Julius Anderson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Apr 28 2016, 8:46 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cynthia M. Carter Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Julius Anderson, April 28, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A04-1003-CR-162
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jane Woodward
Appellee-Plaintiff Miller, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D01-0904-MR-14
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Julius Anderson appeals his conviction and fifty-five-year sentence for murder
following a jury trial. He argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct
during cross-examination and closing argument in the form of a Doyle violation
which amounted to fundamental error. He also contends that the trial court
abused its discretion during sentencing. Concluding that Anderson has not
demonstrated that fundamental error occurred or that the trial court abused its
discretion, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In the early morning hours on April 21, 2009, Anderson and his girlfriend,
Dawn Brooks, were out partying and driving around with another couple,
Terrence Eppenger, Jr. (“Terrence Jr.”), and Christine Purucker. The couples
stopped at a local convenience store for “some chips” and “smokes.” Tr. at
469. Anderson and Brooks entered the store while Terrence Jr. and Purucker
stayed in the car. While in the store, Brooks ran into an old friend, Kerry
Montgomery, and gave him a hug and got his phone number. Anderson was
“very upset” about the interaction between Brooks and Montgomery to the
extent that he would not let Montgomery leave the store. Id. at 332.
Montgomery tried to explain that he was married and that he and Brooks were
just friends, but Anderson would not listen and instead hollered “crazy stuff” at
Montgomery. Id. at 342. Montgomery was scared. The convenience store
cashier eventually asked all of them to leave. Montgomery saw Anderson and
Brooks get into the car with another couple and drive away.
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[3] Terrence Jr. and Purucker dropped off Anderson and Brooks at Brooks’s home
and then drove to Terrence Eppenger, Sr.’s house (“Terrence Sr.”) and went to
bed in the basement. A little while later, Terrence Sr. was watching television
in his bedroom when he was startled by pounding on the window. Terrence Sr.
saw Anderson outside the window and told him to go around to the front door.
Anderson “barged” into the house and tried to run to the basement. Id. at 427.
Terrence Sr. stopped Anderson and told him that Terrence Jr. and Purucker
were sleeping and that he could not go into the basement. Terrence Sr.
observed blood on Anderson’s arm. Terrence Sr. thought that Anderson must
be bleeding and asked him what had happened. Anderson replied that “it
wasn’t blood.” Id. Terrence Sr. was skeptical and dialed 911. Anderson said
“don’t call the police,” so Terrence Sr. hung up. Id. However, because
Terrence Sr. had already dialed the number, an emergency dispatcher called
him back. As Terrence Sr. was explaining the situation to the dispatcher,
Anderson took off out the front door and ran away.
[4] At 3:35 a.m., South Bend Police Corporal Tim Cichowicz was dispatched to
Terrence Sr.’s home based on a report that a man had shown up at the home
covered in blood. Corporal Cichowicz spoke with Terrence Sr. and Purucker.
They told the officer that Anderson had arrived at the residence covered in
blood and Purucker stated that she could show the officer where Anderson
lived with Brooks. Purucker got into the police vehicle and directed Corporal
Cichowicz to Brooks’s home.
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[5] When Corporal Cichowicz pulled up to Brooks’s home, he noticed smoke
coming from the roof. After he observed more smoke coming from the west
side of the home, Corporal Cichowicz contacted dispatch and told them to send
the fire department. To keep Purucker safe, Corporal Cichowicz quickly drove
her back to Terrence Sr.’s house, before returning to Brooks’s home. The fire
department had not yet arrived, but other police officers were now on the scene.
South Bend Police Officer Anthony Dawson broke a window of the home and
yelled to see if anyone was inside. He then tried to open the front door of the
home, and although the knob would turn, he was unable to push the door open.
Officers went to the back of the house and noticed blood on the back door and
in several other areas.
[6] It had begun to rain by the time the fire department trucks and other emergency
vehicles arrived. Firefighters had difficulty getting through the front door and
discovered that a couch had been blocking the entry. After gaining entry to the
home, the firefighters found Brooks’s body. She “was almost completely nude,
except for a bra which was around her neck.” Id. at 174. She was unresponsive
with no “signs of life.” Id. Her body was placed in an ambulance and Corporal
Cichowicz accompanied the ambulance to the morgue.
[7] Around the same time period, Scott Sousa and his girlfriend Kai Legge were
awakened to the sound of Sousa’s barking dog. When they investigated, they
found Anderson lying on the floor of the back porch of Sousa’s apartment.
