Tammy Spengler v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID A. SMITH GREGORY F. ZOELLER
McIntyre & Smith Attorney General of Indiana
Bedford, Indiana
GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
May 16 2013, 9:12 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TAMMY SPENGLER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 88A01-1207-CR-318
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Larry W. Medlock, Judge
Cause No. 88C01-1106-MR-419
May 16, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
At some point prior to June 22, 2011, Tammy Spengler and her co-defendant, Timothy
Orman, killed her co-defendant’s father and uncle and left their bodies to rot in a shed on the
property where the killings took place. Approximately one-and-a-half to two weeks later,
Spengler admitted to her mother that she had killed two people. At her mother’s suggestion,
Spengler turned herself into the police, admitted to the killings, and gave police information
that led to the discovery of the victims’ decomposing bodies. Following trial, Spengler was
convicted of murder, aiding in murder, and invasion of property.
On appeal, Spengler contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
certain conversations conducted over jailhouse phone lines. Specifically, Spengler claims
that her comments made during a conversation between Spengler and her co-defendant
amounted to an involuntary statement made during a custodial interrogation and that the
admission of a recording of certain conversations between Spengler and her mother was
unfairly prejudicial. Spengler also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her
convictions and that her 120-year sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that the trial court
acted within its discretion in admitting the recordings of Spengler’s conversations with her
co-defendant and her mother, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Spengler’s convictions,
and that Spengler’s sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 22, 2011, Spengler called her mother, Tammy Thacker, and asked her mother
to pick her up at a service station in Floyds Knobs. While Thacker and Spengler were
driving back toward Thacker’s home in Palmyra, Spengler told Thacker that she had killed
2
“Tim and Bum” a few weeks ago. Tr. Vol. I, p. 142. “Tim and Bum” referred to Timothy
M. Orman and Roy Orman, her boyfriend Timothy Orman’s1 father and uncle, respectively.
Spengler told Thacker that she and her boyfriend had placed the bodies in a shed on the
property where the killings took place. At Thacker’s suggestion, Spengler agreed to notify
police about the killings and turn herself in. Thacker and Spengler stopped at a gas station in
Palmyra, from where Spengler called the police.
After Spengler told the 911 dispatcher that she had killed two people and expressed a
desire to turn herself in, Spengler was met at the gas station by multiple police officers.
Spengler told the officers that she “killed two people about a week and a half ago[,]” Tr. Vol.
I, p. 158, and told the officers where the killings took place as well as the location of the
bodies. Spengler told the officers that she placed the bodies in a blue shed and that she did
not “know if [she] locked it or not.” Tr. Vol. I, p. 175. Spengler was then placed in the back
of a police vehicle and read her Miranda2 rights.
Other officers were dispatched to the address given by Spengler as the location of the
killings. These officers were subsequently able to locate the victims’ bodies in a shed on the
property. The victims’ bodies were clothed, wrapped in either a sheet or blanket, wrapped in
plastic, and stacked one on top of the other. There was a strong stench from the
decomposing bodies emanating from the shed. The shed had become overrun by thousands
1
Because one of the victims and Spengler’s co-defendant are both named “Timothy,” we will refer to
Spengler’s boyfriend as Spengler’s co-defendant throughout this memorandum decision.
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
of flies and also had a layer of maggot larva or maggot pupae approximately an inch deep on
the floor.
Upon investigating the residence on the property, detectives found numerous guns and
large amounts of ammunition. Detectives also found evidence in the form of blood stains,
bloody handprints, pieces of flesh, skull fragments, spent shell casings, a black plastic bag
with bloody clothing inside, and a pair of sandals. Detectives also noticed that someone had
made an attempt to clean up the scene. A hole in an aluminum screen door which appeared
to be made by a shotgun blast was covered with tape. There was another hole on the door
that seemed to be made by a piece of solid projectile. In addition, interior locks and padlocks
appeared to have been forced open.
Investigators recovered lead projectiles from Timothy M. Orman’s body, and birdshot3
was recovered from both Timothy M. Orman’s and Roy Orman’s bodies. Upon examining
the victims’ bodies, investigators found that Timothy M. Orman’s head was no longer
attached to his body and that it was “markedly fragmented due to trauma.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 239.
