Catina M. Caudill v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Mar 17 2016, 8:37 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James A. Shoaf Gregory F. Zoeller
Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Catina M. Caudill, March 17, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
03A01-1508-CR-1228
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kathleen Tighe
Appellee-Respondent. Coriden, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
03D02-1410-CM-4831 & 03D02-
1412-F6-5719
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] In this consolidated appeal, Appellant-Defendant, Catina M. Caudill (Caudill),
challenges the trial court’s revocation of her probation under Cause Nos.
03D02-1412-F6-5719 (F6-5719) and 03D02-1410-CM-4831 (CM-4831).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Caudill raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering Caudill to serve the balance of her
two previously suspended sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On March 17, 2015, Caudill pled guilty to possession of heroin, a Level 6
felony, under Cause No. F6-5719, and conversion, a Class A misdemeanor,
under Cause No. CM-4831. Under Cause No. F6-5719, the trial court
sentenced Caudill to two years of imprisonment, all suspended to probation,
with the first year executed at community corrections. Under Cause No. CM-
4831, the trial court sentenced Caudill to one year of imprisonment suspended
to probation. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
[5] A month later, on April 17, 2015, the State filed petitions to revoke Caudill’s
probation in each case, alleging that Caudill had violated her probation by
using methamphetamine. Caudill admitted to violating her probation at a
hearing on June 1, 2015. The trial court ordered Caudill to complete the
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Women Recovering with a Purpose (WRAP) program1 and to remain in
community corrections for the entire term of probation. However, while on
probation and in the substance abuse program, Caudill provided Suboxone, a
prescription medication, to two other participants in the program.
[6] On June 8, 2015, the State filed a Second Verified Petition to Revoke Probation
in both cases, alleging that Caudill violated her probation by being
unsuccessfully discharged from the WRAP program. On July 20, 2015, the
trial court held a fact-finding hearing. At the hearing, the director of
Residential Services for Bartholomew County Court Services, Rob Gaskill
(Director Gaskill), testified that two individuals informed him that they used
Suboxone, which was provided to them by Caudill. Caudill objected to
Director Gaskill’s testimony, arguing that it constituted hearsay, but the trial
court overruled the objection. Caudill, in turn, claimed that she did not provide
drugs to those individuals. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
found that Caudill had violated her probation, and ordered the remaining
balance of her two previously suspended sentences to be executed, one-and-one-
half years under Cause No. F6-5719 at the Department of Correction and one
year under Cause No. CM-4831 at the Bartholomew County Jail, and to be
served consecutively.
1
The WRAP program is a female substance abuse program administered by community corrections in
Bartholomew County, Indiana.
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[7] Caudill now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[8] Probation is a favor granted by the State and is not a right to which a criminal
defendant is entitled. Sparks v. State, 983 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
aff’d on reh’g. The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court. Id. Thus, a trial court’s decision to revoke probation and its
subsequent sentencing decision are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Id. A probation revocation proceeding is in the nature of a civil proceeding,
and, therefore, the alleged violation need be established only by a
preponderance of the evidence. Jenkins v. State, 956 N.E.2d at 146, 148 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Violation of a single condition is sufficient to
revoke probation. Id. As with other sufficiency issues, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. We look only to the evidence
which supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences flowing
therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the
trial court’s decision that the probationer committed a violation, revocation
of probation is appropriate. Id.
II. Analysis
[9] Caudill argues that she was denied her right to due process when her
participation in the WRAP program was terminated without a written notice of
the claimed violation. We have previously held in Gosha v. State, 931 N.E.2d
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432, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), that a participant in a drug court program is
entitled to due process, including an evidentiary hearing, with written notice of
the claimed violations, disclosure of the evidence against her, an opportunity to
be heard and to present evidence, and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses.
[10] However, it is well settled that a federal constitutional error is harmless if it is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the judgment. Pope v.
State, 853 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In Pope, the defendant was
placed in community corrections and agreed to, among other conditions, return
to jail without going through the court if she violates any of the rules of
community corrections. Id. at 971-72. The defendant later failed her urine
analysis test, was arrested, and taken to jail. Id. at 972. When she appeared
before the trial court, the defendant, who was in custody, indicated that she had
not been informed why she had been arrested and was appearing in court. Id.
