Dexter Rogers v. Anonymous Hospital A (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Feb 29 2016, 9:30 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Dexter Louis Rogers ANONYMOUS HOSPITAL A
Fort Wayne, Indiana Mark W. Baeverstad
Jason A. Scheele
Jessica L. Pixler
Rothberg Logan Warsco LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dexter Rogers, Individually and February 29, 2016
as Personal Representative of the Court of Appeals Case No.
Estates of Carrie Bell Rogers and 02A03-1507-CT-826
Premius Rogers, Interlocutory Appeal from the Allen
Superior Court
Appellant/Cross-Appellee/Plaintiff, The Honorable Nancy Eshcoff
Boyer, Special Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No. 02D03-1401-
CT-39
Anonymous Physician C,
Anonymous Physician F,
Anonymous Physician L,
Anonymous Medical Provider A,
and Anonymous Hospital A,
Appellees/Cross-
Appellants/Defendants.
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Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Parkview Health System, Inc., is a healthcare network serving northeastern
Indiana, a network that includes Appellee/Cross-Appellant/Defendant
Anonymous Hospital A (“the Hospital”). In June of 2011, Carrie Bell Rogers,
the mother of Appellant/Cross-Appellee/Plaintiff Dexter Rogers, fell while a
patient at the Hospital and died approximately two months later.
[2] In June of 2013, Rogers filed a proposed complaint with the Indiana
Department of Insurance (“IDOI”) alleging negligence by seventeen health care
providers (“the Healthcare Providers”) in allowing Carrie to fall and in her post-
fall care. As part of the discovery process, Rogers sought to depose Michael J.
Packnett, the CEO of Parkview. The Hospital moved for a protective order
preventing Rogers from deposing Packnett, which the trial court initially
granted. In May of 2015, after a change in trial court judge, the trial court
ordered the Hospital to produce Packnett for a deposition. The trial court
eventually ordered the Hospital to pay a $160.00 court reporter’s fee when it did
not produce Packnett for a deposition as ordered.
[3] Meanwhile, Rogers sought information related to an incident report he believes
should have been filed with the Indiana Department of Health (“IDOH”). In
fact, no such IDOH incident report has been submitted. Rogers, however,
became aware of an internal Hospital report submitted into the Hospital’s
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MIDAS reporting system (“the MIDAS report”) and sought to discover it in its
entirety. The Hospital responded that the MIDAS report was protected from
discovery by the Indiana peer-review statute and, in part, by work-product
privilege. The trial court ordered the Hospital to provide Rogers with a
redacted copy of the MIDAS report. Rogers appeals, arguing that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying him full access to the contents of the
MIDAS report. The Hospital responds to Rogers’s contention and argues that
the trial court abused its discretion in ordering it to produce Packnett for a
deposition and provide even a redacted copy of the MIDAS report. We
conclude that (1) we do not have jurisdiction to decide the issue of the MIDAS
report and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Hospital to
produce Packnett for a deposition. However, we also conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning the Hospital for failing to
produce Packnett for a scheduled deposition. Consequently, we reverse in part,
affirm in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] On June 26, 2011, Carrie was a patient at the Hospital when she fell. Carrie
died on August 23, 2011. On June 26, 2013, Rogers, individually and in his
capacity as the personal representative of Carrie’s estate, filed a proposed
complaint with the IDOI alleging negligence by the Healthcare Providers. On
March 21, 2014, the Healthcare Providers filed a motion in the trial court for
preliminary determination and to dismiss based on Rogers’s alleged failure to
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timely answer interrogatories or respond to requests for production of
documents.
[5] On January 9, 2015, Rogers filed a “Motion to Compel Defendants’ Witness
for Discovery and to Amend Complaint” in which Rogers sought an order to
produce the CEO/owner of Parkview for a deposition and add that person to
the list of defendants. On March 2, 2015, the trial court granted the Hospital’s
motion to quash Rogers’s notice of deposition and subpoena duces tecum of
Packnett and issued a protective order. On March 5, 2015, Rogers moved to
remove the trial court judge, Stanley Levine. On March 3, 2015, Judge Levine
recused himself, and, on March 27, 2015, the parties agreed to the appointment
of Special Judge Nancy Boyer.
