Robert L. Peals v. Indiana State University and its Board of Trustees ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Oct 01 2012, 9:15 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
JOHN B. STEINHART WAYNE E. UHL
Indianapolis, Indiana Stephenson Morow & Semler
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ROBERT L. PEALS, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 84A01-1110-PL-451
)
INDIANA STATE UNIVERSITY and its )
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Phillip I. Adler, Judge
Cause No. 84D02-0611-PL-9675
October 1, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
Robert Peals (“Peals”) appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of Indiana State
University and its Board of Trustees (“the School”) on Peals’s breach of implied contract
claim. He presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court’s judgment for the
School was clearly erroneous. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Shortly after earning his Bachelor of Science degree in Criminology from the School
in the summer of 1996, Peals applied for admission to the School’s Master of Science
program in Criminology (“the Program”). The School conditionally admitted Peals because
his undergraduate grade point average (“GPA”) fell below the required level for regular
admission to the Program (“1996 admission”). To maintain his enrollment, Peals’s
admission required him to earn a grade of at least “B” in each of his first four graduate
classes and to maintain a GPA of a “B,” a 3.0 (“the grade requirement”). Except for a brief
period during which he was on sabbatical, Dr. Jeffrey Schrink (“Dr. Schrink”) was the
chairperson of the School’s criminology department during the events at issue and was
Peals’s academic advisor.
Peals registered late for the fall semester of 1996 and attended classes. He failed to
satisfy his grade requirement when he earned a 2.87 GPA for the fall semester of 1996, and
the School placed him on probationary status. The School therefore notified Peals that if he
failed to raise his GPA to at least 3.00 by the time he completed twelve additional hours of
coursework, he no longer would be enrolled in the Program.
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In the spring of 1997 Peals enrolled in and attended a class, “CRIM 604,” taught by
Dr. Edmund Grosskopf (“Dr. Grosskopf”). By mid-semester, Peals had a grade of “F” in
CRIM 604, which would drop him below the grade requirement by the end of the semester.
Peals failed to satisfy both the grade requirement and the requirement of his probationary
status when he earned a 2.75 GPA for the spring semester of 1997.
Instead of removing Peals from the Program, the School again notified Peals that he
was on probationary status, and that if he failed to raise his GPA to at least 3.00 by the time
he completed twelve additional hours of coursework, he no longer would be in the Program.
Peals attempted to enroll in nine credit hours for the summer of 1997, but because of a past
due financial account balance he did not receive credit for those classes. Peals neither
registered for, nor attended classes at the School from the fall of 1997 through the spring of
1999.
Under the terms of Peals’s 1996 admission to the School, “[a]ny student admitted to
the School of Graduate Studies and to a department who has not enrolled and received
graduate credit for work at Indiana State University for a period of two consecutive years will
have cancelled his or her admission[]” (“the two-year limit”). (Ex. 3.) By the fall of 1999,
when Peals next attempted to register for classes, he had exceeded the two-year limit, and he
could not register because of a hold on his account caused by a past due financial account
balance. Because of the hold on Peals’s account, the Registrar did not know that he needed
to apply for readmission to the Program, so they could not advise him of that fact.
On April 14, 2000, Peals applied for readmission to the Program. In July of 2000, the
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School conditionally readmitted Peals over the objection of the criminology department
faculty. A condition of Peals’s readmission was to complete all degree requirements by
December 14, 2001, with no deadline extensions permitted. When Peals failed to complete
his degree requirements by the deadline, the School removed him from the Program.
On November 13, 2006, Peals filed a complaint against the School in the Vigo
Superior Court alleging breach of contract. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a
general verdict for the School on Peals’s contract claim on September 8, 2011. Peals filed
this appeal on October 7, 2011.
Discussion and Decision
On appeal from a bench trial, we uphold the trial court’s judgment unless the
judgment is clearly erroneous. Garling v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., 766 N.E.2d 409, 410
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Clear error occurs where the trial court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, and we are left
with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Hinesley–Petry v. Petry, 894 N.E.2d
277, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. In the absence of special findings, we review a
trial court’s decision as a general judgment. Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Pryor, 683 N.E.2d 239,
240 (Ind. 1997). We will affirm the trial court’s judgment if it can be sustained on any legal
theory consistent with the evidence. Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, 944 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, and we
consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom. Id.4
The parties have stipulated that an implied contract existed between Peals and the
School by virtue of his admission as a student, and Indiana law recognizes an implied
contractual relationship between student and university. Gordon v. Purdue Univ., 862
N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Neel v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 435 N.E.2d 607, 611
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982). However, the terms of the contract are rarely delineated. Neel, 435
N.E.2d at 610. Furthermore, we do not apply contract law rigidly in this context, and we
exercise restraint in applying traditional legal rules to disputes within the academic
community. Id. at 610-11. As we have previously noted:
In the area of academic services, the courts’ approach has been similar to that used
with contracts conditioned upon the satisfaction of one party. The university requires
that the student’s academic performance be satisfactory to the university in its honest
judgment. Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the university or a professor,
the court will not interfere. The good faith judgment model both maximizes academic
freedom and provides an acceptable approximation of the educational expectations of
the parties.
Gordon, 862 N.E.2d at 1251. In this context, “bad faith is not simply bad judgment or
negligence[, r]ather, it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose
or moral obliquity. . . .” Id. at 1252.
On appeal, Peals alleges that the School had a dishonest purpose and thus acted in bad
faith, breaching the implied contract between them. More specifically, Peals alleges that: (1)
the School failed to allow Peals to drop a class; (2) Dr. Schrink intentionally failed to
properly advise and assist Peals; (3) Dr. Schrink intentionally provided Peals and School
officials with false information; and (4) the School prevented Peals from registering for
certain classes, and then charged him tuition for those classes. The trial court entered a
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general judgment as opposed to findings of fact and conclusions thereon. However, in so
ruling, the trial court necessarily found an absence of bad faith as to each of Peals’s
allegations.
The evidence most favorable to the judgment discloses that, while the School gave
Peals multiple opportunities to graduate from the Program, Peals was either unable or
unwilling to meet his obligations. Peals failed to take the steps necessary to timely withdraw
from CRIM 604. Peals received advice and assistance from Dr. Schrink, both in his capacity
as chairperson of the Criminology department, and as a graduate student advisor, but Peals
often failed to implement his advice. For example, on several occasions, he failed to timely
return signed forms or to timely register, and he failed to keep his financial account free of
encumbrances or holds. To the extent that Dr. Schrink provided information to Peals, false
or otherwise, this information caused no harm to him.1 Peals alone bears responsibility for
his failure to earn credit for the summer 1997 classes, and the School justifiably charged
Peals for those classes which he attended, and in which he eventually enrolled late. Many of
Peals’s arguments essentially are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence, which we decline
to do. Holtzleiter, 944 N.E.2d at 505.
Conclusion
The evidence most favorable to the judgment supports the trial court’s conclusion that
the School did not breach its implied contract with Peals by acting in bad faith, and therefore
1
In one conversation with a School official, Dr. Schrink reported that Peals had not taken classes in 1999.
(Tr. 132.) However, this mistake did not adversely affect Peals, who had been out of class for at least two
years and required readmission regardless of whether he had attended class in 1999.
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the trial court’s judgment for the School is not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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