Sousa did not know Anderson very well. Sousa allowed Anderson inside his
apartment and observed that Anderson was “covered in blood” but did not
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appear to be injured in any way. Id. at 280. After Sousa helped clean Anderson
up, Sousa saw that Anderson had a cut on his finger. Sousa believed that all of
the blood was much more than would have come from just a cut on Anderson’s
finger. Anderson told Sousa he had been in a fight at Brooks’s house with “a
person” and that it was “somebody that knew [Brooks].” Id. at 281. Anderson
mentioned a fire in the house, that he jumped out the window, and that he
“didn’t know if the person he was fighting was hurt or dead, but he stabbed
them.” Id. Anderson instructed Sousa not to call the police.
[8] Sousa noted that Anderson “kept changing his story” and “didn’t seem to know
what story” to tell him. Id. at 284. Within ten minutes of discovering
Anderson, Sousa heard the sirens of an ambulance, police car, and fire truck go
by his apartment. Legge was astonished by the amount of blood on Anderson.
She “got real concerned that maybe there was more to the story” than
Anderson had told them. Id. at 319. Sousa inquired about Brooks’s well-being
and Anderson said that he did not know, “that she had a few blows to the
face,” but that he believed that “she was okay.” Id. at 284. Anderson asked
Sousa if he could sleep on his couch, and Sousa obliged. Sousa felt uneasy, so
he did not go back to sleep.
[9] Around 11:00 that morning, Anderson asked Sousa to drive him somewhere.
Sousa and another individual who had been asleep in Sousa’s apartment,
Patrick Florant, subsequently drove Anderson and dropped him off at a burger
place. Before they left, Florant noticed blood on Anderson’s pants. Anderson
and Florant spoke a little bit, and Anderson told Florant not to call police.
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Anderson was behaving “[a] little sketchy” in the car and “was laying down
like he didn’t want to be seen.” Id. at 287. Florant wanted Anderson out of his
car because of the “odd” way he was acting. Id. at 301. Florant was afraid of
the “repercussions” because of whatever was “going on” with Anderson. Id.
[10] An autopsy of Brooks’s body was performed by forensic pathologist Dr. Joseph
Prahlow. Dr. Prahlow found multiple external injures to the body including “at
least a couple dozen” blunt force injuries, several sharp force injuries, as well as
additional injuries suggesting the possibility of strangulation. An internal
examination also revealed that Brooks endured significant brain trauma as well
as bleeding around the brain. The examination also revealed thermal injuries
caused by smoke and soot inhalation. Regarding the sharp force injuries,
Brooks had some “superficial or shallow” stab wounds and “three definite stab
wounds.” Id. at 384. One of the stab wounds went through the left side of her
neck, cut her epiglottis, broke through a bone in her neck, and exited the right
side of her neck. Another stab wound was seven inches in length, stretching
from her left elbow to her shoulder, and cut through muscles and soft tissue in
her arm. While all of the stab wounds would have caused significant bleeding,
Dr. Prahlow opined that none of them “would be considered rapidly lethal.”
Id. at 387. Similarly, the blunt force head injuries “were not instantaneously
lethal.” Id. at 388. The evidence of the thermal injuries caused by smoke and
soot inhalation indicated that Brooks was still breathing during the fire and that
although all of her other injuries “did not kill her by themselves, [] they
certainly could have.” Id. at 388. Dr. Prahlow opined that the cause of
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Brooks’s death was “a combination of blunt force, sharp force, possible
strangulation, thermal and smoke and soot inhalation.” Id. at 393.
[11] Various items of evidence were collected from the crime scene which revealed
the presence of Anderson’s DNA. His DNA was found on a red stain on the
latch of the back gate in the yard, and a white shirt found on Brooks’s bed had
numerous reddish-brown stains that contained both Anderson’s and Brooks’s
DNA. A knife was also found in the home that had reddish-brown staining.
DNA testing revealed Anderson’s DNA on the knife handle and Brooks’s DNA
on the blade.
[12] The State charged Anderson with two counts of class B felony arson and one
count of murder. A four-day jury trial began on December 14, 2009. Anderson
testified at trial. He claimed that, after he and Brooks went to bed, three men
entered Brooks’s bedroom and attacked them. He said that one of the men had
a gun. The man with the gun set fire to one of the sheets on the bed. Anderson
stated that he saw the men stab Brooks. He claimed that he fought with the
men, and maybe even killed one of them, before he was eventually able to
escape. He stated that he heard Brooks screaming as he ran away. In response
to the prosecutor’s question on cross-examination, Anderson admitted that he
had never told law enforcement this version of events prior to trial. The jury
found Anderson not guilty of arson but guilty of murder. A sentencing hearing
was held on February 12, 2010. The trial court sentenced Anderson to fifty-five
years executed in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – Anderson has failed to establish fundamental
error.
