Tanner Howard v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 20 2014, 6:45 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BRENT R. DECHERT GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JODI KATHRYN STER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TANNER HOWARD, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 34A02-1304-CR-392
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Brant J. Parry, Judge
Cause No. 34D02-1207-FB-171
February 20, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Tanner Howard (Howard), appeals the trial court’s denial of
his motion to dismiss.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Howard raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial
court abused its discretion by denying Howard’s motion to dismiss.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 18, 2011, Sergeant Mark Miller and Officer Chad Vancamp
(Officers), of the Kokomo Police Department were dispatched to an area near Armstrong
and Elm Streets in Kokomo, Indiana, to investigate shots that had been fired. Upon arrival,
the Officers observed several males standing over Christopher Ingle (Ingle). Two of the
males, one of which was later identified as Howard, fled and refused to comply with the
Officers’ command to stop. After a pursuit, the Officers caught up with Howard and the
other male and apprehended them. The Officers conducted a body search on Howard, and
they found him to be in possession of Ingle’s wallet. On retracing their path of pursuit, the
Officers discovered a handgun. Two hours after the arrest, the Officers interviewed Ingle
who stated that he and his friends were on Armstrong Street waiting to engage in a fight
with other people when three men started walking towards them. Ingle told the Officers
that he was struck in his face with a gun and was robbed of his wallet. The Officers also
interviewed Howard who confessed that he had struck Ingle in the face with a gun, and
while doing so, the gun accidently discharged and shot Ingle’s friend in the leg. Howard
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also admitted that during the incident, he had seen a wallet on the ground and thought it
was his, so he picked it up and put it in his pocket.
The following day, on December 19, 2011, the State filed an Information, charging
Howard with resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-
1(a) under cause number 34D03-1112-CM-1362 (Cause No. CM-1362). Meanwhile, the
detectives at Kokomo Police Department continued with their investigation in the robbery
and shooting. On February 14, 2012, Howard pled guilty to resisting law enforcement and
on March 15, 2012, he was sentenced to one year.
On May 22, 2012, the Kokomo Police Department completed its investigation in
the robbery and the shooting that took place on December 18, 2011. On July 9, 2012, the
State filed an Information, charging Howard with Count I, robbery resulting in bodily
injury, a Class B felony, I.C. § 35-42-5-1(1); and Count II, criminal recklessness, a Class
D felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(2) under cause number 34D02-1207-FB-00171 (Cause
No. FB-00171). On October 23, 2012, Howard filed a motion to dismiss Cause No. FB-
00171 pursuant to I.C 35-41-4-4(a), (the Successive Prosecution Statute). In his motion,
Howard argued that a dismissal of the new charges was warranted since the robbery,
shooting, and resisting law enforcement arose from a single scheme or plan, and thus the
State was barred under the Successive Prosecution Statute to bring the latter charges.
Following a hearing on February 4, 2013, the trial court denied Howard’s motion on
February 13, 2013. In its Order, the trial court stated, in pertinent part, the following:
According to the probable cause filed in the instant case, the investigation of the
fight, robbery and shooting lasted until well after [Howard] entered into a plea and
was sentenced in the original prosecution for resisting law enforcement. The
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investigating officers were taking statements of witnesses and suspects, collecting
evidence, and having evidence analyzed for blood residue and fingerprints. The
probable cause for the instant case does not include the affidavit used to find
probable cause in the original prosecution. However, it also includes approximately
95 additional pages of affidavits, pictures, lab results, etc. which were gathered
during the investigation of the incident which occurred just prior to [Howard]
fleeing from the officers.
(Appellant’s App. pp. 59-59(a)).
On March 22, 2013, Howard filed a motion to certify the trial court’s ruling for an
interlocutory appeal and on March 27, 2013, the trial court granted this motion. On June
10, 2013, we accepted jurisdiction. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Howard contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
dismiss because prosecuting him for the charges in Cause No. FB-00171 after he had
already pled guilty to the charge alleged in Cause No. CM-1362 was barred under the
Successive Prosecution Statute.
On appeal, “we review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of
discretion.” Johnson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). An abuse of
discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances or when the trial court has misinterpreted the law. Howard v. State, 818
N.E.2d 469, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). As such, we must determine whether Howard’s
offenses were part of a “single scheme or plan” such that they should have been joined in
the initial prosecution. Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2002). The
Successive Prosecution Statute sets forth the circumstances under which a prosecution is
barred by reason of a previous prosecution for a different offense:
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(a) A prosecution is barred if all of the following exist:
(1) There was a former prosecution of the defendant for a different offense
or for the same offense based on different facts.
(2) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction of the
defendant or in an improper termination under section 3 of this chapter.
(3) The instant prosecution is for an offense with which the defendant should
have been charged in the former prosecution.
(b) A prosecution is not barred under this section if the offense on which it is based
was not consummated when the trial under the former prosecution began.
I.C. § 35–41–4–4.
