Mark B. Howard v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this                            Aug 13 2018, 7:31 am
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the                         CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,                      Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Susan D. Rayl                                            Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Smith Rayl Law Office, LLC                               Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Monika Prekopa Talbot
    Supervising Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Mark B. Howard,                                          August 13, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A04-1711-CR-2601
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Marc T. Rothenberg,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G02-1509-F2-32201
    Barteau, Senior Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Appellant Mark B. Howard appeals the terms of his release on bail and his
    sentence. We affirm.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018         Page 1 of 10
    Issues
    [2]   Howard presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:
    I. Whether the trial court erred by altering the conditions of Howard’s bail.
    II. Whether Howard’s sentence is inappropriate.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   Howard and Amber Brown were involved in a relationship for several years,
    and they have a son together. Once their relationship ended in 2014, Howard
    and Amber stayed in contact with one another because of their son. At some
    point after ending her relationship with Howard, Amber became friends with a
    man named Will. Howard became very upset when he learned of Amber’s
    friendship with Will, and, throughout the day of September 8, 2015, he sent
    threatening text messages to Amber.
    [4]   Due to the threatening nature of Howard’s messages, Amber planned to stay
    somewhere else that night. Amber asked her brother, Lee, to accompany her
    and her son to her apartment so she could gather some clothes and things.
    Once they had entered the apartment and shut and locked the door, someone
    began kicking in the door. Amber yelled for her brother who was in the other
    room and then took her son to a room at the back of the apartment. As Lee
    was nearing the front door of the apartment and Amber was heading to the
    back of the apartment with her son, they both saw an arm and a gun appear in
    the open doorway. Lee pulled out his handgun and began firing. He then
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 2 of 10
    walked to the door and recognized the person on the floor as Howard. Amber
    called the police, and Howard asked Lee to hide his gun.
    [5]   Based upon this incident, the State charged Howard with attempted murder, a
    1                               2                                      3
    Level 1 felony; burglary, a Level 2 felony; intimidation, a Level 6 felony; and
    4
    carrying a handgun without a license, a Level 5 felony. Following a jury trial
    on these charges, Howard was found guilty of burglary, intimidation, and
    carrying a handgun without a license. The trial court sentenced him to an
    aggregate sentence of twenty-five years with five years suspended. Howard
    now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Conditions of Bail
    [6]   Howard contends the trial court erred by altering the conditions for his bail.
    Particularly, he claims that, after he was released on bond, the trial court
    granted the State’s request for the additional conditions of home detention and
    GPS monitoring without a showing of good cause as required by Indiana Code
    section 35-33-8-5 (2004).
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2014).
    2
    Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (2014).
    3
    Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1 (2014).
    4
    Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 (2014).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 3 of 10
    [7]   The State argues this issue is moot. Indeed, Howard concedes in his brief that
    “there [is] nothing that this Court can now do to correct the trial court’s error.”
    Appellant’s Br. p. 12. Nonetheless, he maintains that the issue should be
    addressed.
    [8]   An issue is deemed moot when it is no longer “live” or when the parties lack a
    legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Jones v. State, 
    847 N.E.2d 190
    , 200
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Stated differently, when we are unable to
    provide effective relief upon an issue, the issue is deemed moot, and we will not
    reverse the trial court’s determination ‘where absolutely no change in the status
    quo will result.’” 
    Id. (quoting In
    re Utley, 
    565 N.E.2d 1152
    , 1154 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1991)). An issue that is otherwise moot may nevertheless be decided on its
    merits if it involves a question of “great public interest.” Mosley v. State, 
    908 N.E.2d 599
    , 603 (Ind. 2009). Such cases raise important policy concerns and
    present issues that are likely to recur. 
    Id. Any decision
    we would render in this
    case would result in no change in the status quo for Howard. Further, this issue
    does not present an important policy question. Accordingly, we decline to
    address this issue because it is moot.
    II. Inappropriate Sentence
    [9]   Next, Howard asserts his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his
    offense and his character. Howard appeals his sentence only as to his burglary
    conviction.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 4 of 10
    [10]   Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a
    sentence, article VII, sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize
    independent appellate review and revision of sentences through Indiana
    Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we may revise a sentence authorized
    by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we determine
    that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
    character of the offender. Thompson v. State, 
    5 N.E.3d 383
    , 391 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2014). However, “we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s
    sentencing decision, both because Rule 7(B) requires us to give ‘due
    consideration’ to that decision and because we understand and recognize the
    unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Stewart v.
    State, 
    866 N.E.2d 858
    , 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The principal role of appellate
    review under Rule 7(B) is to attempt to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a
    perceived “correct” result in each case. Garner v. State, 
    7 N.E.3d 1012
    , 1015
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In other words, the question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is
    not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is
    whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 
    894 N.E.2d 265
    ,
    268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of persuading the
    appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006).
    [11]   To assess whether the sentence is inappropriate, we look first to the statutory
    range established for the class of the offense. Here, the offense is a Level 2
    felony burglary, for which the advisory sentence is seventeen and one-half
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 5 of 10
    years, with a minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum of thirty years.
    Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5 (2014). Howard was sentenced to an aggregate term of
    twenty-five years with five years suspended. The trial court ordered that he
    serve eighteen years in the DOC and two years on home detention for his
    conviction of burglary.
    [12]   Next, we look to the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. As
    to the nature of the burglary offense, we note that to commit this offense,
    Howard equipped himself with a ski mask and a gun. Armed with the gun, he
    kicked in the door of the apartment where his seven-year-old son resided and
    committed this offense in the presence of his son while also putting his son in
    grave danger.
