Donny Lee Sturgill v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    FILED
    Sep 27 2012, 9:24 am
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the
    case.                                                             CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    JILL M. ACKLIN                                  GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Acklin Law Office, LLC                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Westfield, Indiana
    JOSEPH Y. HO
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    __________________________________________________________
    DONNY LEE STURGILL,                             )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )        No. 52A02-1202-CR-162
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                               )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.              )
    ________________________________________________________________________
    APPEAL FROM THE MIAMI SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Daniel C. Banina, Judge
    Cause No. 52D02-1105-FD-86
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    September 27, 2012
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BARNES, Judge
    Case Summary
    Donny Sturgill appeals his three-year sentence for Class D felony escape. We
    affirm.
    Issue
    Sturgill raises one issue, which we restate as whether his three-year sentence is
    inappropriate.
    Facts
    In 2001, Sturgill pled guilty to attempted murder and was sentenced to thirty years
    with ten years suspended. After seeking post-conviction relief, the State and Sturgill
    agreed to set aside the attempted murder conviction, and Sturgill pled guilty to Class B
    felony aggravated battery. Sturgill was sentenced to twenty years and apparently was
    permitted to serve the remainder of his incarceration on in-home detention.            After
    approximately six months, Sturgill violated the terms of his in-home detention by using
    cocaine, and his in-home detention was revoked. After serving time in the Department of
    Correction, Sturgill was again permitted to serve a portion of his sentence on in-home
    detention.
    On May 21, 2011, while on in-home detention, Sturgill cut his electronic
    monitoring device after an argument with his wife and then fled to Illinois. On May 26,
    2011, the State charged Sturgill with one count of Class D felony escape for removing the
    electronic monitoring device. On September 14, 2011, the State filed a second Class D
    felony escape charge for fleeing to Illinois. Sturgill eventually pled guilty to the first
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    count, and the State agreed to dismiss the second count and not to file charges arising out
    of an unrelated incident.
    On January 30, 2012, a sentencing hearing was held. The trial court considered
    Sturgill’s criminal history and the fact that he was in a community transition program at
    the time of the offense as aggravators. The trial court considered Sturgill’s guilty plea as
    a mitigator. The trial court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and
    sentenced him to three years in the Department of Correction. Sturgill now appeals.
    Analysis
    Sturgill argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
    offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits us to revise a sentence
    authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that
    the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the
    offender. Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be “extremely” deferential to a trial
    court’s sentencing decision, we still must give due consideration to that decision.
    Rutherford v. State, 
    866 N.E.2d 867
    , 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We also understand and
    recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. 
    Id.
    “Additionally, a defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that his or
    her sentence is inappropriate.” 
    Id.
    The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers,
    and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement
    of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
    Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—
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    the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of
    counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” 
    Id.
     Whether a sentence is
    inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the
    crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
    case. 
    Id. at 1224
    . When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence under Rule 7(B),
    we may consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court in
    sentencing the defendant, including whether a portion of the sentence was suspended.
    Davidson v. State, 
    926 N.E.2d 1023
    , 1025 (Ind. 2010).
    Sturgill contends that the nature of the offense does not warrant the maximum
    sentence because he cut the electronic monitoring device after an argument with his wife.
    According to Sturgill, he was acting in a moment of stress and strong emotion without the
    benefit of cool reflection. Even if Sturgill, who had previously violated the terms of his
    in-home detention, was upset because of an argument with his wife, it does not justify
    cutting off the electronic monitoring device and fleeing the state for two months. We are
    not convinced that the nature of the offense warrants a reduction of the sentence.
    As for his character, Sturgill asserts the maximum sentence is not warranted
    because he pled guilty and his criminal history is “not reprehensible.” Appellant’s Br. p.
    9. Although he pled guilty, he benefited from the dismissal of another charge and the
    State’s agreement not to file additional unrelated charges. Further, Sturgill’s criminal
    history includes three juvenile adjudications and a Class B felony aggravated battery
    conviction, the basis for his in-home detention. More importantly, however, Sturgill had
    4
    previously violated the conditions of in-home detention by using cocaine. Sturgill’s
    character does not require reduction of his sentence.
    Conclusion
    Sturgill’s three-year sentence for escape is not inappropriate. We affirm.
    Affirmed.
    VAIDIK, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 52A02-1202-CR-162

Filed Date: 9/27/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021