Mark A. Rittenhouse v. Rosetta D. Rittenhouse (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                     FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                              Apr 04 2018, 8:32 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Paul J. Watts                                            John R. McKay
    Watts Law Office                                         Daniel Cyr
    Spencer, Indiana                                         Hickam & Lorenz, P.C.
    Spencer, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Mark A. Rittenhouse,                                     April 4, 2018
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    60A04-1708-DR-1840
    v.                                               Appeal from the Owen Circuit
    Court
    Rosetta D. Rittenhouse,                                  The Honorable Kelsey B. Hanlon,
    Appellee-Defendant                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    60C02-1512-DR-149
    May, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018           Page 1 of 13
    [1]   Mark A. Rittenhouse appeals the division of marital assets ordered pursuant to
    the dissolution of his marriage to Rosetta D. Rittenhouse. He asserts the court
    abused its discretion by awarding Rosetta thirty percent of the marital estate.
    We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In January of 1994, Mark purchased a house. At that time, he and Rosetta
    were already dating, and she moved into the house with him. In 1999 or 2000,
    Rosetta moved out for approximately three months and then returned to Mark’s
    house, where she lived until “two thousand eleven or twelve,” (Tr. at 7), when
    she moved out for “the best part of two years.” (Id. at 8.) Mark and Rosetta
    began dating again in 2013, married on September 17, 2013, and separated on
    December 5, 2015. Mark filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage on
    December 29, 2015.
    [3]   On July 17, 2017, the trial court entered an final order that included the
    following pertinent findings of fact:
    2.     The Petitioner, Mark A. Rittenhouse, is 62 years of age
    and is currently self-employed as a contractor. Last year [Mark]
    earned approximately $56,862.00.
    3.     He has had arthritis for several years, currently has lost the
    use of one hand and anticipates neck surgery in the immediate
    future, causing a decrease in income.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 2 of 13
    4.    The Respondent, Rosetta D. Rittenhouse, is 70 years of
    age and has held different jobs both before and during the
    pendency of this action. [Rosetta] receives SSI benefits of
    $770.00 per month with medicare plus income from cleaning
    houses, averaging $75.00 per house. In recent years [Rosetta] has
    cleaned between 1 and 3 houses per week.
    5.   [Rosetta] has heart problems that have impacted her
    employment options.
    6.     On or about January 1, 1994, [Mark] purchased the
    residence . . . for $100,000.00. The remaining balance on the
    mortgage is approximately $34,011.00. The home’s present
    value is $150,000.00[.]
    7.     The Parties maintained a relationship for approximately
    20 years, residing together in the residence for most of that time
    with the exception of two periods, the first of approximately 1
    year and the second of approximately 2 years just prior to the
    marriage. During their cohabitation, they maintained separate
    accounts and did not comingle their debts or property other than
    the various items of personal property maintained in the home.
    8.      [Rosetta] did not make financial contributions to the
    acquisition, improvements or costs of maintenance of the marital
    residence prior to or during their marriage. [Rosetta] paid some
    utilities and regularly bought groceries but, otherwise, retained
    her income for her own benefit and did not make significant
    contributions to the household expenses.
    9.   [Rosetta] made non-monetary contributions to the
    household as a homemaker during the marriage.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 3 of 13
    10. During the time the parties resided together prior to the
    marriage, [Mark] assisted [Rosetta] with payments on her
    delinquent credit card accounts and bills.
    11. [Rosetta] had issues with overspending. [Rosetta] opened
    a Sears Mastercard account in [Mark]’s name without [Mark]’s
    knowledge or permission. [Mark] subsequently settled the
    balance of $4,553.11 by paying $2,276.56.
    12. Pursuant to this Court’s provisional order, [Rosetta]
    removed approximately $4,895.00 of personal property and
    home décor from the residence. The Court adopts the values
    contained in [Mark]’s Exhibit 1, excluding the $5,000.00 value
    placed on the MISCELLANEOUS items contained in [Mark]’s
    Ex. 1. The Court finds those items to be worth $2,500.00.
    13. [Mark] has pensions to which he has made no
    contributions for many years. [Rosetta] did not contribute to the
    acquisition of either pension.
    14. The debts of the parties total $61,487.50. The Court is not
    considering the loan against [Mark]’s IRA as marital debt, as he
    took that loan out after the filing of his Petition.
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 8-9) (emphasis in original). After a number of
    statements regarding the law controlling the court’s decision, the court then
    entered the following conclusions:
    4.    Although the Parties cohabited for a substantial time
    period prior to the marriage, [Mark] established his business and
    purchased his home, vehicles and pension prior to the marriage
    and without significant contribution from [Rosetta] during any
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 4 of 13
    period of cohabitation. The Parties did not commingle their
    property and debts before or during the marriage.
    5.    [Mark]’s pension accounts should be a set-off in this favor
    and not included in the Court’s calculation of the distribution of
    the marital estate.
    6.    Both Parties appear to have diminishing earning capacities
    due to health concerns. [Mark] has a superior earning capability
    to [Rosetta].
