Paul Hoffert, Jr. v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )


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  •  Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),                          FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                       Jan 25 2013, 9:40 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of                                     CLERK
    establishing the defense of res judicata,                         of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                              ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    WILLIAM S. FRANKEL, IV                               GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Wilkinson, Goeller, Modesitt, Wilkinson              Attorney General of Indiana
    and Drummy, LLP
    Terre Haute, Indiana                                 KELLY A. MIKLOS
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    PAUL HOFFERT, JR.,                                   )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                          )
    )
    vs.                                  )       No. 84A05-1205-CR-273
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                    )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                           )
    APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable David R. Bolk, Judge
    Cause No. 84D03-1107-FC-2209
    Cause No. 84D03-1111-FD-3492
    Cause No. 84D03-1111-FD-3578
    Cause No. 84D03-1111-FD-3596
    January 25, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    FRIEDLANDER, Judge
    Paul Hoffert, Jr. appeals the revocation of his placement in a work-release program
    and the order to serve a portion of the balance of his sentence in the Department of
    Correction.
    We affirm.
    The relevant facts are that under four separate cause numbers, Hoffert pleaded guilty
    to burglary, a class C felony, public intoxication as a class B misdemeanor, and five class D
    felonies, including two counts of theft, attempted receipt of stolen property, auto theft, and
    receipt of stolen property. On January 5, 2012, Hoffert was sentenced to an aggregate
    sentence of nine years for these convictions. The trial court ordered him to serve three years
    executed as a direct commitment to the Vigo County Work Release Program and suspended
    the remaining sentence to formal probation.
    On April 18, 2012, the State filed a “Petition to Revoke Direct Placement in the Work
    Release Program and/or to Revoke Probation.” Appellant’s Appendix at 8. The petition
    alleged that Hoffert violated the conditions of his work-release program in the following
    ways: (1) He tested positive for cannabis on January 25, 2012, the day he commenced the
    Vigo County Work Release program; (2) on January 27, he was found with a hand-rolled
    cigarette in the Vigo County Community Correction (VCCC) dorm bathroom; (3) as of April
    18, he was $379.00 in arrears on his work-release fees; and (4) as of April 18, he had failed
    to obtain gainful employment. On April 25, 2012, the State filed an amended petition further
    alleging that Hoffert tested positive for benzodiazepines and cannabis on April 3. Following
    a May 1, 2012 hearing on the State’s amended petition to revoke, the court found that Hoffert
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    had violated the conditions of the work-release program. As a result, the court ordered that
    the three years previously ordered to be served on work release, plus one year of the
    previously suspended sentence, were instead to be served at the Indiana Department of
    Correction (DOC).
    Community corrections programs, like probation, serve as alternatives to commitment
    to the DOC, and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. McQueen v. State, 
    862 N.E.2d 1237
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Placement on probation or in a community corrections
    program is a “matter of grace” and a “conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.” Million
    v. State, 
    646 N.E.2d 998
    , 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). We review challenges to the revocation
    of placement in a community corrections program using the standard of review we use when
    reviewing a revocation of probation. See Monroe v. State, 
    899 N.E.2d 688
     (Ind. Ct. App.
    2009). A revocation hearing is civil in nature, and the State need prove an alleged violation
    only by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id.
     When reviewing a decision to revoke, we will
    not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, and will consider only the
    evidence most favorable to the trial court’s decision. 
    Id.
     We will affirm the trial court if
    there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting revocation. 
    Id.
    Hoffert does not challenge the court’s finding that he violated the conditions of his
    community-corrections placement. Rather, he contends that those violations did not warrant
    revocation. For instance, he describes the January 25 positive cannabis test as “a baseline
    test on the day he entered the work release program[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 3. This implies
    that his eligibility or fitness for community corrections placement is not affected by actions
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    that pre-date commencement in the program. This is simply not the case. See Million v.
    State, 
    646 N.E.2d at 1002
     (“no … language in the community corrections statute [] limits the
    trial court’s discretion to revoke placement only when a violation occurs during the period of
    placement. Thus, … the trial court [may] revoke a defendant’s placement in the community
    corrections program before he enters [that] phase of his sentence”). Moreover, the April 18
    amended petition to revoke alleged that Hoffert tested positive for illegal substances more
    than two months after the initial test. As for his possession of a cigarette in the VCCC dorm,
    it is of no significance that, as Hoffert notes, “the cigarette he possessed contained only
    tobacco.” Appellant’s Brief at 3. Hoffert does not deny that possessing even a tobacco
    cigarette was still a violation of the VCCC facility’s rules. Hoffert also admits he did not
    obtain employment before the amended petition to revoke was filed, but contends this did not
    warrant revocation because “he was in the program only 87 days before the petition to revoke
    was filed”. 
    Id.
     “Only 87 days” can also be described as “almost three months.” In the
    context of a diligent search for employment, three months is not an inconsequential length of
    time.
    Any of the foregoing violations would be sufficient to support revocation. See
    Bussberg v. State, 
    827 N.E.2d 37
    , 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[p]roof of a single violation of
    the conditions of probation is sufficient to support the decision to revoke probation”), trans.
    denied. Thus, we need not address Hoffert’s claim regarding the nonpayment of fees. The
    trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Hoffert’s placement in a community
    corrections program.
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    Judgment affirmed.
    NAJAM, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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