Dorothy Miller v. City of Mishawaka ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 08 2012, 9:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
of the supreme court,
estoppel, or the law of the case. court of appeals and
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
MARTIN A. MCCLOSKEY BROOKS J. GRAINGER
Elkhart, Indiana South Bend, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DOROTHY MILLER, et al, )
)
Appellants-Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) No. 71A03-1201-PL-3
)
CITY OF MISHAWAKA, et al, )
)
Appellees-Defendants. )
APPEAL FROM THE SAINT JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Michael P. Scopelitis, Judge
Cause No. 71D07-1009-PL-180
August 8, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FRIEDLANDER, Judge
Dorothy Miller d/b/a AAA Mattress and Furniture (AAA) appeals the denial of its
Complaint for Declaratory Relief and the judgment entered in favor of the City of
Mishawaka, Kenneth Prince, in his capacity as City Planner, and Peg Strantz, in her capacity
as Associate City Planner, (collectively, the City) regarding the enforcement of a City
ordinance regulating signs. AAA presents two issues for our review:
1. Is the City’s sign ordinance unconstitutionally vague?
2. Did the imposition of fines for violations of the City’s sign ordinance
violate AAA’s due process rights?
On cross-appeal, the City requests that we find it is entitled to appellate attorney’s fees and
remand for a determination concerning the amount.
We affirm.
On August 29, 2009, Miller started AAA, which is a retail furniture store that
specializes in bedroom and dining room furniture and mattresses, in Mishawaka, Indiana.
After opening the business, Miller received a letter from the City, signed by Strantz in her
capacity as Associate City Planner, regarding the City’s ordinances regulating signs.1 This
letter addressed the use of banners and signs, and based upon the letter, AAA removed a
banner that was hanging on its premises apparently believing such to be in violation of the
ordinances.
On September 22, 2009, the City cited AAA for violating City Ordinance Section 129-
72 by “displaying a temporary mobile sign on trailer” and levied a twenty-five dollar fine.
The trailer is “4 by 8, it as [sic] one axel [sic] which has two wheels. It has ¾ inch plywood
on the base bolted onto the frame. It has 2 by 4 side posts bolted onto the frame with 4 by 8
1
The property on which AAA is located is zoned C-1 general commercial.
sheets of plywood bolted onto the sides of the 2 by 4’s [sic].” Transcript at 54. The plywood
sides are painted yellow and contain the following verbiage:
WHY PAY MORE?
MATTRESS & FURNITURE[2]
BLOWOUT
BEST PRICES
Exhibit H (footnote supplied). AAA uses the trailer to haul merchandise from its warehouse
to the retail store and also for some deliveries to customers. When used for hauling purposes
the trailer is hitched to Miller’s mini-van. At times, however, the trailer is parked in the
parking lot in front of AAA’s business premises. AAA challenged the citation, asserting that
the trailer was not a sign, but a registered vehicle that was vital to its business.
Nine months later, on June 23, 2010, AAA received a second citation from the City
for “displaying a temporary mobile sign on property” along with a fine for fifty dollars.
Exhibit G. AAA received eight additional citations between July 21, 2010 and September 10,
2010, two of which carried fines of one hundred dollars and the remaining six carried fines of
$250 each. Each citation identified the violation as being placement of a temporary mobile
sign on the property.
On September 15, 2010, AAA filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking to
prevent the City from enforcing the ten citations issued against AAA for violations of the
City’s sign ordinances. The City filed a counter-claim seeking enforcement of the numerous
2
“& FURNITURE” is in a much smaller font below the word “MATTRESS.” Exhibit H.
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citations, additional fines for alleged violations that were not cited, and reasonable attorney’s
fees. AAA’s request to have this action removed to federal court was denied. A bench trial
was held on November 14, 2011. On December 5, 2011, the trial court entered an order
denying AAA the relief it sought and granting judgment in favor of the City for several of the
sign ordinance violations as well as for violations that were not cited. The trial court further
awarded attorney’s fees to the City. AAA now appeals.
