Lynn Wooden v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 29 2016, 10:22 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Deborah Markisohn Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lynn Wooden, February 29, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1412-CR-574
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John M.T. Chavis
Appellee-Plaintiff. II, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49F15-1307-FD-46844
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Lynn Wooden (“Wooden”) appeals his conviction by jury of two counts of
Class D felony resisting law enforcement1 and one count of Class A
misdemeanor driving while suspended.2 His sole argument is that that he did
not make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.
Because the facts and circumstances of the case reveal that, among other things,
Wooden was advised of the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself,
we conclude that the waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent. We therefore affirm his convictions.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether Wooden’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent.
Facts
[3] On July 17, 2013, fifty-three-year-old Wooden made a left turn without using
his turn signal. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer
Christopher Shaw (“Officer Shaw”) activated his lights and sirens, and Wooden
1
IND. CODE § 35-44.1-3-1. This statute was amended effective July 1, 2014, and Wooden’s offense would
now qualify as a Level 6 felony. However, because Wooden committed this offense in 2013, we will apply
the statute in effect at that time.
2
IND. CODE § 9-24-19-2.
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pulled over. As Officer Shaw was walking to Wooden’s car, Wooden drove
away. Officer Shaw and Officer John Schwerrs (“Officer Schwerrs”) pursued
Wooden, who eventually stopped under an overpass. The officers got out of
their cars with their guns drawn and yelled at Wooden to show his hands.
Wooden, however, reached for the center console in his car. As the officers
approached the car, Wooden rolled up the window and locked his doors while
continuing to reach for the console. Officer Schwerrs broke the driver’s side
window with his baton while another officer reached in the window, unlocked
the door, and opened it. The officer grabbed Wooden’s arm and pulled him out
of the car.
[4] Wooden struggled with the officer and explained that “he was a member of the
Moorish Nations, and that the laws of the State of Indiana or the United States
[did not] apply to him, and [he was] allowed to travel as he please[d] without
being stopped or bothered.” (Tr. 124-25). The officers discovered that
Wooden’s driver’s license was suspended with prior convictions, and that he
had two outstanding warrants in Marion County for driving while suspended.
[5] At Wooden’s July 18, 2013, initial hearing, a master commissioner pointed out
that Wooden had “been arrested a lot of times and convicted. So you know
how the law works.” (Tr. 164). The commissioner also told Wooden that he
had the right to be represented by counsel and encouraged Wooden to hire an
attorney. When Wooden responded that he would not hire an attorney, the
commissioner further explained as follows:
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[T]hat’s up to you. You absolutely have the right to make a bad
decision about whether to be represented by counsel or not.
When you go to court on Tuesday, there will be an attorney there
called the prosecuting attorney whose job it is to enforce the law.
. . . So if you change your mind between now and then, and
seek to hire counsel to help you to make a defense against those
charges . . . you have a right to do that, and I would encourage
you to do that.
[6] (Tr. 165-66).
[7] Five days later, at Wooden’s first pretrial hearing, Wooden told the trial court
that he did not plan to hire an attorney. The trial court responded that it would
“highly recommend getting an attorney – you know, whether you get your own
or you use Ms. Sanders [who had been appointed to represent Wooden]. Ms.
Sanders is a highly capable attorney; she’s in my court more than most other
lawyers are. She knows how I do things. So – I would recommend using her.”
(Tr. 176). When Wooden asked about jurisdictional issues, the trial court
explained, “that’s something you need to raise with your attorney, discuss with
your attorney. Your attorney’s going to be equipped – somebody who’s gone to
three years of law school and has also practiced in this court. The attorney will
be equipped to evaluate the viability of your jurisdictional claims.” (Tr. 177).
[8] The trial court further explained:
Trust me when I say . . . [t]here’s some stuff I know that you
don’t know about the law. . . . Ms. Collins has gone to law
school, and she’s been practicing in the Prosecutor’s Office.
