Victoria Yates v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
FILED
Sep 04 2012, 9:45 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
VICTORIA YATES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1202-CR-126
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert P. Hurley, Judge Pro-Tempore
Cause No. 49F07-1109-CM-63529
September 4, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
Victoria Yates (“Yates”) appeals her conviction for Battery as a Class A
misdemeanor.1 Yates presents two issues for our review, which we restate as the single issue
of whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Yates’s claim of self-defense. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On August 31, 2011, Yates and Nadine Deroux (“Deroux”) were employed as medical
record keepers at Joy Health Services. At some time after 3:00 p.m., after an argument
between Yates and Deroux, Deroux was seated at her desk facing her computer when Yates
grabbed Deroux’s hair. Yates put her in a headlock, and repeatedly punched her in the face
until a co-worker pulled Yates off of her. Deroux was treated at the St. Vincent Hospital
emergency room for injuries inflicted during the incident including bruises, scratches, and a
fractured nose.
On September 16, 2011, the State charged Yates with Class A misdemeanor battery.
A bench trial was conducted on January 23, 2012. At the conclusion of the trial, the court
found Yates guilty as charged and entered a judgment of conviction against her. The court
imposed a sentence of 365 days, 363 of which were suspended to probation, and ordered
Yates to complete sixteen hours of community service. Yates now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
On appeal, Yates concedes that she struck Deroux, but she contends that the State
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.
2
failed to present sufficient evidence to disprove her claim of self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt. Specifically, Yates argues that Deroux initiated the fighting by pushing
her; that Deroux was an aggressive, trained martial artist; and that she was protecting herself
from Deroux.
Self-defense is an affirmative defense established by the Indiana Code. “A person is
justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect the person or a third
person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.”
I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a) (2006).2 To support a claim of self-defense, a defendant must have acted
without fault, been in a place where she had a right to be, and been in reasonable fear or
apprehension of bodily harm. White v. State, 699 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ind. 1998). The
defendant’s belief of fear must be reasonable and in good faith, and her reaction to that belief
must be reasonable based on the surrounding circumstances. Id.We review a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a self-defense claim
under the same standard as any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Sanders v. State, 704
N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999). We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.
Sanders, 704 N.E.2d at 123. The trial court’s verdict will not be disturbed if there is
sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Id. In
other words, we will reverse a conviction where the defendant claimed self-defense only if
no reasonable person could say the State disproved self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
2
The relevant statutory provision was changed, effective March 20, 2012. The new statutory language
recodifies § 35-41-3-2(a) at § 35-41-3-2(c). We refer to the version of the statute in force at the time of the
alleged crime.
3
Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. 1999).
Deroux testified that Yates initiated the fight by approaching her from behind,
grabbing her hair and punching her in the face. (Tr. 11-13.) Furthermore, though there is
evidence that Deroux had five years of martial arts training, there was no indication that
Deroux threatened Yates with that training, and the extent of Deroux’s injuries indicates that
Deroux did not actually use martial arts in her altercation with Yates.
To the extent Yates points to one or another version of the fight’s origin or directs our
attention to Deroux’s martial arts training, these arguments are invitations to judge witness
credibility and reweigh evidence, which we cannot do. See Sanders, 704 N.E.2d at 123.
Conclusion
The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Yates’s claim of self-defense,
therefore we affirm Yates’s conviction.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
4