1.
AAA argues that the City’s sign ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. When
reviewing a constitutional challenge to a municipal ordinance, we treat the ordinance as if it
stands on the same footing as an act of the legislature. Lex, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Town of
Paragon, 808 N.E.2d 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Thus, rules relating to
statutory construction apply equally to ordinances. Lutz v. City Of Indianapolis, 820 N.E.2d
766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). A municipal ordinance is therefore presumed to be constitutional,
and we place the burden upon the party challenging the ordinance to show
unconstitutionality. Id. An ordinance is unconstitutionally vague only if individuals of
ordinary intelligence cannot adequately comprehend the ordinance so as to inform them of
the prohibited conduct. Vaughn v. State, 782 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.
An ordinance need not list with exactitude each item of prohibited conduct; rather, an
ordinance need only inform an individual of the generally prohibited conduct. Lutz v. City Of
Indianapolis, 820 N.E.2d 766.
The first step in interpreting an ordinance is to determine if the municipality has
spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. See Siwinski v. Town of Ogden
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Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. 2011). If an ordinance is clear and unambiguous on its face, no
room exists for judicial construction. Id. If, however, an ordinance contains ambiguity that
allows for more than one interpretation, it opens itself up to judicial construction to effect the
legislative intent. Id. (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. 1993)).
City Ordinance Section 129-72 provides, in part, that regardless of the zoning district,
it is unlawful to erect or maintain a temporary sign, except as permitted by a proper
temporary sign permit under City Ordinance Section 129-75. City Ordinance Section 129-3
defines a sign as:
an announcement, identification, image, description display, illustration or
device, illuminated or nonilluminated, which advertises products or services,
on- or off-premises, which is located on private property and is visible from
any public place or is located on private property and exposed to the public
and which directs attention to a product, place, activity, person, institution,
business or solicitations, whether permanently or temporarily installed.
Exhibit A. A temporary sign is defined as:
any sign, portable sign, pennant, valance, inflatable display or advertising
display constructed of cloth, canvas, light fabric, cardboard, wallboard, plastic,
metal or other light materials, with or without structural frames. Temporary
signs may be displayed for no more than 15 days only as regulated by the
provisions of this chapter. . . .
Id. A “mobile sign” is defined as “a temporary, freestanding sign, mobile sign, or trailer sign
which is not set in a permanent base or foundation that will withstand wind pressure or wind
forces.” Id. The definition of a “trailer sign” directs one to the definition of a temporary
sign. Id. City Ordinance Section 129-4 vests administration of the sign ordinance with the
City Planner.
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AAA acknowledges that the ordinance defines what constitutes a “temporary” sign
and a “mobile” sign, but argues that there is no corresponding definition for what constitutes
a “temporary mobile” sign for which AAA was cited. This argument is simply specious.
As set forth above, the City’s sign ordinance defines what the City considers to be a
temporary sign and what constitutes a mobile sign and we find that the manner in which the
City did so informs individuals of ordinary intelligence as to what type of signage is
permitted and what is prohibited. Here, the sign at issue fits squarely within the definitions
of a temporary sign and a mobile sign. The two need not be mutually exclusive.
We agree with AAA that when the trailer is used to move merchandise, it functions as
a trailer. AAA, however, overlooks the fact that when the trailer is parked in the parking lot
adjacent to AAA’s premises, is exposed to the public, and conspicuously directs attention to
AAA and its products, it functions as a sign. That sign is clearly mobile (being on wheels)
and temporary by virtue of the fact that it is portable/mobile. Persons of ordinary intelligence
would know that the trailer with its graphics constitutes a sign that is mobile and thus, by
definition, temporary, when it is positioned in such a manner that it functions as a sign. The
ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague to the extent it defines what types of signs are
prohibited within the zoning district where AAA operates.
