Warren Parks v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before FILED
any court except for the purpose of Aug 13 2012, 8:56 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
WARREN PARKS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
BRIAN REITZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
WARREN PARKS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 81A01-1201-CR-19
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE UNION CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Matthew R. Cox, Judge
Cause No. 81C01-0608-FD-210
August 13, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
Appellant-Defendant Warren Parks appeals following the issuance of an order by the
trial court holding him in contempt of court. On appeal, Parks contends that (1) his
underlying theft convictions violate constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy; (2)
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss, which was based on the
State’s alleged failure to bring him to trial within one year as is required by Indiana Rule of
Criminal Procedure 4(C); and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in
contempt of court. On cross-appeal, the State argues that the first two issues raised by Parks
in the instant appeal should be dismissed because Parks is not entitled to a second direct
appeal of those issues. Alternatively, the State argues that Parks’s underlying theft
convictions do not violate prohibitions against double jeopardy and that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Parks’s motion to dismiss or in holding Parks in contempt of
court. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Our opinion in Parks’s first direct appeal instructs us as to the underlying facts leading
to this successive direct appeal:
In August 2006, the State charged Parks with four counts of theft as class D
felonies under cause number 81C01–0608–FD–210 (“Cause No. 210”). That
same month, the State charged Parks with four counts of theft as class D
felonies under cause number 81C01–0609–FD–253 (“Cause No. 253”). Parks
entered a plea agreement that addressed both Cause No. 210 and Cause No.
253. Specifically, Parks pled guilty to two counts of theft as class D felonies
under Cause No. 210 and two counts of theft as class D felonies under Cause
No. 253. The plea agreement stated that “[o]n each Count in each cause
number [Parks] shall be sentenced to a period of incarceration of Three (3)
years, with One (1) year suspended and placed on probation for the suspended
portion of the sentence, with terms and conditions of probation to be
determined by the Court.” Appellant’s Appendix at 11. The trial court
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accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Parks accordingly.
Parks v. State, No. 81A04-0810-PC-600 (Ind. Ct. App. January 14, 2009). In addition, Parks
was ordered to pay $956.63 in restitution.
On October 1, 2008, Parks filed a consolidated appeal in which he claimed that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to reject his plea agreement, his convictions violated
prohibitions against double jeopardy, and the imposed probation transfer fee violated the
Equal Protection Clause. We issued a memorandum decision on January 14, 2009, affirming
the trial court.
Parks filed a second notice of appeal on January 4, 2012. The trial court dismissed the
January 4, 2012 notice of appeal. On January 20, 2012, Parks filed an answer to the trial
court’s ordering dismissing the January 4, 2012 notice of appeal. That same day, the trial
court issued an order finding Parks “in direct contempt of court for the contents of the
pleading” and sentenced him to six months in the Union County Jail. Appellant’s App. p. 16.
Parks filed a third notice of appeal on February 21, 2012, in which he levied a challenge to
the trial court’s contempt finding. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Parks contends that his underlying theft convictions violate prohibitions against
double jeopardy, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss, and the
trial court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt of court. Again, on cross-appeal,
the State argues that the first two issues raised by Parks in the instant appeal because Parks is
not entitled to a second direct appeal of those issues. Alternatively, the State argues that
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Parks’s convictions do not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy and that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Parks’s motion to dismiss or in holding him in
contempt of court.
I. Whether Parks’s Underlying Theft Convictions Violate the
Prohibitions Against Double Jeopardy
Parks claims that his underlying theft convictions violate the prohibitions against
double jeopardy. Parks, however, unsuccessfully raised this claim in his prior direct appeal.
As a general rule, when this Court decides an issue on direct appeal, the doctrine of res
judicata applies, thereby precluding its review in successive appeals or post-conviction
proceedings. See Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000). The doctrine of res
judicata prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute. See
id. Thus, because Parks unsuccessfully raised his double jeopardy claim in his prior direct
appeal, we conclude that the claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See id. Parks,
therefore, cannot raise this issue in his instant appeal and is not entitled to relief on this
ground.
II. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in
Denying Parks’s Motion to Dismiss
Parks also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
dismiss because the State failed to bring him to trial within one year as required by Indiana
Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(C). We note, however, that although this issue was arguably
available during his first direct appeal, Parks now raises this issue for the first time. Where
an issue was available but not presented on direct appeal, any claims relating to said issue is
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forfeited on successive appeals and post-conviction review. See id. Furthermore, even if
Parks could raise this issue in the instant successive direct appeal, Parks has waived this issue
by virtue of pleading guilty. See Hornyak v. State, 548 N.E.2d 841, 841-42 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990) (providing that once a defendant pleads guilty, he waives his right to a trial and,
accordingly, any claim relating to the timeliness of said trial). As such, Parks is not entitled
to any relief on this ground.
III. Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Holding Parks in Contempt
Finally, Parks claims that the trial court abused its discretion in holding him in
contempt of the court.
“Whether a person is in contempt of a court order is a matter left to the trial
court’s discretion.” Evans v. Evans, 766 N.E.2d 1240, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (citing Meyer v. Wolvos, 707 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999),
trans. denied.) We will reverse the trial court’s finding of contempt only
where an abuse of discretion has been shown, which occurs only when the trial
court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it. Id. When we review a contempt order, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. MacIntosh v. MacIntosh,
749 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 785 N.E.2d 1194, 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
The record demonstrates that the trial court found Parks in “direct contempt of court
for the contents of” his “Answer To [the trial court’s] Order Dismissing [Parks’s second]
Notice of Appeal.” Appellant’s App. p. 16. Parks, however, has failed to provide this court
with copies of any of the documents relating to the trial court’s decision to find Parks in
contempt of court, including his second notice of appeal, the trial court’s order dismissing
said notice of appeal, and his answer to the trial court’s order. In light of Parks’s failure to
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provide this court with these documents, we are unable to determine why Parks was held in
contempt, and accordingly cannot determine whether the trial court’s decision was against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. As such, we conclude that Parks
is not entitled to relief on this ground.1
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ROBB, C.J. and BAKER, J., concur.
1
Furthermore, to the extent that Parks claims that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing fines
and restitution without first holding a hearing to determine whether Parks had the ability to pay said fines and
restitution, we note that Parks has presented no evidence demonstrating that the trial court failed to inquire into
Parks’s ability to pay the imposed fines and restitution. In addition, the record demonstrates that Parks,
although indigent, was able to pay some toward the imposed fines and restitution as he made approximately
nine payments toward said fines and restitution between April 29, 2009, and July 28, 2010.
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