Anthony J. Overton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                              Aug 13 2019, 8:38 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Susan D. Rayl                                            Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    George P. Sherman
    Supervising Deputy Attorney
    General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Anthony J. Overton,                                      August 13, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-2090
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Barbara Crawford,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G09-1711-F6-44654
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019                 Page 1 of 11
    [1]   Anthony Overton appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony theft. His sole
    contention is that the stolen property found on his person during a search
    incident to arrest should not have been admitted into evidence because its
    discovery resulted from an unconstitutional seizure.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   Around 1:00 a.m. on November 18, 2017, a concerned citizen made a 911 call
    from outside an apartment complex at the corner of 11th Street and College
    Avenue in Indianapolis. The caller, who provided his name and phone
    number, reported that there was a black man wearing a dark jacket with a hood
    being “super suspicious.” State’s Exhibit 1B (recording of 911 call). He said that
    the man had been walking up and down “patrolling this area” and using a light
    to look into parked cars near a bar and strip mall. 
    Id. The caller
    opined, “I
    think he’s going to try and break into cars.” 
    Id. While still
    observing the man
    during the call, the caller reported that the man walked down 11th Street and
    then just turned into an alley.
    [4]   IMPD Officers Linford Parker and Kevin Moore were dispatched in response
    to the call, and Officer Brian Hofmeister backed up on the run because he was
    in the area. Officer Hofmeister drove southbound down the alley off of 11th
    Street that connects with 10th Street and runs parallel with College Avenue and
    Broadway Street. He turned eastbound on 10th Street and then northbound on
    College Avenue when a red truck caught his attention. The truck was parked in
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019   Page 2 of 11
    a parking lot on the edge of the alley through which Officer Hofmeister had just
    driven. The interior light of the truck was on, and it had not been on moments
    before. Officer Hofmeister then observed the legs of a person “bent over inside”
    the truck. Transcript at 108. He had not seen anyone walking in that block
    while patrolling the area.
    [5]   As a result of his observations, Officer Hofmeister stopped and radioed Officers
    Parker and Moore. He said, “I think I got somebody over here in the alley,
    around 10th and 11th and College … watch the truck, you can kind of see
    somebody wrestling around inside of it.” 
    Id. at 101.
    Officer Parker responded
    that he was “right there”, so Officer Hofmeister began to drive around to the
    mouth of the alley for backup. 
    Id. at 106.
    After Officer Hofmeister turned off
    of College to 11th, he heard Officer Parker radio that he had “the person.” 
    Id. at 102.
    Officer Parker “saw [Overton] in the alley coming from the truck” and
    stopped him about thirty to forty feet from the truck. 
    Id. at 119.
    [6]   Officer Hofmeister then turned onto Broadway and could see that Officer
    Parker had Overton in custody.1 Officer Hofmeister pulled around to assist
    and, after running a license plate check on the truck, determined that the truck
    had been recently reported stolen. Additionally, Overton matched the
    1
    Contrary to Overton’s assertion on appeal, Officer Hofmeister did not testify that Overton was in handcuffs
    at this point in time.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019                 Page 3 of 11
    description provided by the 911 caller, and the truck had a busted-out rear
    window.
    [7]   Shortly thereafter, Officer Moore arrived on the scene to assist. Overton was in
    handcuffs at this point, and Officer Parker informed Officer Moore that
    Overton was being placed under arrest for theft of the truck. Officer Moore
    then searched Overton’s person and recovered, among other items, a distinctive
    pocket knife and a car key from Overton’s front pocket. 2 Both of these
    belonged to the owner of the stolen truck, Billy Albright, whom Officer
    Hofmeister brought to the scene. Albright indicated that the items were inside
    his truck when it was stolen from outside his residence.
    [8]   The State charged Overton with Class A misdemeanor theft and Class B
    misdemeanor unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle. Additionally, the State
    alleged that Overton had a prior conviction for conversion, which elevated his
    theft charge to a Level 6 felony.
    [9]   Overton’s one-day jury trial was held on June 13, 2018. Officer Parker did not
    testify due to illness, but Officers Hofmeister and Moore testified for the State.