    7.     [Mark] has rebutted the presumption that an equal division
    of the marital estate would be just and reasonable.
    8.     Considering the factors enumerated in I.C. 31-15-7-5,
    including the contribution of the parties to acquisition of the
    property, the extent to which the property was acquired before
    the marriage, the health and earning abilities of the parties and
    the dissipation of assets, the Court concludes that a just and
    reasonable distribution of marital assets would be as follows: a
    70% distribution to [Mark] and a 30% distribution to [Rosetta]
    (percentage calculated after setting off [Mark]’s pension
    accounts). The net value of the marital estate after the pension
    account’s set-off is $135,357.50 (see attached balance sheet).
    9.    Said distribution of assets and debts should be made as
    follows:
    a.      [Rosetta] shall be awarded all the personal property
    as contained in the proposed division in [Mark]’s
    Exhibit 1, the same having a total value of
    $4,895.00 (see paragraph 11 in Findings).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 5 of 13
    b.      [Mark] shall be awarded all the personal property as
    contained in the proposed division outlined in
    [Mark]’s Exhibit 1, plus the tractor, which was not
    included, the same having a total value of
    $4,050.00.
    c.      [Mark] shall be awarded the marital residence and
    shall be sole[ly] responsible for the associated
    mortgage and all other costs associated with the
    same. The marital residence is valued at
    $150,000.00 and was encumbered at the time of
    final separation in the amount of $34,011.00.
    d.      [Mark] shall be awarded as his sole and separate
    property his retirement accounts. These shall be set-
    off from the marital estate for calculation purposes.
    e.      [Rosetta] shall be awarded the 2007 VW
    Convertible worth approximately $7,700.00.
    [Mark] shall pay the balance on the vehicle note
    within 60 days of this Order and execute any
    necessary documentation to effectuated [sic] the
    transfer [of] full ownership of the vehicle to
    [Rosetta]. [Rosetta] shall also be awarded the Ford
    Explorer Sport Track worth approximately
    $2,500.00.
    f.      [Mark] shall be awarded the 2013 Chevy Truck
    worth approximately $14,000.00 and shall be
    responsible for the associated lien in the amount of
    $14,000.00. [Mark] shall also be awarded the 1999
    Ford Expedition worth approximately $2,500.00.
    g.      [Mark] shall be responsible for the Sears Mastercard
    Debt in the amount of $2,276.50, the Care Credit
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 6 of 13
    Card in the amount of $3,200.00, and the Visa Card
    in the amount of $1,000.00.
    h.      [Mark] shall have as his sole and separate property
    the intangible property including the bank account
    (#[ . . . ]) containing $1,200.00 and the Business
    account containing $10,000.00.
    i.      [Mark] shall pay to [Rosetta] a cash payment of
    $25,512.25 within 90 days of this Order.
    (Id. at 10-12) (emphases in original).
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   Mark asserts the court’s division of the marital estate was an abuse of discretion
    because the court misapplied the law. Where, as here, a party requested
    findings and conclusions pursuant to Trial Rule 52, we cannot set aside the
    findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Quinn v. Quinn, 
    62 N.E.3d 1212
    ,
    1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Our review is two-tiered: first, we decide “whether
    the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support
    the judgment.” 
    Id.
     We affirm the trial court’s findings unless no facts or
    inferences from the record support them, but we review legal conclusions de
    novo. 
    Id.
    [5]   Indiana subscribes to a “one-pot” theory of marital property. Morey v. Morey, 
    49 N.E.3d 1065
    , 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing 
    Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4
    ). Thus,
    when parties petition for dissolution of marriage,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 7 of 13
    the court shall divide the property of the parties, whether:
    (1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;
    (2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:
    (A) after the marriage; and
    (B) before final separation of the parties; or
    (3) acquired by their joint efforts.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4
    (a); see also 
    Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98
     (defining “property” for
    the purposes of dissolution as “all the assets of either party or both parties”).
    Even if the court later determines that it will set a particular asset aside to one
    of the parties, it must first include such asset in the marital estate and assign it a
    value. Quinn, 62 N.E.3d at 1223. This “one-pot” theory ensures that all assets
    are subject to the trial court’s power to divide and award. Morey, 49 N.E.3d at
    1069.
    [6]   Then, when the court divides the property, it
    shall presume that an equal division of the marital property
    between the parties is just and reasonable. However this
    presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant
    evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors,
    that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 8 of 13
    (1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
    property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
    producing.
    (2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
    spouse:
    (A) before the marriage; or
    (B) through inheritance or gift.
    (3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
    disposition of the property is to become effective, including the
    desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell
    in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just
    to the spouse having custody of any children.
    (4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
    the disposition or dissipation of their property.
    (5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
    (A) a final division of property; and
    (B) a final determination of the property rights of the
    parties.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5
    . If the court determines that one party rebutted the
    presumption of equal division, “then the court must state its reasoning in its
    findings and judgment.” Morey, 49 N.E.3d at 1072.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 9 of 13
    [7]   The trial court has discretion to divide marital property, and we reverse only if
    the court abused its broad discretion. Love v. Love, 
    10 N.E.3d 1005
    , 1012 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2014). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court: (1) entered a
    ruling clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before
    the court, (2) misinterpreted the law, or (3) disregarded evidence of factors listed
    in the controlling statute. 
