Akheem J. Purnell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 18 2016, 8:04 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Bellin Gregory F. Zoeller
Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Akheem J. Purnell, February 18, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A03-1507-CR-1008
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stephen R.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bowers, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D02-1501-F2-1
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Akheem J. Purnell (“Purnell”) appeals, following a jury trial, his convictions
and sentence for Level 2 burglary while armed with a deadly weapon1 and
Level 3 robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.2 Purnell argues that: (1)
his two convictions violate the Indiana Constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy because they were enhanced by evidence of the same deadly
weapon; and (2) his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B). Because our Supreme Court has established that the use of a single deadly
weapon during the commission of separate offenses may be used to enhance the
level of each offense without resulting in a violation of the Indiana Double
Jeopardy Clause, we affirm his convictions. Additionally, because Purnell has
failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and his character, we affirm his sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether Purnell’s convictions violate the Indiana Constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
2. Whether Purnell’s sentence is inappropriate pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B).
1
IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1(3)(A).
2
I.C. § 35-42-5-1(2).
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Facts
[3] On January 13, 2015, around 6:00 p.m., Ashley Sanders (“Sanders”) was at her
house with Angela Coleman (“Coleman”) and Shaneka Ballard (“Ballard”).
Sanders’s two children and Coleman’s three children, who were between the
ages of three and twelve years old, were also at Sanders’s house. As the women
were sitting at the kitchen table, which had marijuana on it, they heard a knock
at the front door. Sanders went to the door and, with the door still closed,
asked who was there. A man then asked for Sanders’s boyfriend by name.
Sanders replied that her boyfriend was not there.3 After the man left, Sanders
looked out the door and saw “a bunch of guys outside.” (Tr. 50).
[4] Sanders returned to the kitchen and told Coleman and Ballard what had
happened. The three women then walked toward the front door, and a man
knocked on the door and again asked for Sanders’s boyfriend. After Sanders
told him that her boyfriend was not there, the man asked, “Where’s the weed
at?” (Tr. 51). The man then kicked in the door, entered the house, and yelled,
“Get the f**k down.” (Tr. 51). Sanders heard a “clicking noise” that sounded
like a gun, and she ran out the back door and to a neighbor’s house to call the
police.
[5] Meanwhile, eight to ten men—all armed with guns and wearing bandana
masks—also entered the house, pointed their guns, and ordered the remaining
3
Sanders’s boyfriend was in jail.
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women and children to get on the ground. One man asked, “Where’s my s**t
at[?]” and another one asked, “Where’s the stuff?” (Tr. 113). One man was
pointing a gun at Ballard when his gun “slipped” or “dropped” from his hand.
(Tr. 106). As he reached down for the gun, his bandana mask fell from his face,
and Ballard recognized him as Purnell, whom she knew by his nickname,
“Bama.” (Tr. 109). Ballard—who had known Purnell for over ten years since
elementary school—said, “Bama, are you serious?” (Tr. 111). Purnell
responded, “This has nothing to do with you. Be quiet.” (Tr. 111). As some of
the men held the women and children at gunpoint, others went to the
bedrooms, pulled out the drawers, and “ransacked” the house. (Tr. 56). After
taking Sanders’s cellphone, her house and car keys, a “collection” of athletic
shoes, some marijuana, and some money from Ballard’s backpack, the men left
the house. (Tr. 55).
[6] Approximately fifteen to thirty minutes after the crimes, Ballard contacted
Purnell by sending a private message through Facebook4 and told him that she
wanted her belongings returned. Purnell responded that Ballard “was not
supposed to be there” and gave her his cell phone number, asking her to call
him. (State’s Ex. 21). He also wrote that she should “[b]e cool” and “don’t say
s**t” because he would return her belongings. (State’s Ex. 21). Ballard then
called the cell phone number and recognized Purnell’s voice. She said,
4
Ballard was a Facebook friend of Purnell, whose Facebook user name was “Bama Purnell.” (State’s Ex.