    During the trial, Overton sought to suppress the items found on his person,
    claiming that their discovery resulted from an illegal seizure. The trial court
    denied the motion to suppress and admitted the evidence. The jury ultimately
    found Overton guilty of theft as a Level 6 felony and not guilty of unauthorized
    2
    Overton also had a screwdriver in his back pocket.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019   Page 4 of 11
    entry of a motor vehicle. On August 2, 2018, the trial court sentenced Overton
    to 545 days in community corrections. Overton now appeals, challenging the
    admission of the knife and key found on his person following an allegedly
    unconstitutional seizure.
    Discussion & Decision
    Standard of Review
    [10]   The trial court has broad discretion when ruling on the admissibility of
    evidence. Guilmette v. State, 
    14 N.E.3d 38
    , 40 (Ind. 2014). On appeal, we
    review such rulings for abuse of discretion and reverse only when admission is
    clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error
    affects a party’s substantial rights. 
    Id. “But when
    an appellant’s challenge to
    such a ruling is predicated on an argument that impugns the constitutionality of
    the search or seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, and we
    consider that question de novo.” 
    Id. at 40-41.
    [11]   Overton argues the seizure violated both the Fourth Amendment of the United
    States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
    Although these provisions contain textually similar language, it is well
    established that they must be separately analyzed. Graham v. State, 
    971 N.E.2d 713
    , 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Thus, we will address each in turn.
    Fourth Amendment
    [12]   The Fourth Amendment provides:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019   Page 5 of 11
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
    papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
    shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
    probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
    particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
    or things to be seized.
    One exception to the warrant requirement for a seizure is an investigatory stop
    based on reasonable suspicion. Campos v. State, 
    885 N.E.2d 590
    , 597 (Ind.
    2008); Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 30-31 (1968). “Reasonable suspicion exists
    where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences
    arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe
    that criminal activity has or is about to occur.” 
    Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 597
    (quoting Baldwin v. Reagan, 
    715 N.E.2d 332
    , 337 (Ind. 1999)). Further, an
    investigatory stop may be based upon the collective information known to the
    law enforcement organization as a whole rather than just on the personal
    knowledge of the arresting officer. See Dunson v. State, 
    64 N.E.3d 250
    , 254 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 
    788 N.E.2d 835
    , 840 (Ind. 2003).
    [13]   “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case
    basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the
    circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 
    752 N.E.2d 163
    , 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see
    also U.S. v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances
    should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each
    might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the
    circumstances may warrant further investigation by officers). “Reasonable
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019   Page 6 of 11
    suspicion entails some minimum level of objective justification for making a
    stop; something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
    hunch, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
    the evidence.” State v. Straub, 
    749 N.E.2d 593
    , 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
    [14]   Here, Officer Parker had reasonable suspicion to detain Overton in the alley,
    after seeing him walk away from the truck, based on the other information he
    had learned from dispatch and Officer Hofmeister. Specifically, around 1:00
    a.m., the officers were dispatched to the one-block area on the report of a black
    man wearing a dark jacket with a hood walking around and suspiciously
    peering into parked vehicles with a light. Officer Hofmeister patrolled the area
    and observed an interior light on in a truck parked in the middle of the block,
    just off an alley. This light had not been on moments before when he drove
    down the alley, and Officer Hofmeister could see that someone was bent over
    inside the truck with their feet still outside on the ground. Officer Hofmeister
    did not see any other individuals walking in the area. He radioed Officer
    Parker regarding the person in the truck. Officer Parker was nearby and
    stopped Overton in the dark alley, walking away from the truck, seconds later. 3
    3
    The record does not establish a precise timeline, but it can be reasonably inferred from Officer Hofmeister’s
    testimony and the map admitted into evidence that the time period between Officer Hofmeister’s
    observations and Officer Parker stopping Overton in the alley was a matter of seconds. Another reasonable
    inference from the evidence is that the person Officer Hofmeister saw in the truck was Overton, whom
    Officer Parker stopped after seeing Overton nearby in the alley coming from the same truck.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019                    Page 7 of 11
    Overton fit the description given by the caller, a concerned citizen, and had just
    exhibited suspicious behavior similar to that reported by the caller.
    [15]   Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Parker had particular and
    objective bases for suspecting that Overton was engaged in criminal activity.