[6] Meanwhile, on March 26, 2015, Rogers moved the trial court to reconsider its
ruling of March 2, 2015, that he was not entitled to depose Packnett and to
certify the question for interlocutory appeal. On April 2, 2015, Rogers moved
the trial court to compel discovery, including an “incident report” that he had
requested from the Hospital. Appellee’s App. p. 163. On April 10, 2015, the
Hospital responded that it had, in fact, complied with all outstanding discovery
orders and that the only document withheld was an internally-prepared MIDAS
report. On April 15, 2015, the Healthcare Providers responded to Rogers’s
motion to certify the question of Packnett’s deposition for interlocutory appeal,
arguing that it did not comply with the requirements of Indiana Rule of
Appellate Procedure 14(B)(1)(c)(ii).
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[7] On May 14, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on all pending motions. At the
hearing, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Well, I mean, we’re covering the medical
records now, we’re covering the MIDAS report, we’re covering
any and all writings, emails, etcetera, about the investigation.
That, I think, from what I’ve read of your stuff, that’s the core
thing that you’re interested in right now.
ROGERS: No. The core–well, the core thing is an item that
you already covered and I wasn’t willing to–uh, given an
opportunity to elaborate on
THE COURT: What’s that?
ROGERS: And that’s deposing the CEO of Parkview Health.
He is the respondeat superior. He is responsible for the sins of
the servants that he oversees. That’s a civil term. You know
that. So that being said, how can–if he has direct pertinent
material evidence that I can ask him questions to get material
evidence from–
THE COURT: Well, what evidence do you think he’s going
to have that we haven’t already covered here?
ROGERS: Huh, he’s the head of the compliance -
THE COURT: I know what he is. I’m just asking you a
question. Whatever is produced here that we’ve covered, do you
think there’s something else that he has in his hands that
wouldn’t be written down that we’ve covered here?
ROGERS: Yes.
THE COURT: What?
ROGERS: How would I–exactly. That’s–
THE COURT: Well, what would it be?
ROGERS: I don’t know. That’s considered hearsay. Unless
I’m allowed to have the opportunity to depose the individual,
we’re just talking hypothetics (sic) here. There is no really legal
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basis, there is no logical basis, as to why this person is being so
protected like he’s some god or something. He’s just–he’s just a
title, you see. How can you have a president of the United States
who wasn’t exempt from being deposed in the court of law in a
sexual case–
THE COURT: Alright–
ROGERS: –but we have–
THE COURT: Alright. No–
ROGERS: –but we have an individual–
THE COURT: No, no, no–
ROGERS: –we have an individual here who’s a CEO–
THE COURT: Mr. Rogers–
ROGERS: –of a hospital–
THE COURT: Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rogers–
ROGERS: What? How come I can’t get it on the record?
THE COURT: We’re not going to talk about Clinton in here.
ROGERS: I’m not talking about Clinton.
THE COURT: It has nothing to do with this.
ROGERS: I’m talking about the case. I’m not talking about
him specifically. The point is this: he wasn’t exempt from
discovery and he’s the CEO of all fifty states. And I can’t depose
a CEO of a hospital in little old Fort Wayne, Indiana that
nobody knows about.
THE COURT: I don’t care. You know what? Depose him.
ROGERS: You giving the order I can?
THE COURT: You pay for the deposition, you can depose
him.
ROGERS: Great. That’s what I want. That’s what I want.
THE COURT: You got it.
ROGERS: Thank you.
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COURT REPORTER: Judge, can I just go on the record as
saying a lot of what’s been said here I’m not getting because Mr.
Rogers is speaking over you? Just for my record.
THE COURT: Okay, yes.
ROGERS: I’m sorry. That’s passion.
[Counsel for Defendants]: Your Honor, may I be heard on that
issue?
THE COURT: What do you want to say?