21).
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“Bama[,]” and he “instantly went into that [he] would get [her] stuff back” and
that “he knew exactly who had it.” (Tr. 143). Purnell told her that he “was
sorry” and would return her things. (Tr. 143).
[7] The following day, Ballard informed the police of her conversation with
Purnell, and she identified him on a photo array. When the police met with
Purnell, they got his cell phone, called the phone number that Ballard had
provided from the Facebook conversation, and Purnell’s phone rang.
[8] Thereafter, the State charged Purnell with Level 2 burglary while armed with a
deadly weapon and Level 3 robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. The
trial court held a two-day jury trial on June 2-3, 2015. During the trial, all three
women testified, and Ballard identified Purnell as one of the perpetrators and
testified that he had a gun during the crimes. The State also introduced
evidence of Ballard’s Facebook conversation with Purnell.
[9] Purnell’s defense was that Ballard had misidentified him. During his closing
argument, his counsel challenged the credibility of Ballard and the other victims
and suggested that they had provided inconsistent testimony regarding details
of the crimes. Purnell also tried to discount Ballard’s testimony regarding
contacting him on Facebook by suggesting that it might not have been his
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Facebook page and that someone could have made up a fake Facebook page.5
The jury found Purnell guilty as charged.
[10] Subsequently, on July 6, 2015, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. As part
of his statement, Purnell asserted that he felt that he had been “wrongfully
accused of this crime by the jury.” (Tr. 298). His attorney argued that the trial
court should not enter judgment of conviction on Purnell’s robbery offense,
asserting that there was a “double jeopardy issue” and suggesting that the same
evidence had been used to establish the essential elements of both offenses.6
(Tr. 297). The prosecutor responded that the robbery conviction did not need
to be merged or dismissed because the evidence showed that the burglary had
been completed before the robbery occurred.
[11] Prior to imposing Purnell’s sentence, the trial court asked him who else had
been involved in the crimes, and he responded that had “no idea” who they
were. (Tr. 303).7 When sentencing Purnell, the trial court stated:
Well Mr. Purnell, I’ve heard all the evidence in this case along
with the jury and the evidence was overwhelming. There was no
question that you were present and part of this enterprise.
5
Purnell’s counsel compared the situation to “Monte Teo[,] . . . the Notre Dame football player” that “[f]ell
for a fake Facebook account.” (Tr. 267).
6
Purnell’s double jeopardy argument did not focus on the enhancement of the crimes by the use of a deadly
weapon.
7
Apparently, at the time of sentencing, the other perpetrators of the crimes had not been identified.
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The text messages . . . the communications that were had after
the event, I - they weren’t actually text messages, confirm your
involvement here. And the only - the only thing that I can
conclude is that when you tell me you don’t know who else was
involved and you say you weren’t involved is that you were less
than candid with the jury and you’re being less than - less than
honest with me. And that expression of remorse that was
conveyed earlier is hollow and doesn’t really mean anything.
I look at the aggravating circumstances here, I see a young man
who has a juvenile record that includes receiving stolen property
and theft, criminal mischief, battery, and possession - I believe it
was possession of marijuana, but the main thing is that there are
at least five adjudications, which were four offenses that would
have been crimes if committed by an adult. I’m not considering
in any way your multiple truancy or runaway status convictions
as aggravating circumstances.
I also note as I review the presentence investigation that your
performance while on Probation or subject to the authority of the
juvenile court was far from what was expected from you. You
were threatening to staff members, you were violating the terms
of your juvenile sentence and that too is an aggravating
circumstance.
The mitigating circumstance here, at age twenty-one, is that
you’re still a young man, although you’re on the, the edge of the
age range that I would consider to be a mitigating circumstance.
I still think that’s a mitigating circumstance here.
