Delareco Pacely v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
RICHARD K. MUNTZ GREGORY F. ZOELLER
LaGrange, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JOSEPH Y. HO
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Oct 19 2012, 9:21 am
IN THE
CLERK
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
DELARECO PACELY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 44A03-1110-CR-488
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAGRANGE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable George E. Brown, Judge
Cause Nos. 44D01-0908-FC-10, 44D01-0908-FC-12, & 44D01-0908-FC-13
October 19, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SHARPNACK, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Delareco Pacely appeals his eighteen-year sentence for three counts of Class C
felony child molesting. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (2007). We affirm.
ISSUES
Pacely raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the summer of 2009, the LaGrange County Sheriff’s Department and the
Indiana State Police investigated allegations that Pacely was inappropriately touching
young girls at the Pioneer Trailer Park in Howe, Indiana.
The investigation revealed that in July 2009, twelve-year-old K.C. was helping a
family move into a trailer. Pacely pinched her breast when she was in the living room
then later grabbed her bottom, thighs, and right breast. When K.C. went out to the front
porch, Pacely followed her outside and touched her breast again. Two neighbors saw
Pacely touching K.C. on the front porch.
Pacely violated at least two other young girls in 2009. Eleven-year-old C.K.
stayed with Pacely in his trailer on several occasions. While she was there, Pacely
touched or fondled her vagina over her clothing, fondled or squeezed her bottom inside of
her pants, and fondled, squeezed, or twisted her breasts.
Eight-year-old S.D. often stayed at Pacely’s place and took baths there. Pacely
would take her out of the bath and rub lotion on the outside and inside of her vagina. He
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did this on six different occasions. When police investigated the incident, Pacely claimed
that he applied cocoa butter on S.D. “so her skin wouldn’t dry out.” Appellant’s
Amended App. p. 56. Among other explicit video images on his cell phone, the police
found two of him rubbing lotion on S.D. Pacely claimed he took the video to prove that
he did not do anything wrong.
The State charged Pacely with five counts of child molesting in five different
cause numbers. They included the three Class C felony molestations detailed above, in
cause numbers 44D01-0908-FC-10 (“FC-10”) (K.C.), 44D01-0908-FC-12 (“FC-12”)
(C.K.), and 44D01-0908-FC-13 (“FC-13”) (S.D.), as well as a Class A felony in cause
number 44D01-0908-FA-9 (“FA-9”) and another Class C felony in cause number 44D01-
0908-FC-11 (“FC-11”). Each count involved a different victim.
Two years after he was charged, Pacely pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to the Class C felonies in FC-10, FC-12, and FC-13. In exchange, the State
dismissed FA-9 and FC-11.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found no mitigators and one aggravator,
which it explained as:
One thing that concerns me a great deal, and I realize that the elements of
the crime – and I was reading them here while we were talking, a person
who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age performs or submits to
any fondling or touching, the fourteen (14) years of age, all these kids were
like twelve (12) according to the allegations here and while that’s certainly
part of the element[s] and it’s certainly under fourteen (14), I think twelve
(12) is getting pretty young. Okay? In other words, more under the – I
know, you want to make an argument on that, [defendant’s counsel], but
more – twelve (12) year old kid, that’s two years under the limit. Okay? I
consider that to be somewhat aggravating here.
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Sent. Tr. pp. 11-12. The court thus imposed a six-year sentence on each count and
ordered them to be served consecutively on grounds that there were multiple victims and
separate incidents. Pacely now appeals his sentence.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Pacely contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
Subject to the review and revision power discussed below, sentencing decisions rest
within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse
of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g,
875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court abuses its
discretion when it: (1) fails to enter a sentencing statement; (2) enters a sentencing
statement that includes reasons that are unsupported by the record; (3) enters a sentencing
statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration; or (4) enters a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper
as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.
First, Pacely argues that the trial court improperly used his victims’ ages as an
aggravator. When a victim’s age is a material element of the crime, it may not be used as
an aggravator to support an enhanced sentence. McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 539
(Ind. 2001). However, a trial court may properly consider the particularized
circumstances of the factual elements as aggravating factors. Id.