[Counsel for Defendants]: I will be brief. I think this issue has
been argued and ruled upon by the former judge in this case.
THE COURT: You know what? You know what? It’s
discovery, okay? It’s discovery. If it was ruled on before, it can
come up again now. It can come up again when this trial takes
place. He’s going to want to depose him sometime along the
line. Whether I think it’s irrelevant is irrelevant. Whether it can
lead to some discoverable evidence, I don’t know. It’s certainly
tenuous. It’s certainly a long shot. Certainly I don’t think so, but
if that’s what Mr. Rogers wants so that we can move this case
along, then we’ll give it to him.
May 14, 2015, Tr. pp. 27-30.
[8] On May 15, the trial court denied Rogers’s motion to certify a discovery issue
for interlocutory appeal but ordered the Healthcare Providers to produce the
MIDAS report for in camera review. On May 27, 2015, the Hospital filed a
motion to reconsider with respect to the Packnett deposition. The Hospital also
contended that portions of the MIDAS report were protected by the Indiana
peer review statute, attorney-client privilege, and work-product privilege. On
June 3, 2015, Rogers moved for sanctions and a rule to show cause because the
Hospital had not produced Packnett for a scheduled deposition. On June 19,
2015, the trial court ordered the Hospital to pay a $160.00 court reporter’s fee
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for failing to produce Packnett for the scheduled deposition. On June 29, 2015,
the trial court ordered the Hospital to deliver the MIDAS report, with pages 18
to 23 and a portion of page 10 redacted.
[9] On July 6, 2015, the Hospital filed a notice of appeal and an amended notice of
appeal two days later. The Hospital indicated in its notice of appeal that it was
taking an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order and from a final
judgment. On July 29, 2015, Rogers also filed a notice of appeal, indicating
that he was taking an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order. Rogers’s
contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
portions of the MIDAS report redacted. The Hospital contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in (1) ordering that it make Packnett available for
deposition and sanctioning it when he did not attend a scheduled deposition
and (2) ordering it to produce any portions of the MIDAS report.
Discussion and Decision
I. Whether This Court has
Jurisdiction Over This Appeal
[10] As an initial matter, we consider the question of whether we have jurisdiction
to consider the issues raised in this interlocutory appeal. Although the parties
have not raised the issue, we are obligated to raise the question sua sponte. See
Jernigan v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1044, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“Subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived, and courts at all levels are required to consider
the issue sua sponte.”).
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Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s ability to hear and
decide a case based on the class of cases to which it belongs.
Warrick County v. Weber, 714 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999). Whether we have subject matter jurisdiction is an issue
we should raise sua sponte if the parties do not. Id. As we have
previously explained, “dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction takes precedence over the determination of and
action upon other substantive and procedural rights of the
parties.” Id. (quoting Gorman v. Northeastern REMC, 594 N.E.2d
843, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), decision clarified on denial of reh’g
597 N.E.2d 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied). Jurisdiction
is a question of law we review de novo. Id.… Our Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that we have
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders only under the conditions
described in Appellate Rule 14. Ind. App. R. 5(B). Under App.
R. 14, there are three ways we may obtain jurisdiction over an
interlocutory appeal: (1) when the right is provided by statute, see
App. R. 14(C); (2) when the trial court certifies the order and we
accept jurisdiction, see App. R. 14(B); or (3) when the order is
one of the nine enumerated types that may be appealed “as a
matter of right,” see App. R. 14(A).
Young v. Estate of Sweeney, 808 N.E.2d 1217, 1219-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[11] Here, the parties have not pointed us to any statute that applies, and the trial
court certified neither question raised for interlocutory appeal. Consequently, if
either of the issues in this appeal are properly before us, it is because it is in one
of the enumerated categories of appeal as a matter of right.
