Barbara Jo Woolley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                               FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                      May 25 2017, 9:22 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                        CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                            Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Kimberly A. Jackson                                     Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                   Attorney General of Indiana
    Caryn N. Szyper
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Barbara Jo Woolley,                                     May 25, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    83A05-1612-CR-2765
    v.                                              Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Bruce V. Stengel,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    83C01-1510-F3-6
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 83A05-1612-CR-2765 | May 25, 2017     Page 1 of 9
    [1]   Barbara Jo Woolley appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after
    Woolley pleaded guilty to four counts of Level 3 Felony Neglect of a
    Dependent. Woolley argues that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive
    sentences and by finding an improper aggravating factor. Finding no error, we
    affirm.
    Facts
    [2]   In September 2013, Woolley lost her job as a licensed practical nurse at a
    nursing home. Because of the loss of income, she and her ex-husband, Gordon,
    moved in with her son, John; John’s wife, Danielle; and John and Danielle’s
    four children—J.W. (age eight), C.W. (age five), S.W. (age four), and A.W.
    (age two).
    [3]   On October 16, 2015, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report
    alleging that the Woolley home was dirty. When DCS workers and law
    enforcement entered the residence, they encountered a scene that was described
    as “the worst neglect case” they had ever seen. Sent. Tr. p. 32-43, 54. Police
    officers documenting the scene required respirators, disposable foot covers, and
    gloves for their safety, especially in the upstairs of the home.
    [4]   The home had a strong odor of urine and feces. S.W. and A.W. were found
    upstairs in cribs in the master bedroom. The room was cluttered, dark, and
    dirty. Feces were smeared on the wall behind S.W.’s crib. A.W. appeared
    dirty. Four-year-old S.W. had wrist bones as small as an infant’s and his skin
    had a yellow tint. Five-year-old C.W. was in the adjacent room, which
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    contained only a toddler mattress on the floor. She appeared to be very
    malnourished. Eight-year-old J.W. was found in another room that was locked
    from the outside. He slept in a wooden bed frame with no mattress, box spring,
    or pillows. Everything in the room—including every wall, the ceiling, the
    “bed,” the blankets, and the floor—was smeared with feces. The feces on the
    floor had been there so long that they were smoothed over from being walked
    on over time. Even the items that J.W. used to eat—his bowl, plate, and sippy
    cup—were covered in feces. The room had no toys, and the windows were
    boarded up with plywood.
    [5]   All four children lacked proper hygiene and were suffering from varying degrees
    of malnutrition and dehydration. None of the children were potty-trained,
    none of them could communicate, and none of them even recognized one
    another. Their physical condition was appalling: J.W. had fecal matter on his
    legs, under his fingernails, and under his toenails; S.W. had fleas and fecal
    matter on his body; C.W. had head lice and fleas on her; and J.W. and A.W.
    had bug bites on their bodies. All the children were pale, had yellow-tinted
    skin, and would not eat normal food for their ages. Only J.W. could eat solid
    food; the other children ate only baby food because they did not know how to
    chew or swallow solids. S.W. was so emaciated that his ribs and hip bones
    were visible. At the age of four years, he weighed only 22.3 pounds.
    [6]   None of the children had seen a doctor since they were born except for J.W.,
    who had been to a doctor once when he was three years old. None of the
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    children had been outside in over a year. Some of the neighbors did not even
    know that children lived at that residence.
    [7]   The children’s guardian ad litem, an attorney who had been serving as a
    guardian ad litem for twenty-two years, later described C.W. and S.W. as
    looking “like Holocaust survivors” and said that the children “were all like no
    other children that [she] had ever seen.” Sent. Tr. p. 17-19. The guardian ad
    litem summarized their condition as follows:
    All the children suffer from health issues along with indescribable
    mental and functional impairments . . . . These children never
    saw the sunshine, the grass, felt the snow, experienced the
    warmth of loving arms. Instead they were kept in rooms and
    cribs like caged animals. Diapers, sewage and filth was
    throughout the house. The children didn’t even have the
    consolation of each other. None expressed any recognition of
    their siblings. They were deprived of food, health care, love and
    stimulation. They don’t even cry when upset, likely because it
    has never elicited a response so why bother.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 203.
