Steven Richards v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 17 2016, 9:11 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher L. Clerc Gregory F. Zoeller
Columbus, Indiana Attorney General
Paula J. Beller
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Steven Richards, March 17, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
03A05-1507-CR-948
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable James D. Worton,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
03C01-1501-F6-126
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
Steven Richards pled guilty to battering his girlfriend, and the trial court
sentenced him to two and a half years in the county jail with six months
suspended to probation. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
not recognizing his guilty plea and remorse as mitigators. Because Richards
has failed to prove that his guilty plea and remorse were significant mitigators,
we affirm his sentence.
Facts and Procedural History
[1] Nine days after being released from work release for a receiving-stolen-property
conviction, Richards—who was thirty-two years old and had at least twelve
criminal convictions—head-butted his live-in girlfriend, resulting in a knot to
her forehead. Later that same day, Richards choked his girlfriend, causing her
to briefly lose consciousness. The girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter witnessed
Richards choking her mother.
[2] The State charged Richards with Count 1: Level 6 felony strangulation and
Count 2: Level 6 felony domestic battery. Richards and the State entered into a
plea agreement in which Richards agreed to plead guilty to Amended Count 1:
Level 6 felony battery with moderate bodily injury. In exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss Count 2. The trial court accepted the plea agreement.
[3] Richards testified at the sentencing hearing. He opened by saying he “wanted
to apologize to both our families for all the trouble I’ve put us all through.” Tr.
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p. 8. Richards explained that the incident occurred because he was using
alcohol and methamphetamine, was stressed, and was “hanging out with the
wrong people.” Id. at 25.
[4] The trial court found five aggravators, including Richards’ numerous
convictions (which included convictions for both battery and domestic battery),
the numerous chances he had been given to turn his life around, as well as the
fact that he committed this offense in the presence of the victim’s eight-year-old
daughter. Appellant’s Br. p. 6 (Sentencing Order). The court found no
mitigators. Id. Although the court was “encouraged” that Richards had taken
AA, Celebrate Recovery, and GED classes in jail, the court said that “in [its]
mind [that did] not mitigate anything in this offense.” Tr. p. 55. In addition,
the court acknowledged that Richards pled guilty; however, it found that
Richards’ guilty plea did not amount to a mitigator because he “received a deal
from the plea bargain.” Id. The court sentenced Richards to two and a half
years in the Bartholomew County Jail with six months suspended to probation.
[5] Richards now appeals his sentence.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Richards contends that the trial court erred by not recognizing two mitigators:
his guilty plea and remorse. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g,
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875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom. Id. at 490-91.
[7] One way that a trial court may abuse its discretion is by not recognizing
mitigators that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration. Id.; see also McElfresh v. State, No. 32S01-1511-CR-667 (Ind.
March 3, 2016), slip op. at 12. The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the trial court failed to find or identify a mitigating factor by
establishing that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly
supported by the record. McElfresh, slip op. at 12.
[8] Richards first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not recognizing
his guilty plea as a mitigator. A defendant who pleads guilty deserves to have
“some” mitigating weight given to his plea in return. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at
220. A guilty plea’s significance, however, varies from case to case. Id. at 221.
For example, a guilty plea may not be significantly mitigating when it does not
demonstrate the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility or when the defendant
receives a substantial benefit in return for the plea. Id. A guilty plea also may
not be significantly mitigating when the plea was more likely the result of
pragmatism than acceptance of responsibility and remorse. Id.
[9] Here, the record shows that Richards’ decision to plead guilty was fueled by
pragmatism. The State had three witnesses to Richards’ crime: Richards’
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girlfriend, the girlfriend’s daughter, and a neighbor. Richards also received a
substantial benefit: the State dismissed a Level 6 felony domestic-battery
charge, which carried a domestic-violence determination. See Ind. Code § 35-
38-1-7.7. Richards has therefore failed to prove that his guilty plea was a
significant mitigator.
[10] Richards next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not recognizing
his remorse as a mitigator. He claims that his in-court apology and the fact that
he took classes in jail show that he “has genuine remorse” and “has learned his
lesson.” Appellant’s Br. p. 4.
[11] A trial court’s determination of a defendant’s remorse is similar to a
determination of credibility. Stout v. State, 834 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied. Although Richards testified at the sentencing hearing that
he “wanted to apologize to both our families for all the trouble I’ve put us all
through,” Tr. p. 8, he did not apologize for his actions. In addition, Richards
attempted to minimize his conduct by claiming that the battery was caused by
drugs and alcohol, stress, and his association with others. The trial court was in
the best position to gauge the sincerity of Richards’ remorse and did not find it
mitigating. Accordingly, Richards has failed to prove that his remorse was a
significant mitigator.
[12] Although Richards does not directly argue that the trial court should have
considered the classes he took in jail as a mitigator, he testified about the classes
at his sentencing hearing, and the trial court found that the classes were not
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entitled to any mitigating weight. The Indiana Supreme Court recently held
that a trial court abused its discretion by not affording any mitigating weight to
the programs the defendant was enrolled in while in jail because the programs
did not make the defendant eligible for reduced time. McElfresh, slip op. at 13.
Nevertheless, our Supreme Court found that the error was harmless given the
defendant’s criminal history. Id. Likewise here, even assuming that the trial
court should have afforded some mitigating weight to the classes that Richards
took in jail, we find that any error was harmless given Richards’ significant
criminal history, which included other battery convictions. We therefore affirm
Richards’ sentence.
[13] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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