Two large pieces of lead projectile were recovered from Timothy M. Orman’s arm, a
projectile fragment was recovered from his head, and birdshot was found in his chest, hand,
and head. In addition, Timothy M. Orman’s skull displayed fractures associated with a
gunshot wound to the jaw. His skull was in multiple pieces, and certain sections of his skull
were never recovered.
Investigators also found that Roy Orman was shot in the face and torso with birdshot.
3
Birdshot is a type of ammunition used in shotguns.
4
Investigators concluded that as many as eight shots could have been fired at the victims.
Further investigation revealed that Roy Orman had previously obtained a protective order
prohibiting Spengler from being around him or his residence.
On June 24, 2011, the State charged Spengler with two counts of murder, a felony;4
two counts of aiding murder, a felony;5 and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.6 On
February 7, 2012, the State moved to amend the charging information and to add a firearm
sentencing enhancement. The trial court subsequently granted the State’s motions.
Spengler’s trial was held on May 9-17, 2012, after which the jury found her guilty of
the murder of Timothy M. Orman, aiding in the murders of both Timoth M. Orman and Roy
Orman, and invasion of privacy. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on June 20,
2012. During this hearing, the trial court merged the aiding in the murder of Timothy M.
Orman conviction into the murder conviction and sentenced Spengler to consecutive terms of
sixty years each for the murder of Timothy M. Orman and aiding in the murder of Roy
Orman. The trial court also sentenced Spengler to a consecutive term of one year for the
invasion of privacy conviction, for an aggregate term of one hundred twenty one years. This
appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
On appeal, Spengler contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
4
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (2010).
5
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
6
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2010).
5
certain evidence, that the evidence presented by the State at trial was insufficient to sustain
her convictions, and that her sentence is inappropriate.
I. Admission of Evidence
Spengler contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain
evidence at trial. Specifically, Spengler claims that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting a recording of a conversation she had with her co-defendant while both were
incarcerated prior to trial. Spengler also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting a recording of certain phone conversations that took place between Spengler and
her mother.
The evidentiary rulings of a trial court are afforded great deference.
Norton v. State, 785 N.E.2d 625, 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We review a trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Southern v. State, 878 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied
(2008). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court. Id. We will reverse only when a manifest abuse of discretion denies the
defendant a fair trial. Norton, 785 N.E.2d at 629.
Marshall v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “Moreover, we will sustain
the trial court if it can be done on any legal ground apparent in the record.” Jester v. State,
724 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 2000).
A. Spengler’s Conversation with Her Co-Defendant
On appeal, Spengler claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a
recording of a conversation that took place between Spengler and her co-defendant while
both were incarcerated prior to trial. In challenging the admissibility of the recording of this
6
conversation, Spengler does not claim that she had any expectation of privacy or that any
such right was violated when jail officials recorded the conversation between Spengler and
her co-defendant. Instead, Spengler argues that the comments she made during the
conversation qualified as an involuntary statement given during a custodial interrogation. In
support of this argument, Spengler asserts that her co-defendant qualified as a government
agent because police arranged for the conversation to take place after her co-defendant
offered to make a statement to police about the murders if he were first permitted to speak to
Spengler.
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel at all critical stages
of prosecution.” Dodson v. State, 502 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ind. 1987) (citing United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)). The Sixth Amendment is not violated when a passive listener
merely collects, but does not induce, incriminating statements. Hobbs v. State, 548 N.E.2d
164, 167 (Ind. 1990). However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is violated when the
government intentionally creates a situation likely to induce an incriminating statement from
a charged defendant in the absence of counsel.” Dodson, 502 N.E.2d at 1336 (citing Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)). This can include instances where police promise
leniency or hire an inmate to act as an informant in exchange for the inmate revealing
incriminating statements made by fellow inmates. See generally id. (providing that a
statement of a fellow inmate is inadmissible at trial if the fellow inmate was promised any
benefit or leniency in exchange for the information).
With regard to questions about whether a statement was voluntarily given, the Indiana
7
Supreme Court has held:
In determining whether a statement was voluntarily given we consider the
surrounding circumstances. A statement must not be induced by any violence,
threats, promises or any other improper influences. In viewing the
voluntariness of a confession we do not weigh the evidence. If there is
sufficient evidence to support the trial court, we will not disturb the ruling of
admissibility.