She’ll make certain objections, and they might be viable
objections that I grant that would not allow you to say stuff. And
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you may not know why you can’t say stuff. . . . The law may
prohibit you from offering certain things into evidence . . . . I
don’t want you to harm your case and any defenses you may
have because you don’t know about . . . the law. . . . If you
decide after all that, I still want to go pro se, that’s fine. . . . I
won’t treat you any differently. But . . . that works both ways. I
will treat you as somebody who’s gone to law school, who has
read the Rules of Evidence, and who’s passed the Bar Exam. I’ll
treat you the same way. Now, if you haven’t done all that – then
you’re putting your case in jeopardy. . . . [D]id you not wish the
Public Defender Agency to represent you?
(Tr. 179-80). Wooden responded that he would “not accept benefits from the
Public Defender – no benefits from this Court whatsoever.” (Tr. 180).
[9] At a pretrial conference in April 2014, Wooden asked the trial court about
obtaining a copy of a video from Langley Productions, the company that
produces the television show, COPS, which was filming when Wooden was
arrested. Wooden believed that the video had been purposely destroyed. The
trial court responded to Wooden’s concerns as follows:
Now – what you need to do is if you believe that somehow . . .
they destroyed evidence, then you need to raise that issue at trial.
. . . Maybe you can create some kind of negative or rebuttable
presumption that somehow if that tape was available. . . . Now,
I’m not going to educate you on what a lawyer would do because
that’s not my job. I know what I would do if I was practicing
law – which I did eighteen years before taking the bench. I know
what I would do; I’m not telling you that, because that’s not my
role. That’s the thing about having an attorney. But you’re free
to represent yourself. But there might be a way that somebody
could raise that issue at trial. Somebody who’s experienced in
doing that could raise that issue at trial. Maybe somebody could
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create some kind of rebuttable presumption or adverse
presumption that if that evidence were available, that evidence
would be favorable to me, and not favorable to the State. I don’t
know; I can’t give you that advice.
(Tr. 280). The trial court also reminded Wooden that he could request an
attorney any time before trial.
[10] Wooden failed to appear for his scheduled jury trial on September 17, 2014. A
few days later at the arrestee processing center, Wooden told a master
commissioner that the police “hid the video from COPS.” (Tr. 371). The
commissioner responded that she was sorry for Wooden’s frustration. She
further explained Wooden’s need for an attorney as follows, “normally a person
in your situation would be represented by an attorney. And an attorney would
know the proper methods to go through, the proper avenues to go request all of
that evidence. The Court normally doesn’t get evidence from people.” (Tr.
371).
[11] A few days later at a pretrial hearing, Wooden told the trial court that he did
not ask for a trial or tell the court that he was going to represent himself. The
trial court responded as follows:
You wanted to represent yourself a long time ago – matter of
fact, I appointed Ms. Anne Sanders, who’s an excellent . . .
attorney. And she could have helped you on this matter. But
you did not work with her, and then you said that you wanted to
represent yourself. Now, if – if that has changed, we can revisit
that issue. . . . I think it’s wise to have a representative –
somebody who’s trained in the law, somebody who knows how
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to navigate the Rules of Evidence and what have you, to make
sure that you don’t put your own head in the noose . . . . [W]e
could revisit that issue.
(Tr. 380). Wooden told the trial court that he just wanted the discovery
materials he had requested so he could proceed, and the trial court responded as
follows:
We’ve gone through the discovery issue time and time again.
We’re at the point where this case needs to go forward. . . . This
case has got to be over a year old . . . . Now if you believe that
you have an issue with discovery and what have you, that’s
where the benefit of having a lawyer to represent you . . . she can
. . . sift through it and find out what is legitimate and what is not.
. . . [I]n my opinion, I believe that you should consider working
with an attorney. That’s my opinion. . . . You’re free to do what
you want to do . . . I believe that you have sufficient intelligence,
knowledge, and education to represent yourself. The problem is,
that’s from a basic standpoint; that’s not from a legal standpoint,
in that you’re not going to know the rules of evidence. You’re
not going to know certain case law and what have you germane
to this case. So there could be something that you say or do – or
there’s something that you don’t say or do – that could have an
adverse impact on what happens to you. . . . I always think that
one should be represented by somebody who’s trained to do this
job.