*****
And in spite of the fact that from the trial testimony you
expressed some remorse to the victim here at that point because
you know, she wasn’t supposed to be there. She wasn’t the target
of all this. In fact, the evidence suggest that none of the young
women who were present were the target of this crime. But that
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doesn’t mean that there wasn’t intent to commit a burglary, that
doesn’t mean that there wasn’t a robbery here, that doesn’t mean
that you didn’t actively participate in these crimes.
(Tr. 303-05). The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the sole mitigating factor of Purnell’s young age. The trial court
imposed a twenty-five (25) year sentence, with twenty (20) years executed and
five (5) years suspended to probation, for his Level 2 felony conviction and
imposed a ten (10) year sentence for his Level 3 felony conviction. The trial
court ordered these sentences to be served concurrently. Purnell now appeals.
Decision
[12] Purnell argues that: (1) his two convictions violate the Indiana Constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy because they were both enhanced by
evidence of the same deadly weapon; and (2) his sentence is inappropriate. We
will review each argument in turn.
1. Double Jeopardy
[13] Turning first to Purnell’s double jeopardy argument, we note the Indiana
Double Jeopardy Clause provides, in relevant part, that “No person shall be put
in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” IND. CONST. art. I, § 14. “Indiana’s
Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to prevent the State from being able to
proceed against a person twice for the same criminal transgression.” Richardson
v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999). Consequently, two or more offenses are
the “same offense” and violate the state double jeopardy clause if, “with respect
to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence
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used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish
the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Id.
[14] Purnell contends that his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause under
the actual evidence test. The Double Jeopardy Clause is violated under the
actual evidence test if there is “a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts
used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may
also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged
offense.” Id. at 53. “[A] ‘reasonable possibility’ that the jury used the same
facts to reach two convictions requires substantially more than a logical
possibility.” Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008). “Rather,
‘reasonable possibility’ turns on a practical assessment of whether the jury may
have latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions.” Id. See also
Griffin v. State, 717 N.E.2d 73, 89 (Ind. 1999) (“To establish that two offenses
are the same offense under the actual evidence test, the possibility must be
reasonable, not speculative or remote.”), cert. denied. Our supreme court
explained that “under the Richardson actual evidence test, the Indiana Double
Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the
essential elements of one offense also establish only one or even several, but not
all, of the essential elements of a second offense.” Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d
1141, 1142 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind.
2002)).
[15] Purnell does not challenge the evidence establishing the underlying elements of
burglary and robbery. Instead, his actual evidence argument lies in his
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contention that “there is a reasonable possibility that the jury used the same
evidence to establish the ‘while armed with a deadly weapon’ enhancement in
both Count I and Count II.” (Purnell’s Br. 8-9). He asserts that because
“[t]here was no separate evidence presented to show that [he] was armed with a
deadly weapon at separate points in time to substantiate an enhancement on
both counts[,]” his robbery conviction should be reduced to a Level 5 felony.
(Purnell’s Br. 6). In support of his argument that his convictions cannot be
enhanced by the use of the same deadly weapon, he relies on Smith v. State, 872
N.E.2d 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, and attempts to analogize the
prohibition of enhancing multiple convictions based on the same bodily injury
to the enhancement of convictions by the same deadly weapon.
[16] The State, on the other hand, asserts that “[t]he mere fact that the State used the
same gun as evidence of the deadly weapon for [Purnell’s] burglary and robbery
convictions does not establish a double jeopardy violation under the actual
evidence test.” (State’s Br. 11) (citing Miller v. State, 790 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind.
2003); Leggs v. State, 966 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Bunch v. State,
937 N.E.2d 839, 847-48, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; Rawson v. State,
865 N.E.2d 1049, 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).
[17] Purnell’s argument falls into “a series of rules of statutory construction and
common law that supplements the constitutional protections afforded by the
Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause.” Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 439 (citing Pierce v.