A. Packnett Deposition
[12] As previously mentioned, the Hospital was essentially sanctioned $160.00 for
failure to deliver Packnett to a scheduled deposition. Appellate Rule 14(A)(1)
provides that “[a]ppeals from the following interlocutory orders are taken as a
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matter of right … (1) For the payment of money[.]” While we have held that
expenses incurred complying with discovery orders do not satisfy Appellate
Rule 14(A)(1), Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 801 N.E.2d 191, 194 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004), trans. denied (“Scroghan I”), the Hospital here was sanctioned, which,
under Indiana precedent, is different. In a later appeal in the same Scroghan
case, we held that a sanction imposed for violating a discovery order did, in
fact, give the party an interlocutory appeal for the “payment of money.” See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 851 N.E.2d 317, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Scroghan
II”) (“In such situations, if a party is willing to incur possibly serious sanctions
to obtain review of a discovery order, then the option should be available.”).
Moreover, the Scroghan II court further concluded that the appeal as of right
extended to the propriety not only of the sanction but also of the underlying
discovery order. See id. Pursuant to Scroghan II, we have jurisdiction to hear
the Hospital’s argument with regard to the trial court’s order that it produce
Packnett for a deposition.
B. The MIDAS Report
[13] The second issue raised by the parties involves the discoverability of the
MIDAS report, with the Hospital arguing that it is not discoverable and Rogers
arguing that it should be not redacted, as the trial court ordered. Review of the
nine categories listed in Appellate Rule 14(A) reveals only subsection (3) as a
possible basis for an interlocutory appeal as of right, as the trial court’s order
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arguably involves the “delivery of a document.”1 The Scroghan I court,
however, held that the mere delivery of a document does not satisfy Appellate
Rule 14(A)(3):
Rule 14(A)(3) pertains to the delivery of documents where
“‘delivery imports a surrender.’” Cua v. Morrison, 600 N.E.2d
951, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (Sullivan, J. concurring) (quoting
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Locke, 107 Ind. 9, 7 N.E. 579, 582 (1886)),
trans. denied. Surrender may occur with such items as securities,
receipts, deeds, leases, or promissory notes. See, e.g., Koch v.
James, 616 N.E.2d 759, 760-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (delivery of
stocks), reh’g denied, trans. denied; see also W. Union Tel., 7 N.E. at
582. “‘It is easy to see that the administration of justice might be
seriously embarrassed, and vexatious delays secured, if appeals
could be taken in every case where a written instrument is
ordered to be produced for use as evidence on the trial of the
cause.’” Cua, 600 N.E.2d at 953 (quoting W. Union Tel., 7 N.E.
at 582). Thus, in order to seek an interlocutory appeal as of right
for the delivery of a document under Rule 14(A)(3), we find that
the delivery of the document must import a surrender of the
document.
1
Appellate Rule 14(A) lists the following nine categories of orders that give rise to interlocutory appeals as
of right:
(1) For the payment of money;
(2) To compel the execution of any document;
(3) To compel the delivery or assignment of any securities, evidence of debt, documents or things
in action;
(4) For the sale or delivery of the possession of real property;
(5) Granting or refusing to grant, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve a preliminary injunction;
(6) Appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver, or revoking or refusing to revoke the appointment
of a receiver;
(7) For a writ of habeas corpus not otherwise authorized to be taken directly to the Supreme
Court;
(8) Transferring or refusing to transfer a case under Trial Rule 75; and
(9) Issued by an Administrative Agency that by statute is expressly required to be appealed as a
mandatory interlocutory appeal.
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Scroghan I, 801 N.E.2d at 194. Because there is clearly no surrender of the
MIDAS report occurring in this case, Appellate Rule 14(A)(3) does not apply.
Consequently, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to hear the parties’
claims regarding the MIDAS report.
II. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in
Allowing Rogers to Depose Packnett
[14] The Hospital contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering it to
produce Packnett for a deposition.
The grant or denial of a discovery motion is within the trial
court’s discretion and will be overturned only for an abuse of
discretion. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Sercon Corp., 654 N.E.2d 1163,
1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh’g denied. An abuse of discretion in
this context occurs only if the order is unreasonable in light of all
of the attendant circumstances and is prejudicial to a party’s
rights. Cua v. Morrison, 626 N.E.2d 581, 583 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993), adopted, 636 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. 1994).