(Tr. 382-85).
[12] At the final pretrial conference, the trial court granted the State’s motion to
appoint standby counsel. The trial court held Wooden’s jury trial on October
22, 2014. At a sidebar discussion, before the jury was selected, Wooden asked
for assistance from his standby counsel “if me and her can come to an
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understanding.” (Tr. 31-32). However, before trial started, Wooden decided
that he did not want Sanders’ assistance or to attend the trial. After telling the
trial court that it was incompetent, Wooden left the court room, and the trial
court held his trial without him.
[13] A jury convicted him as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to 730 days
with 606 days suspended for each conviction of resisting law enforcement, and
365 days with 241 days suspended for driving while suspended. The trial court
ordered all sentences to run concurrent to each other. Wooden appeals his
convictions.
Decision
[14] Wooden’s sole argument is that his waiver of counsel was not knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel. McBride v.
State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Implicit in the right to counsel is the right to self-representation. Drake v. State,
895 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). However, before a defendant waives
his right to counsel and proceeds pro se, the trial court must determine that the
defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Jackson v.
State, 992 N.E.2d 926, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We review de
novo the trial court’s determination that a defendant waived his right to
counsel. McBride, 992 N.E.2d at 917.
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[15] “‘It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better
defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.’” Hopper v.
State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 617-18 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 807 (1975)). The defendant who waives his right to counsel and asserts his
right to self-representation should therefore be informed of the dangers and
disadvantages of doing so. Parish v. State, 989 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013). The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that there are no specific
“talking points” a trial court must follow when advising a defendant of the
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel. Poynter v. State, 749
N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001). Rather, a trial court needs only to come to a
“considered determination” that the defendant is making a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Id.[16] The Indiana Supreme Court has adopted four factors for a trial court to
consider when determining whether a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver has occurred:
(1) the extent of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s decision;
(2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the
defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation; (3) the background and experience of the
defendant; and (4) the content of the defendant’s decision to
proceed pro se.
Id. at 1127-28. When applying these factors, the trial court is in the best
position to assess whether a defendant has made a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver. Id. at 1128. The trial court’s decision will most likely be
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upheld where the court has made the proper inquiries, conveyed the proper
information, and reached a reasoned conclusion. Id.
[17] Here, our review of the transcript reveals that from the time of his initial
hearing on July 18, 2013, until his jury trial on October 22, 2014, Wooden
attended at least seventeen hearings where he was repeatedly advised of his
right to counsel and the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself.
Specifically, two commissioners and one trial court judge warned Wooden that
not having counsel could harm his case and any possible defenses. In addition,
the trial court told Wooden that even though he had the intelligence to
represent himself, he had not gone to law school, read the rules of evidence, or
passed the bar exam. Wooden was advised that he would be “legally
outmatched” by the prosecutor. (State’s Br. 12).
[18] Wooden was also advised of the advantages of having an attorney. For
example, the trial court advised him that an attorney would have gone to law
school and passed the bar exam. An attorney would have been able to evaluate
Wooden’s discovery issues and jurisdictional claims and would have had
courtroom experience.
[19] With regard to the other Poynter factors, Wooden had experience with the law
because he had been arrested and convicted in the past for similar charges.
When Wooden was arrested for the current offenses, he had two outstanding
warrants for driving while suspended. In addition, the State is correct that
Wooden “made his reasons for rejecting representation clear.” (State’s Br. 12).
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As a member of the Moorish Nation, Wooden did not believe the laws of
Indiana applied to him, and he did not think the trial court had jurisdiction over
him. He also accused the trial court of being incompetent before choosing not
to attend his trial.
[20] Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly determined that Wooden’s
waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We,
therefore, affirm the trial court.
[21] Affirmed.
[22] Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.
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