[13] Anderson first claims that the State violated his rights under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution when, during cross-examination
and closing argument, the prosecutor commented on his “post-detention
silence.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Anderson points to the following questions
asked of him during the State’s cross-examination:
Q: And with respect to the final count in this case, murder, you
agree that Dawn Brooks was a living breathing human being
before April 21?
A: Yes, she was, sir.
Q: That she was killed at the hands of another human being?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that wasn’t some sort of weird accident?
A: No.
Q: Somebody attacked her?
A: Yes.
Q: Again, you’re just saying that wasn’t you?
A: Yes, it wasn’t me, sir.
Q: You’re saying it was these three guys that you have a
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description about now today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That you assume pretty strongly was an ex-boyfriend?
A: It seemed like it. I’m not going to say it was. Didn’t nobody
tell me. It seemed like it.
Q: And so because you loved Dawn, certainly you would want
the correct person in this case discovered and arrested, right?
A: Of course.
Q: So you wait until the morning of trial testimony to give
information about the suspects to law enforcement?
A: I was advised by my lawyers not to say nothing.
Tr. at 693-95.
[14] Anderson also points to the following excerpt from the State’s closing
argument:
Mr. Anderson testified that he loved Dawn. Loved her. Was his
girlfriend. He felt like less of man because he couldn’t buy her
pretty things on her birthday. He could have been a hero. He
just defended his woman with honor by throwing a guy into a
corner of that cabinet thing. Instead, a guy who doesn’t feel like
a man because he can’t buy her a thing, runs away for hours and
hours and hours, knowing that she’s still alive in a burning house
without saying a flipping thing to anybody? Are you kidding me?
Speaking of not saying a thing to anybody, he told you he didn’t
tell anybody this story before. He told some of the folks at
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Indiana, although what they said he told them was not what you
heard today. He didn’t tell the police back then. He didn’t tell the
fire guys when they’re swarming all over the neighborhood and
at Dawn’s house. In fact, he didn’t tell anybody that could do
anything about it until he came and sat on the stand in trial. He
claims to have information about the attackers, information not
just about their physical descriptions, but his assumptions about
who they might be. He doesn’t offer that to anybody so that
anybody could be followed up on, so that people could be
questioned about Dawn’s ex-boyfriend[s] or acquaintances or
anything like that.
He doesn’t say, hey, I think I might even killed a guy. He bashed
his head, and he was bleeding, and all the stuff you scraped up,
check some of that to see if it is his blood. Anything that could
have been verified, or stated differently, anything that could have
been positively disproved. What did he do? He waited until he
sat here. This from a man who claims to be in love with Dawn.
This from a man who claims to be a human being trying to do
the right thing and just too flustered to do it.
Id. at 725-26.
[15] Although not specifically framed us such, we discern that Anderson is claiming
that the prosecutor committed misconduct in the form of what is referred to as a
Doyle violation. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court held that using a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence to
impeach an exculpatory story told for the first time at trial violated the
defendant's due process rights. “Doyle rests on the fundamental unfairness of
implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and
then using his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.”
Barton v. State, 936 N.E.2d 842, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (2011).
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“The key to Doyle is that it protects the defendant from being found guilty
simply on the basis of a legitimate choice to remain silent.” Trice v. State, 766
N.E.2d 1180, 1183-84 (Ind. 2002). 1 While Anderson frames the issue as a
violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a Doyle
violation is actually a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause prohibition against fundamental unfairness. Sobolewski v. State, 889
N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
[16] Because Anderson’s trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s questions
or comments, request a jury admonishment, or move for a mistrial, Anderson
maintains that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted fundamental error. 2 We
review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by determining (1) whether
misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the
circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or
she would not have been subjected otherwise. Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667
(Ind. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, a
1
We note that “[w]here a defendant asserts a Doyle violation, he ‘ordinarily bears the burden of showing that
Miranda warnings were given prior to the post-arrest silence used by the state for impeachment purposes.’”
Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, Criminal Procedure
§ 9.6(a) n.47 (3d ed. 2007)). Although the State contends that Anderson has not met that burden, we think
that the record belies any assertion that Anderson was not Mirandized at some point prior to trial. He was
arrested and detained in the St. Joseph County Jail pending trial, so we will presume that he received the
standard advisement of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest and booking. Also, Anderson’s
statement on the witness stand that “I was advised by my lawyers not to say nothing” indicates that he was
aware that he had a legitimate choice to remain silent. Tr. at 695.
2
“To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the time the alleged misconduct
occur—request an admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is desired, move for a mistrial.” Ryan v.
State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014).
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defendant fails to properly preserve his claim, he must establish both that the
grounds for prosecutorial misconduct are present and that the prosecutorial
misconduct constituted fundamental error. Id.