Both parties agree that the provisions of subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2) are satisfied
and only subsection (a)(3) is contested. On reading I.C. § 35–41–4–4, we note that “should
have been charged” in subsection (a)(3) must be read in conjunction with Indiana’s Joinder
Statute. Williams, 762 N.E.2d at 1219. Indiana’s Joinder Statute provides in relevant part:
Two (2) or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment or information, with
each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses:
(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme
or plan; or
(2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together
or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.
I.C. § 35–34–1–9(a).
Howard contends that the State had sufficient evidence to support the robbery and
criminal recklessness charges at the time the State filed the resisting law enforcement
charge on December 19, 2011. Howard relies on the Williams case to support his argument.
In Williams, the defendant sold cocaine to an undercover police officer in the parking lot
of an apartment complex. Id. at 1218. When police cars approached to apprehend him,
the defendant fled and hid in an empty apartment. Id. After Williams was arrested, police
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officers discovered cocaine in his possession. Id. The State charged Williams with
residential entry and possession of cocaine for those crimes committed after fleeing from
the police, and he pled guilty to the possession offense. Id. The State charged Williams
separately with dealing in cocaine and possession of cocaine for the offenses that he
committed before leaving the scene of the narcotics deal. Id. Williams moved to dismiss
the later charges, arguing that they were barred under the Successive Prosecution Statute.
Id. Although the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, our supreme court reversed,
finding that the charges were “based on a series of acts so connected that they constituted
parts of a single scheme or plan.” Id. at 1220.
Our review of the record establishes that Williams is inapposite to the instant case.
In Williams, the State charged Williams with possession of cocaine and residential entry,
however, it failed to charge him with dealing in cocaine from the undercover operation
until a later date. Our supreme court in that case held there was probable cause to charge
Williams with dealing in and possession of cocaine at the same time he was charged with
the residential entry and possession of cocaine offenses. In the instant case, the record
reveals that the State did not have sufficient probable cause to charge Howard with robbery
and criminal recklessness at the time the State filed the resisting law enforcement charge.
On December 18, 2011, Ingle did not name Howard and neither did he know his identity.
On December 19, 2011, the day Howard was charged with resisting law enforcement,
Howard told the police he had been hit first, the handgun accidentally discharged, and he
had picked up Ingle’s wallet by mistake. It was not until December 20, 2011, that Ingle
named Howard by name and identified his photo. Thus it was unclear whether Howard
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had committed a criminal act or he had acted in self-defense. Irrespective of Howard’s
statements, the Kokomo Police Department made the decision to test the handgun for latent
fingerprints and for possible blood match. On January 12, 2012, Detective Purtee reported
that no suitable fingerprints had been found to match Howard’s. The police however found
a reddish stain on the handgun and sent over to the Indiana State Police Laboratory for
further evaluation. (App. p. 164-69). Here the record obviously shows that police took
several months investigating the robbery and shooting.
We find that the instant case to be more like State v. McDonald 954 N.E.2d 1031(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In McDonald, in the summer of 2008, McDonald’s three children,
were removed from McDonald and his wife’s care by the Department of Child Services
due to unsanitary conditions in the home. During the interviews, the oldest child claimed
that McDonald had molested her, while the second child was unable to communicate due
to severe speech delays and impaired hearing. Id at 1032. The State filed charges with
respect to the oldest child only. Id. McDonald pled guilty to the charge. After the second
child was able to speak clearly, the State filed new charges with respect to the second child.
Id. McDonald thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Id. at
1033. The State filed an interlocutory appeal challenging McDonald’s motion. On appeal,
we held that:
McDonald relies on Williams and Wiggins for the proposition that the trial court
properly dismissed the charges. However, in both Williams and Wiggins, the State
was aware of the basis of the second charges and had evidence to support the second
charges at the time it filed the first charges. See Williams, 762 N.E.2d at 1220
(holding that charges for dealing in and possession of cocaine should have been
brought at the same time as prior charges for residential entry and possession of
cocaine); Wiggins, 661 N.E.2d at 881 (holding that prosecution for conspiracy to
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deal cocaine was barred after the defendant’s prosecution for dealing in cocaine).
This is not a case of attempted piecemeal prosecution as in Williams and Wiggins.
The State simply had inadequate evidence to support charging McDonald until July
2010. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by granting McDonald’s
motion to dismiss the charges related to [the second child].
Id. at 1035.
As in McDonald, probable cause was necessary to file the charges in Cause No. FB-
00171 and the State had no obligation to file the charges until such probable cause existed.
As we noted before, on the date of filing the first charges, December 19, 2011, the State
did not have probable cause to charge Howard with the later charges. The investigation
into the robbery and shooting was complex. The police had the task of interviewing several
witnesses and they also had to test the handgun for latent fingerprints or a possible blood
match. The record reveals that the forensic results for the handgun were a key piece of the
evidence and the investigation pertaining to that was concluded several months after the
incident. Under these circumstances, we find that the State simply had inadequate evidence
by December 19, 2011 to charge Howard with the subsequent charges. Therefore, we
cannot say trial court abused its discretion by denying Howard’s motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Howard’s motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J. AND MAY, J. concur
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