State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002); Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 834). “Among
these is the rule that precludes a ‘[c]onviction and punishment for an
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enhancement of a crime where the enhancement is imposed for the very same
behavior or harm as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted
and punished.’” Sistrunk v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1051, 1053-54 (Ind. 2015) (quoting
Guyton, 771 N.E.2d at 1143 (quoting Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 56 (Sullivan, J.,
concurring))) (emphasis added by Sistrunk Court).
[18] We agree with the State that there is no double jeopardy violation. While the
State cannot use evidence of the same bodily injury to enhance multiple
offenses, see Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 439 (citing Pierce, 761 N.E.2d at 830), our
state double jeopardy law does not prohibit multiple enhancements based on a
defendant’s use of the same weapon in the commission of multiple offenses. See
id. See also Sistrunk, 36 N.E.3d at 1054 (“committing two or more separate
offenses while armed with a deadly weapon . . . is not within the category of
rules precluding enhancement of each offense based on ‘the very same
behavior.’”); Berg v. State, No. 32A01-1504-CR-127, 2015 WL 6681087, at *4
(Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2015) (clarifying that while the State is prohibited from
using the same bodily injury to enhance multiple offenses, it is not prohibited
from enhancing multiple offenses by the defendant’s use of the same weapon
when committing multiple offenses).
[19] “The repeated use of a weapon to commit multiple separate crimes is not ‘the
very same behavior’ precluding its use to separately enhance the resulting
convictions.” Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 439. “Rather, the use of a ‘single deadly
weapon during the commission of separate offenses may enhance the level of
each offense.’” Id. (quoting Gates v. State, 759 N.E.2d 631, 633 n. 2 (Ind.
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2001)). Indeed, our supreme court recently explained that the holding
expressed in Miller—that “the use of a single deadly weapon during the
commission of separate offenses may enhance the level of each offense”—is a
“rule [that] predates Richardson by several years and thus cannot be said to be
included in the ‘very same behavior’ category of examples precluding
enhancements.” Sistrunk, 36 N.E.3d at 1054 (citing multiple cases). The
Sistrunk Court also noted that it had made the same observation post-
Richardson. Id. (citing Gates, 759 N.E.2d at 633 n.2; Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 439).
The Sistrunk Court then clarified:
In sum, our jurisprudence teaches that committing two or more
separate offenses each while armed with a deadly weapon—even
the same weapon—is not within the category of rules precluding
the enhancement of each offense based on “the very same
behavior.” Stated somewhat differently, our recognition in
Richardson of the common law rule establishing that
enhancements cannot be imposed for the very same behavior
could not have included use of a single deadly weapon during the
commission of separate offenses. And this is so because no such
common law rule existed. Instead the opposite was true.
Id.
[20] Here, there is no dispute that Purnell’s burglary and robbery were separate
offenses. The State introduced evidence that Purnell was armed with a gun
when he and his cohorts kicked in the door of and entered Sanders’s house and
that he had the same gun when he assisted in the commission of the robbery
offense. Because our Supreme Court has established that the use of a single
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deadly weapon during the commission of separate offenses may be used to
enhance the level of each offense and does not result in a violation of the
Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause, we affirm Purnell’s convictions. See, e.g.,
Sistrunk, 36 N.E.3d at 1054 (reviewing double jeopardy cases and holding that
the defendant’s commission of robbery and criminal confinement while armed
with the same gun was not within the category of double jeopardy rules
precluding the enhancement of each offense based on the very same behavior);
Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 439 (holding that there was no double jeopardy violation
where the defendant’s convictions for criminal confinement, robbery, and
criminal deviate conduct were enhanced by use of the same knife); Gates, 759
N.E.2d at 633 n.2 (“It is well established in Indiana that the use of a single
deadly weapon during the commission of separate offenses may enhance the
level of each offense.”). See also Leggs, 966 N.E.2d at 209 (holding that the
defendant “was not subjected to double jeopardy when he was convicted of
multiple crimes enhanced by the use of a knife”); Bunch, 937 N.E.2d at 848
(holding that the use of the sawed-off shotgun to enhance the defendant’s
robbery and confinement convictions did not constitute double jeopardy);
Rodriguez v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that
the defendant’s use of a shotgun to commit multiple offenses did not preclude
the separate enhancement of the offenses and did not violate double jeopardy
principles), trans. denied.