Turner v. State, 273 Ind. 627, 629, 407 N.E.2d 235, 237 (1980) (internal citations omitted).
Again, here, the record reveals that, at Spengler’s co-defendant’s request, jail officials
allowed Spengler and her co-defendant to engage in a monitored conversation in the
jailhouse visitation booths via the jailhouse recorded phone lines. Nothing in the record
indicates that Spengler’s co-defendant attempted to elicit any incriminating statements from
Spengler or was promised or received any leniency or benefit for attempting to elicit
incriminating statements from Spengler. To the contrary, the record indicates that Spengler’s
co-defendant was acting on his own initiative and that the conversation took place at
Spengler’s co-defendant’s request, apparently so that he could try to convince Spengler to
deny any involvement in the killings and allow him to take sole responsibility for their
crimes.7
Upon review, we conclude that the record supports an inference that Spengler’s co-
defendant was acting on his own behalf, not on behalf of the State when he spoke to
Spengler. As such, he did not qualify as a governmental agent when he spoke to Spengler.
7
Review of the conversation indicates that Spengler repeatedly rejected her co-defendant’s request
that she deny involvement in or knowledge of the killings and subsequent placement of the bodies in the shed.
Spengler repeatedly indicated that she was involved in the killings and indicated that she had already admitted
as much to the police.
8
See generally Hobbs, 548 N.E.2d at 167 (holding that the trial court acted within its
discretion in admitting testimony of co-inmate of defendant who testified about statements
made by defendant regarding the crime because the co-inmate acted on his own initiative and
was not instructed by police to initiate any conversation with or collect information from
defendant or promised any benefit in exchange for doing so); Dodson, 502 N.E.2d at 1336
(holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence because the
inmate at issue acted on his own initiative and not at the request of police). Accordingly,
Spengler’s comments made during her conversation with her co-defendant did not qualify as
involuntary statements made during a custodial interrogation. The trial court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion in admitting a recording of this conversation at trial.
B. Spengler’s Phone Conversations with Her Mother
Spengler also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a recording
of conversations Spengler engaged in with her mother over the jailhouse recorded phone
lines. Again, in challenging the admissibility of the recording of these conversations,
Spengler does not claim that she had any expectation of privacy or that any such right was
violated when jail officials recorded the conversation between her and her mother. Instead,
Spengler argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the recording of these
conversations because the content of the conversations was unfairly prejudicial. Specifically,
Spengler argues that the content of the calls, which included repeated use of curse words and
occasional references to potential criminal penalties, activities offered in prison, and possible
homosexual conduct, “likely had a significant unfair prejudicial impact on the jury in
9
Spengler’s case.” Appellant’s Br. p. 16.
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “‘In order to be
admissible, the evidence need only have some tendency, however slight, to make the
existence of a material fact more or less probable, or tend to shed any light upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused.’” Steinberg v. State, 941 N.E.2d 515, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(quoting Simmons v. State, 717 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)), trans. denied.
However, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Evid. R. 403. The Indiana
Supreme Court has noted that because all relevant evidence in a criminal prosecution is
“inherently prejudicial,” “the inquiry boils down to a balance of probative value against the
likely unfair prejudicial impact the evidence may have on the jury.” Richmond v. State, 685
N.E.2d 54, 55-56 (Ind. 1997).
During the conversations at issue in the instant appeal, Spengler made numerous
references to the killings which indicated that she was knowledgeable about, was present for,
and participated in the killings. These statements are relevant as they have a tendency to shed
light on Spengler’s guilt. See Steinberg, 941 N.E.2d at 524. Despite the unquestionable
relevance of Spengler’s comments about the killings, Spengler claims that the conversations
are unfairly prejudicial because during these conversations, both Spengler and her mother
repeatedly used curse words and Spengler made sporadic references to the potential penalties
10
that she could face if convicted. Spengler also made sporadic references to activities
provided in prison and to her “wife,” which could allude to a potential homosexual
relationship. Spengler, however, does not explain how she was prejudiced by these sporadic
references or her and her mother’s use of curse words. We find it extremely unlikely that the
jury decided to convict Spengler merely because of a few sporadic references to a “wife,”
potential penalties, or services offered in prison when the recording of the conversations
contained multiple statements acknowledging Spengler’s guilt. The probative value of
Spengler’s statements, which, again, indicated that she was knowledgeable about, was
present for, and participated in the killings, far outweighs the potential harm of the repeated
use of curse words by both Spengler and her mother and periodic references to potential
homosexual behavior, activities offered in prison, and the potential range of penalties that
Spengler might face, if convicted. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the recording of the conversations between Spengler and her mother.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Spengler next contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions for
murder and aiding murder.8
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of
appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to
determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this
8
Spengler does not present any argument relating to the sufficiency of the evidence relating to her
conviction for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.