AAA also argues that the City’s sign ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because
the determination of what constitutes a sign is vested in the subjective opinion of the City
Planner. We disagree. The City Planner or his designee is charged with administering the
City’s sign ordinance. As we concluded above, the ordinance adequately defines what
constitutes various types of signs that are permitted and prohibited within a certain zoning
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district. The City Planner simply has to enforce the ordinance according to its clear and
unambiguous terms.
AAA’s argument that the trailer is licensed and insured and used to transport
merchandise ignores the fact that the trailer can serve a second function as a mobile,
temporary sign when parked in front of AAA’s premises. AAA has failed to demonstrate
that the City’s sign ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The trial court did not err in
denying AAA’s complaint for declaratory relief and in entering a judgment in favor of the
City.
2.
AAA argues that the fines imposed for its violations of the City’s sign ordinance
violated its due process rights in that the fines were arbitrarily imposed. Specifically, AAA
asserts that there are no criteria or ascertainable standards for determining the progressive
and arbitrary amounts of the imposed fines.
Here, the City Planner testified that the goal of imposing a fine is to gain compliance
with an ordinance3 and that the “established policy” of the City is to impose a fine at the
lowest level and then progressively increase the fine, keeping in mind the ultimate goal.
Transcript at 109. The lowest fine to be imposed is $25 and the fine can be increased up to
$250 without court involvement.4 Here, the first citation against AAA carried with it a $25
fine. Six months later, a second citation was issued and a fine of $50 was levied. The third
3
The City Planner explained that the purpose of the fines is not to general a profit for the City.
4
Ind. Code Ann. § 36-1-3-8(a)(10)(B)(i and ii) (West, Westlaw current through legislation effective May 31,
2012) provides that a governmental unit does not have the power to assess a fine for an ordinance violation of
7
and fourth citations each imposed fines of $100. The last six citations, which were issued
over the course of less than six weeks with some being on consecutive days, levied fines of
$250 each against AAA for violation of the City’s sign ordinance. Notwithstanding the
citations, AAA repeatedly parked the trailer in its parking lot such that it clearly functioned
as a sign.
AAA does not claim that it was unaware that the citations were directed to the trailer
when it functioned as a sign. AAA has at all times relied on its argument that the trailer is a
mode of transportation used for moving merchandise, completely ignoring the fact that the
trailer functions separately as a sign when parked in front of AAA’s premises.
Because AAA failed to take action to avoid further violations of the City’s sign
ordinance, the City issued additional citations and imposed progressively increasing fines in
its attempt to gain AAA’s compliance. AAA has failed to establish that the amount of the
fines and the progressive nature of the fines are arbitrary and unrelated to their purpose.
3.
The City requests that it be awarded appellate attorney fees. Pursuant to Ind. Code
Ann. § 36-1-4-17(c) (West, Westlaw current through legislation effective May 31, 2012), a
more than $2500 for the first violation of the ordinance or more than $7000 for a second or subsequent
violation of the ordinance.
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governmental unit “shall determine the costs of collecting money . . . .” Such costs include
reasonable attorney’s fees. This statute permits an award reasonable attorney fees to the
City, but, contrary to the City’s claim, it does not mandate such.
In addressing the City’s request, we note that Indiana adheres to the American Rule
with respect to the payment of attorney fees, which requires each party to pay his or her own
attorney fees absent an agreement between the parties, statutory authority, or rule to the
contrary. Breining v. Harkness, 872 N.E.2d 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Our
appellate rules provide that we “may assess damages if an appeal, petition, or motion, or
response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in the Court’s discretion and may
include attorneys’ fees. The Court shall remand the case for execution.” Ind. Appellate Rule
66(E).
An award of appellate attorney fees “is discretionary and may be ordered when
an appeal is replete with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment,
vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Trost-Steffen v. Steffen, 772 N.E.2d 500,
514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. “However, we must use extreme
restraint when exercising our discretionary power to award damages on appeal
because of the potential chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to
appeal.” Id.Gertz v. Estes, 922 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
We cannot say that AAA’s appeal was replete with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity,
harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay. We therefore deny the City’s request for
appellate attorney’s fees.
Judgment affirmed.
MAY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
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