George T. Bonin v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Mar 13 2014, 10:03 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GEORGE T. BONIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KRISTIN GARN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
GEORGE T. BONIN, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1304-EX-376
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE )
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Steven F. Bier, Chairperson
Cause No. 13-R-00821
March 13, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER, Judge
Appellant-petitioner George Bonin appeals appellee-respondent Review Board of
the Indiana Department of Workforce Development’s (Review Board) decision to deny
him unemployment. More particularly, Bonin argues that he left his employment with
Ryder Integrated Logistics (Ryder) when his night shift schedule caused him fatigue and
he was concerned for the safety of others; Bonin maintains that, under these
circumstances, he should receive unemployment benefits. We conclude that the Review
Board was correct in determining that Bonin left employment without good cause as
defined in Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1. Therefore, we affirm the Review Board’s
determination that Bonin was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
FACTS
Bonin began working for Ryder on August 27, 2012. He accepted full-time
employment with Ryder as a truck driver with the understanding that his shift would
begin between 10:00 p.m. and midnight and end between 10:00 a.m. and noon. Bonin
was employed by Ryder until September 11, 2012, when he severed the employment
relationship. Bonin told his supervisor that he could not sleep in the afternoons and that
he did not feel safe driving the night shift.
On November 8, 2012, a claims deputy from the Department of Workforce
Development determined that Bonin was eligible for unemployment benefits because he
was involuntarily employed due to a physical disability. The deputy further determined
2
that Bonin had made reasonable efforts to maintain his job because the “medical
condition was verified to the employer.” Appellee’s App. p. 2. On November 19, 2012,
Ryder filed an appeal from the determination of eligibility, and, on February 18, 2013, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on Bonin’s unemployment claim. At the
hearing, Bonin testified that he quit working for Ryder because he was unable to adjust
his sleeping habits to the night shift and felt unsafe driving at night. He also testified that
he had called his doctor and spoken with him over the phone about possible solutions to
his inability to sleep. His doctor suggested over-the-counter sleep aids and offered to
discuss prescription sleep aids, but Bonin did not make an appointment.
The ALJ issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ found as fact
that 1) Bonin had known that he would be driving at nighttime when he accepted
employment with Ryder; 2) Bonin had consulted his physician by phone and expressed
concern over the safety of driving at night while deprived of sleep, but he had not met
with his physician to further explore his options; and 3) Bonin had voluntarily left
employment. The ALJ also made several conclusions of law including 1) Bonin was not
diagnosed with a medical condition and did not have a medically substantiated disability;
2) Bonin did not show that a reasonably prudent person would terminate employment
under the same or similar working conditions when he took a position understanding that
he would work over night and worked only ten days; and 3) Bonin voluntarily left
employment without good cause in connection with work.
3
Bonin filed an appeal with the Review Board. On March 13, 2013, the Review
Board issued its determination affirming the decision of the ALJ. Bonin now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
We initially observe that the Unemployment Compensation Act provides that
“[a]ny decision of the review board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of
fact.” McClain v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Dept of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1316
(Ind. 1998). Moreover,
Indiana Code § 22-4-17-12(f) provides that when the Board’s decision is
challenged as contrary to law, the reviewing court is limited to a two part
inquiry into: (1) “the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision”;
and (2) “the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts.”
Under this standard courts are called upon to review (1) determinations of
specific or “basic” underlying facts, (2) conclusions or inferences from
those facts, sometimes called “ultimate facts,” and (3) conclusions of law.
Id. at 1317.
Under our standard of review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the
credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review
Board’s findings. Id. We will reverse the decision “only if there is no substantial
evidence to support the findings.” Id.
Questions of ultimate facts are essentially “mixed questions of law and fact.” Id.
at 1318. The ultimate facts are typically reviewed to ensure that the Review Board’s
inference is reasonable. Some questions of ultimate fact are within the special
competence of the Review Board. In such cases, a court should “exercise greater
4
deference to the reasonableness of the Board’s conclusion.” Id. The Review Board’s
deduction requires reversal if the underlying facts are not supported by substantial
evidence or the logic of the inference is faulty, even where the agency acts within its
expertise, or if the agency proceeds under an incorrect view of the law. Id.
II. Bonin’s Claims
Bonin states that he was unable to continue working for Ryder because he had
difficulty adjusting his sleeping habits to the night shift. He maintains that he could not
operate his truck in a manner he felt was safe when dealing with fatigue.
At the outset, we note that Bonin has failed to make any claim that might entitle
him to a reversal of the Review Board’s determination that he is ineligible for
unemployment benefits. He does not argue that he had good cause for leaving or that a
reasonably prudent person in his circumstances would have felt compelled to leave
employment. Thus, we agree with the Review Board that these issues have been waived.
Waiver notwithstanding, Bonin’s argument fails on the merits. An employee who
voluntarily leaves his employment must have “good cause in connection with the work”
in order to avoid becoming disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Ind.
Code. § 22-4-15-1(a). For a claimant to show good cause, he or she must demonstrate
that a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would be compelled to leave
employment. Indianapolis Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Jones, 669 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996). If a claimant lacks good cause for severing the employment
5
relationship, he or she is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under
Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1(a).
As discussed above, Bonin claims that he cannot adjust to sleeping in the
afternoon and that the fatigue resulting from a lack of sleep makes it difficult and unsafe
for him to drive during the night shift. While Bonin called his doctor to seek advice, he
neither attempted to take the over-the-counter sleep aids his doctor suggested, nor did he
schedule an appointment with his doctor to discuss prescription sleep aids. Appellant’s
App. p. 6-8. Bonin gave no reason for this decision, other than his aversion to sleep aids.
Id. Under these circumstance, we will not say that driving the night shift alone is enough
to cause a reasonably prudent person to end his employment. In that case, no truck driver
would work at night. Consequently, we conclude that Bonin did not have good cause to
end his employment.
The decision of the Review Board is affirmed.
NAJAM, J., concurs, and CRONE, J., concurs in result.
6