Clark did not raise or argue his proposed
    mitigating circumstance at his sentencing hearing. “A defendant who fails to raise
    proposed mitigators at the trial court level is precluded from advancing them for the first
    time on appeal.” Pennington v. State, 
    821 N.E.2d 899
    , 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Waiver
    notwithstanding, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.             The
    mitigating circumstance advanced by Clark is a discretionary mitigating circumstance
    found in Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(b)(1). The statutory language provides that the
    trial court “may” find certain mitigating circumstances, but is not required to do so. 
    Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7
    .1(b)(1). Moreover, the record is silent on the issue of whether any harm
    was caused by Clark’s offenses.
    5
    In sum, Clark waived his appellate claim by failing to first present it to the trial
    court. Waiver notwithstanding, Clark has failed to establish that the mitigating evidence
    was both significant and supported by the record.
    Affirmed.
    FRIEDLANDER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 76A05-1305-CR-261

Filed Date: 3/18/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021