K.C., on Behalf of M.C. v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
FILED
Aug 27 2012, 9:09 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, CLERK
of the supreme court,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. court of appeals and
tax court
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
K.C. GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Brownsburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ANGELA N. SANCHEZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
K.C. ON BEHALF OF M.C., )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 32A01-1111-JV-533
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HENDRICKS CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Thomas K. Milligan, Senior Judge
The Honorable Robert J. Lowe, Senior Judge
The Honorable Jeffrey V. Boles, Judge
Cause No. 32C01-1109-JD-437
August 27, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
M.C., by next friend K. C. (Mother), pro se, challenges a delinquency order requiring
payment of certain fees. She purportedly seeks “dismissal” of all orders entered in the
delinquency proceedings, restitution, and punitive damages. We address a single
consolidated issue: whether M.C. has established her entitlement to relief. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On September 18, 2011, sixteen-year-old M.C. engaged in a physical altercation with
another young woman on a public thoroughfare. The State alleged that M.C. was a
delinquent child for committing battery causing bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor if
committed by an adult. On October 1, 2011, Mother received a letter from the Hendricks
County Probation Department advising her that her daughter’s initial hearing was scheduled
on October 7, 2011. Mother attempted to reschedule the hearing because of a work conflict
but was apparently unable to do so. Instead, M.C.’s father accompanied M.C. to the hearing
where she requested a court-appointed attorney.
The following week, Mother contacted the probation department and left a detailed
message that she did not want M.C. to have the court-appointed attorney. She also contacted
the attorney and told him that she would not be bringing her daughter to the appointment
because she did not want him to represent her child. After speaking with a probation officer
and being advised that her daughter has a right to a court-appointed attorney, Mother took
M.C. to the appointment. That same day she filed a “Minute Sheet/Order” advising the trial
court that she had been unable to attend the initial hearing for “business travel reasons,” and
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that the trial court had appointed an attorney for her daughter against Mother’s wishes.
Appellant’s App. at xv. Mother also requested that her daughter’s next scheduled hearing be
rescheduled to accommodate Mother’s business schedule.
The trial court did not reschedule the hearing, and on October 17, 2011, M.C.,
represented by appointed counsel and accompanied by Mother, admitted to having committed
an act that would be the lesser charge of disorderly conduct, a class B misdemeanor, if
committed by an adult. During the hearing, M.C. testified that she had not used illegal drugs
since eighth grade and that she would not test positive for any illegal drugs if tested that day.
The trial court adjudicated M.C. to be a delinquent child and imposed six months of informal
probation. The terms of probation included paying a $165 docket fee, a $165 probation fee, a
$140 attorney fee, and a $100 administrative fee. In addition, M.C. was ordered to complete
thirty hours of community restitution, write an apology to the victim in the case, and remain a
student in good standing at her high school.
Despite M.C.’s testimony, later that day, she tested positive for marijuana. On
October 25, 2011, the probation department filed a Petition to Modify Disposition, wherein it
stated that M.C. had violated the terms of her supervision when she tested positive for
marijuana on a urine drug test after testifying in open court that the last time she had used any
illegal substances was three years previously when she was in the eighth grade. Mother hired
private counsel for M.C.
At the October 31, 2011, initial hearing on the petition to modify, M.C.’s counsel
admitted that M.C. had lied to the trial court and tested positive for marijuana. The trial court
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ordered M.C. to be detained and evaluated at the Hamilton County Juvenile Services Center
for eight days until the November 7, 2011, hearing on the petition. At the hearing, M.C.
admitted that she had lied under oath at the October 25 hearing and that she had tested
positive for marijuana. The trial court released M.C. to Mother’s custody, returned her to the
terms and conditions of her probation, ordered her to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation
and follow all recommendations, and to pay $1,120 for the cost of her eight-day detention.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
In a twenty-nine page appellate brief, with general references to the federal and state
constitutions, Mother argues that 1) M.C. did not have a right to a court-appointed attorney
against Mother’s wishes; 2) the trial court should not have sent M.C. to the detention facility;
3) the trial court erred in failing to consider whether justice was served by ordering Mother to
pay court and detention facility fees; 4) justice cannot be served by inflicting undue
hardships on an innocent parent for the delinquent acts of a minor child; and 5) the statute
authorizing the trial court to order parents to pay for the cost of services provided to a child
unduly punishes innocent parents. Mother, as next friend of M.C., seeks dismissal of M.C.’s
case, reimbursement of the fees already paid, and $50,000 in punitive damages.
As a pro se appellant, Mother is held to the same established rules of procedure that
trained legal counsel are bound to follow. See Foster v. Adoption of Infant Male Federspiel,
560 N.E.2d 691, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Also, the fact that Mother is proceeding pro se
does not excuse her from complying with the appellate rules. See id. Indiana Appellate Rule
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46(A)(8) provides that the argument section of the appellant’s brief must contain the
contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each
contention must be supported by citations to authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts
of the Record of Appeal relied on. Id. In addition, the argument for each issue must include
the applicable standard of review. Id.Here, Mother has failed to set forth any applicable standard of review or cite any legal
authority other than general federal and state constitutional provisions in support of her
issues. She has also failed to make any cogent legal argument. Mother has therefore waived
appellate review of these issues. See York v. Fredrick, 947 N.E.2d 969, 979 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011), trans. denied, (stating that a party waives an issue where the party fails to develop
cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record).
Waiver notwithstanding, we note that the juvenile court system is founded on the
notion of parens patriae, which allows the court the power to step into the shoes of the
parents. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004). The parens patriae doctrine gives
juvenile courts the power to further the best interests of the child, which implies a broad
discretion unknown in the adult criminal court system. Id. at 636.
The policy of this State and the purpose of our juvenile code are to ensure that
children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, protection,
treatment, and rehabilitation. Id. The juvenile code must be liberally construed to that end.
Id. Under the juvenile code, the juvenile court acts not only as the adjudicator of legal
responsibility but also as the administrator of probation, detention, and many child and family
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social service programs. Id. In essence, the code affords juvenile courts a degree of
discretion and flexibility, unparalleled in the criminal code, to address the needs of children
and to act in their best interests. Id. The juvenile code has specific provisions that set forth a
juvenile’s right to counsel and a parent’s responsibility to pay for court-ordered services. See
Ind. Code §§ 31-32-2-2 and 31-40-1-3.
Here, Mother does not argue that the trial court misapplied provisions of the juvenile
code. Rather, her arguments are challenges to the statutes themselves. For example, Mother
argues that a child should not have the right to court-appointed counsel without the
permission of the child’s custodial parent and that drug testing or questioning from a judge
should only be done with the permission of and through the parent who is financially and
legally responsible. Appellant’s Br. at 12. She also argues that a parent should be allowed
the opportunity to give consent to drug testing of the child for which the parent is legally and
financially responsible until the age of 18, and that no parent should be responsible for
detention fees unless that parent has done something to willfully contribute to the
delinquency of the child or unless the parent has given his or her consent to the detention.
Appellant’s Br. at 15, 16-17. Mother also believes that asking the parent to pay for the
delinquent acts of the child is similar to asking the parent to pay for any other relative that
commits a crime. Appellant’s Br. at 17. Mother concludes that she “has been forced to open
checkbook with child and court having total access and control of money earned by an
innocent, hard-working, law-abiding citizen who happens to be a parent.” Appellant’s Br. at
28. Mother’s challenges to the juvenile code, however, are best made to the legislature. See
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Bunker v. National Gypsum Company, 441 N.E.2d 8, 14 (Ind. 1982).
Because Mother has waived issues and made improper arguments, we affirm the
trial court in all respects.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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