    [13]   With regard to the character of the offender, we observe that at age twenty-eight
    Howard had already amassed a noteworthy criminal history. As a juvenile,
    Howard had several interactions with the juvenile system, two of which
    resulted in formal proceedings. In one instance, he participated in a diversion
    program for an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be battery
    resulting in bodily injury with a prior offense, a Class D felony. In another,
    Howard was charged with offenses that, if committed by an adult, would
    constitute resisting law enforcement as a Class D felony, resisting law
    enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor, and reckless driving as a Class B
    misdemeanor. These charges resulted in a true finding for resisting law
    enforcement as a Class D felony, for which Howard completed community
    service work and formal probation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 6 of 10
    [14]   At age eighteen, Howard commenced his adult criminal history with the
    charges of theft, as a Class D felony; battery as a Class A misdemeanor;
    criminal mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor; and criminal conversion, as a
    Class A misdemeanor. He was convicted of theft and two counts of
    misdemeanor battery. Subsequently, his probation was revoked for violations
    including committing an additional criminal offense, submitting diluted urine
    drug screens, failing to report to probation, failing to pay court ordered fees,
    and submitting a drug screen positive for THC. He was ordered to serve 120
    days in DOC, 120 days on work release, and 120 days on home detention. He
    later violated the conditions of his community corrections placement.
    [15]   From 2010 to 2015, Howard steadily committed new offenses. He accumulated
    convictions for possession of marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor; driving
    while suspended with a prior, as a Class A misdemeanor; two counts of theft, as
    Level 6 felonies; criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon, a Level 6 felony;
    and leaving the scene of an accident, as a Class B misdemeanor. In addition,
    charges of felony and misdemeanor domestic battery as well as misdemeanor
    battery were filed but dismissed, and charges of felony distributing
    hallucinogenic substance or marijuana, misdemeanor use/possession of drug
    paraphernalia, and a misdemeanor vehicular offense were apparently filed but
    resolved with an unknown disposition. Moreover, it was alleged that Howard
    violated his probation by failing to comply with community service and failing
    to pay his financial obligations.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 7 of 10
    [16]   The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant’s character and
    an appropriate sentence varies based on the gravity, nature, and proximity of
    prior offenses in relation to the current offense, as well as the number of prior
    offenses. Sandleben v. State, 
    29 N.E.3d 126
    , 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.
    denied. Here, in addition to juvenile offenses, Harold has at least four felony
    convictions and at least five misdemeanor convictions, some of which involve
    violence. In addition, Howard was out on bond for another offense at the time
    he committed the current offenses, and, during his trial, he violated the no
    contact order that was in place with regard to Amber. Both of these
    circumstances may be considered by the court as aggravating factors. See Ind.
    Code § 35-38-1-7.1 (5), (6) (2015).
    [17]   Furthermore, Howard made it clear he felt no remorse for his actions. Exhibit
    1 from his sentencing hearing is the recording of a phone call he made from jail
    to a female the night of his trial in which he spoke of Amber, referring to her as
    a “bitch” and making disparaging comments about her glasses and her weight.
    Ex. 1. He laughed about how he had been “mean mugging” Amber and her
    mother through the trial and was told to stop by his attorney, and he stated that
    he was disappointed that Amber’s mother was absent from the courtroom when
    the not guilty verdict was read for the attempted murder charge because he
    wanted to give her a big smile. 
    Id. He also
    referred to his similarity to Charles
    Manson in his dealings with Amber and stated he did not care that the court
    revoked his bond because he had “smoked weed” and had sex all night the
    night before. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 8 of 10
    [18]   The State read statements from both Amber and her mother, which told of
    Amber and Howard’s violent relationship. Amber described their relationship
    as a “very abusive, toxic relationship.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 39. The women
    recounted instances of Howard taking Amber’s clothes and shoes, bleaching her
    clothes, and chasing her on a dirt bike.
    [19]   After hearing the evidence, the trial court characterized Howard’s actions as
    driven by a desire to terrorize Amber. The court noted that by these acts
    Howard directly exposed his son to the toxicity and violence of his relationship
    with Amber, that he had another criminal case pending at the time of these acts,
    and that the phone call from jail showed a complete lack of remorse. In
    characterizing the phone call, the trial court stated, “there is a bravado about
    you in this conversation which to me is mind blowing just hours after you’re
    convicted of a Level 2 Burglary.” 
    Id. at 57.
    The trial court also remarked,
    “You are something. I can characterize what you are. You’re a dangerous
    person whether that’s because of your emotional state, whether that’s because
    of your mental health, whether it’s because of a toxic relationship — and I can
    go on and on with the excuses that I’ve heard from you in your presentence
    investigation or from you today or from you on this phone call. It doesn’t
    matter. The fact is I stand by my first statement. You’re a terrible person.” 
    Id. at 56-57.
    [20]   On appeal, Howard argues for a reduced sentence, citing his limited criminal
    history and that he “likely suffers from mental illness.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14.
    As discussed above, Howard’s criminal history is not “limited” but, rather, is
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 9 of 10
    extensive. Additionally, no evidence links Howard’s crimes and a mental
    illness. See Corralez v. State, 
    815 N.E.2d 1023
    , 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating
    there must be nexus between defendant’s mental health and crime in question
    in order for mental history to be considered mitigating factor). Nonetheless, the
    trial court ordered a mental health evaluation and treatment.
    Conclusion
    [21]   For the reasons stated, we conclude that Howard’s sentence is not inappropriate
    given the nature of the offense and his character.
    [22]   Affirmed.
    Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1711-CR-2601 | August 13, 2018   Page 10 of 10