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The trial court, while acknowledging that age was an element of the offense,
specifically noted that twelve years of age “is getting pretty young” and is “two years
under the limit.” Sent. Tr. pp. 11, 12. The trial court’s statement reflects that the nature
of the crime becomes more egregious the younger the victim. Pacely’s victims were
twelve, eleven, and eight years old. The trial court’s statement is sufficient to show why
it considered age to be a particularized circumstance. We cannot say that it abused its
discretion by concluding that this aggravator merited slightly but not fully enhanced
sentences. See Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind. 2011) (“Like a defendant’s
criminal history, the victim’s age also suggests a sliding scale in sentencing, as younger
ages of victims tend to support harsher sentences. . . . The younger the victim, the more
culpable the defendant’s conduct.”).
Next, Pacely argues that the trial court should have found his lack of a criminal
record and his guilty plea as mitigators. He further argues that had the court weighed
these mitigators against its consideration of multiple victims and separate incidents, it
would have imposed concurrent sentences.
Pacely was fifty-one years old at the time of sentencing and had no prior
convictions. He has had three prior arrests for larceny, carrying concealed weapons, and
two counts of battery, but two of these cases were dismissed and the disposition of the
third is unknown. Nonetheless, a trial court is not obligated to accept a defendant’s claim
as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance, Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249
(Ind. 2000), and may properly conclude that a defendant’s lack of a criminal record is not
entitled to mitigating weight, Sipple v. State, 788 N.E.2d 473, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
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trans. denied. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by failing to find
Pacely’s lack of prior convictions as a mitigator.
As for the claimed mitigator of pleading guilty, a defendant who pleads guilty
deserves some mitigating weight to be afforded to the plea. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at
220 (citing McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 591 (Ind. 2007)). However, a trial court
does not necessarily abuse its discretion by failing to recognize a guilty plea as a
significant mitigating circumstance. See id. at 220-21. A guilty plea does not rise to the
level of significant mitigation where the defendant has received a substantial benefit from
the plea or where the evidence against the defendant is such that the decision to plead
guilty is more likely the result of pragmatism than acceptance of responsibility and
remorse. Id. at 221.
Pacely did not express any remorse or concern for the victims. Further, he did not
plead guilty until two years after he was charged and received a substantial benefit from
that plea as the State agreed to dismiss two other cause numbers, one of which included a
Class A felony. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to
consider his guilty plea as a mitigator.
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find Pacely’s lack
of prior convictions or his guilty plea as mitigators, any argument that they would have
resulted in lower or concurrent sentences is moot. It was well within the trial court’s
discretion to order Pacely’s sentences to be served consecutively. See Cardwell v. State,
895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008) (“Whether the counts involve one or multiple victims
is highly relevant to the decision to impose consecutive sentences . . . .”); see also Serino
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v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003) (“[W]hen the perpetrator commits the same
offense against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to
vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one
person.”).
II. INAPPROPRIATE SENTENCE
Pacely also contends that his eighteen-year sentence is inappropriate. Although a
trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a sentence, Article 7,
Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize independent appellate review and
revision of sentences through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a court
“may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind.
2007) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). The defendant has the burden of
persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id. (citing Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d
1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)).
We first look to the statutory range established for the class of the offenses.
Pacely pleaded guilty to three Class C felonies. The statutory range for a Class C felony
is between two and eight years, with the advisory sentence being four years. Ind. Code §
35-50-2-6(a) (2005). The trial court sentenced Pacely to consecutive six-year sentences.
We next look to the nature of the offenses and Pacely’s character. As to the nature
of the offenses, Pacely systematically targeted young girls at the Pioneer Trailer Park. He
grabbed twelve-year-old K.C.’s bottom, thighs, and breasts, continued to pursue her after
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she tried to get away from him, then fondled her again. He fondled eleven-year-old
C.K.’s vagina over her clothing and squeezed her bottom and breasts. On several
occasions when eight-year-old S.D. stayed at his trailer, he would take her out of the bath
and rub lotion on the outside and inside of her vagina. He took videos on his cell phone
of his abuse of S.D.
As to his character, the presentence investigation report shows that Pacely spent a
good portion of his childhood in various foster homes, and we again acknowledge that he
has no prior convictions. However, the depravity of his crimes speaks volumes of his
character. Notably, he claimed the videos of what he did to S.D. would prove his
innocence.
Pacely has failed to persuade us that his eighteen-year sentence is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm Pacely’s eighteen-year sentence.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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