She did not have an attorney representing her. Id. The trial court did not allow
her to speak on her behalf, but told her that if she wanted to challenge the
findings of community corrections, she would have to get an attorney and file a
motion with the court. Id. The court issued an order committing her to jail. Id.
On appeal, we held that the defendant was entitled to notice of an alleged
violation and a hearing before her termination from a community corrections
program. Id. at 973. We further held that the denial of those requirements
of due process was not harmless error. Id. We observed that “Pope was
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impeded in her defense” in that she “sought an independent drug test promptly
after being informed of the allegations against her.” Id.
[B]ecause she received no notice of these allegations and was
summarily returned to jail, [the defendant] was unable to get an
independent drug screen until several weeks later. Obviously, the
delay reduced the probative value of the drug screen, since the
fact finder could conclude that the drugs had passed from her
system naturally by the time the independent drug screen was
conducted. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
[11] In contrast, here, Caudill received sufficient notice of the nature of the alleged
violation. On June 1, 2015, Caudill admitted to the use of methamphetamine
while on probation and was placed in the substance abuse program. Two days
later, on June 3, 2015, Caudill was “pulled out and [was] told that two girls had
said that [Caudill] gave them drugs.” (Transcript p. 6). She was then
terminated from the program. On June 8, 2015, the State filed its Second
Verified Petition to Revoke Probation stating that the reason for the request was
her unsuccessful discharge from the substance abuse program. At this point,
she had sufficient notice of the alleged violation and sufficient disclosure of the
evidence against her. Further, at an initial hearing on June 9, 2015, Caudill
indicated that she would hire counsel, and the trial court scheduled a fact-
finding hearing for July 20, 2015. Therefore, unlike the defendant in Pope,
Caudill was provided with a reasonable opportunity to investigate the
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circumstances of her discharge from the WRAP program, consult with counsel,
and develop her defense before the fact-finding hearing.
[12] On July 20, 2015, at the fact-finding hearing, Caudill appeared in person and
with counsel. Director Gaskill was called to the stand and testified that “two
other participants verbally [informed him] directly that they used Suboxone that
they received from [Caudill] when she came into the program that day.” (Tr. p.
3). Caudill objected based on hearsay, but the trial court properly overruled her
objection. See Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2) (the Rules of Evidence do not
apply to probation proceedings). Director Gaskill testified that “all three of
them [were jailed]” and Caudill was not deemed “appropriate for further
placement in [the] program.” (Tr. p. 3). Caudill’s counsel cross-examined
Director Gaskill and inquired whether Caudill failed her drug screen test.
Director Gaskill replied that Caudill did not fail it, but her “instant drug screen
[did] not test for [Suboxone].” (Tr. p. 5). When Caudill took the stand, she
denied the allegations. Caudill neither called other witnesses to the stand nor
provided any other evidence. Unlike Pope, where the defendant was not
provided with an opportunity to develop her case, here, Caudill had the
opportunity, yet all her defense amounted to was a general denial. Following
Caudill’s testimony, the trial court held that Caudill violated the terms of her
probation.
[13] Under these circumstances, we conclude that it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the alleged denial of written notice and other elements of due process
did not affect the trial court’s determination that Caudill violated the terms of
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her probation. Caudill violated her probation twice. The first time, she
violated her probation when she used methamphetamine; and the second time,
two days later, when she was discharged from the substance abuse program. In
sum, because the outcome would not have been any different, the alleged error,
if any, was harmless.
[14] Finally, while we agree with Caudill that the trial court should have issued a
written statement containing the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking
her probation, we find the trial court’s failure to designate specific facts and the
reasons for its decision to be harmless because the trial court’s order was
sufficiently supported by the record. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618,
622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (the trial court’s order of probation revocation and the
hearing transcript were adequate for appellate review and, when examined
together, satisfied the writing requirement).
[15] Accordingly, applying our standard of review, because probation is a matter of
grace and because Caudill violated her probation twice, we hold that the trial
court’s decision to revoke her previously suspended sentence in light of her
behavior was well within the trial court’s sound discretion.
CONCLUSION
[16] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly revoked
Caudill’s probation.
[17] Affirmed.
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[18] Najam, J. and May, J. concur
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