    Id.
     When we review a claim that the trial court
    improperly divided marital property, we consider only the evidence most
    favorable to the trial court’s disposition. Morey, 49 N.E.3d at 1069. Even if the
    facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different conclusion, “we will
    not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Id.
    [8]   Division of marital property is highly fact sensitive, and we review a trial
    court’s division “as a whole, not item by item.” Love, 10 N.E.3d at 1012. We
    will not weigh evidence or consider evidence that conflicts with the trial court’s
    judgment. Id. The party challenging the division of marital property “must
    overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with
    the applicable statute.” Id. at 1012-13 (quoting Wanner v. Hutchcroft, 
    888 N.E.2d 260
    , 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). In essence, we may not reverse a property
    distribution unless there is no rational basis for it. Id. at 1013.
    [9]   The trial court concluded Mark’s pension plans should be excluded from the
    marital estate and Mark had rebutted the presumption of equal division of the
    remaining marital assets. The court also concluded:
    4.    Although the Parties cohabited for a substantial time
    period prior to the marriage, [Mark] established his business and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 10 of 13
    purchased his home, vehicles and pension prior to the marriage
    and without significant contribution from [Rosetta] during any
    period of cohabitation. The Parties did not commingle their
    property and debts before or during the marriage.
    *****
    8.     Considering the factors enumerated in I.C. 31-15-7-5,
    including the contribution of the parties to acquisition of the
    property, the extent to which the property was acquired before
    the marriage, the health and earning abilities of the parties and
    the dissipation of assets, the Court concludes that a just and
    reasonable distribution of marital assets would be as follows: a
    70% distribution to [Mark] and a 30% distribution to [Rosetta]
    (percentage calculated after setting off [Mark]’s pension
    accounts). The net value of the marital estate after the pension
    account’s set-off is $135,357.50 (see attached balance sheet).
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 10-11) (emphasis in original).
    [10]   Mark asserts the trial court erred by giving Rosetta thirty percent of the marital
    assets remaining after his pensions were set aside to him: “Rose admittedly
    contributed nothing to the acquisition or costs of maintenance of the property
    and . . . [w]hile she paid some utilities and bought groceries, Rose’s ‘non-
    monetary contributions to the household’ as a homemaker were as much for
    her and her children’s benefit as for Mark.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5.)
    [11]   We decline Mark’s invitation to alter the percentage of marital assets to which a
    homemaker is entitled based on the bread-winning spouse’s post-hoc
    assessment of whether the homemaker’s presence in the home brought
    adequate benefit to the bread-winner. The court identified and valued the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 11 of 13
    assets, determined the pensions Mark earned prior to cohabiting with Rosetta
    should be set aside to him, evaluated the statutory factors that control whether
    the presumption of equal division has been rebutted, determined justice
    required Mark receive seventy percent of the marital assets, and explained its
    decision in the final order. Mark has not demonstrated the court erred as a
    matter of law. Cf., e.g., Quinn, 62 N.E.3d at 1224 (reversing and remanding for
    recalculation of property disposition because court failed to include all property
    in the marital pot).
    [12]   Mark also claims that affirming the trial court’s decision “effectively
    discourage[s] cohabiting couples in those circumstances from marrying.”
    (Appellant’s Br. at 8.) The “circumstances” to which Mark refers are the facts
    that the parties had cohabited for nearly twenty years prior to their 2013
    marriage, that during cohabitation the parties had intentionally kept their
    finances separate because of Rosetta’s compulsive spending, and that Mark had
    only married her when he thought the spending “problem was resolved.” (Id. at
    7.) He asks us to “balance that public policy [of acknowledging the
    contributions made during lengthy cohabitation if the parties later marry] with
    the equally important policy in favor of encouraging marriage.” (Id. at 6.)
    We are not unsympathetic to the frustration Mark undoubtedly feels about the
    decision he made in 2013 and the impact it has had on his finances. We
    cannot, however, ignore the policy decisions made by our Legislature.
    Indiana’s legislature adopted the “one-pot” theory of marital property, which
    defines all the assets produced before or during the marriage, by one or both of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 12 of 13
    the parties, as marital property. 
    Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4
    (a). It also created a
    presumption that all the marital assets should be divided equally between the
    parties. 
    Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5
    . To the extent Mark is asking us to ignore the
    presumption that a wife is entitled to half of the assets owned by a married
    couple, his arguments are better addressed to the legislature.
    Conclusion
    [13]   Mark has not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion when it assigned
    to Rosetta thirty percent of the marital assets remaining after Mark’s pensions
    were set aside to him. Accordingly, we affirm.
    [14]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A04-1708-DR-1840 | April 4, 2018   Page 13 of 13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 60A04-1708-DR-1840

Filed Date: 4/4/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/4/2018