Luther Riddell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                            Feb 29 2016, 9:19 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Donald E.C. Leicht                                       Gregory F. Zoeller
    Kokomo, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Eric P. Babbs
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Luther Riddell,                                          February 29, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    34A04-1507-CR-897
    v.                                               Appeal from the Howard Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable George A.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Hopkins, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    34D04-1412-MR-171
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016   Page 1 of 9
    [1]   Luther Riddell was convicted of Murder,1 a felony, and was determined to be a
    Habitual Offender. Riddell presents two issues for our review:
    1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Riddell’s
    motion for a mistrial?
    2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting certain
    evidence during the habitual offender phase?
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   During the early morning hours of December 16, 2014, Jay West went to
    Riddell’s house. An argument and fight ensued, most of which was recorded
    on Riddell’s surveillance camera system. As West walked away from Riddell’s
    home and out of camera range, Riddell grabbed an object and followed him.
    Riddell then returned to camera range and replaced the object. West was
    discovered lying in a nearby yard and ultimately died of a stab wound. West’s
    DNA was taken from the blade of a knife that was found in proximity to where
    Riddell can be seen grabbing and later replacing an object.
    [4]   The following day, the State charged Riddell with murder and alleged him to be
    a habitual offender. A three-day jury trial commenced on June 9, 2015. At the
    end of the second day, just before the court recessed for the evening, there was
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1
    (1).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016   Page 2 of 9
    an outburst from the gallery by an unidentified woman who yelled, “You need
    to fucking die, you fucking murderer, lying ass, bitch.” Transcript at 213. The
    trial court summoned security and removed the jury to the jury room. The
    record continued outside the presence of the jury with Riddell’s counsel moving
    for a mistrial based on the spectator’s outburst. Riddell’s counsel argued that
    “the jury has been affected and may have been tainted and contaminated.” 
    Id. at 214
    . The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and Riddell’s counsel
    made no further request.
    [5]   The jury reconvened the next day and the trial continued. After the close of
    evidence, the jury returned its verdict finding Riddell guilty of murder. The trial
    then continued with the habitual offender phase tried to the jury. To establish
    Riddell was a habitual offender, the State offered State’s Exhibit 19, a series of
    documents relating to his August 15, 2008 conviction for receiving stolen
    property, a class D felony, under Cause No. 34D04-0710-FD-141. Riddell
    objected to admission of State’s Exhibit 19, asserting that not every document
    therein was certified. The trial court looked at the exhibit and sua sponte
    removed four pages of the exhibit, which were described as a “prosecutor’s
    report” and an “update report.” Transcript at 275. The trial court allowed
    admission of the remaining documents that comprised State’s Exhibit 19,
    including the certified charging information, certified probable cause affidavit,
    and certified sentencing order from Cause No. 34D04-0710-FD-141. The trial
    court overruled Riddell’s objection that the exhibit must be “taken either as a
    whole or not.” Transcript at 276.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016   Page 3 of 9
    [6]   When the State offered State’s Exhibit 21, which included documents relating to
    Riddell’s April 25, 2006 conviction for burglary, a class C felony, under Cause
    No. 30D01-0512-FC-185, Riddell objected, citing again the fact that several of
    the documents included therein were not certified. The trial court sua sponte
    took out the probable cause affidavit, but allowed admission of the remaining
    documents, which included the certified charging information, certified guilty
    plea and sentencing entry, and certified judgment of conviction from Cause No.
    30D01-0512-FC-185. The trial court overruled Riddell’s objection that the
    exhibit “ha[d] to be accepted in whole or rejected.” Transcript at 278. The jury
    found Riddell to be a habitual offender. On July 10, 2015, the trial court
    sentenced Riddell to sixty years for murder with a ten-year enhancement for his
    status as a habitual offender. Riddell now appeals.
    Discussion & Decision
    1. Mistrial
    [7]   Riddell argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
    a mistrial following an outburst from someone in the gallery while the jury was
    still present in the courtroom. Riddell asserts that the trial court’s failure to
    admonish the jury immediately after the outburst occurred allowed the outburst
    “to germinate in [the jurors’] minds.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Riddell also
    seemingly faults the trial court for not admonishing the jury the following
    morning before trial resumed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016   Page 4 of 9
    [8]   A mistrial is an extreme action and is warranted only when no other action can
    be expected to remedy the situation. Vaughn v. State, 
    971 N.E.2d 63
    , 68 (Ind.
    2012). “The decision to grant or deny a mistrial motion is left to the sound
    discretion of the trial court.” 
    Id. at 67
    . We will reverse the trial court’s
    determination on the issue only for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when
    the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances before the court. 
    Id. at 67-68
    . “We afford great deference to the
    trial court because it is in the best position to gauge the circumstances and
    impact on the jury.” 
    Id.
    [9]   When faced with a circumstance that a defendant believes might warrant a
    mistrial, generally the correct procedure is to request an admonishment. Isom v.
    State, 
    31 N.E.3d 469
    , 482 (Ind. 2015). If unsatisfied with the admonishment or
    if it is obvious that an admonishment will not be sufficient to cure the error,
    then counsel may move for a mistrial. 
    Id.
     In situations similar to the present, it
    has been held that an admonishment to disregard an outburst by a spectator is a
    reasonably curative measure. Thus, where an admonishment is given in such
    cases, the trial court’s subsequent denial of a motion for mistrial is not an abuse
    of discretion. See Adkins v. State, 
    524 N.E.2d 1274
    , 1275 (Ind. 1988); Hill v.
    State, 
    497 N.E.2d 1061
    , 1067 (Ind. 1986) (same).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016   Page 5 of 9
    [10]   Here, Riddell never requested an admonishment, but rather, moved
    immediately for a mistrial.2 The decision whether to admonish a jury is a
    function of trial strategy because an admonishment may draw undue attention
    to the very remarks and or conduct to be addressed. See Brewer v. State, 
    455 N.E.2d 324
    , 327 (Ind. 1983). It is a function of defense counsel to determine if
    such strategy is desirable. 
    Id.
     The trial court’s function is to rule on such
    request, if made, and not to, sua sponte, initiate the admonishment of the jury.
    