2. Sentencing
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[21] Purnell contends that his aggregate sentence of twenty-five years, with twenty
years executed and five years suspended to probation, for his Level 2 felony
conviction and his Level 3 felony conviction is inappropriate. Purnell, who was
twenty-one years old at the time of his offenses and had a history of juvenile
offenses, suggests that his sentence was inappropriate because this was his first
adult felony conviction.
[22] We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). The
defendant has the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate.
Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The principal role of a
Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some
guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the
sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).
[23] Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on “the culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad
of other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. Additionally,
“[u]nder Indiana law, several tools are available to the trial court to use in
fashioning an appropriate sentence for a convicted offender.” Sharp v. State, 970
N.E.2d 647, 650 (Ind. 2012). These “penal tools”—which include suspension
of all or a portion of the sentence, probation, executed time in a Department of
Correction facility, and concurrent rather than consecutive sentences—“form
an integral part of the actual aggregate penalty faced by a defendant and are
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thus properly considered as part of the sentence subject to appellate review and
revision.” Id. (citing Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010)).
[24] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that
the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081.
Here, the jury found Purnell guilty of Level 2 felony burglary and Level 3
felony robbery. The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is between ten (10)
and thirty (30) years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half (17
½) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is
between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with an advisory sentence of nine (9)
years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5. At sentencing, the trial court found that the aggravating
circumstances, including Purnell’s criminal history and prior failed attempts at
probation, outweighed the sole mitigating factor of Purnell’s young age. The
trial court imposed a twenty-five (25) year sentence with twenty (20) years
executed and five (5) years suspended to probation for his Level 2 felony
conviction and imposed a ten (10) year sentence for his Level 3 felony
conviction, and it ordered these sentences to be served concurrently. Thus, the
trial court utilized some of the available “penal tools” to fashion a sentence for
Purnell. See Sharp, 970 N.E.2d at 650.
[25] The nature of Purnell’s offenses reveals that he and a group of up to ten men—
all of whom were armed with guns and wearing masks—kicked in the door of a
house containing three women and five minor children. Purcell and his cohorts
were in search of drugs. Thereafter, they pointed their guns at the women and
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children and then took money, keys, shoes, marijuana, and a cellphone from
the house. Purnell attempts to minimize the nature of his offenses by pointing
out that he may have been found guilty under an accomplice liability theory
and suggesting that he did not personally carry any items out of the house. We
do not find merit in this argument. Indeed, an “individual who aids another
person in committing a crime is as guilty as the actual perpetrator.” Sanquenetti
v. State, 727 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind. 2000).
[26] Turning to Purnell’s character, we see from the record that Purnell had a
history of juvenile adjudications for receiving stolen property, theft, criminal
mischief, disorderly conduct, and possession of marijuana. Additionally, he
also had violations of juvenile probation. Purnell suggests that his character
should be viewed with favor because this was his first adult felony conviction.
Purnell also asserts that he “immediately expressed remorse and offered to
make right what was taken[.]” (Purnell’s Br. 13). The trial court, however,
factored in Purnell’s age and proffered remorse when sentencing him. Indeed,
the trial court considered his age to be a mitigating circumstance but
determined that it was not a particularly weighty one. Additionally, before
imposing Purnell’s sentence, the trial court noted that his expression of remorse
was “hollow.” (Tr. 303). We will not reweigh the trial court’s determinations.
[27] Purnell has not persuaded us that that his aggregate twenty-five year sentence,
with twenty years executed and five years suspended to probation, for his Level
2 felony and Level 3 felony convictions is inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm
the trial court’s sentence.
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[28] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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