Andreatta v. Hunley, 714 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
[15] Indiana Trial Rule 26(B)(1) provides that
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the
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trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods
otherwise permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall
be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery
sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery
has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain
the information sought or; (iii) the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues. The court may act upon its own initiative
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule 26(C).
(Emphasis added).
[16] Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing Rogers to depose Packnett. At a minimum, the discovery
sought must concern a matter “which is relevant to the subject-matter involved
in the pending action[,]” and Rogers has failed to suggest, much less establish,
that Packnett could provide any information relevant to Rogers’s claim.
Indeed, when asked what information he thought Packnett might be able to
provide if deposed, Rogers responded, “I don’t know” and admitted that “we’re
just talking hypothetics (sic) here.” May 14, 2015, Tr. p. 28.
[17] The Hospital argued in a hearing on its motion to quash Rogers’s subpoena of
Packnett that he had no information regarding Carrie’s medical care or the
allegedly deficient reporting systems, was not the supervisor of any physician or
other staff member involved in Carrie’s care, was not the supervisor of the
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Hospital’s Director of Quality and Accreditation, and has no role in filing
incident reports with IDOH. Rogers does not dispute any of this, arguing, it
seems, that as CEO of Parkview, he is ultimately responsible for everything that
occurs in any of its facilities. Responsibility is not knowledge, however. In
short, there is not the slightest indication that Packnett had anything to do with
Carrie’s treatment or would be able to provide any relevant information about
it.2 We reverse the trial court’s order allowing Rogers to depose Packnett.
III. Sanction Against the Hospital
[18] Finally, we turn to the $160.00 sanction the trial court imposed against the
Hospital for failing to produce Packnett for a scheduled deposition.
We assign the selection of an appropriate sanction for a discovery
violation to the trial court’s sound discretion. McCullough v.
Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. 1993). Trial judges
stand much closer than an appellate court to the currents of
litigation pending before them, and they have a correspondingly
better sense of which sanctions will adequately protect the
litigants in any given case, without going overboard, while still
discouraging gamesmanship in future litigation. We therefore
review a trial court’s sanction only for an abuse of its discretion.
Id. at 180-81.
Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind. 2012).
2
The trial court seemed to recognize the lack of merit in Rogers’s request, noting that it was “certainly
tenuous” and “certainly a long shot.” May 14, 2015, Tr. p. 30. Nonetheless, the trial court granted Rogers’s
request to depose Packnett, reasoning that “if that’s what Mr. Rogers wants so that we can move this case
along, then we’ll give it to him.” May 14, 2015, Tr. p. 30. While we sympathize with the trial court, we
cannot endorse the granting of discovery requests seemingly on the basis of expediency and nothing else.
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[19] We have already concluded that the trial court abused its discretion for ordering
the Hospital to produce Packnett for a deposition. That said, the Hospital was
under court order to produce Packnett and, although there was a pending
motion to reconsider before the trial court, no stay or protective order had been
secured while the trial court evaluated the motion. Even though we eventually
ruled in the Hospital’s favor on the merits, we do not wish to encourage the
violation of direct court orders by reversing the trial court’s sanction order. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s order that the Hospital pay a $160.00 court
reporter’s fee for failing to produce Packnett for a scheduled deposition.
Conclusion
[20] We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to address the parties’ arguments
regarding the MIDAS reports and that the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering the Hospital to produce Packnett for a deposition. However, we
nonetheless conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
a $160.00 sanction against the Hospital for failing to produce Packnett for a
scheduled deposition. Consequently, the trial court’s order regarding the
MIDAS report and the sanction against the Hospital remain in place. We
reverse the trial court’s order that the Hospital produce Packnett for a
deposition and remand with instructions to reinstate the order to quash
Rogers’s subpoena and protective order.
[21] We reverse the judgment of the trial court in part, affirm in part, and remand
with instructions.
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Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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