    [8]   While Woolley’s grandchildren were confined upstairs, she regularly left the
    home to attend classes at Ivy Tech Community College, where she was enrolled
    in the education program. As part of her coursework, she learned about child
    and adolescent development and the duty to report child abuse and neglect.
    Woolley went upstairs daily to see the children and babysat the children more
    than once. She admitted that the children had been downstairs only two or
    three times in the two years she had lived in the residence.
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    [9]    On October 30, 2015, the State charged Woolley with four counts of Level 3
    felony neglect of a dependent. She pleaded guilty as charged on July 20, 2016.
    On August 11, 2016, the trial court sentenced Woolley to consecutive terms of
    sixteen years for the neglect of J.W. and nine years each for the neglect of the
    other three children—an aggregate term of forty-three years imprisonment. She
    now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Consecutive Sentences
    [10]   Woolley first argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive
    sentences. Trial courts may only impose consecutive sentences within the
    bounds of the statutory sentencing scheme. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2; Wilson v.
    State, 
    5 N.E.3d 759
    , 762 (Ind. 2014). Because neglect of a dependent is not
    listed as a “crime of violence,” Woolley’s offenses are subject to a statutory cap
    if they arise from a single episode of criminal conduct. I.C. § 35-50-1-2.
    Whether multiple offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct is a
    factually sensitive inquiry to be made by the trial court. Schlichter v. State, 
    779 N.E.2d 1155
    , 1157 (Ind. 2002). In conducting this analysis, the focus is on the
    timing of the offenses and the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature of the
    crimes. Reed v. State, 
    856 N.E.2d 1189
    , 1200-01 (Ind. 2006).
    [11]   Woolley’s offenses do not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct. First,
    her crimes involve four separate children. See, e.g., Pittman v. State, 
    885 N.E.2d 1246
    , 1259 (Ind. 2008) (holding that “[c]onsecutive sentences reflect the
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    significance of multiple victims”). Furthermore, the children each suffered
    daily neglect over a period of two years. In other words, an individual crime
    was committed against each child victim every day for two years. It is readily
    apparent that these crimes do not constitute a single episode of criminal
    conduct.
    [12]   The trial court articulately explained its reasons for imposing consecutive
    sentences:
    [Woolley] was in the household for a little over two years, about
    25 months. This conduct was not closely related in time. It was
    not closely related in circumstances. This was an individual
    crime committed each day and repeated each day such that the
    episode of criminal conduct just not—does not apply. This is not
    a single episode. The probable cause and plea—or probable
    cause and charging information encompass evidence of multiple
    acts of neglect, depravity, cruelty and confinement that occurred
    over multiple years. This did not occur in one single incident
    over two hours, four hours, six hours, but, in fact, occurred for
    the vast majority of the childrens’ lifetime and for the [entire]
    lifetime of the youngest child, [A.W.]. So the Court does not feel
    that . . . our legislature[] intended this [to] apply and there are
    several cases . . . that indicate this is not considered to be an
    episode of criminal conduct.
    Sent. Tr. p. 79-80. We agree, and find no error with respect to the imposition of
    consecutive sentences.
    II. Aggravating Factor
    [13]   Woolley also argues that the trial court found an improper aggravating factor.
    One of the ways in which a trial court can err in the sentencing process is by
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    finding aggravators or mitigators that are unsupported by the record or
    improper as a matter of law. E.g., Laster v. State, 
    956 N.E.2d 187
    , 193 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2011).