[17] “Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where
the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so
prejudicial to the defendant's rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’” Id. at
668 (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). Indeed, to
establish fundamental error, the defendant must show that, under the
circumstances, the trial judge erred in not sua sponte raising the issue because
the alleged errors constituted clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary
principles of due process and presented an undeniable and substantial potential
for harm. Id. “An alleged Doyle violation is of constitutional magnitude and
may be reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine.” Sobolewski, 889
N.E.2d at 857.
[18] First, our review of some of the closing argument reveals that, for the most part,
the prosecutor was referring not to Anderson’s post-Miranda silence but to his
pre-arrest failure to mention his version of events regarding the three attackers
to the multiple witnesses, firemen, and law enforcement personnel whom he
encountered shortly after he and Brooks were allegedly attacked, but before he
was arrested. Therefore, Doyle was not implicated, as a prosecutor’s comment
on a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is not prohibited. Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S.231, 240 (1980) (impeachment by use of pre-arrest silence
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
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[19] As far as the challenged cross-examination questions and the remainder of the
closing argument, we conclude that even assuming that the prosecutor’s
comments are deemed a Doyle violation, any such violation did not amount to
fundamental error. To determine whether a Doyle violation denied a defendant
a fair trial, we must examine five factors: (1) the use to which the prosecution
puts the post-Miranda silence; (2) who elected to pursue the line of questioning;
(3) the quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt; (4) the intensity and
frequency of the reference; and (5) the availability to the trial court judge of an
opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or to give curative instructions.
Barton, 936 N.E.2d at 852-53.
[20] Regarding the first two factors, the State elected to briefly refer to Anderson’s
post-Miranda silence to impeach his novel claim at trial that he and Brooks were
attacked by three men and that those men were responsible for the murder. As
to the quantum of other evidence indicative of Anderson’s guilt, the jury heard
extensive circumstantial evidence, as well as DNA evidence found on one of
the murder weapons, which clearly implicated Anderson in the murder. As to
the intensity and frequency of the prosecutor’s reference to Anderson’s post-
arrest silence, it was brief and did not comprise a substantial part of the State’s
case against Anderson. The State’s cross-examination of Anderson comprises
forty-four pages of the record, only two of which involve the prosecutor’s
questions regarding Anderson’s post-arrest silence. Moreover, during closing
argument, the prosecutor concentrated primarily on the ample circumstantial
evidence of Anderson’s guilt and did not emphasize his post-Miranda silence.
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Finally, regarding the trial court’s opportunity to give a curative instruction or
grant a mistrial, Anderson failed to bring any concerns to the attention of the
court, and we do not believe that Anderson has demonstrated that the trial
court should have sua sponte recognized an undeniable or substantial potential
for harm, as there was none. Under the circumstances presented, we cannot
say that the State’s minimal reference to Anderson’s post-Miranda silence made
a fair trial impossible. Consequently, we conclude that even if prosecutorial
misconduct in the form of a Doyle violation occurred, it did not amount to
fundamental error.
Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion during
sentencing.
[21] Anderson next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion during
sentencing. 3 Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial
court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion
during sentencing by: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement, (2) entering a
sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing sentence but the record
does not support the reasons, (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits
3
Although Anderson mentions this Court’s sentence revision powers pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B), he offers no 7(B) analysis or argument. Accordingly, we do not address it.
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reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,
or (4) considering reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Kimbrough v.
State, 979 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2012).
[22] The trial court here found one aggravating factor and one mitigating factor, and
imposed the advisory sentence of fifty-five years for the murder. Anderson
contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the manner in
which the murder was committed as an aggravating factor. It is well settled
that the nature and circumstances of a crime may properly be considered as an
aggravator. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492; McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116,
1120 (Ind. 2001). Nevertheless, Anderson takes issue with the trial court’s brief
reference during sentencing to him setting fire to the house after he attacked
Brooks. Anderson claims that this reference indicates that the court improperly
relied upon arson, a crime of which he was acquitted, as the reason for finding
the nature and circumstances of the crime as an aggravating factor. We
disagree.
[23] The trial court’s sentencing statement makes clear that the trial court considered
the forensic pathology testimony, which detailed the extreme violence and
torture inflicted upon Brooks by Anderson with a knife, as well as blunt force
trauma and possible strangulation, all while Brooks remained alive and
breathing. The court emphasized the suffering endured by Brooks and the fact
that Anderson knew that she was still alive and admittedly had the opportunity
to get her help, but that he chose to run and explicitly instructed others not to
call the police or summon help. The court’s reference to Anderson setting the
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fire was by no means the linchpin of its otherwise proper consideration of the
nature and circumstances of the crime as an aggravator, and thus we find no
abuse of discretion.
[24] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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