    Id.
     We therefore reject Riddell’s argument to the extent he claims it was
    incumbent upon the trial court to admonish the jury even where an
    admonishment was not requested.
    [11]   We likewise reject Riddell’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
    denying his motion for mistrial. To prevail on appeal from the denial of a
    motion for mistrial, Riddell must establish that the questioned conduct “was so
    prejudicial and inflammatory that he was placed in a position of grave peril to
    which he should not have been subjected.” Gregory v. State, 
    540 N.E.2d 585
    ,
    589 (Ind. 2001). The gravity of peril is determined by considering the
    misconduct’s probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision, not the
    impropriety of the challenged action, evidence, or misconduct. Mack v. State,
    
    736 N.E.2d 801
    , 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.
    2
    When the jury reconvened the following day, Riddell again did not request an admonishment.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016           Page 6 of 9
    [12]   The circumstance giving rise to Riddell’s motion for a mistrial was an
    emotional outburst from an unidentified female spectator. The spectator used
    profane language and accused Riddell of being a liar and a murderer. The
    outburst occurred as the court recessed the jury for the evening. The trial court
    immediately summoned security and removed the jury from the courtroom.
    After the jury was removed, Riddell immediately moved for a mistrial, asserting
    the jury had been “tainted.” Transcript at 214. The trial court disagreed and
    denied the motion.
    [13]   Here, the spectator’s outburst was short, transpiring in a matter of seconds.
    Further, there was no disruption of trial proceedings as the jury was preparing
    to exit the courtroom after the proceedings had been adjourned for the day.
    The spectator’s outburst did not add to the State’s evidence. Indeed, the State’s
    evidence of Riddell’s guilt was overwhelming, with much of it presented by way
    of the recording taken from Riddell’s security cameras. The recordings showed
    a heated exchange followed by Riddell initiating a physical confrontation. The
    recording also showed Riddell following West after he left Riddell’s property.
    Riddell is seen grabbing an object and then replacing it. A knife later found in
    proximity to where Riddell is seen grabbing an object contained West’s DNA
    on the blade. West was found in a nearby yard and died of a stab wound at the
    scene. The spectator’s outburst, while an unfortunate breach of decorum, did
    not place Riddell in a position of grave peril to which he otherwise would not
    have been subjected. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Riddell’s motion for a mistrial.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016   Page 7 of 9
    2. Habitual Offender
    [14]   During the habitual offender phase, the State offered State’s Exhibits 19 and 21,
    each composed of documents relating to Riddell’s prior convictions for the
    jury’s consideration of Riddell’s status as a habitual offender. Riddell’s
    argument with regard to admission of these exhibits is that the trial court
    exceeded its authority when it admitted the exhibits as modified by the court
    instead of admitting them as offered by the State or excluding them altogether.
    Riddell cites no authority to support his argument that the trial court could not
    admit the exhibits as modified. Riddell has therefore waived any error in this
    regard. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“[e]ach contention must be
    supported by citations to the authorities . . . relied on”); Jackson v. State, 
    758 N.E.2d 1030
    , 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding waiver where appellant failed
    to cite appropriate authority).
    [15]   Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
    State’s Exhibits 19 and 21 without certain documents that were initially
    contained therein. Trial courts have “inherent discretionary power on the
    admission of evidence.” Vasquez v. State, 868 N2d 473, 476 (Ind. 2007)
    (quotation omitted). Indeed, trial courts frequently redact or excise
    inadmissible matter from statements and other evidence. Townsend v. State, 
    533 N.E.2d 1215
    , 1225 (Ind. 1989). This is apparently what happened here.
    [16]   To the extent Riddell complains that the exhibits as tendered by the State are
    not included in the record, we note that it was Riddell’s burden to provide us
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016   Page 8 of 9
    with a complete record. See Moffitt v. State, 
    817 N.E.2d 239
    , 247 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2004) (noting that the appellant bears the burden of presenting a complete
    record with respect to the issues raised), trans. denied. Finally, we note that
    Riddell does not challenge the documents that were admitted as part of State’s
    Exhibits 19 and 21 as inadmissible. Upon review of the documents in each
    exhibit, it is clear that each one bears a proper certification. Riddell has failed
    to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting State’s Exhibits
    19 and 21.
    [17]   Judgment affirmed.
    [18]   Robb, J. and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 34A04-1507-CR-897

Filed Date: 2/29/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/29/2016