    [14]   Woolley was a licensed practical nurse during the years she lived with the
    children. The trial court found this to be an aggravating factor, explaining its
    reasoning as follows:
    All nurses, registered nurses, your licensed practical nurses, at the
    time they are pinned, when they get their authority to practice
    take a pledge and that pledge is known as the Florence
    Nightingale Pledge. I had told the attorneys that I was going to
    take judicial notice that she was a practical nurse and that pledge
    is as follows: “I solemnly pledge myself before God and in the
    presence of this assembly to pass my life in purity and to practice
    my profession faithfully. I will abstain from whatever is
    deleterious and mischievous and will not take or knowingly
    administer any harmful drug. I will do all in my power to
    maintain and elevate the standard of my profession and will hold
    in confidence all personal matters committed to my keeping and
    all my family affairs coming into my knowledge in the practice of
    my calling. With loyalty I will endeavor to aid the physician in
    his work and to devote myself to the welfare of those committed
    to my care.” I want to emphasize and repeat the last phrase of
    the Florence Nightingale Pledge which nurses in Indiana, and I
    think, in fact, all nurses across the country take. The last phrase
    is “Devote myself to the welfare of those committed to my care.”
    That does not say to the patients committed to my care but it just
    says to the welfare of those committed to my care. I think that is
    an aggravating factor that she’s a nurse, that she’s taken a pledge
    to devote herself to those committed to—to devote herself to the
    welfare of those committed to her care. Also as a nurse she has a
    legal duty to report evidence of suspected abuse to law
    enforcement officers. Also as a nurse she has received
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    specialized training to recognize the situations, to know how
    devastating it is on youngsters to not have a proper diet, to not
    get exercise, to not be in the sunlight, to not have cleanliness.
    She knows all those and she’s received special training, although
    it doesn’t take any special training. I once again have to look at
    these pictures, pictures that have been introduced 1 through 11 to
    see those to know that this is just a horrible situation, particularly
    the pictures from 4 through 11 that depict the children.
    Sent. Tr. p. 82-83. Woolley argues that this aggravator was inappropriate
    because the nurse’s pledge was evidence outside the record and because her
    nursing background was irrelevant, inasmuch as “no special training was
    necessary to detect the inappropriate conditions of the children.” Appellant’s
    Br. p. 13.
    [15]   Initially, we note that Woolley did not object to this aggravating factor, either at
    the beginning of the sentencing hearing when the trial court indicated its
    intention to take judicial notice of her nursing background and the pledge or at
    the end in the passage set forth above. Consequently, she has waived this
    argument. Angleton v. State, 
    714 N.E.2d 156
    , 158 (Ind. 1999).
    [16]   Waiver notwithstanding, we note that Woolley’s nursing background is
    supported by the record. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 173. Furthermore, we
    cannot say that the trial court erred by finding that her nursing background is
    particularly aggravating given the nature of these offenses. Woolley is correct
    that even a lay person would have recognized that the conditions these four
    children were forced to live in were unconscionable. Appellant’s Br. p. 23-24.
    Therefore, it is even more egregious when a nurse—a person trained in an
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    occupation that focuses solely on the health and well-being of other people—
    takes no action to help her four obviously suffering grandchildren. She had a
    greater awareness than an average lay person of the physical, mental, and
    developmental needs of children, but did nothing.
    [17]   As for the trial court’s acknowledgement of the nurse’s pledge, it is apparent
    that the trial court was merely using the pledge to emphasize its point that
    nurses are in the business of caring for others and, as a nurse, Woolley fell
    woefully short of what is commonly expected of those in her profession. In
    other words, the trial court used the pledge to highlight the reason that
    Woolley’s training and experience in the nursing profession was aggravating.
    We find no error in this regard or in any regard with respect to this aggravating
    factor.1
    [18]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    1
    Even if we did find error in the recitation of the nurse’s pledge, it would not render the aggravator itself
    improper. We are confident that the trial court would still have found Woolley’s nursing background to be
    an aggravator even if it had not been aware of or recited the nurse’s pledge.
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