11
structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they
must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate courts
affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary
that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to
support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and quotations
omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be reached based on
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence presented.” Baker v. State, 968
N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in original). Upon review, appellate courts do not
reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d
433, 435 (Ind. 2002). Inconsistencies in witness testimony go to the weight and credibility of
the testimony, “the resolution of which is within the province of the trier of fact.” Jordan v.
State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 818 (Ind. 1995).
Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1) provides that “[a] person who: (1) knowingly or
intentionally kills another human being … commits murder, a felony.” “A person engages in
conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, [s]he is aware of a high
probability that [s]he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (2010). “A person engages in
conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, it is [her] conscious objective
to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a).
Indiana Code section 35-41-2-4 (2010) allows a defendant to be convicted of a crime
based on accomplice liability. Indiana Code section 35-41-2-4 provides that one “who
knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense
12
commits that offense.” Under the statute, the individual who aids another person in
committing a crime is as guilty as the actual perpetrator. Sanquenetti v. State, 727 N.E.2d
437, 441 (Ind. 2000); see also Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. 2000). A jury may
infer complicity and participation in a crime from defendant’s (1) presence at the scene of the
crime; (2) failure to oppose the crime; (3) companionship with the one engaged therein; and
(4) course of conduct before, during, and after the offense which tends to show complicity.
Hauk, 729 N.E.2d at 998; Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). While
the defendant’s presence during the commission of the crime and her failure to oppose the
crime are, by themselves, insufficient to establish accomplice liability, the jury may consider
them along with other facts and circumstances tending to show participation. Boyd, 766
N.E.2d at 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ind.
1999)). “In order to sustain a conviction as an accomplice, there must be evidence of the
defendant’s affirmative conduct, either in the form of acts or words, from which an inference
of common design or purpose to effect the commission of a crime may be reasonably drawn.”
Id. (citing Peterson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)).
Spengler’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence appears to be predicated on her
incorrect contention that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the recordings of her
conversations with her co-defendant and her mother. Spengler also appears to ignore the
evidence of her numerous admissions of guilt, including statements to her mother and police
prior to her arrest. Instead, Spengler claims that the evidence is insufficient to prove she
committed or aided in committing the killings because at trial, her co-defendant attempted to
13
take full responsibility for the killings by testifying that he acted alone. Spengler also claims
that the State presented an “undifferentiated mass” of evidence from which a reasonable juror
could not find her guilty. Spengler’s claims in this regard, however, merely amount to an
invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768
N.E.2d at 435.
The evidence presented at trial, which, again, included multiple admissions by
Spengler that she committed or participated in the killings, was sufficient to sustain
Spengler’s murder and aiding in murder convictions. Spengler admitted to killing the victims
and to helping to move their bodies to a shed. After admitting to the killings, Spengler told
police where the bodies were located. In addition, the forensic investigator who reviewed the
evidence collected from the crime scene testified that, while she could not positively identify
Spengler as a source of the DNA evidence recovered at the crime scene, she could not rule
Spengler out as a possible source of the DNA. In light of the evidence supporting the
verdict, including Spengler’s admissions to committing the crimes in question, the jury could
reasonably infer that Spengler knowingly or intentionally killed Timothy M. Orman and that
she aided in the knowing or intentional killing of Roy Orman. See Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 229;
Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146-47. As such, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain
Spengler’s convictions.
