Paul Sparks v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, Sep 28 2012, 9:31 am
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BRYAN E. BARRETT GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Rushville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
PAUL SPARKS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 70A01-1204-CR-140
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE RUSH CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable David E. Northam, Judge
Cause No. 70C01-1011-FC-577
September 28, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
Paul Sparks contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to
six years with three years to be served in the Indiana Department of Correction because
the court did not adequately explain why he should serve three years in the DOC.
Finding that the trial court adequately explained its reasons, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On November 13, 2010, Sparks unlawfully operated a car in Rush County,
Indiana, after his driving privileges had been forfeited for life. The State charged Sparks
with Class C felony operating a motor vehicle while privileges are forfeited for life and
Class B misdemeanor false informing. Sparks and the State entered into a plea
agreement whereby Sparks pled guilty to Class C felony operating a motor vehicle while
privileges are forfeited for life, and the State dismissed the other charge. As for
sentencing, the parties agreed as follows: “6 Years in the Indiana Dept. of Correction, all
suspended but 3 years (method of execution of sentence is to be determined by the
Court).” Appellant’s App. p. 22. In addition, Sparks agreed that his “agreed upon
sentence [wa]s appropriate in this case and hereby WAIVE[D] any future request to
modify [his] sentence.” Id. at 23.
The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Sparks to six years in
the DOC with three years suspended to probation. Id. at 26.
Sparks now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
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Sparks contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to three
of his six years in the DOC because the court did not adequately explain why it was
sentencing him to the DOC. Sparks claims that the trial court should have considered
other options, such as house arrest or work release.1
Sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s
judgment should receive considerable deference. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
1222 (Ind. 2008). “The trial court must enter a statement including reasonably detailed
reasons or circumstances for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. The reasons given, and
the omission of reasons arguably supported by the record, are reviewable on appeal for
abuse of discretion; however, the “relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly
found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.” Id.A sentencing court abuses its discretion only if its decision was “clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d
482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
An abuse of discretion will also be found if the trial court (1) fails “to enter a sentencing
statement at all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
sentence – including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any – but the
record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits
1
Sparks also cites the standard for challenging the appropriateness of the sentence but makes no
argument that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or his character. Any
argument not waived by the terms of his plea agreement is thus waived by his failure to make an
argument in his brief.
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reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,” or (4)
considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-91.
Contrary to Sparks’ contention that the trial court’s sentencing statement is
inadequate, we find that the trial court adequately explained its reasons for sentencing
him to three years in the DOC. The trial court noted that Sparks had an “extensive”
criminal history, mainly involving driving offenses. Tr. p. 16. The trial court stated,
[The] Court notes as, as the State did that the Defendant has an extensive
history of criminal convictions, the majority of which, without getting
picky, the majority of which are, are related to Operating While
Intoxicateds, Operating as Habitual Offenders, that go[] back all the way to
1991 . . . .
Id. After highlighting more of Sparks’ criminal history, including a 2011 conviction in
Fayette County, Indiana, for operating a motor vehicle while privileges are forfeited for
life, the court concluded that three years in the DOC was appropriate based on his
“pattern of activity.” Id.
The record shows that Sparks’ driver’s license was suspended for life in 2001.
PSI p. 3. Sparks’ PSI shows numerous convictions for OWIs and operating as an HTV as
far back as 1981. Id. at 3-5 (for example, OWI in Decatur County, Indiana, in 1981).
Specifically, Sparks has six felony convictions and five misdemeanor convictions for
these crimes; five of Sparks’ driving convictions came after he received his lifetime
suspension in 2001. Id.; Tr. p. 14. In May 2011, Sparks pled guilty in Fayette County to
the very same crime as in this case and was serving a four-year sentence on work release
and probation at the time of sentencing in this case. Tr. p. 9-10. Sparks’ criminal history
establishes that his lifetime driving suspension has not deterred him from driving a
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vehicle and that the trial court had little reason to believe that Sparks would be deterred
from breaking the law if the executed portion of his sentence was served in an alternate
placement, such as work release. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Sparks to three years in the DOC.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
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