    That is, the information known to the officers supported a reasonable suspicion
    that Overton was looking into vehicles for items to steal in the early morning
    hours when it was unlikely he would be detected. Officer Parker, thus, acted
    reasonably when he made an investigatory stop of Overton in the dark alley to
    assess the situation further with backup from Officer Hofmeister. Indeed, it
    would have been poor police work for Officer Parker not to have stopped
    Overton to investigate his behavior further.
    [16]   Within a short time after Officer Parker stopped Overton, Officer Hofmeister
    finished driving around the block and assisted with the investigatory stop.
    Officer Hofmeister promptly checked the license plate on the truck and
    determined that it had been reported stolen two days prior. Additionally, the
    truck had a broken back window providing access to the cab of the truck. At
    this point, the officers’ reasonable suspicion escalated to probable cause, and
    Overton was placed under arrest for auto theft 4 and then searched incident to
    arrest by Officer Moore, who had just arrived on the scene. See Sebastian v.
    4
    It is unclear when Overton was placed in handcuffs, but the record does establish that he was handcuffed by
    the time Officer Moore arrived, which was after Officers Hofmeister and Park had discovered that the truck
    was stolen and had decided to place Overton under arrest.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019                  Page 8 of 11
    State, 
    726 N.E.2d 827
    , 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Probable cause to arrest exists
    where the officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would warrant
    a man of reasonable caution to believe that a suspect has committed the
    criminal act”, and “[u]nder the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the
    warrant requirement, a police officer may conduct a search of the defendant’s
    person….”), trans. denied. The stolen items found on Overton’s person during
    this search were admissible at trial, as their discovery did not result from a
    violation of the Fourth Amendment.
    Article 1, Section 11
    [17]   Overton also asserts a violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
    Constitution, which “safeguards the ‘right of the people to be secure in their
    persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure.’”
    Watkins v. State, 
    85 N.E.3d 597
    , 600 (Ind. 2017). An analysis under Article 1,
    Section 11 “turns on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the
    totality of the circumstances.” Carpenter v. State, 
    18 N.E.3d 998
    , 1002 (Ind.
    2014). In making this evaluation, we apply the test established by our Supreme
    Court in Litchfield v. State, 
    824 N.E.2d 356
    (Ind. 2005). “The ‘reasonableness of
    a search or seizure [turns] on a balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion,
    or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the
    method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and
    3) the extent of law enforcement needs.’” J.G. v. State, 
    93 N.E.3d 1112
    , 1122-23
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting 
    Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361
    ) (alteration in J.G.),
    trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019   Page 9 of 11
    [18]   In some cases Article 1, Section 11 “confers greater protections to individual
    rights than the Fourth Amendment”, but Indiana has adopted the Terry
    rationale in determining the legality of investigatory stops under Article 1,
    Section 11. W.H. v. State, 
    928 N.E.2d 288
    , 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
    denied; see also State v. Cunningham, 
    26 N.E.3d 21
    , 25 (Ind. 2015) (observing that
    many search and seizure issues are resolved in the same manner under both
    constitutions, including an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion);
    Holbert v. State, 
    996 N.E.2d 396
    , 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
    [19]   As discussed previously, Officer Parker had reasonable suspicion to make a
    brief investigatory stop of Overton to address behaviors observed by the 911
    caller, Officer Hofmeister, and himself in the alley in the middle of the night.
    The degree of suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances was
    significant rather than “quite low” as suggested by Overton. See Appellant’s Brief
    at 29. The officers then needed to dispel their reasonable suspicions that
    Overton was looking to take (or actually taking) items from unoccupied
    vehicles in the area. Finally, the degree of intrusion was not high under the
    circumstances. Officer Parker stopped Overton walking in the alley for a brief
    investigation, and Officer Hofmeister arrived as backup within a very short
    time. The investigatory stop then quickly led to the discovery that the truck was
    stolen, and the stop evolved into an arrest based on probable cause. We
    conclude the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances and, thus, find
    no violation of Article 1, Section 11.
    [20]   Judgment affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019   Page 10 of 11
    Kirsch, J. and Vaidik, C.J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019   Page 11 of 11