III. Appropriateness of Sentence
Spengler also contends that her 121-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of her offenses and her character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “The
14
Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial
court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “‘concentrate less
on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more
on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is
being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant’s character.’” Paul v. State, 888
N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002), trans. denied). The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that her
sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
With respect to the nature of her offenses, Spengler concedes that the crimes of which
she was convicted and her treatment of the victims’ remains can accurately be described as
“heinous,” Appellant’s Br. p. 23, but argues that her aggregate 121-year sentence is
nonetheless inappropriate. Spengler argues that her sentences should be run concurrently
rather than consecutively because her criminal acts constituted a single episode of criminal
conduct rather than a larger pattern of criminal behavior. However, we note that the statutory
authority limiting consecutive sentences for criminal acts committed during a single episode
of criminal conduct explicitly excludes crimes of violence, including murder. See Ind. Code
§ 35-50-1-2 (2010) (providing that murder is a crime of violence and exempting crimes of
violence from the stated limitation for consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a
single episode of criminal conduct).
The record demonstrates that Spengler and her co-defendant shot and killed two
15
persons and placed their bodies in a shed. The bodies remained in the shed for approximately
one-and-a-half to two weeks before Spengler informed police of the killings and the location
of the bodies. By the time police found the bodies, the bodies had begun to decompose and
the shed where the bodies were placed had been overrun by flies and other insects. Spengler
is correct to describe her actions as “heinous.”
With respect to her character, Spengler claims that her 121-year sentence is
inappropriate because she has a documented history of mental health issues, she was
relatively young at the time she committed the crimes, and she has a minor criminal history.
A person’s mental health history should be considered at sentencing if there is a nexus
between the defendant’s mental health and the crime in question. See Corralez v. State, 815
N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In the instant matter, nothing in the record
establishes a nexus between these claimed mental health issues and the commission of the
instant criminal acts. Moreover, upon evaluation of Spengler’s competency to stand trial, Dr.
Asad Ismail found that Spengler exhibited an “average” intelligence and did not display any
evidence of psychosis, delusions or hallucinations, mania, or hypomania. Appellant’s App.
Vol. 2, p. 81.
Further, in Indiana, a trial court is only required to consider a criminal defendant’s age
at sentencing if the defendant is younger than sixteen years old. See generally Monegan v.
State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504-05 (Ind. 2001) (providing that relevant statutory authority evinces
strong legislative sentiment that a child younger than sixteen should be treated differently in
our judicial and correctional systems that one who is sixteen or older). Spengler, who, again,
16
was twenty-three when she committed the instant criminal acts, is not entitled to receive
special consideration because of her age.
We acknowledge that Spengler’s criminal history is relatively minor and lacks gradual
escalation. Spengler’s criminal history consists of a juvenile adjudication for what would be
Class D felony escape if committed by an adult. Spengler claims her minor criminal history
prior to the commission of the instant offenses does not “show a pattern of escalation.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 26. We cannot agree. Spengler went from committing the relatively minor
criminal act of what would be Class D felony escape if committed by an adult to committing
murder and aiding in the murder of a second person. This exhibits a rapid escalation of the
seriousness of Spengler’s criminal acts. In addition, the pre-sentence investigation report that
was completed prior to sentencing indicates that Spengler has a pending Class D felony
battery resulting in bodily injury charge, and that her victim in that case is a law enforcement
officer. Spengler’s criminal history, her commission of the instant criminal acts, and her
pending criminal charge indicate an ongoing disregard for the lives and safety of others as
well as a disregard for the law.
In summary, Spengler, together with her co-defendant, shot and killed her co-
defendant’s father and uncle, dragged their bodies to a shed, and left the bodies to rot. We
cannot say that her 121-year sentence is inappropriate.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BROWN, J., concurs.
RILEY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
17
________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TAMMY SPENGLER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 88A01-1207-CR-318
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
RILEY, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part
While I agree with the majority’s analysis and result reached in the admission of
evidence issues and the sufficiency of the evidence argument, I respectfully dissent from the
majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s imposition of Spengler’s 121-year sentence.
As noted, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. Based on Spengler’s relative minor criminal history which consists of a single
juvenile adjudication, I would sentence her to two concurrent terms of sixty years each for
Counts I and IV and a consecutive term of one year for Count V, invasion of privacy, for an
aggregate term of sixty-one years.
18
19